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Abstract 
 
In the late eighteenth century, a Qing-centered, pluralistic legal order emerged in 
the Tibetan regions of the Qing empire. In the Gansu borderlands known to Tibetans as 
“Amdo,” the Qing state established subprefectures to administer indigenous populations 
and prepare them for integration into the empire. In the 1790s, the Qianlong emperor 
asserted the dynasty’s sovereignty in central Tibet and embarked on a program to reform 
the Tibetan government. This dissertation examines the nineteenth-century legacy of 
these policies from the twin perspectives of the indigenous people of the region and the 
officials dispatched to manage them. On the basis of Manchu and Tibetan-language 
sources, Part One argues that the exercise of Qing sovereignty in central Tibet was 
connected to the Qianlong court’s desire to monopolize indigenous arts of divination, 
especially as they related to the identification of prominent reincarnations. The Qing 
court exported a Ming-era bureaucratic technology—a lottery, and repurposed it as a 
divination technology—the Golden Urn. The successful implementation of this new 
ritual, however, hinged on the astute use of legal cases and the intervention of Tibetan 
Buddhist elites, who found a home for the Urn within indigenous traditions.  
 iv 
Several Tibetans involved in the initial implementation of the Urn hailed from 
Amdo, and their knowledge of the Qing empire and Tibetan legal culture informs Part 
Two. Following Qing official critiques of Buddhist governance, these Tibetans reasserted 
the legitimacy of Buddhist jurisprudence and celebrated the rise of large monastic polities 
in Amdo. However, on the basis of the extant archives of a Qing subprefect in Amdo, I 
argue that Tibetan litigants also made extensive use of Qing institutions to resolve 
conflicts and the contingent adjudication of legal cases in Qing forums fundamentally 
shaped the growth of large monastic domains such as Labrang Monastery. Qing local 
officials served as the embodiment of a pluralistic legal order and the insistence that Qing 
officials exercise “Tibetan” jurisprudence resulted in the creation of a distinctive body of 
legal practices. The encounter between Qing officials and Tibetans in the course of legal 
proceedings, therefore, played an essential role in consolidating a fractious “Tibetan 
world.”  
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Note on Transliteration and Nomenclature 
 
 
The Qing-period encounter between Tibetans and agents of the Qing government 
unfolded in a variety of languages and dialects. For the purposes of this study, materials 
in three languages have been consulted: Manchu (Ma.), Tibetan (Tib.), and Chinese 
(Ch.). 
Chinese words and names are transcribed in Pinyin and the original characters 
have been placed in parentheses after the first appearance of the word. Manchu words 
and names are transcribed according to the conventions of Jerry Norman’s 
Comprehensive Manchu-English Dictionary (2013). Where only the Chinese version of a 
Manchu name is known, a hyphen separates syllables of the Pinyin romanization. Tibetan 
words and names are transcribed according to the conventions of the Tibetan and 
Himalayan Library Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan established by 
David Germano and Nicholas Tournadre (2003). A full Wylie transcription follows the 
first instance of each term, proper name, or title. Generally, I refer to individuals 
according to the standard English transcription of their name from their native language. 
Thus, the name of the Manchu frontier-troubleshooter Nayanceng is written according to 
the transcription of his Manchu name and not his Chinese name (Na-yan-cheng 那彥成). 
Terms or titles that appear frequently in multiple languages have been rendered 
according to the standard Manchu-language transcription. Thus, the Mongol-language 
title for reincarnate lamas, qutughtu (meaning “holy” or “blessed-one”) is consistently 
rendered “kūtuktu” following the standard Manchu transcription. Similarly, the Mongol-
language title “nomunkhan” is written in this dissertation using a slightly modified 
Manchu transcription: “nomunhan” (Ma. nomun han). While these decisions have 
 xiii 
resulted in some perhaps ungainly combinations of Tibetan and Manchu (for example, 
the Démo Kūtuktu or Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu), it is hoped that the improved clarity 
and consistency of the text enhances the reading experience.  
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Figure 1: Album leaf, Finding of a Dalai Lama, Harvard Art Museums, Arthur M. 
Sackler Museum, Bequest of the Hofer Collection of the Arts of Asia, 1985.863.5. The 
album is undated. It probably depicts the identification of the ninth Dalai Lama in 1808. 
In this painting, Qing officials resident in Lhasa together with Tibetan monastic and lay 
authorities observe as the young candidate is asked to identify the possessions of the 
previous incarnation. A similar album, dated 1809, is held in the library of the Institut des 
Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Paris. See, Isabelle Charleux and Gaëlle Lacaze, 
“L’intronisation du IXe Dalai lama vue par un prince mongol: un rouleau peint conservé 
à la bibliothèque de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises,” Arts Asiatique 59 (2004): 30-
57. 
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There are those who find a way to be free, 
Yet some constantly suffer under the rule of others. 
Oh, how the just is outweighed by the unjust, 
And the sentient beings of this land can find no peace! 
 
 
Keep [one’s people] from mixing with one another, 
And they will not bring injury upon each other. 
Nurturing each separately without altering their customs, 
That is the way for ruling the sentient beings.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Selections from Ju Mipham Namgyel Gyatso (Tib. Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912), Rgyal 
po lugs kyi bstan bcos sa gzhi skyong ba'i rgyan (“An Ornament for Worldly Kings, A Treatise 
on the Way of the King”): 37ba, 38na.  
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
 
 
In 1909, or roughly thereabouts, “constitutionalism” was in the air. Among the 
many odd and unexpected items that can be found in the archives of the “Subprefect for 
Pacifying the Tibetans” of Xunhua (循化撫番同知), a busy and troublesome post located 
on the Sino-Tibetan frontier in Gansu province, is a copy of the magistrate’s instructions 
to his runners concerning how to promote the benefits of “constitutional government (憲
政).” The runners were told that, “Nowadays the political system of our country is 
changing and we must sincerely work together to establish a constitutional state. This is 
nothing like the authoritarian system of the country in the past and the people cannot be 
oppressed like they were before.”1 This and a host of other instructions relating to the 
new system were to be explained to the Salars2 and Tibetans of the subprefecture.  
Qing officials stationed in other Tibetan regions were less sanguine about the 
prospects for constitutional government. In August of 1909, the Lhasa amban Lian-yu, 
argued in a memorial dispatched to the court that constitutional government and other 
forms of self-governance should not be pursued in Tibet. He argued that as “vassals (蕃
薯),” the Tibetans were not only different but morally inferior to the people of the 
                                                
1 QSDG 7-YJ-4715: 《循化廳為持票傳人給八工的諭》: “現在吾國政體變更，誠共和立憲
政體國，非昔日專制之國，民亦非昔日壓制之民。” The document is undated but contains an 
internal reference to the beginning of the “New Policies” two years prior. 
 
2 The Salar (撒拉) are Turkic-speaking Muslims native to Xunhua subprefecture. See Ma Haiyun, 
“Fanhui or Huifan? Hanhui or Huimin? Salar Ethnic Identification and Qing Administrative 
Transformation in Eighteenth-century Gansu,” Late Imperial China 29.2 (December 2008): 1-36. 
 2 
“interior provinces.” Therefore it was inappropriate to “rule them under one law together 
with the other people of China (中國).” Moreover, he warned the court that given the 
depth of Tibetan resentment of Qing rule, it was only the threat of force that had kept the 
Tibetans in check and “allowed us to live in peace with them.”3 Lian-yu’s argument 
rested, however, on a powerful analogy: 
 
Consider all the powerful countries of the West: There are none among 
them who have have ever instituted constitutional government among 
vassals who are of a different race (異種). In the case of England in India, 
America in the Philippines, France in Indochina, and Holland in Java, 
although all of them have established parliaments [in their home countries], 
the peoples of their vassal states still have not been able to participate in 
government or be informed about political affairs. I have heard that 
occasionally a viceroy will confer authority on one or two local 
representatives, but they have not granted permission for elections, or the 
right to consult in governance. […] Our country has already borrowed law 
from Western Europe and is now establishing a constitution. Therefore in 
our treatment of vassals it seems there is no harm in imitating their 
policies.4 
 
In the late 1890s and throughout the last decade of the the Qing dynasty (1636-
1912), it was not uncommon to find Qing frontier officials discussing their administration 
of the dynasty’s Inner Asian “vassals” in parallel with contemporaneous Euro-American 
imperialism. The similarity did not go unobserved among western commentators either. It 
is therefore perhaps not surprising that contemporaneous European descriptions of Qing 
administration in Inner Asia labeled it “colonial.” In 1878, William Frederick Meyers 
noted that it had become commonplace to refer to the Qing court’s primary institution for 
governing the “outer regions”—the Lifanyuan (Ma. tulergi golo be dasara jurgan, 理藩
                                                
3 Wu Fengpei, ed., Lianyu zhu Zang zougao (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1979), 87. 
 
4 Ibid., 88. 
 
 3 
院), as the “Colonial Office” (an obvious reference to the British Colonial Office in 
London).5 Brunnert and Hagelstrom’s influential description of the Qing government 
similarly identified this agency as the “Court of Colonial Affairs.”6 During the twentieth 
century, however, reference to the Qing as a “colonial” empire gradually diminished. 
This was a testament to the persuasiveness of a particular strand of late-Qing Chinese 
nationalism that claimed all the constituent territories of the Qing to be integral and 
indivisible parts of the “Chinese nation”—a unified state whose size and diversity could 
be accounted for by the exceptional power of Chinese culture to peacefully attract and 
assimilate since time immemorial.7 
In the last twenty years, following the revival of Manchu studies and the growing 
interest in the Qing’s Inner Asian possessions, it has again become fashionable to apply 
the adjective “colonial” to the Qing imperial order (although it must be noted that the 
analogy remains very much out of favor among the modern scholar-officials of the 
PRC).8 This time round, however, interpretations of “colonialism” have gone beyond 
                                                
5 See, for instance, William Frederick Mayers, The Chinese Government (Shanghai: Kelly & 
Walsh, 1897), 22. 
 
6 H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, The Present Day Political Organization of China 
(Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1912), 160-161. 
 
7 For summaries of this process, see: James Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How 
the Qing Frontier and its Indigenes Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); and 
for later Guomindang and PRC reiterations, Thomas Mulaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: 
Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011). 
 
8 James Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-
1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 15-18; Peter Perdue, “Comparing Empires: 
Manchu Colonialism,” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998): 255-262; and Perdue, 
“China and Other Colonial Empires,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 16 no. 1-2 
(Spring-Summer 2009), 85-103; Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner 
Asia,” The International History Review 20 no. 2 (June 1998): 287-309; and Laura Hostetler, 
Qing Colonial Enterprise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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defining the term solely in terms of the features that would have been most salient to 
Lian-yu and his Western contemporaries: European military domination for the sake of 
political security or economic exploitation. In contrast, building on subaltern studies and 
other recent reconsiderations of European colonial empires, definitions of colonialism 
have come to emphasize the processes of cultural domination and differentiation that 
accompanied and facilitated the political and economic domination of the metropole or a 
minority elite group over an indigenous majority.9 Partha Chatterjee in particular has 
noted the degree to which colonial rule rested not only on maintaining the superiority of 
the ruling elite, but also on reifying the separateness of ruled groups.10 Reconsiderations 
of colonialism have also increasingly focused on the role of indigenous elites in the 
creation of imperial systems. For Charles Maier in particular, it is the presence of 
indigenous collaborators who define empire as a distinctive form of political 
organization:  
Empire does not mean just the accumulation of lands abroad by conquest. 
And it does not mean just the imposition of authoritarian regimes on 
overseas territories. Empire is a form of political organization in which the 
social elements that rule in the dominant state—the “mother country” or 
the “metropole”—create a network of allied elites in regions abroad who 
accept subordination in international affairs in return for the security of 
                                                
9 See, for instance, Jürgen Osterhammel’s synthetic definition of colonialism: “Colonialism is a 
relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority 
of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are 
made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a 
distant metropole. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers 
are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.” Osterhammel, 
Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 16-17. 
 
10 For Partha Chatterjee’s “rule of colonial difference,” see The Nation and its Fragnments: 
Colonial and Post Colonial Histories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 16-27. 
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their position in their own administrative unit (the “colony” or, in spatial 
terms, the “periphery”).11 
     
As noted above, several Qing historians have seen these definitions as broadly 
applicable to the Qing case and thus begun to place the Qing empire in a comparative 
analysis with other contemporaneous colonial empires. Peter Perdue in particular has 
recently highlighted four characteristics of the Qing empire that resembled other colonial 
systems: the institution of separate administrative systems for different colonial regions, 
the cultivation of indigenous elites to serve in these separate administrations, careful 
management of immigration from China proper into the colonial territories (although this 
policy vastly expanded during the late Qing), and finally, extraction of natural resources 
and other local products, when possible.12  
This dissertation concurs with these views that the Qing was a colonial empire. 
The utility of this analytical framework is that it draws attention to the contingent 
encounters between indigenous elites and representatives of the ruler. As James Hevia 
has aptly put it, Qing rule was a “continuing achievement” that hinged on the careful 
management of encounters between indigenous elites and Qing agents (and on a regular 
basis with the emperor himself) and the subsequent representation of these meetings in 
official and unofficial documents.13 For this reason, my study has focused on tracking 
relationships between individual Tibetan-Buddhists and Tibetan communities with Qing 
                                                
11 Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 7. 
 
12 Perdue, “China and Other Colonial Empires,” 93.  
 
13 James Hevia, “Lamas, Emperors and Rituals: Political implications in Qing imperial 
ceremonies,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 16 (1993): 247. 
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colonial agents over the long term. This narrow focus on specific and repeated encounters 
between Tibetan-Buddhists and Qing officials reveals the degree to which Qing colonial 
rule, much like that of other colonial regimes, was far from static. Over the period 
documented in this study, the agendas, goals, and even the vocabularlies of these 
individuals changed dramatically, reshaping the politics of both the metropole and the 
periphery. Jürgen Osterhammel has written that, “colonialism is not just any relationship 
between masters and servants, but one in which an entire society is robbed of its 
historical line of development, externally manipulated and transformed according to the 
needs and interests of the colonial rulers.”14 Although such a statement might speak to the 
aspirations of Lian-yu in 1909, evidence from this study suggests that in both Amdo and 
central Tibet, far from arresting the development of Tibetan society, the Qing colonial 
context transformed it—and Tibetans, Chinese, Manchus, and a variety of other peoples 
played an integral part in the process. 
 
The Qianlong Legacy Revisited 
  
In the fall of 1792, in the aftermath of the Qing military’s successful expulsion of 
the Gurkha army from central Tibet, the Qianlong emperor (1711-1799) promulgated the 
tetraglot “Discourse on Lamas” in Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan. In the 
“Discourse,” the emperor examined the rationale for his massive expenditure of men and 
material on behalf of the Gelukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism. Although he stated that 
support for the church would continue, Qianlong argued that the moral failings and 
                                                
14 Osterhammel, 15 (emphasis in original). 
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administrative ineptitude of Tibet’s ecclesiastical rulers required drastic reforms and the 
formal imposition of his authority over the Tibetan central government. Yet Qianlong 
also recognized that there was subtle distinction between imposing sovereignty and 
imposing an alien culture. Towards the end of his proclamation he inserted the following 
precept drawn from the chapter on the “System of the King” in the Book of Rites: “One 
should restore their teachings, not replace their teachings. One should rectify their laws, 
not replace their traditions.”15 
This succinct formulation simultaneously captures a fundamental principle of 
Qianlong’s governing agenda and encapsulates the underlying tension of Qing 
administration in its newly acquired territories. The emperor demanded a mode of 
colonial rule that was both highly interventionist and deeply conservative. But how 
would the diverging impulses of this axiom be reconciled in practice? Where did 
“adjustment” end and “replacement” begin? What degree of deference would be granted 
to indigenous customs and institutions? Moreover, the pedantic translation of this edict 
into Tibetan and its reliance on the authority of classical Chinese texts that few Tibetan 
readers were likely to recognize raises further questions about the effectiveness of official 
proclamations. To whom was the emperor speaking? What did Tibetan Buddhists make 
of it all? How would Qing officials, indigenous elites, and commoners navigate the space 
between “restoration” and “transformation”? 
                                                
15 Discourse on Lamas (Tibetan version), Lines 30-31: “de‘i bslab bya bcos dgos/ de‘i bslab bya mi brje/ 
de‘i khrims bcos dgos/ de‘i lugs mi brje zhes yod/ ” The Chinese original reads: “修其教，不易其俗，
齊其政，不易其宜。” My translation is based on the Tibetan text of the tetraglot Discourse on Lamas 
(Lama Shuo 喇嘛說) inscription at Yonghegong. Original text in O. Franke and B. Laufer, Lamaistische 
Kloster-Inschriften aus Peking, Jehol und Si-ngan; mit unterstützung der Hamburgischen 
Wissenschaftlichen Stiftung (Hamburg: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen) in Berlin, 1914), 
plate 4. 
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Both Chinese and Western historians of Qing-period Tibet view the Qianlong 
reign as the high point in the dynasty’s efforts to incorporate Tibetan regions into the 
Qing empire. In particular, these narratives hold that it was the court-directed reformation 
of central Tibetan administration in the aftermath of the Gurkha wars of 1789 and 1791 
and the concurrent establishment of imperial oversight of the process of political 
succession via reincarnation that completed the Qing’s imperial project. Luciano Petech 
has portrayed the following century as a period of “stagnation, with little apparent 
change” during which both local Tibetans and Qing agents slumbered in a  “somnolent 
peace.”16 This dissertation sees Qianlong's reforms not as the culmination, but rather as a 
tentative beginning of this project, the implications of which have yet to be addressed, in 
large measure because neither Western nor Chinese historians have taken the trouble to 
fully engage in the meaning of colonialism as an analytical framework for thinking about 
the Qing empire in Tibetan regions.  
The dissertation investigates the practices and experiences of Qing colonialism 
from the twin perspectives of the indigenous people of the region and the officials 
dispatched to manage them. The broader scholarly agenda is not only to place nineteenth-
                                                
16 Lucciano Petech, Aristocracy and Government in Tibet: 1728-1959 (Serie Orientale Roma 35. 
Rome: Instituto Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1973), 4. Patricia Berger argues that 
the Vajrayāna Buddhist ritual institutions and practices developed during the Qianlong reign as 
part of his patronage of Tibetan Buddhist adepts such as Changkya Rolpé Dorjé, “faded into 
politically advantageous, rote usage by the end of the dynasty.” See, Patricia Berger, Empire of 
Emptiness (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 196-197. For decline and stagnation 
narratives of Qing rule in Tibetan regions (including Amdo), see also: Melvyn Goldstein, A 
History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist  State (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 44; Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1967), 170; Lin Hsiao-ting, Tibet and Nationalist China’s 
Frontier: Intrigues and ethnopolitics, 1928-49 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2006), 8; and Wu Fengpei and Zeng Guoqing, Qingchao zhu zang dachen zhidu de jianli yu 
yange (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1989), 76. 
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century Amdo within the broader context of Qing frontier administration, but also to 
examine generalizations about Qing patronage of Tibetan Buddhism. It has been well 
established in existing scholarship that the court’s patronage and promotion of Tibetan 
Buddhism was a pillar of the dynasty’s legitimacy in Inner Asia.17 But historians have 
only recently begun to consider the following questions: First, how did the dynasty 
attempt to consolidate the claims that the Qianlong emperor made on both the religious 
and political spheres of Tibetan society? Second, how did individual Qing colonial 
officials understand their place in the local order, and see Tibetan society more generally? 
Third, how did indigenous Tibetan discourses conceptualize the Qing polity? And fourth, 
how were indigenous political philosophies and identities transformed by Qing 
colonialism?  
To answer these questions the dissertation identifies and explains two key 
changes in Tibetan regions that occurred in the aftermath of the Qing conquests. The first 
is the transformation of the political landscape of Amdo. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, monastic domains displaced the principalities of the Mongol noble 
houses as centers of local authority. The second transformation lies in the intellectual 
realm of political philosophy: In response to the Qianlong emperor’s explicit rejection of 
Buddhism as a legitimate foundation for rule, Tibetan scholars, primarily in the Amdo 
region, rearticulated the case for ecclesiastical rule. In so doing, they not only rationalized 
                                                
17 See: Patricia Berger, (2003); Pamela Crossley, “The Rulerships of China,” American Historical 
Review 97, 1468-1483; David Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Qing 
Empire” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 38.1 (June 1978): 5-34; James Hevia, “Lamas, 
Emperors and Rituals: Political implications in Qing imperial ceremonies” Journal of the 
international association of Buddhist studies 16 (1993): 243-278; Peter Perdue, China Marches 
West (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Vladimir Uspensky, Prince Yunli (Tokyo: 
Institute For the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1997.) 
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the emergence of major monastic polities in Amdo and Tibet more broadly, but also 
discarded the role of the lay patron, in this case, the Qing court. Thus this dissertation 
helps explain the emergence of the large ecclesiastical polities that would flourish under 
the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876-1933) and the collapse of the ideological framework 
that held Tibet and China together. Yet the expansion of these indigenous monastic 
polities and the Tibetan-language accounts of their expansion obscure an important 
paradox, which is that the role of Qing administrators in local Tibetan society had also 
expanded during the nineteenth century. Fractured by the capricious and often violent 
politics of incarnation and in competition for estates and subjects, Tibetan hierarchs and 
other indigenous leaders turned to Qing officials as judges of last (and sometimes first) 
resort, inviting Qing colonial agents and military forces into their communities to 
dispense justice. Thus, at the turn of the century, the son of the governor-general of 
Gansu province would warily refer to the monastic domains and confederations of central 
Tibet, Gansu, and Qinghai as the “Warring States.”18  The Qing court had served 
unintentionally as midwife at their birth and now could not longer extract itself from the 
burden of their litigiousness. 
This argument represents not only a revision of early modern Tibetan history but 
also an attempt to link Tibetan studies more organically to recent scholarly trends in 
Chinese history. My dissertation stands in dialogue with older Sinocentric narratives of 
the expansion of the Qing frontier, as well as with recent studies of the British, Ottoman, 
and Russian empires that seek to explore the agency of indigenous peoples in colonial-
type systems. For instance, the dynamic between local religious figures and Qing 
                                                
18 Tao Baolian Xingmao shixing ji  (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 2002 [1896]), 240. 
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imperial emissaries in Amdo finds parallels in the relationship between the muftiate and 
tsarist authorities in Russian Central Asia and in patterns of brokerage between local 
elites and the Ottoman sultan.19 The rise of large indigenous political domains at the 
interstice of Qing and British empires in Tibet resembles Pekka Hämäläinen’s 
reconstruction of the Comanche empire, which flourished at the margins of several 
competing global empires.20  
By focusing on the formal and informal encounters of Qing officials and 
indigenous people on the grounds of the local yamen, market place, or monastery it is 
possible to move away from simplistic “impact-response” or “resistance-collaboration” 
models of social change during periods of imperial expansion and colonialism and 
appreciate the degree to which systems of local laws and administration were creatively 
produced on site at the colonial periphery. In this respect the most important theoretical 
context for this dissertation is the recent work on “legal pluralism” and “legal politics” in 
colonial systems pioneered by scholars of colonial law such as Lauren Benton and Lisa 
Ford.21 Much like colonial India, Gansu province in the nineteenth century contained 
                                                
19 Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The 
Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 
20 Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
 
21 This literature is vast, but surprisingly includes very little about East Asia or China in 
particular. See for instance, Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World 
History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Benton, “Forum on 
Law and Empire in Global Perspective: Introduction,” American Historical Review 117.4 
(October, 2012): 1092-1100; Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People 
in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). A 
recent edited volume on the subject ignores East Asia: Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross, 
“Empires and Legal Pluralism: Jurisdiction, Sovereignty, and Political Imagination in the Early 
Modern World,” in Legal PLuralism and Empies, 1500-1800, ed. Lauren Benton and Richard 
Ross (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2013), 1-20. 
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multiple sources of legal authority, multiple traditions of jurisprudence, and, most 
importantly, multiple legal scripts. Tibetans made strategic use of all these resources as 
they sought the resolution of local conflicts. For instance, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven, like indigenous people elsewhere, in the colonial courtroom Tibetans could 
tactically speak either the language of the metropole (i.e. “talk Chinese”) or call on 
aspects of their cultural difference depending on their strategy for winning the case. Seen 
from a historical perspective, my dissertation comes to the conclusion that rather than the 
policies of Qing governors or court jurists, it was the day-to-day, year-to-year, process of 
litigation in frontier courts that drove the expansion of Qing jurisprudence into Tibetan 
regions and articulated Qing administrative jurisdictions and imperial sovereignty in 
ways that were meaningful to both indigenous peoples and Qing local officials.  
In a recent discussion of Native American law prior to and during European 
colonization, Katherine Hermes has introduced the term “jurispractice” to describe 
indigenous legal traditions. For Hermes, jurispractice refers to a “legal mentalité” or 
established tradition of legal procedures and principles that does not amount to a 
“philosophy of law” or tradition of “jurisprudence.”22 This distinction is helpful in 
discussing legal culture in Tibet as well, although I define “jurispractic” somewhat 
differently and find that it is appropriate to speak of both jurisprudence and jurispractice 
in Qing-period Tibetan regions. As discussed in Chapter Four, scholars at Labrang 
monastery, for instance, did possess a theory of law as an objective category and 
discussed the origins and legitimacy of their own legal tradition in contrast to that of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
22 Katherine A. Hermes, “The Law of Native Americans, to 1815,” in The Cambridge History of 
Law in America, Vol. 1, eds. Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 33-34.  
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other civilizations and kingdoms. I am also reluctant to assume that Tibetan and Mongol 
lay elites did not also possess or share in the discussion of Tibetan jurisprudence. 
However, the distinction between jurisprudence and jurispractice does permit us to 
discuss local practices of mediation, investigation, trial, and punishment separately from 
high, literary traditions of legal philosophy preserved and practiced by monastic 
authorities. Jurisprudence and jurispractice distinguish ways of speaking about the law 
from historically documented ways of acting legally. As used in this dissertation, the term 
“jurispractice” connotes also the fluidity and contingency of legal practices—practices 
that were often not necessarily dictated or defined by a particular tradition of 
jurisprudence. Moreover, it is worth mentioning the parallels between the histories of 
Native American and Tibetan jurispractices.  
The most salient similarity is the shared an emphasis on reciprocity. For instance, 
parties to a conflict expected that crimes or wrongdoing would be addressed, but that this 
would ideally take the form of reparations, not forms of corporal punishment or 
incarceration. There was also a shared belief that this burden would not necessarily fall 
entirely on one individual—the community at large could be responsible for making just 
compensation. The mediation process was also guided by the understanding that all 
parties to the conflict should gain from the ultimate resolution.23 Hermes also observes 
that Native American legal practices began to come under intense strain in the 1780s 
when colonial officials of the new United States began to take a more active interest in 
                                                
23 Ibid., 34-40. For a useful discussion of Tibetan “jurispractices” in Amdo, see Robert Ekvall, 
“Peace and War Among the Tibetan Nomads,” American Anthropologist 66.5 (October 1964): 
1119-1148.  
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overseeing, revising, and ultimately replacing Native American law. 24  A 
contemporaneous effort to incorporate Tibetan jurispractices into the Qing colonial 
administration, and then rectify, reform, and replace these laws, was undertaken by the 
Qianlong court.  
The dissertation consists of two parts and seven chapters. Part One describes the 
process by which Qing colonial officials together with Tibetan elites from both central 
Tibet and Amdo gradually reformulated a Ming bureaucratic practice—a lottery for 
assigning official posts in China proper, into a Tibetan divination technology. Popularly 
referred to as the “Golden Urn Lottery,” I argue that lottery in its final form(s) was 
understood by contemporaries not as a randomized “lottery” but rather as a divination 
ritual. Chapter One explores the deliberative process that lay behind the introduction of 
the statute on the Golden Urn—a process that unfolded almost entirely in Manchu. The 
chapter describes how growing fears about the dangers of unsupervised divination led to 
the exportation of a new ritual procedure for identifying reincarnate lamas from China 
proper. The chapter then traces how discussions of Tibetan divination arts gradually 
shifted to talk of why Buddhist monks were unprepared to serve as political 
administrators and how indigenous traditions of Buddhist jurisprudence were an unstable 
foundation for Tibetan administration. Thus concerns with unregulated divination became 
intimately tied to a novel articulation of Qing sovereignty in Tibet—a formulation that 
was to have major implications for the administration of central Tibet. 
 Chapters Two and Three examine the Qing attempts to enforce the use of this 
new ritual from the perspective of Manchu and Tibetan sources. Chapter Two traces the 
promotion of the “Golden Urn” lottery, a process that entailed a simultaneous attack on 
                                                
24 Hermes, 61-62. 
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indigenous Tibetan divination technologies, in particular the oracles of central 
Tibet. Shortly after introducing the new procedure, the Qianlong emperor came to believe 
that indigenous technologies of divination had to be forcefully discredited and displaced 
before the new Qing ritual could take root. Chapter Three takes up the specific case of the 
third Jamyang Zhepa (1792-1855), a leading reincarnate monk from Amdo who was 
identified using the urn in 1796. This chapter relies on contemporaneous Tibetan-
language biographies and local histories along with Manchu-language reports filed by the 
ambans in Lhasa and Xining. This historical record reveals a fascinating story, one that 
includes outright deceit and manipulation of reincarnation on the part of the Qing state as 
well as the absorption of Qing-invented rituals into indigenous religious culture and the 
ultimate acceptance of Qing meddling through the careful diplomacy of court-sponsored 
reincarnate monks. My contention in this first part of the dissertation is that the court's 
private and public attempts to legitimize its intervention, and the contemporaneous 
Tibetan responses to these efforts, produced new discursive frameworks by which 
Tibetans, Mongols and Manchus would subsequently understand the political and 
religious relationships between Tibetan individuals, communities, and the Qing state. 
Part Two roots the dissertation more firmly in the soil of Amdo (figure 2). Here, I  
examine how indigenous and imperial knowledge of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands 
intersected and diverged. Chapter Four surveys the historical writings of a group of 
influential historians trained at Labrang monastery, the largest and most powerful 
monastery of the region. The founder of this lineage of historically-minded writers, the 
second Belmang Pandita Könchok Gyeltsen (Tib. Dbal mang Dkon mchog rgyal mtshan, 
1764-1863), had led the delegation from Amdo that had sought the reincarnation of the 
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second Jamyang Zhepa and witnessed the Qianlong emperor’s actions to undermine 
ecclesiastical rule and Tibetan technologies of divination. I argue that the historical works 
he and his students composed upon return to Amdo were an effort not only to reassert 
indigenous notions of political legitimacy but also to make sense of the political power of 
Geluk monastic institutions within Qing society. Their writings were distinctive because 
although they turned to Tibetan history to illustrate the legitimacy of Buddhism-based 
administration and jurisprudence, their arguments were glossed in language and political 
conceptions unique to the Qing. Moreover, their sense of malaise regarding the long-term 
health of the Qing polity reveals the degree to which Tibetan elites were participating in a 
pan-empire conversation about statecraft. In Chapter Five, I argue that indigenous notions 
of political legitimacy also implied a particular understanding of the political geography 
of their Amdo homeland. This chapter explores how indigenous knowledge of place 
conflicted with those of Qing statesmen dispatched to govern Gansu Province and 
Kokonor (Qinghai). I note how large-scale grassland warfare of the first half of the 
nineteenth not only defied Qing attempts at comprehension and categorization, but also 
revealed the fragility and malleability of local community and ethnic identities. 
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Figure 2: The Amdo region relative to Asia 
 
Chapters Six and Seven introduce the litigious world of the “Warring States” of 
the Sino-Tibetan frontier. During the Tongzhi and Guangxu reigns (1861-1908) chronic 
violence between Tibetan-Buddhist communities in Xunhua subprefecture combined with 
constant litigation in Qing courts gradually led to the creation of two major 
confederations of Gelukpa monasteries in Amdo. The Qing magistrate of Xunhua 
subprefecture ostensibly supervised the monasteries that headed these two 
confederations, Labrang and Rongwo, and the enormous extant archives of this office 
(perhaps 100,000 pages of documents) provide a detailed record of the conflict. Here I 
will discusses the process by which Tibetans sought Qing administrators and turned to 
the “Imperial” or “Royal” law (Ch. 王法, Tib. rgyal khrims) to resolve their problems. 
The pursuit of “imperial law” led paradoxically not to the importation of the laws of 
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China proper, but rather to the consolidation of a body of novel jurispractice known as 
the “Tibetan laws and statutes” (Ch. 番例番規). This Qing-period invention of a 
“traditional” legal tradition helped delimit a separate “Tibetan” legal structure and ethnic 
identity at the same time as Qing officials became embedded in the day to day disputes of 
indigenous communities. By the end of the Guangxu reign, a new body of “Qing” 
jurispractice, centered on the yamen of the local Qing subprefects, had arisen from the 
contingent practice and implementation of disperate traditions of Tibetan, Mongol, 
Muslim, and Chinese of jurisprudence. 
The local archival sources reveal that the war between Rongwo and Labrang was 
extremely violent. Despite the fact that these were both Gelukpa monasteries, their 
subordinates committed numerous atrocities that spared neither clergy nor lay people. 
The final chapter of the dissertation investigates this violence and the contemporary 
language used to justify it in Chinese and Tibetan sources. I find that Tibetan authors 
writing in Chinese manipulated notions of Tibetan “barbarity” to convince Qing 
magistrates to act in certain ways. Meanwhile, from a Qing perspective, the chronic 
violence was evidence that Tibetans were unlikely to be assimilated and that high-ranking 
reincarnate lamas such as the Jamyang Zhepa, who was the head of Labrang, were no 
longer the essential allies they had once been. Instead, during the late 19th-century, Qing 
officials increasingly turned to Gansu Muslims to serve as intermediaries between the 
court and Tibetan populations. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
classical formulation of Qing-Tibetan relations as “patron and priest,” was largely 
abandoned both in practice and in discourse. The legacy of violent local legal politicking, 
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however, would have profound implications for the construction of “Tibetan” identity in 
the twentieth century, both from Tibetan and Chinese perspectives. 
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Part One: Rectifying the Way of the Buddha: The Institution of 
the Golden Urn Ritual and its Legacy in Late Qing Tibet 
 
Introduction: 
 
 
When undertaking a great enterprise, one must not only [act] at the 
appropriate time and context but also in accord with what is just and 
brilliant.  If opportunity presents itself, yet one is unable to make a just and 
brilliant decision, then it will not be accomplished.  If one makes a just and 
brilliant decision, but at an inopportune moment, then it has been made in 
vain and nothing will come of it. 
 
As for the recent establishment of a new procedure for the identification of 
tülku in the aftermath of the subjugation of the Gurkhas, it was easily 
accomplished because the moment was fortuitous.  Eradicating the selfish 
desire of tülku to emanate among their kinsmen is in harmony with the 
wishes of both the outer and inner Mongols.  Now I am in my eightieth year, 
and approach the end of my rule, yet I have accomplished this great 
undertaking and established peace in the region of Tsang.  The restoration of 
the outer peoples and the happiness and welfare of the both the dynasty and 
each household—an enduring achievement, is the fulfillment of my desires 
and I am glad of heart.25 
 
 
With these words the Qianlong emperor (1711-1799, r. 1735-1796) concluded the 
Tibetan-language version of his Discourse on Lamas. The emperor’s essay, composed in 
the winter of the fifty-seventh year of his reign, asserted his prerogative as a Qing 
emperor to subordinate the reincarnated buddhas and bodhisattvas of “Tibetan 
Buddhism” (Tib. Bod chos) to the laws of the dynasty and his own personal supervision. 
Such supervision was imperative, he argued, because the corruption of the process of 
recognizing rebirths in recent times had resulted in mistaken identifications. Not only did 
Qianlong hold these false lamas responsible for dragging the dynasty into two wars with 
                                                
25 Discourse on Lamas (Tibetan text), lines 32-36. See appendix for complete translation. 
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the Gurkhas of Nepal (1789 and 1791-1792), but he also feared that a general loss of faith 
in the authenticity of reincarnate lamas—a key component of the Qing-period governing 
structure in Inner Asia—would trigger an even graver crisis. The Discourse therefore 
introduced the practice of drawing lots from the “Golden Urn” (Tib. gser bum; Ma. aisin 
bumba, Ch. 金本巴瓶) as the mechanism by which the emperor intended not only to gain 
the ability to scrutinize possible candidates before they had been recognized by 
indigenous authorities, but also restore confidence in the recognition process and the 
reincarnate monks of the Gelukpa school more generally.  Qianlong decreed: 
 
When there is a search for the tülku of an important lama of Ü-Tsang, in 
accordance with their tradition, the whereabouts of the [incarnation] shall 
be identified by the special means of reciting scriptures and receiving 
[indications] from the Lamo Chökyong and the other four [protectors] 
when they descend to the medium. Rolls of paper with the name of each of 
the children shall be placed in a golden urn that will have been sent from 
the palace. Then, having chanted before the Jowo Sakyamuni, the Dalai 
Lama and Panchen Erdeni, together with the appointed ambans, will 
jointly pick out a roll of paper.  That will be the reincarnation.  I have 
ordered that the identification occur in this manner.  Although this may 
not entirely eliminate the evils of doing things according to their personal 
desires, [I] believe that this is better than letting them make a decision 
regarding the identification however they please.26 
   
 Although at the time when Qianlong composed the Discourse on Lamas the idea 
for a Golden Urn had only been circulated among a handful of imperial confidants, the 
pride that Qianlong exuded for his new procedure was not misplaced. From the moment 
of the first usage of the Golden Urn three months after the proclamation of the Discourse, 
until its last Qing-period usage in 1908, the ritual remained a key step in the recognition 
                                                
26 Discourse on Lamas, lines 22-23. 
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process. 27  During the last thirty-six years of the dynasty alone, from 1875-1912, 
reincarnations of at least thirteen different lineages were recognized using the urn.  
The scope of the regulation was broad. Where the Discourse decreed that all 
“reincarnations28 of important lamas” should be subject to the Golden Urn lottery, the 
relevant “statute” among the regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs (Ch. Lifanyuan) 
is even more ambitious, noting that it applied to “the Dalai Lama, Panchen [Lama] and 
all other reincarnations.”29 In practice, the statute was generally applied to those lineages 
of reincarnate lamas who had been enrolled in the registers of the Lifanyuan and were 
eligible to receive the title of kūtuktu when they turned eighteen.30 Altogether, by the end 
of the Qianlong reign the Lifanyuan ostensibly managed the affairs of 160 kūtuktus, 
including thirty lineages from Tibet proper (Ü –Tsang), seventy-six among the Mongol 
leagues, thirty-five in Kokonor, five in Khams and fourteen more in and around Beijing.31 
                                                
27 For a relatively complete list of reincarnation lineages that were subject to the law on the 
Golden Urn, see the list compiled by Tibetan authorities in Lhasa themselves during the early 19th 
century and reproduced in: Bod kyi gal che'i lo rgyus yig cha bdams bsgrigs, (Lha sa: Bod ljongs 
bod yig dpe rnying dpe skrun khang, 1991), 281-369. 
 
28 “Reincarnations:” Tib. sprul sku; Ma. hūbilgan; Ch. 呼畢勒罕. 
 
29 Qinding Daqing huidian shili lifanyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe: 2007), 173. 
This edition of the Collected Statutes and Precedents of Great Qing dates to 1899. It is citing a 
statute dated to 1792 (QL 57). 
 
30 See also relevant regulations in the Qinding Lifanbu zeli (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1998 
[1908]), 392-394. These regulations are from the 1908 redaction of the regulations, but quoted 
from previous 1817 and 1899 editions of the Lifanyuan zeli. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, 
In the reports of the Qianlong-period officials though, the fine legal distinction between hūbilgan 
and kūtuktu was often lost and they function as synonyms. In Tibetan translations of these texts, 
the Manchu title kūtuktu and the Manchu term for reincarnation hūbilgan are translated using the 
indigenous term for a reincarnation: tülku (Tib. sprul sku). 
 
31 H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, The Present Day Political Organization of China 
(Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1912), 474. Ning Chia, “The Lifanyuan in the Early Ch’ing 
Dynasty” (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1992), 213. 
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Still, the number of monks considered reincarnations (Tib. sprul sku) by Tibetans 
themselves always far outstripped the Qing lists of officially-sanctioned hūbilgan. Thus, 
despite continued expansion of the Lifanyuan’s registry during the nineteenth century, 
there remained a large pool of tülku-hūbilgan who were potentially subject to the 
regulation but whose selection still took place beyond official purview. As I will discuss 
below, the Golden Urn regulation thus offered an opportunity for Qing officials to bring 
as-yet unsanctioned lineages onto the rolls and thus subject them to the scrutiny of the 
state. Seen from another angle, the same statute also made the Urn ritual accessible to 
lesser lineages, for whom imperial intervention might be advantageous.32  
Given the significance of the lottery, both in terms of its implications for the 
succession of political and religious authority in Tibet and Mongolia, and as an important 
moment when Qing officials and Tibetan elites met, it should not be surprising that there 
is no shortage of scholarship on the history of the ritual. Yet due to the manner in which 
twentieth-century Chinese and Tibetan historians have constructed the urn as a symbol of 
the Chinese nation-state’s sovereignty over Tibet, the analysis of the ritual has been 
reduced to simple arguments about whether it was actually employed.33 As a result, there 
has been little incentive on either side to search for the origins of the ritual or pose crucial 
questions either about where the idea came from or how it was received and understood 
in practice. Furthermore, because of the centrality of the figures of the Dalai Lama and 
Panchen Lama to the national identity of Tibet as it was reinvented in the twentieth 
                                                
32 Only in the 1908 revamped regulations of the Lifanbu did the court formally attempt to delimit 
the use of the urn. These regulations state that only those kūtuktu who had been explicitly 
mentioned in edicts prior to QL 58 as falling under the perview of the Golden Urn statute would 
be required to continue to use the urn. Qinding Lifanbu zeli, 413 (statute 839). 
 
33 Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington: East-West 
Center, 2004), 28, 31. 
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century, research has focused almost exclusively on the whether the ritual was employed 
to recognize rebirths within these two lineages.34 
The lack of attention to these important questions can also be attributed to the fact 
that the standard source for understanding the motivations behind the institution of the 
Golden Urn Lottery in 1792—the Discourse on Lamas, hides the traces of its creation. 
The Discourse on Lamas is hardly representative of the range of ideas that were 
circulating between the court and its officials. It reflects an articulation of a particular 
message at a particular point in time. As such, it provides neither the last word on how 
the Golden Urn would be used, nor any indication of what types of further efforts the 
dynasty might make to exercise its prerogative of supervision in Tibet. Moreover, the 
Discourse on Lamas, even in its Tibetan-translation, did not circulate in central Tibet and 
thus provides few clues on what Tibetans would have learned about the urn. It would be 
nearly a year before a formal proclamation would be issued, translated, and distributed in 
central Tibet.35  
The major reason, however, for the current historical lacunae when it comes to the 
early deliberations surrounding the reforms is that the Chinese-language historical record 
itself only begins slightly less than two months before the composition of the Discourse 
                                                
34 See Lopez’s critique of Tibetan exile nationalism in Donald S. Lopez Jr.  Prisoners of Shangri-
La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 184. 
Interestingly, one can observe that the emphasis on the Dalai Lama as the sole locus of Tibetan 
sovereignty is not merely the result of discourses within the Tibetan exile community or Western 
scholarship. Within China as well, ongoing and shrill attempts to delegitimate the Dalai Lama or 
control him (through the Golden Urn ritual, for instance), have only further shored up the 
importance of the lineage.  
 
35 This would be the Tib. Chu glung wang zhu (Ch. 《水牛年文書》 ) of QL 58/09/15. In 
Chapter Three, I argue that the Discourse on Lamas text probably never circulated in Tibet. No 
record has yet been located in the First Historical Archives (FHA) that indicates that the Lhasa 
ambans received the document. The Qing colonial agents in Mongolia, however, all filed reports 
acknowledging receipt of the edict (See YHGSL vol. 14-16). 
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on Lamas decree (December 1792). It was not until after Fukanggan (福康安, 1754-
1796),36 the commander-in-chief of Qing military forces, had secured the surrender of the 
Gurkhas in September 1792 (QL 57/08/27) that the language of deliberations shifted from 
Manchu into Chinese. Prior to Fukanggan’s return to Tibet from Nepal in November, 
1792, the deliberations primarily involved the emperor, his closest advisors, Hešen (和珅, 
1750-1799) and Agūi (阿桂, 1717-1797), and Hešen’s younger brother, Heliyen (和琳, 
1753-1796, Lhasa amban 1792-1795), who had been appointed chief amban in Lhasa, 
and were conducted entirely in Manchu. The vast majority of Fukanggan’s memorials 
from the Gurkha campaign were composed in Chinese, probably on account of the fact 
that such a large and complex undertaking necessarily included a large number of Han 
officials, both in the field (such as Sun Shiyi 孫士毅 1720-1796, who was in charge of 
logistics 督理糧餉大臣) and in Beijing. Accordingly, the first mention of the new ritual 
in Chinese is in the court letter from the Grand Council containing Qianlong’s command 
that Fukanggan take up the task of overseeing the reform of the Tibetan administration. 
Although Fukanggan would in subsequent reports elaborate on the Golden Urn ritual in 
important ways (which will be addressed in chapter two), this court letter already 
contained a rudimentary outline of the Golden Urn Ritual (closely resembling the 
description of the ritual in the Discourse on Lamas) and six other major proposals.37 Over 
the next two months Fukanggan and the ambans Heliyen and Huilin jointly submitted a 
                                                
36 Ma. Fuk’anggan, 1754-1796. A survey of Fukanggan’s archival record reveals very few 
Manchu-language memorials, suggesting either that his official portfolio of responsibilities 
included none that required the Manchu language or that he was simply not competent in 
Manchu.  
 
37 Qinding Kuo’erka fanglüe (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 622-626. 
Henceforth KKFL. 
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further twenty-two reform measures to the court. After they were approved, they were 
translated into Tibetan and forwarded onto the relevant Tibetan authorities for 
implementation on April 4, 1793 (QL 58/02/24).38 The Tibetan-language compilation of 
these new measures, known as the Twenty-nine Articles (Tib. sgrigs srol don tshan nyer 
dgu) was discovered in the Tibetan archives in the 1980s, translated back into Chinese, 
and rechristened the “Imperially-sanctioned Twenty-nine Articles for the Reconstruction 
of Tibet” (《欽定藏內善後章程二十九條》).39 
Fukanggan’s departure from Lhasa the day after submitting these measures to the 
Dalai Lama also marked the end of the Chinese-language reports.  As Heliyen and later 
Sungyun (松荺, 1752-1835, chief amban 1795-1800) undertook the task of implementing 
and enforcing the new statutes, including the new procedure for recognizing rebirths, 
their reports on the subject were consistently composed in Manchu, a precedent that 
would survive until the very end of the dynasty. Until 1911, matters that touched on the 
relationship between the Qing court and the ruling monastic elite, including the 
reincarnation, education, enthronement and general patronage of kūtuktu both by the 
dynasty and by the Mongol aristocracy of Kokonor, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and Ili, 
remained the purview of Manchu-language reports.  
This chapter utilizes the full archival record, as well as contemporary Tibetan-
language sources, to examine the history of the Golden Urn from its initial conception to 
its reception in Tibetan society, not only in Lhasa but also in Kham and Amdo. The 
                                                
38  Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu zhongyang zhengfu guanxi dang’an shiliao huibian (Beijing: 
Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1995), 821-822. Henceforth Huibian. 
 
39 Liao Zugui, Li Yongchang, and Li Pengnian, Qingding zangnei shanhou zhangcheng 
ershijiutiao banben kaolü [Philological research on the ‘Twenty-nine articles of reconstruction] ( 
Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006) 8-14. The first translation was published in Ya 
Hanzhang, Dalai Lama zhuan (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 62-71. 
 27 
Tibetan, Manchu and Chinese texts produced in the course of inventing and 
implementing the “tradition” of the Golden Urn in the 1790s constitute the most 
significant and sustained discussion of Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism, and the utility of 
Buddhist governance among mid-Qing officials. As such, the debates and concerns of 
these texts reveal the formation of a new set of frameworks and discourses concerning the 
position of Tibet Buddhists within the Qing empire. Among the emperor and his officials, 
a crisis of faith in the authenticity of a key component of Tibet’s governing class—in the 
kūtuktus, led to efforts to assert the dominance of the court in both politics and religion. 
As James Hevia has previously pointed out, the emperor’s Discourse on Lamas directly 
challenged the presumptions of the Gelukpa prelates who considered themselves at the 
very least as the spiritually superior “priests” of their Manchu “patrons.”40 I find that 
Qianlong’s message was neither consistently delivered by his officials nor uniformly 
understood by Tibetan lama-officials. The behavior of Fukanggan, for instance, was 
interpreted in Tibetan sources as an expression of the renewal of traditional patron-priest 
relations, whereas the “arrogance” of Heliyen was merely ignored. Qianlong’s attempt to 
explicitly subjugate the Buddhist elite, what Hevia refers to as Qianlong’s “gesture of 
closure,” was reinterpreted by the Eighth Dalai Lama and his biographer, the Démo 
Kūtuktu, as an attempt to become one of them: Qianlong as a reincarnated Gelukpa lama 
sitting at the head of an theocracy.  
It was the Golden Urn itself however, that underwent the most profound change 
between Beijing and Lhasa: A Ming-period administrative lottery for assigning posts 
within the bureaucracy became a legitimate Tibetan divination technology. The following 
                                                
40 James Hevia,  “Lamas, Emperors and Rituals: Political Implications in Qing imperial 
Ceremonies” (Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 16 1993, 243-278), 
267. 
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three chapters analyze this process. The first chapter traces the inner court deliberations 
between Qianlong and his ministers that evolved into the famous statement on the court’s 
relationship to Tibetan Buddhism and the institution of the Golden Urn. I find that, 
months before the court came to the consensus that a full-scale reform of Tibetan 
administration would be necessary, Qianlong had already begun to fear that a wide-
spread crisis of faith was brewing among Tibetan Buddhists. Ultimately, Qianlong and 
his ministers came to the conclusion that it was the indigenous oracles and divination 
practices of central Tibet that had corrupted the process of recognizing kūtuktus. It was 
Qianlong’s intention that the Golden Urn would replace the oracles as the penultimate 
stage in the identification of reincarnations. 
Chapter Two examines the early introduction of the Golden Urn in Lhasa. To 
Qianlong’s dismay, his officials soon reported that the local Tibetan population shared 
neither his sense of crisis nor his hostility to the oracles. Thus in order for the 
transplantation of the lottery to be successful, Qianlong’s men in Lhasa were compelled 
to embark on an active campaign to discredit and displace indigenous divination 
practices. This campaign involved a mixture of coercion and persuasion that ultimately 
evolved into a full-scale assault on the credibility of the Dalai Lama, the governing 
ministers, and the central administration of Ganden Phodrang government more 
generally. Chapter Two concludes with an examination of first usage of the Golden Urn 
ritual in the recognition of a major kūtuktu, the Eighth Phagpa Lha (Tib. ‘Phags pa lha, 
Ma. Pakbala Kūtuktu, 1795-1847) of the Chamdo region in Kham.  
Just months after the identification of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu, the search for the 
rebirth of the Second Jamyang Zhepa (Tib. ‘Jam byang bzhad pa, Ma. Jamyang Kūtuktu, 
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1728-1791), the most important lineage in the Amdo region, came to light at court. The 
passing of both the Phagpa Lha and the Jamyang Zhepa so soon after the institution of the 
Golden Urn represented a fortuitous opportunity for the court to promote their new 
procedure in two strategic regions far from central Tibet. Qianlong and the imperial 
residents in Xining and Lhasa therefore took great care handling these two searches.  
 The case of the Jamyang Zhepa, the topic of the third chapter, posed a major 
challenge to the court because popular opinion in the local community had already begun 
to coalesce around a single candidate before the lottery was held. The subsequent covert 
manipulation of the ritual by the amban Sungyun at the request of Qianlong ensured that 
the candidate favored by the public was not recognized as the rebirth. This intervention 
has until now been a secret of the Manchu-language archives. In this section I employ 
several Tibetan-language biographies of the Jamyang Zhepa and other local histories to 
explore how Tibetan observers explained the unexpected shift in fortunes. In this case, 
local sources, including the biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa (1792-1855), reveal 
that the acceptance of the Golden Urn Lottery as a legitimate step in the recognition 
process was tenuous at best and required significant attention from influential kūtuktus 
allied to the Qianlong court. Ultimately, the ritual was legitimized and precedent was set 
for numerous future recognitions in the Amdo region. Yet Tibetans’ interpretations of the 
ritual continued to diverge significantly from those of Qing officials. Where Qianlong 
saw old and corrupted traditions being replaced, Tibetan narratives describe the new 
ritual as a continuation of tradition and the fulfillment of indigenous prophecies.  Where 
Qianlong saw the eradication of the old oracles, Tibetans saw the new ritual as fitting into 
previous traditions of requesting advice from oracles.  
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Chapter One: A Crisis of Faith and the Origins of the Golden Urn 
 
Introduction: Tibet’s Loss of “Toose” 
 
It is no small irony of history that Sungyun, who had assisted in handling the 
affairs of Lord Macartney, the English ambassador whose refusal to perform the kowtow 
had caused so much trouble in Beijing in 1793, was himself given strict orders not to 
perform the kowtow when meeting the Eighth Dalai Lama less than a year later in 
December of 1794 (QL 59/11/13; 1794-12-05).41  In his instructions to Sungyun, the 
newly appointed chief Lhasa amban, the emperor was evidently concerned that the new 
custom of not prostrating before the Dalai Lama was still not well established. He feared 
that “Sungyun, a man of the Mongol banners who reveres the Yellow Teaching” might 
show weakness in the presence of the Dalai Lama and fail to uphold the precedent 
established by Heliyen, his predecessor.42 It appears that the refusal of the previous chief 
amban Heliyen to prostrate before the Dalai Lama had been an impromptu decision taken 
by Heliyen himself which was subsequently reported to Qianlong by the assistant amban, 
Cengde. Qianlong evidently approved and included a frank rationale for Sungyun’s 
edification: 
 
                                                
41 Sungyung was ordered to accompany Macartney and his entourage for the first leg of their 
return journey from Beijing to Hanghzou in the fall of 1793. See James Hevia, Cherishing Men 
from Afar (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 197-202. 
 
42 MWLF 159:1203. 
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Heliyen did not prostrate before the Dalai Lama, yet regardless they (the 
Tibetan elite) were extremely obedient and respectful to him. Although the 
Jirung and Dimu kūtuktus43 did not kneel before him (Heliyen), I have 
received subsequent memorials reporting that all the others, from the 
kūtuktus to the g'ablon44 knelt. Heliyen's behavior is very pleasing. If any 
ambans were to act in such haughty and arrogant manner in other places, I 
would probably find it unacceptable. Yet for the past several years the 
customs (tacin) of Tibet (Dzang) have been in decline. The only reason 
things are not completely in tatters is because in reality it is the ambans 
who have been entrusted with containing all the problems (the Tibetans) 
have encountered. Thus since the ambans have rectified matters, authority 
(toose) resides in them.45 Since they have only just found a basis for 
managing affairs,46 it is acceptable that they have not been able to pin 
[everything] down.47 
 
 A more succinct encapsulation of the dramatic shift in political authority that 
occurred in Lhasa between 1791 and 1792 cannot be found in the archives. As he gazed 
back on the affairs of the proceeding three years, Qianlong clearly felt that they had 
culminated in the permanent transfer of sovereign authority (Ma. toose) to his appointees. 
Yet in this section I will argue that this profound shift in political authority to the Qing 
                                                
43 Ma. Jirung Kūtuktu, Ch. Ji-long Hu-tu-ke-tu 濟嚨呼圖克圖 or Da-ca huofo 達擦活佛, Tib. 
Tatsak Rinpoché (Rta tshag rje drung rin po che 08 Ye shes blo bzang bstan pa’i mgon po, 1760-
1810). From 1791-1804 served as the de-facto head of the Tibetan administration. In 1804 he 
officially became regent for the Ninth Dalai Lama. His seat at Kundeling Monastery in Lhasa was 
founded with donations from the Qing court in the aftermath of the second Gurkha War (1792). 
He received title of “Jirung” from the Qing court. Démo Kūtuktu: Ma. Dimu Kūtuktu, Ch. Di-mu 
hu-tu-ke-tu 第穆呼圖克圖, Tib. Démo Tülku (De mo 08 ngag dbang thub bstan ‘jigs med rgya 
mtso, 1778-1819) succeeded the Tatsak Rinpoché as regent in Tibet, 1810-1819. It is revealing 
that neither of these two lama-officials felt compelled to genuflect before the Qing ambans. 
 
44 Kalön: the Manchu transliteration of the title for the Tibetan state councilors who made up the 
Kashag. Tib. zhabs pad or bka' blon. 
 
45 Ma. “eiten baita teisulefi mayan tatabume. fuhali ambasai afabuha be dahame yaburakū 
turgunde. baita teni šašun akū de isinaha. uttu tuwancihiyahe manggi. toose be ambasa de bici.” 
 
46 “yaya baita icihiyara de teni fakjin bahambime…” I interpret the fakjin (support, basis, 
foundation) as referring to the new statutes enacted by Fukanggan that provided the ambans with 
a new legal basis for asserting authority over the Tibetan central administration. 
 
47 MWLF 159:1202-1203. 
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court was neither inevitable nor was it initially the intention of Qing officialdom, even 
during the immediate aftermath of the Gurkha’s attack on Tibet and the collapse of local 
defenses in the winter of 1791-92. This is particularly evident from the behavior of the 
Qing generalissimo Fuk’anngan when he arrived in Lhasa in QL 57/01/22), two months 
before Heliyen. The following brief discussion of Fukanggan’s audience with the Eighth 
Dalai Lama helps establish not only the fact that Qing officials had not firmly decided to 
take the Dalai Lama’s toosa for themselves, but also the degree to which Tibetan 
observers—at the very least the Dalai Lama’s biographer, the Démo Kūtuktu—
understood the general’s arrival as an affirmation of the traditional patron-priest 
relationship. 
 
Cooperation: The Qing War of Prayer Against the Gurkhas & the First Audience 
between Fukanggan and the Dalai Lama 
 
 Initially Qianlong and his ministers were impressed by the manner in which the 
Dalai Lama and the abbots of the major monasteries in Lhasa faced the threat of a Gurkha 
attack on Lhasa. In truth it was the apparent witlessness of the serving Lhasa ambans 
Bootai (保泰) and Yamantai (雅滿泰) that most vexed the court. As the Gurkha forces 
rolled across the Tibetan frontier and then sacked Trashi Lhünpo in the face of anemic 
defenses, the ambans urged the Dalai Lama to flee with the young Panchen Lama 
northeast to Amdo. The Dalai Lama resisted this suggestion and after traveling to the 
Jokhang cathedral to perform his own prognostication, announced that the Gurkhas 
would not make it to Lhasa. The biography of the Dalai Lama recalls that he informed the 
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ambans: “Since [you] ambans are commissioned at the command of the emperor, [your] 
judgments should be made according to the truth.  However, due to the personal 
magnificence of the emperor (Tib. gong ma chen po'i sku'i gzi byin la brten), the Gurkha 
forces will not be able to arrive here.  Yet I will continue to observe this matter.  You two 
should not worry and must make a report to the emperor.”48 Upon receiving the ambans’ 
report that the Dalai Lama had refused to budge from the Potala, Qianlong wrote, “It is 
fortunate that the Dalai Lama and the abbots are decisive and will tenaciously defend 
Buddhism. The people will be fortified through their unity and not take to flight at the 
slightest fright. This bestirs my heart, reward them!”49 The ambans, however, were 
promptly cashiered. 
Inspired by the Dalai Lama’s fortitude, representatives of the monastic 
community of Lhasa proposed opening a second front in the war against the Gurkhas: “If 
we are unable to destroy those demons of rage (the Gurkhas) who threaten the body of 
the Glorious Lama (the Dalai Lama) this will be a major sin against the jewel vehicle of 
us Buddhists (Tib: nged chos pa). We lamas by means of a violent device will cut [the 
Gurkhas] off from the deities who support their domain and visualize their painful 
death.”50 The deployment of prayer against the Gurkhas quickly received the full support 
of the Qing court. Qianlong certainly assumed that the Gurkhas would bring to bear 
whatever magical weaponry they could muster. In this escalating prayer war, a flurry of 
                                                
48 Démo Kūtuktu, 'jam dpal rgya mtsho'i rnam thar (Lhasa: Drépung Monastery, 1811; TIBRC 
W2CZ7847), 198ka.3. The term gzi byin is questionably translated here. Stein notes that this is a 
transliteration from a Chinese word, meaning “majesty, splendor, brilliance, or charisma,” but he 
does not include the original character. Need to check. 
 
49 KKFL (QL 56/09/20), 103. 
 
50 Démo Kūtuktu, 198ka.1. 
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communications passed between Qianlong, Agūi, Hešen, the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu,51 
and the Dalai Lama concerning the sponsorship of major ceremonies in both central Tibet 
and in Beijing of the winter of 1791-2. In a court letter passed to the Dalai Lama via the 
Grand Councilors Agūi and Hešen, the emperor stressed the important contribution that 
“earnest and sincere recitation of sutras” (Ma. hing sere unenggi gūnin i nomun 
hūlabume) could have on the progress of the war. He already credited the work of the 
monks of Ü with “pinning down the squirming Gurkha bandits” when the latter’s 
campaign failed to reach Lhasa.52 He was particularly concerned about the abilities of the 
renegade Šamarba Lama (Tib. Zhwa dmar bla ma) who was living under the protection 
of the Gurkhas. He warned the Dalai Lama: “As for the Šamarba, he is an evil lama of the 
Red Hats, a deceitful person who is an expert at wielding harmful magic. At this time it 
cannot be predicted what sorts of vain magic there will be so [you] must be ready to 
intercept and repel.”53 
                                                
51 Ma. Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu. This lama appears to have been passed through the court, both in 
Chengde and Beijing during this year and may have been serving as the Seal-holding-lama at 
Yonghegong. However this Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu should not be confused with a similarly named 
kūtuktu based at Lamo Dechen and Labrang monasteries who also occasionally resided in Beijing 
during the 18th century. According to Sangyé Rinchen, the fourth Ganden Siretu Kūtuktu of Lamo 
Dechen was only 19 years old in 1792 and residing in Qinghai. See, Sangs rgyas rin chen, “LAmo 
bde chen dgon pa’i sku phyags gser khri rin po che’i sku phreng rim byon gyi lo rgyus mdo bsdus 
ngo sprod zhu ba,” Mdo smad zhib jug 9, 113. In the Manchu-language archive, in the 1790s, the 
title seems to have been used as shorthand to refer to any lama who had served as the throne-
holder at Gandan Monastery (also called the Ganden Tripa). From these documents it appears that 
the Dalai Lama sent his communications to the office of the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu who then 
forwarded them to the court if necessary. 
 
52 MWLF 155:0243. 
 
53 MWLF 155:0244. These archival materials frequently mention several specific sutras or 
prayers about which I have yet to find the Tibetan-language equivalent. In particular, in the 
context of mustering prayer for martial usage, the (Ma.) g’al mandal (“gal mandala?”) and the 
doksit nomun (“doksit sutra”?) are often discussed. Qianlong also mentions the importance of 
assigning monks the task of reciting mantras (Ma. k’or maktambi), but specifics are not 
mentioned. 
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When Fukanggan and the vanguard of the Qing expeditionary force arrived in 
Lhasa on February 14, 1792 (QL 57/01/22), Fukanggan and Qianlong were yet undecided 
about what degree of courtesy and what type of comportment would be appropriate when 
meeting the Dalai Lama. Fukanggan wrote that he had received the following rather 
ambiguous instructions from the emperor: 
 
Since you have the rank of general and are traveling to Tibet to settle 
affairs, when you first meet in order to convey my instructions, it is 
naturally not necessary to prostrate (行禮) before him. Yet the Fan of 
Tibet take etiquette seriously, therefore it is not inadvisable to show a bit 
of respect. You should deliberate on this matter and by your comportment 
make the right impression and preserve their system.54 
 
While it is clear from these instructions that privately Qianlong believed that his general 
outranked the Dalai Lama, they do not imply that at that time the emperor envisioned the 
transfer of indigenous authority to court-appointed officials in the way that he would 
several years later. And even if he did believe that the toose of Tibetan officials had 
shifted, then he certainly felt it was not yet the time to force the issue. Ultimately, both 
Fukanggan’s relevant memorial and the Biography of the Eighth Dalai Lama state that 
Fukanggan had decided to prostrate yet the Dalai Lama graciously exempted him.  
In their essentials, the two accounts of this audience, one composed by Fukanggan 
either the same day or shortly thereafter, and the other perhaps a decade or more later, 
resemble each other closely. And while the interpretive frameworks of each account 
differ, they both convey the impression that after this unprecedented and somewhat 
                                                                                                                                            
 
54 Huibian (《匯編》), 705-708: “前奉諭旨：以臣身為將軍，且為安輯衛藏前往，初次見面
傳旨，自應無庸向其行禮，但藏內番眾索所敬重，亦未便不稍為加禮，令臣斟酌情形，以
飾觀瞻而存體制。” 
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improvised exchange on the basis of two different ritual traditions, the lama and general 
had favorable impressions of one another. Fukanggan’s report describes the Dalai Lama 
as a competent and loyal instrument of the emperor’s will. The biography of the Eighth 
Dalai Lama examines the behavior of the general, whom the lama is quoted as addressing 
using his Manchu title—Aliha Da chenpo” (Tib. A li ha dA chen po, an interesting 
admixture of Manchu with Tibetan meaning “Great Grand Secretary”), in excruciating 
detail in order to demonstrate the process by which over the course of his stay in Lhasa 
Fukanggan was transformed into a sincere disciple of the Dalai Lama, laying the 
groundwork for a archetypical patron-priest relationship.55  
The Démo Kūtuktu’s account presents the initial audience between Fukanggan 
and the Dalai Lama as a carefully scripted event, designed so that the basic framework of 
the ritual would serve to remind participants of the elevated status of the lama over the 
secular officer. Démo Kūtuktu commences his narrative by noting how the servants of the 
Dalai Lama had arranged three thrones on the north side of the hall, one each for the 
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, and a slightly lower throne for the general.56 Yet within 
this framework, lama and general made a variety of spontaneous gestures and exchanges. 
Since such a meeting was clearly unprecedented, Démo Kūtuktu seems to be describing 
an event in which the participants were constructing the ritual as they went along. The 
implicit hierarchical arrangement of the setting allowed for some flexibility during the 
                                                
55 Fukanggan’s memorials reporting his audiences with the Dalai Lama often note the presence of 
the Démo Kūtuktu, the author of the biography. Thus we have good evidence that Démo Kūtuktu 
witnessed many the events in question. It is no surprise then that he was able to discuss the 
relationship between Fukanggan and the Dalai Lama for nine full folio sheets (both recto and 
verso, a total of 18 pages of text!). This appears to be the most sustained discussion of any topic 
or event broached in the biography.  
 
56 Démo Kūtuktu, 201ka.01.  
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give and take of the audience. What follows is a paraphrase of the Tibetan original with 
translations when necessary. 
When Fukanggan arrived at the door of the hall, the Dalai Lama and Panchen 
Lama came forward to greet him at the entrance. There the Dalai Lama asked after the 
emperor. In return Fukanggan presented gifts and a ceremonial scarf on behalf of the 
emperor. The party then moved to the space before the thrones where the Dalai Lama and 
Fukanggan again exchanged ceremonial scarves “as equals.” 57  Fukanggan's first 
statement in response to the Dalai Lama’s well wishes was an expression of faith in the 
Dalai Lama's status as a true Buddha:   
 
[Fukanggan] petitioned, ‘Upon this opportunity to meet the Buddha, may I 
prostrate in homage before you?’  Then he requested, ‘May the Dalai 
Lama resume his throne and enlighten [us].’  
 
Dalai Lama forcefully responded, ‘The emperor is truly Manjusri, the 
father of all the Buddhas.  Since you have come here like a fruit of his 
vision, and on behalf of the teaching of the direction of the setting sun (i.e 
the Western Teaching) and for the [benefit] of all sentient beings, a person 
such as yourself does not need to prostrate in the customary manner before 
a lama like me!’ 
 
The grand secretary58 then continued, ‘Out of concern for the greatness of 
the personage of the emperor, Dalai Lama, you have refused my request to 
prostrate. This is a sign that you certainly are wise in the customs of the 
interior (Tib: nang gi lugs srol mkhyen pa'i rtags yin). Although you have 
in this circumstance dispensed with my prostration, henceforth it is 
appropriate that I perform it. The Dalai Lama truly is Buddha. He is the 
crown of all the incarnations (Tib. ho thog tu) and the lord even of those 
                                                
57 Démo Kūtuktu, 201ka.03. 
 
58 The “Grand Secretary:” Tib. krung thang chen po. An interesting phenomenon in the biography 
is that narrator, the Démo Tülku, consistently refers to Fukanggan using a Tibetan transliteration 
of the Chinese honorific term for a Grand Secretary: zhongtang (中堂), Tib. krung thang chen po. 
In quoted speech of the Dalai Lama however, Démo Tülku has the lama refer to the Grand 
Secretary using the Manchu title: Ma. Aliha da. 
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lamas who serve as preceptor to the emperor himself. Therefore if I take a 
seat on a throne like this, it will be harmful to making merit. So I insist 
that I definitely must sit on a inferior seat.’  
 
In reply the Dalai Lama requested, ‘My heart possesses great gratitude 
because the Manjusri emperor due to his kind and compassionate concern 
for the clergy, laity and all sentient beings throughout Tibet (Tib. bod), has 
dispatched you, a great minister who is like a second emperor (Tib. gong 
ma gnyis pa lta bu'i blon chen). It is a good arrangement for you, the 
minister of the emperor, to take a seat on this throne.  If you do not take 
this throne, I will not be satisfied.’   
 
This request and all of the [Dalai Lama's] words and instructions were 
effortlessly similar to the customs of the interior. Thus the faith and 
spirituality of the grand secretary increased even further. He grasped the 
hand of the Great Protector and placed it on his head. Subsequently, in 
private audiences, [Fukanggan] offered his head to the Great Protector and 
bowed (i.e. prostrated). On account of this [the Dalai Lama] knew 
him/knew his words [to be true/sincere].59  
 
From this dialogue, it would appear that Fukanggan arrived prepared to perform 
the kowtow, yet was restrained due to a special act of grace on the part of the Dalai 
Lama. What is remarkable about this audience is the exchange of “customs” (Tib. lugs 
srol). The Dalai Lama’s gesture of not requiring Fukanggan to prostrate is construed as a 
sign of his knowledge of China. The transaction of customs is completed a moment later 
when in response to Fukanggan's request to hold a major “stability of life” (Tib. zhabs 
brtan) offering for the emperor, the Dalai Lama states that the desire to sponsor such a 
ceremony is in accord with "the customs of Tibet (Tib. bod) as a place that worships and 
protects the three jewels of the Dharma.”  This explicit exchange of “customs”—the 
gesture towards Qing political superiority in the context of the audience in exchange for 
an admission of the religious power of incarnate lamas, over the very lifespan of the 
emperor himself—implicitly establishes the parity of the two actors in the patron-priest 
                                                
59 Démo Kūtuktu, 201ka.06-201kha.04. 
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relationship. Shortly thereafter, on the date fixed by the Dalai Lama, a three-day-long 
“stability of life” ceremony was held for the emperor. The biography notes that on the 
last day of the ceremony Fukanggan personally sponsored a mass tea ceremony (Tib. 
mang ja) for five hundred monks. The author, the Démo Kūtuktu, states that through this 
Fukanggan established his “reverence for the his rightful privileges as a patron.”60 
Fukanggan’s own narrative of what transpired between arriving at the entrance to 
the audience hall and taking throne is quite different. Here, in between the well-wishing 
at the door and the discussion of prostration, Fukanggan reports that he has accomplished 
what for him was the most essential task of the audience—conveying the emperor’s edict 
to the Dalai Lama and other assembled dignitaries. The promulgation of this decree is not 
recorded in the Tibetan-language biography. The content of the edict sends a powerful, if 
ambiguous message. Qianlong first justifies again the purpose of the military expedition 
as an expression of his desire to protect the Dalai Lama and the Gelukpa more generally. 
Second, he contrasts the failings of the ambans with the presence of mind of the Dalai 
Lama, the latter of which he again wishes to reward. Finally, however, he notes that 
because “those people in Tibet who govern affairs are unable to think long-term and only 
concern themselves with the short-term” 61  and the “Tibetan troops are much too 
cowardly,” in the future, “after the bandits have been pacified and eliminated, with regard 
to the matter of reconstruction, it will be necessary to design and establish new 
                                                
60 Démo Kūtuktu, 203ka.06: “krung thang chen po yang sku ngos kyis yon mchod kyi go bab ma 
‘dzol ba’i gus ‘dud tshad med/” 
 
61 “恐藏內辦事之人未能從長計畫，只顧目前。” 
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laws/regulations to ensure that the border is tranquil and there are no further disasters.”62 
Qianlong concludes by stating that it will be the responsibility of the Dalai Lama and 
Panchen Lama to promulgate and enforce these future laws.  
Having conveyed the emperor’s decree, the remaining task is to assess not only 
the degree to which the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama are willing to undertake future 
responsibilities, but also how capable they are of carrying them out successfully. 
Fukanggan reports favorably on both of these aspects. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s insistence 
that Fukanggan need not prostrate is not understood as an indulgence towards the 
“customs of the interior,” but rather as a frank admission that the general outranks him 
and an expression of his willingness to obey. Fukanggan records that the Dalai Lama 
stated, “A monk like myself will not accept being prostrated to by an unusually important 
official such as yourself.”63 Fukanggan’s memorial also characterizes the Dalai Lama as 
an effective administrator. He commends, for instance, the Dalai Lama on his skill at 
organizing supplies for the military force. The general notes that the seat prepared for 
him "truly is exceedingly proper."64 Finally, Fukanggan even writes that he finds the ten-
year-old Panchen Lama so attractive and charming that it is hard to believe he is not 
really a reincarnation. 
The Démo Kūtuktu’s narrative of the initial audience and subsequent events 
presents Fukanggan as more than just the “second emperor.” Démo’s portrayal of 
Fukanggan is an unprecedented characterization of an individual Manchu official whose 
                                                
62 “將來剿平賊匪後，一切善後事宜，必須另立章程，逐一籌辦，務使邊圉謐寧，永除後
患。” 
 
63 Huibian, 707. 
 
64 Huibian, 708. 
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personal investment in the faith goes beyond merely representing the court. The general 
repeatedly sought teachings from the Dalai Lama and sponsored various ceremonies 
around the city. For instance, nearly a year after their first audience, when Fukanggan had 
returned from Nepal to supervise the reform process, the biography records that 
Fukanggan sponsored another major “stability of life” ceremony, this time for his own 
mother.65 At the conclusion of the ceremony, as “they sat together in the private chamber 
[of the Dalai Lama] as priest and patron,” Fukanggan again states that having come to 
Tibetan he no longer wishes to leave.66 The unprecedented personal bond between the 
Dalai Lama and Fukanggan appears most clearly in the multi-day ceremonies that 
accompanied the general’s final departure from Lhasa.  
On Fukanggan’s day of departure, the Dalai Lama, responding to the general’s 
request for yet further instruction, established a tent at some distance from the town. 
There the two had a final conversation during which Fukanggan took the Dalai Lama as 
his personal object of devotion. The Dalai Lama exhorted him to take comfort:   
 
‘You are a great official attached to the thoughts of the emperor.67 
Therefore, if you commit yourself to the worship of the superior deity, the 
venerable Manjusri,68 the power of his blessing will be enormous. And, if 
you also propitiate the Wish-fulfilling Jewel Protector who is the 
manifestation of the deity of the powerful Avalokiteshvara (i.e. me, the 
DL), your achievements will be swift and great. Do that for the Gods!’ 
                                                
65 The Biography notes the exceptional nature of this request. The general requested that the 
stability of life ritual be held during the Monlam ceremonies of the Tibetan New Year. Thus the 
Dalai Lama had to make a special dispensation of monks and material to hold the ceremony. 
 
66 Démo Kūtuktu, 205ka.06. 
 
67 I.e. in the service of the emperor. 
 
68 Tib. rje btsun ‘jam dbyangs. 
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The Grand Secretary insisted, his voice hoarse from earnestness, ‘You are 
the sole Protector of all the sentient beings and in particular the thirteen 
myriarchies of Tibet.69 Although we ourselves dwell in a distant land, you 
Dalai Lama exist in the center of our heart through our meditation. Regard 
us with compassion as a father does his son. We offer service out of the 
gratitude we have held in our hearts for all you have done in the cause of 
the two traditions.70 Just as a master apportions [work] to his servants, 
command me [to take up] your happy affairs. In what remains of my life, I 
shall, by performing the Three Pleasing Actions, follow you appropriately 
as your student.’ 71  
 
The elaborate depiction of Fukanggan is significant because it is the general’s 
personal sincerity that authenticates the larger patron-priest relationship between the Qing 
emperors and the kūtuktus of Tibetan Buddhism. Here, finally, is flesh-and-blood 
confirmation that the Qing court stands behind its expressions of faith for the Gelukpas. 
Moreover the Démo Kūtuktu’s narrative, by quoting Fukanggan’s memorials to the court 
and imagining the dialogue between the general and emperor during subsequent 
audiences in Beijing, proves to his readership that Fukanggan, as witness to the 
accomplishments of the Dalai Lama, has personally conveyed the truth to the Qianlong 
emperor. The biography records:  
 
Later, in response to the emperor’s questions during an audience 
[Fukanggan] reported, ‘When seen clearly and in person the Dalai Lama is 
in fact a genuine Buddha in human form.  He was able to answer other 
                                                
69 Tib. bod khri skor bcu gsum gyi mgon po. The “thirteen myriarchies” is a metaphorical 
reference to the territories granted to the first Sakya ruler in Dbus and Gtsang by Kublai Khan 
(Tib. Se chen rgyal po). So this statement draws a parallel to the Mongol period and the 
delegation of powers to the Sakya rulers. 
 
70 Italics added. Tib. “lugs gnyis kyi las don.” The expression, the “Two traditions (lugs gnyis)” 
refers to the religious (Tib. chos) and the political/secular (Tib. srid). Often expressed as chos srid 
lugs gnyis. 
 
71 Démo Kūtuktu, 207kha.04-208kha.01. 
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[people's] questions with unobstructed wisdom. When we approached him 
with major unresolved debates among our officers and troops, he 
immediately solved them.’ 
 
At this the emperor rejoiced saying, ‘You have honestly reported the 
attainments/wisdom of my Dalai Lama's body, speech and mind without 
concealment.’ He then ordered the Grand Secretary to offer a khatak and 
other gifts to the [Dalai Lama].72 
 
As a final conclusion to this section it is necessary to point out that the Démo 
Kūtuktu does not characterize Fukanggan as having presided over the transfer of political 
authority (Ma. toose) from indigenous governors to the Qing ambans. The “Great Grand 
Secretary’s” final words at departure quoted above imply the continuity of the Dalai 
Lama’s authority over the “two traditions,” referring to both politics and religion.73 The 
Démo Kūtuktu’s reconstruction of Fukanggan’s report to the emperor also makes the case 
for the Dalai Lama’s aptitude for handling worldly affairs. According to the author the 
war against the Gurkhas was if anything a joint affair. In terms of strategy and 
maintaining the morale of the Qing forces, Fukanggan was reliant on the Dalai Lama’s 
wisdom.74 After Fukanggan returned from the front, the Dalai Lama offered, “a prayer of 
thanks for the transformation of the Gurkha people and chiefs into servants of the 
religious domain by means of both the power of the majesty of the imperial patron and 
the various protector and guardian deities from the side of virtue.”75 The wording of this 
                                                
72 Démo Kūtuktu, 203kha.05-06. 
 
73 Démo Kūtuktu, 208ka.01. 
 
74 Démo Kūtuktu, 202ka.01. 
 
75 Démo Kūtuktu, 206kha.01 (412). Here again we encounter the term “gzi byin” to refer to the 
emperor’s majesty. There is also the important term “mthu sdops” conveying the notion of a 
particular kind of magical power. “dus ‘dir gong ma mchod yon gyi sku’i gzi byin dang / dkar 
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prayer makes it clear that it took both the charisma of the emperor and the power of the 
deities summoned by the Tibetans to successfully conclude the war. Moreover, the prayer 
suggests that victory had reduced the Gurkhas not to the status of subject of the emperor, 
but rather servants of the “religious domain,” i.e. the estate of the Dalai Lamas and 
Buddhism.76  
If we recall for a moment the general’s own description of the initial audience, the 
fact that the Tibetan account lacks any mention of political transition does not seem so 
strange. The emperor’s own message, for instance, was itself vague: both the ambans and 
the indigenous secular governing elite (the kalöns) had been the target of the emperor’s 
withering criticism, not the Dalai Lama. Thus although Qianlong promised that the 
government would be reformed, it was not at all clear at that time the direction it would 
take. Moreover, in the same memorial that included Fukanggan’s description of his initial 
audience with the Dalai Lama, the general also explained to Qianlong that dealing with 
possible “reconstruction” reforms was “not an urgent matter at present.”77 His request to 
postpone further discussion of reforms is a sign that at the very least he had not yet fixed 
ideas of what a post Gurkha-war Tibetan government would look like. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
phyogs pa’i chos skyong srung ma rnams kyi mthu stobs la brten nasgor ‘go dmangs lha ‘bangs 
su tshud b’i gzab gsol gtang rag tu/” 
 
76 It is also important to point out that in both Tibetan and Qing archival sources, the dispute 
between the Tibetan central government and the Gurkhas is consistently portrayed as between 
Tibet and Nepal, not between the Qing and Nepal. Similarly, Tibetan and Qing officials were 
charged with delimited the “Tibetan boundary,” not a “Qing boundary.” MWLF 155:0088. 
 
77 Huibian, 707. 
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Suspicions 
 
The initial impetus for the urn ritual came not from a desire to assume the 
political authority of Tibetan Buddhist monks (this would come later and only in fits and 
starts) but from profound feelings of insecurity fed by the unpredictable nature of 
reincarnation and the seemingly capricious and unconstrained behavior of the oracles, 
those handful of individuals whose skills at spirit possession and divination frequently 
provided the final word on the identification of reincarnated lamas and even Tibetan 
government policy more generally. The idea for the urn arose first among Qianlong and 
his inner circle of advisors. This group included Hešen and his brother Heliyen, the old 
stalwart of the Qianlong reign, Agūi, and other trusted and influential lamas who resided 
in Beijing. When examining the origins of the Gurkha war they determined that the root 
cause was a scramble for wealth on the part of a corrupt group of interrelated nobles and 
reincarnated lamas. If these lamas were fraudulent, then the oracles who had identified 
them were clearly charlatans as well. Moreover, the court blamed defeatist divinations for 
the quick collapse of defenses around Trashi Lhünpo monastery. They worried that a 
political order that hinged on faith in reincarnation was fragile if the process of 
identification was not reliable. If the subject populations of the various monastic domains 
of Inner Asia started to doubt the legitimacy of their lama-lords, or, even worse, if 
conflict broke out between different parties supporting different candidates, there might 
be grievous strategic consequences for the dynasty. The Gurkha war was thus understood 
in the first as a crisis of faith and only secondarily as a crisis of governance. The latter 
followed naturally from the first, but it is highly indicative that the Qing reform efforts 
began by tackling what they perceived to be the core problem—restoring faith in the 
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authenticity of reincarnation. Only months later did the court begin pulling together a 
program for the reform of the Tibetan administration. As Fukanggan had pointed out, the 
superficial squabbles over trade and coinage were to be handled later. Understanding the 
motives of the Gurkhas and punishing their transgressions were a secondary concern to 
dealing with the seeming moral collapse of the Tibetan ecclesiastic elite.  
Doubts about the ability of powerful Buddhist adepts to direct the course of their 
future reincarnation are probably as old as the claims themselves. The Qing court shared 
these doubts, although it is clear that Qianlong personally believed that there were real 
kūtuktu, his close friend and “state preceptor” (Tib. gur gyi slob dpon, Ch. 國師) 
Changkya Kūtuktu Rolpay Dorjé being the most famous example. As the case of the 
Šamarba lama (Tib. Zhwa dmar bla ma) demonstrates, Qianlong still feared the powers 
of even those lamas upon whom he publically cast aspersions.78 Thus the important 
matter is not faith in reincarnation per se but the credibility of the recognition process. 
And there is good evidence that this issue had been a perennial concern of the emperor 
for several decades. 
The best known precedent for an intervention into the recognition process was the 
1758 decree that forbade the followers of the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu from searching for 
his reincarnation among the aristocracy of Mongolia. Qianlong alludes to this precedent 
when he describes in Discourse on Lamas the prediction of the Tüsiyetü Khan that his 
wife’s unborn child would be the next Jebtsundamba and subsequent embarrassment 
when the child turned out to be a daughter. Peter Perdue has argued that the 1758 
prohibition and the subsequent Golden Urn lottery were both motivated by the strategic 
                                                
78 MWLF 155:0244. 
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desire to head off the possibility that a powerful incarnation would emerge within the 
household of a great Mongol lord thus creating a potent challenge to the hegemony of the 
Qing emperors in Inner Asia.79 I find that, while that might have been the case in 1758 
and certainly a consideration in 1792, this line of reasoning does not appear in the 
deliberations between Qianlong and his ministers at this later period. 
A court letter from Qianlong concerning the reincarnation of the Changkya 
Kūtuktu (QL 51/06/28; 1786-07-23) is perhaps an early articulation of the concerns that 
would become prominent in 1792. In the aftermath of Changkya Rolpay Dorjé’s death in 
1785, the bereaved emperor took great interest in the process of locating the kūtuktu’s 
rebirth. Rolpay Dorjé had left instructions that his rebirth would occur in a place known 
as “Ralo” under the jurisdiction of the Xining amban. Thus Qianlong instructed Bufu, the 
Xining amban, to coordinate with the Chuzang Kūtuktu (Ma. Cūbdzang Kūtuktu, Tib. 
Chu bzang Ho thog thu, Changkya’s younger brother) in the search. Qianlong warned the 
amban however, to beware of corruption: “When the rebirth emerges, it cannot be 
foreseen whether there will be petty quarrels over the which person it is. At the time 
when the kūtuktu's disciple (Ma.) Gelek Namk'a returns to the pastures, it is unacceptable 
for him to, having accepted any goods, come to an identification of the reincarnation 
according to his own feelings.”80 This represents the articulation of two concerns that 
would become more prominent over the next couple years: First, the emperor worried 
about the potential for local conflicts over different candidates. Second, he feared that 
those charged with assisting in the search could be corrupted by the potential for personal 
gain. A year-and-a-half later, Qianlong ordered that the name of the candidate located by 
                                                
79 Peter Perdue, China Marches West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 279. 
 
80 MWJXD: 03-138-3-050. 
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Chuzang Kūtuktu be sent to Tibet for confirmation by the Lamo Chökyong oracle.81 In 
May of 1788, Qianlong received word that the oracle had sanctioned the child in 
question.82 Overall, the archival record from this period does not contain documents that 
suggest the emperor was particularly suspicious of the oracles or the prophetic arts of 
central Tibet at this time. 
 
The Sack of Trashi Lhünpo & the “Concocted Prophecy” 
 
The collapse of the defenses at Trashi Lhünpo monastery in Tsang and the 
subsequent plundering of the monastery provided the Qing dynasty not only with casus 
belli for launching an expeditionary force against Nepal, but also resulted in a key 
imperial pronouncement on divination and the position of lamas under Qing law that 
would shape the thinking behind the emperor’s Discourse on Lamas. The court’s search 
for culpability in the immediate aftermath of the debacle at Trashi Lhünpo resulted in the 
execution of an unlikely figure: a senior monk (Tib. rje drung, “jédrung”)83—one of only 
nine monks who remained behind in the monastery to attempt to defend it from the 
Gurkhas.  
The fall of Trashi Lhünpo was a major embarrassment for the court. Just two days 
before the Gurkhas captured the monastery, the chief amban Baotai who had arrived to 
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83 The precise identity or position of this monk is unclear. “Jédrung” is an honorific title, 
synonymous with zhabs drung. See Zhang Yisun, “rje drung,” in Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo 
[Encyclopedic Tibetan-Chinese dictionary] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1993), 910. 
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escort the young Panchen Lama back to Lhasa filed a first-hand report from the front 
lines that, that although the situation was indeed desperate, the monastery was defensible.  
A little more than thirteen hundred soldiers had been collected, and the four thousand 
resident monks had been ordered to construct fortifications and otherwise prepare to 
defend the place.  Baotai noted, however, that there were rumors that the leading 
reincarnate lama of the monastery, the Drungpa Kūtuktu, was preparing to flee. Therefore 
he had sent a letter to the lama ordering him to stay put and sustain the morale of the 
monks.84 Unfortunately, after returning to Lhasa, Baotai was informed by the kalön that 
just three days after he had departed with the Panchen Lama, Drungpa slipped away, 
taking with him as much valuable treasure and he could carry and the morale of the 
remaining monks as well. The next day the monastery fell into the hands of the 
Gurkhas.85   
  At first the wrath of the court fell squarely on the Drungpa Kūtuktu. When in QL 
56/10/10 (November 5, 1791) the assistant amban Yamantai suggested permitting him to 
return to the monastery to assist in reorganizing the scattered monks, Qianlong ordered 
the lama sent to Beijing for trial and imprisonment. His indictment read as follows: 
 
 As soon as the Jungba Kūtuktu heard the news that bandits were coming 
to raid, he thought nothing of offering a stout defense and instead gathered 
what wealth he could carry and at the earliest possible moment fled, 
leaving the Jédrung Khenpo (Tib. rje drung mkhan po, Ch. 仔仲堪布) 
with nothing to rely on and the masses in a state of fright. Under the 
pretext of having performed a divination, [the Jédrung Khanpo] then 
spread lies and misled the people, causing the mass of lamas to scatter and 
flee. Thus by the time the bandits finally arrived at the Trashi Lhünpo, the 
majority of lamas had already been gone for days. If the Drungpa Kūtuktu 
                                                
84 Huibian, 667.  
 
85 Huibian, 672-3. 
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had only slightly understood the gravity of the situation and led the 
[monks] in a stalwart defense, how could the bandits have captured the 
place? The loss of Trashi Lhünpo is actually a case of them giving it away 
themselves! The Drungpa Kūtuktu is truly the chief villain in this case… 
He has forgotten his principles, betrayed his teachings and merely pursues 
whatever suits him. How could we have entrusted the Panchen Erdeni to 
him? From the standpoint of the laws of Buddhism (Ch. fofa 佛法), one 
should not value life any more than death. [One] should think nothing of 
laying down one's life for that which benefits Buddhism. Moreover, how 
can he so treasure these trifling objects? Truly the Drungpa Kūtuktu is 
motivated by selfish desires, craves life and turned his back on what was 
right. The nature of his offense is obvious. I have already instructed that in 
principle he should be executed for his crimes. Yet out of consideration 
for the fact that he is the cousin of the previous Panchen Lama, just have 
him brought to the capital to be confined in a temple.86 
 
Qianlong’s indictment is based on the principle that all able-bodied monks have the 
obligation to protect Buddhism by whatever means necessary. This principle was not the 
idea of the court alone. At the height of the crisis in early October of 1791, when the 
Gurkhas were rumored to be approaching Lhasa from three directions and Qing 
reinforcements were still clambering their way across the mountains of Sichuan and 
Yunnan, a Manchu-language court letter was delivered to the Tatsak Rinpoché (Ma. 
Jirung Kūtuktu) ordering him to spread word among the high clergy of Lhasa that it 
would be necessary to take up arms. In the letter, Qianlong called upon the Tantric 
practice of “taming the demons” to justify breaking monastic vows.87 According to the 
edict, the Tatsak Rinpoché was to explain that, “Although the Buddhist law prohibits 
killing, if the bandits arrive and we have not lent our energy to the defense, then 
everything will be harmed. Moreover, in the Buddhist texts there is the tradition of 
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87 For a history of violence in Tantric Buddhism, see Jacob Paul Dalton, The Taming of the 
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‘Taming the demons.’ If the Gurkhas unleash their violence, then they have become your 
demons. At this urgent juncture, become their subjugators.”88 The vengeance of the 
emperor, however, would not end with the retroactive application of this principle to the 
Drungpa Kūtuktu. 
As the investigation into the collapse of Trashi Lhünpo evolved over the 
following month, so did the Qing court’s interpretation of the crime. When Qing 
reinforcements under Cengde finally arrived in the region of Tsang, Qianlong ordered 
them to arrest the Jédrung Lobzang Danba and four other monks and bring them to Lhasa 
for questioning. The court located a new “chief villain” in Lobzang Danba.89 These were 
the monks that the court deemed responsible for “using divination to mislead the 
people.”90 On December 23, 1791, under Ohūi’s torture, these men all confessed to the 
charges that Qianlong leveled against them: making a divination before the image of Tara 
(Ch. 吉祥天母), recklessly claiming that it would be impossible to defeat the Gurkhas, 
confusing the morale of the people, and thus causing the monks to flee. Specifically, the 
chief abbot described how they had conducted a tsampa dough-ball investigation (Tib. 
zan brtag, “zentak”). Having encased the answers, “Yes, fight!” and “No, don’t fight!” in 
small balls of tsampa dough, they posed the relevant question to the deity and rolled the 
balls about on a pan until the answer, due to centrifugal force (or the intervention of the 
deity), rolled off. Having received the answer in the negative, they then (had the temerity!) 
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to ask whether they should attempt to parley with the Gurkhas. The ritual was repeated. 
In this case, the deity indicated in the affirmative. Unfortunately, the monk sent to locate 
the Gurkha forces ran away. At the conclusion of his confession the abbot stated that 
despite this turn of events, he had remained in the monastery after the others had fled and 
attempted to do what he could to preserve its treasures.91 As a reward for his troubles, the 
abbot claimed that the Gurkhas had beaten him. Ohūi, “having gathered together a crowd 
including the kalön and the leading lamas of all the monasteries, had him defrocked and 
brought under guard to the market, where, before their eyes, he was beheaded.”92 
Both the Qing official who oversaw his execution, Ohūi, and later the Qianlong 
emperor, made extensive justifications for what they acknowledged was an 
unprecedented punishment. First, Ohūi noted that the inquisition was repeated three 
weeks later in the presence of the Tatsak Rinpoché, who, confirmed that the confessions 
were consistent. The rinpoché then “requested that cases of those who mislead the people 
(huozhong) be handled with severity.” Thus the governing elite of Lhasa, both lay and 
clerical, was also made complicit in his execution.  Second, Ohūi explained that the 
punishments were an expression of the dynasty’s desire to protect the Buddhist teachings, 
which the lamas had violated. He reported to Qianlong that he had subsequently 
explained in private to the Dalai and Panchen lamas that Lobzang Danba had, “under the 
pretext of having made a divination betrayed the teaching and mislead the people. Not 
only was this difficult for the king’s law/royal law (Ch. wangfa 王法) to forgive, but it is 
something that the law of Buddhism cannot tolerate. In principle all five men should be 
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executed, yet out of respect for the recent edict, only the leader has been punished. The 
emperor's desire to protect the Yellow Teachings spares no detail.”93 
Ohūi’s justification before the Dalai Lama reveals, however, one major 
innovation that sets it apart, even from the indictment of the Drungpa Kūtuktu a month 
earlier. The monk’s “rash presumption to speak for the deities” (Ch. 竟敢妄稱神言) was 
no longer merely a crime against Buddhism, but it was now a crime against the “king’s 
law” (Ch. 王法), the secular, universal law of the dynasty which was only now being 
extended to the Buddhist elite. In a separate edict approving Ohūi’s actions, Qianlong 
succinctly restated this change: “These lamas have rebelled against their religion (教), 
which is difficult for the law of the king to forgive let alone for Buddhism (佛法) to 
tolerate.”94 In other words, the emperor was expressing the will to use the laws—and 
punishments—of the secular code to enforce the Buddhist law. At the conclusion of his 
edict, Qianlong emphasizes the novelty of this situation by contrasting it with the state of 
affairs during the Mongol Yuan Dynasty:  
 
I lovingly protect the Yellow Teachings and treat with special kindness 
those lamas who hold fast to the laws of the religion they revere. 
However, if there are those who cannot be pardoned for their failures and 
sins against the religion,95 then they definitely will not be shielded from 
being promptly punished according to the law. Consider the manner in 
which the Yuan patronized lamas: They single-mindedly worshipped the 
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lamas and differentiated not [between right and wrong].96 It reached the 
point where someone who insulted [a lama] would lose their tongue and 
someone who hit [a lama] would lose their arm, causing the lamas to know 
absolutely no restraint. How then could they recover their government 
system? I intend that this judgment concerning Lobzang Danba's use of 
divination to mislead the people, serve the purpose of clarifying the 
intention/purpose of the law with regards to our protection of the Yellow 
Teachings.97 
 
In this statement Qianlong is careful to justify the extension of the emperor’s legal 
authority over Tibetan Buddhists not on the basis of imperial prerogative alone, but rather 
because it is necessary to ensure that monks keep their faith and act selflessly. The 
emperor reserves the right to judge who has violated Buddhist law on the basis of his 
position as a Buddhist who wishes to see the faith flourish. Thus the emperor felt he was 
fully within his rights to determine that the Jédrung Abbot Lobzang Danba’s divination 
was nothing more than a false prophecy designed to obscure the truth about his own 
cowardice.98 Moreover Qianlong argues that it is the right of the ruler to enforce Buddhist 
law and pass judgment on the Buddhist community that maintains the overall stability of 
the government.  
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Qianlong was satisfied with this formulation because he incorporated it into his 
Discourse on Lamas a year later. He evidently considered the execution of the Jédrung 
abbot a watershed moment, not only for his reign but for the history of the dynasty more 
generally. The forceful handling of this matter was proof that the achievements of the 
Qing would endure longer than those of the Mongol Yuan.99  The case established two 
important precedents: First, lamas could be subjected to the full force of “king’s law.” 
Second the court had the right to supervise and authenticate indigenous divination 
practices. Of course it should be noted that in practice the extent of the “king’s law” 
would remain ambiguous. The fact that Qianlong stayed the axe when it came to the 
Drungpa Kūtuktu, the high-ranking reincarnation, demonstrated a continued deference to 
the Buddhist hierarchy. It was the misfortune of the Jédrung lama, perhaps one of the few 
monks courageous enough to face the Gurkhas, that proved true the adage that some are 
more equal than others. It is an astonishing fact that in the years following the collapse of 
Trashi Lhünpo, among those Qing and Tibetan officials who fell under the scrutiny of the 
court, including those Manchu officials discovered as complicit in making secret 
arrangements with the Gurkhas in defiance of the court, only the Jédrung Lama was 
executed. 
 
The Oracles of Central Tibet and the Recognition of False Lamas 
 
                                                
99 Discourse on Lamas, lines 13-13, 29-30. 
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In late March of 1792, a little over a month after Fukanggan had arrived in Lhasa, 
Qianlong decided to dispatch Heliyen to serve as the chief amban in the city.100 This 
move reflected not only the gravity with which Qianlong viewed the situation, but also 
indicated that the emperor desired an unusual degree of frankness, oversight and 
discretion in dealing with Tibetan internal affairs. Subsequently many communications 
between the Heliyen and the emperor were conveyed within Manchu-language letters 
between the amban and his elder brother, the chief grand councilor Hešen. In fact, it 
appears that these brothers made use of the palace memorial system to exchange 
numerous private messages concerning Tibetan affairs, thus to some degree Tibet policy 
for the next several years would become a family affair.101 The archives even contain 
several letters from Tibetan nobles and major incarnations that were sent directly to 
Hešen himself. For instance, an early 1792 (Qianlong 57) letter from the young Panchen 
Lama to Hešen requested that the latter intercede to ensure that the Drungba Kūtuktu, 
who had just been dispatched to Beijing, be treated leniently and permitted to return to 
Tibet as soon as possible.102 Heliyen’s arrival in Lhasa corresponds with a shift in tone 
away from that which had characterized the communications between Fukanggan and 
Qianlong.  
When Heliyen arrived in Lhasa in early June of 1792, Fukanggan had already 
departed and was in the Tibetan border district of Kyirong (Tib. Skyid grong) preparing 
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to launch the punitive expedition into Gurkha territory.103 Heliyen’s investigations, his 
chasing of whispers across Lhasa, and his overall suspicions of the Tibetan elites and 
their governing capabilities seems to have led to an aggressive effort to limit and 
constrain the power of the Tibetan nobility and even began to undermine the legitimacy 
of the Dalai Lama himself. At the same time as Heliyen was getting a handle on affairs in 
Tibet, the Drungba Kūtuktu had arrived in Beijing for questioning. Qianlong’s evolving 
pronouncements on Tibet is most likely attributable to the arrival of new information that 
both confirmed old suspicions (that he probably had initially shared with Heliyen) and 
planted new ones. In a pronouncement dated June 18, 1792, the emperor rebuffed 
requests to have the Drungba Kūtuktu sent back to Tibet. Instead, the emperor criticized 
Tibetans for their reliance on divination and castigated their cowardice as behavior 
unbecoming of a Buddhist, noting that, “true Buddhists do not begrudge their own lives 
for the sake of other living creatures.”104  
It was Heliyen’s early reports on the activities of the family of the kalön Doring 
Tendzin Penjur (Tib. Rdo ring bstan 'dzin dpal 'byor, Ma. Danjin Banjur) that led to the 
emperor’s first condemnation of the oracles of central Tibet. In August of 1791, in a 
brazen raid that marked the renewed ouTibreak of hostilities between Tibet and the 
Gurkhas, the latter captured both Doring Tendzin Penjur and a second kalön, Yutok 
Trashi Döndrup, in the Tibetan border market of Nyanang and took them as hostage back 
to Katmandu. The court found the circumstances of the ministers’ abduction highly 
suspicious, not only because Tibetan officials had provided several different accounts of 
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why the minister was traveling in the border region (most recently two assistants of the 
Dalai Lama had told Fukanggan that the ministers were “traveling to inspect temples”), 
but also because the Šamarba Lama himself had originally claimed to have been abducted 
and now appeared to have taken the Gurkha’s side.105 Upon arriving in Lhasa, Heliyen’s 
investigations revealed that the recently deceased father of Doring Tendzin Penjur had 
been arranging a secret ransom to secure the release of his son.106 Of even greater 
concern to the court, however, was the news that the second son of Doring had been 
identified as the (Ma.) Samba Kūtuktu.107  In his response composed on July 9, 1792 (QL 
57/05/21), the emperor drew a line of causality between the oracles of central Tibet, most 
importantly the Lamo Chökyong, and the trend of identifying reincarnations among the 
scions of Tibetan noble households. Qianlong wrote to Heliyen: 
It is said that [Doring] Tendzin Penjur’s second son is the Samba Kūtuktu. 
The Samba Kūtuktu is a major kūtuktu of Tibet (Ma. Dzang). Now the 
emergence within their family is like the selection of the kalön from the 
household of the Jungkor. Bandida108 is an aristocratic family (Ma. fujuri 
boo) of Tibet. Tendzin Penjur is already the husband of the younger sister 
of the Dalai Lama and nephew by marriage of the Šamarba. If the son of 
Tendzin Penjur is also the Samba Kūtuktu, then it will be that a single 
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household has taken possession of all of the major posts (Ma. tušan) of 
Tibet. This matter cannot be true! This is definitely a case in which when 
it came time to identify the emergence of the hūbilgan, having planted 
preconceived notions in the minds of the Lamo Chökyong and the other 
[oracles], their divinations clearly pointed out the sons of noble families. If 
this was not the case, then how is it possible that the reincarnations 
(hūbilgan) of all the major kūtuktus of Tibet have come to appear only in 
the noble households? Nowadays the Panchen Erdeni, Jebdzundamba 
Kūtuktu and even the Dalai Lama are all from one family.109  
 
The fact that the son of a potentially traitorous Tibetan noble still held hostage in Gurkha 
territory had been recognized as a major reincarnation without any knowledge on the part 
of the court clearly rankled. It led to the emperor’s first articulation of doubt in the 
existing process of recognizing rebirths, in particular the practice of seeking final 
confirmation by soliciting prophecies (Tib. lung dan, Ma. lungdan) from the oracles. It 
also sparked to the first efforts of the court to modify the process of certifying 
reincarnations: “Therefore, henceforth whenever any kūtuktu passes into nirvana, when 
identifying the re-emergence of the rebirth, there certainly must be a true sign, or [the 
candidate] must be able to recognize objects owned by the previous generation. As for 
the Lamo Chökyong, it is not acceptable for him to identify reincarnations from among 
sons of the gentry families or the great clans (Ma. mukūn), or from among the cousins or 
brothers of the Dalai Lama or Panchen Erdeni, according to their own whim and on the 
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pretext of their prophecies."110 Heliyen dutifully responded a month later that, "I will 
strictly see to it that, in accord with the imperial instructions, the existence of 
reincarnations (hūbilgan) will not be determined according to the writ of the self-
motivated prophecies of the Lamo Chökyong. Furthermore, having entered this edict into 
the archives, I will ensure that this will become the precedent for subsequent generations 
of ambans.”111 
 This measure, however, was still limited in both scope and impact. It reflects an 
intermediate moment between the emperor’s previous support for the oracles (recall 
Qianlong’s support for the seeking the judgment of the Lamo Chökyong in the case of the 
Changkya Kūtuktu just four years earlier) and the attempt to radically replace these 
practices that is reflected in the Discourse on Lamas and the establishment of the Golden 
Urn ritual. In this decree Qianlong is still content to promote certain indigenous 
divination technologies over others. Thus instead of seeking confirmation from the 
oracles, Tibetans are required to limit themselves to interpreting portents and conducting 
trials of the candidate children. Still, the chief amban and the emperor were clearly 
building a rationale for further intervention. Their use of the term “post” (Ma. tušan) for 
instance, to refer to the status of kūtuktu-hood desacralizes it by placing it within the 
same category as secular administrative position, legitimizing the notion that far from 
possessing some inherent and inviolable nature, such status can be conferred externally at 
the discretion of the ruler. Moreover, from Heliyen’s perspective the prevailing practices 
of recognizing rebirths and their resulting failures were manifestations of the fact that 
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“the affairs of Tibet are entirely without fixed laws!”112 This specific exclamation, with 
its implicit dismissal of indigenous legal structures and traditions, reverberates 
throughout the subsequent archival record. The emperor, Hešen, Fukanggan, and Agūi all 
deployed the phrase in later communications as they made the case for various programs 
of law making in Tibet.113 In his rescript to Heliyen’s report that he was preparing to 
implement the decree, the emperor indicated that he was already reconsidering the 
decree, stating, “For the time being, await [further instructions]!” 
 
The Golden Urn 
  
The emperor first broached the idea of establishing a lottery in a letter to the 
Grand Councilor Agūi dated August 17, 1792 (QL 57/06/30). In this letter, Qianlong’s 
suspicion of the oracles of Tibet, in particular the Lamo Chökyong, had evolved 
significantly since his previous letter to Heliyen. Here, Qianlong for the first time fully 
articulates his belief that the corruption of the oracles has led to a general crisis of faith in 
the kūtuktus of Tibet and that the Dalai Lama himself may have been complicit in this 
corruption: 
 
Previously, the identity of the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama, Panchen 
Erdeni and all other kūtuktus has been determined by observing the 
prophecies made in person by the Lamo Chökyong. As for this, it is 
impossible that the [oracle’s] decisions have not been corrupted by having 
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113 See for instance, use of the similar rhetoric in a memorial from Fukanggan dated QL 57/12/11 
(Huibian, 795-83) and a later memorial from Agūi dated QL 57/12/28 (1793-02-08, Huibian, 
803-808).  
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accepted goods in advance, from being willfully partial to his own 
relatives, or due to ideas that have been planted in his head by the Dalai 
Lama (having taken cues from the Dalai Lama). Not only has this made it 
impossible for the people to be convinced [in the authenticity of the 
kūtuktus], it is also not the way to ensure that the teachings flourish. As a 
result the Gurkha bandits fearlessly invaded and ran amok in Tibet. It is 
my intention that henceforth, when determining the reincarnation of the 
Dalai Lama, Panchen Erdeni and all other major kūtuktu, observation of 
the divinations of the Lamo Chökyong will completely cease. Instead a 
golden vase will be dispatched to [Tibet] and set before the Buddha in the 
Jokhang temple. Having placed the names of the hūbilgan that have 
appeared inside, the resident ambans together with the Dalai Lama will 
observe as sutras are read and one [name] is selected from the urn. Only 
then will the true reincarnation have been identified.114  
 
Qianlong’s line of reasoning in this letter—that the root cause of the Gurkha invasion was 
the corruption of the oracles—was unprecedented. His crisis of faith argument is thus 
very different not only from the presentation of the situation by Tibet’s governing 
ministers and lamas, but also from the diagnosis of Fukanggan just months earlier.  
On the same day that he filed his account of his audience with the Dalai Lama, 
Fukanggan also composed a long account of the origins of the crisis. Fukanggan states 
that his account is largely based on statements made the Dalai Lama and his monk 
attendants and that their testament is credible since he has double-checked it with the 
information supplied by Cengde and Ohūi. Fukanggan blames the conflict first of all on 
the inherently base nature of the Gurkhas, who “as  foreigners (外夷 waiyi), only lie in 
wait ready to pounce on the slightest opportunity for profit and gain.” 115  Their 
opportunity came in the form of a dispute with the Tibetan government over exchange 
rates and information provided by the inscrutable Šamarba lama that Tibetan defenses 
                                                
114 MWLF 154:0981-0982. 
 
115 Huibian, 708. 
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were weak and disorganized. The general apportioned blame to the kalöns and chief 
amban Bajung as well, singling them out for spinelessness and for signing a separate and 
secret treaty with the Gurkhas that they clearly had no intention of following through on. 
Yet in Fukanggan’s analysis the Dalai Lama emerged unscathed, a testament, perhaps, to 
the impression that the lama and his attendants had skillfully made on the general prior to 
and during his audience. Where the Dalai Lama and his advisors, especially the former 
regent Ngawang Tsültrim, were resolute, uncompromising, and willing to prosecute 
hostilities to their conclusion, Tibet’s secular ruling elite were “cowardly and unable to 
think long-term about the implications of their decisions.” Therefore Fukanggan suggests 
that the centerpiece of any reform effort must be to establish supervision over the council 
of ministers (the kashag).116 
As Qianlong’s rescripts on Fukanggan’s report indicate, the emperor concurred 
with his general’s conclusions.117 Fukanggan’s analysis not only influenced the program 
of reform of Tibetan administration and especially the Kashag that would get underway 
seven months later in October, it also constitutes the foundation of most late nineteenth-
century and twentieth-century Western interpretations of the war as well.118 Yet in his 
Manchu-language letters to his closest advisors, Hešen and Agūi, Qianlong probed 
                                                
116 Huibian, 710. 
 
117 Huibian, 711. 
 
118 See, for instance: W.W. Rockhill, “The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations With the 
Manchu Emperors of China: 1644-1908,” T’oung Pao, XI (1910): 49-52; Hugh Richardson, 
Ch’ing Dynasty Inscriptions at Lhasa (Roma: Serie Orientalia, 1974), 29-48; Shakabpa, Tibet, A 
Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 157-158. Fabienne Jagou, 
“Manzhou jiangjun Fu-kang-an: 1792 zhi 1793 nian Xizang zhengwu gaige de xianqu [The 
Manchu general Fukanggan: instigator of the reform of political affairs in Tibeta from 1792-
1793],” in Bianchen yu jiangli, ed. Li Guoqiang et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 147-151. 
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beyond Fukanggan’s analysis of proximate causes, ultimately deciding that the crucial 
factor was the moral decay of the Geluk establishment itself.  
This move towards placing the blame internally was a characteristic mode of 
thought in the late Qianlong reign. Qianlong’s reasoning in this matter is perhaps best 
understood when placed in the context of his biography and the prejudices and fears 
expressed when dealing with prior matters involving clergy, divination and other magical 
arts. Qianlong’s suspicion of Tibetan Buddhist monks and his shifting policies must 
therefore be considered within the broader context of how the court and its officials (not 
to mention other members of society more generally) perceived the clergy in other parts 
of the empire, most significantly, within China proper. In particular Qianlong’s 
suspicions of the oracles and the Dalai Lama, as well as the extremely harsh punishment 
meted out on the Jédrung Lobzang Danba, recalls two aspects of the emperor’s response 
to the soul-stealing crisis of 1768 as described by Philip Kuhn.119 First, by the mid-point 
in his reign Qianlong had already expressed on multiple occasions his distaste for the 
clergy of China proper. Kuhn writes that, “monk-bashing was a source of moral 
satisfaction for rulers who considered clergy to be mostly hypocrites and corrupters of the 
community.”120 Kuhn places this hostility in the context of concerns shared by both 
society and the Throne in the increasing numbers of mendicant monks thronging the 
roads and markets of the country. Qianlong was hostile to the growing numbers of 
                                                
119 It might also be useful to consider Qianlong’s treatment of Geluk monks in 1792 against the 
events of the two Jinchuan campaigns. In these wars the Qing forces also had to contend with 
suspect lamas and their potential magical powers. Much as in 1792, during the Jinchuan 
campaigns the court perceived itself as aligned with Gelukpa hierarchs against non-Gelukpa 
monks who were allied with “rebellious” Tibetans in Jinchuan. See Chapter Four for further 
discussion of Gelukpa perspectives on their contributions to Qing victory in Jinchuan. 
 
120 Philip Kuhn, Soulstealers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 111. 
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Buddhist clergy both on Confucian grounds, as men who had abandoned their filial 
obligations to be productive members of both family and society, and because their 
numbers had long since escaped the abilities of the state to license them and the state-
sanctioned temples to house them. It was the impossibility of knowing exactly who these 
people were and what they were doing that especially troubled the Throne.121  
Among the behaviors the court worried about was the potential for these 
individuals to engage in communication with the spirit world and conduct divinations, 
thus usurping a role that the Qing code, like those of previous dynasties, had for strategic 
purposes reserved for the emperor and his authorized representatives. Statutes in the 
sections of the Qing code on sacrifices and ceremonies forbade shamanism and 
prognostication, particularly when the latter touched on future of the dynasty. Limiting 
knowledge about the future to the emperor and officialdom more generally was essential 
to social stability lest unauthorized fortunetellers delude the people with false tales of 
dynastic decline and collapse.122 This brings us to the second aspect of the situation in 
1792 that resembles that of 1768. This is what Kuhn labels the “panic factor,” the 
“imperial belief that the credulous masses were ever on the brink of violent panicky 
reactions to hints of political crisis or cosmic disorder.”123 In 1768, this belief underlay 
the emperor’s fear that rumors of sorcerers wandering the land stealing souls would 
trigger public disturbances—events that would surely be read as signs of the dynasty’s 
frailty. This belief also explains why in 1768 the emperor made debunking the 
                                                
121 Kuhn, Soulstealers, 42-3, 45, 109-111. 
 
122 Kuhn, Soulstealers, 86-87. 
 
123 Kuhn, Soulstealers, 64. 
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authenticity of claims of “soulstealing,” divining, and other black arts a priority for his 
officials.  
In light of proscriptions against unauthorized divination in the Qing code, 
Qianlong’s desire to restrict the activities of the oracles of central Tibet does not seem so 
unprecedented. The events of the Gurkha war served as an unwelcome reminder that the 
court’s monopoly over forecasting the future was still incomplete. Moreover, a crisis of 
faith in the sanctity of kūtuktuhood, the lynchpin of governance throughout Tibetan 
regions, might easily set off the kind of panic that the Throne had feared in 1768. The 
Gurkha war, which was still very much underway when Qianlong first floated the idea of 
the urn among his confidents in August, 1792, had already provided the emperor 
evidence of the susceptibility of Tibetans to “panicky” reactions to “false” divinations, 
the evaporation of Tibetan defenses at Trashi Lhünpo being the case in point.  
By means of this brief foray into the history of the emperor’s entanglements with 
the clergy of the interior, I wish to argue that neither Tibet policy nor policy for the rest 
of the empire’s Inner Asian domains for that matter was made in a vacuum. Not without 
reason, historians of the Golden Urn have seen this ritual primarily as an attempt to end 
the Buddhist establishment’s independent authority over reincarnation and thus finally 
exclude the possibility that a great incarnation would emerge as the heir of a great 
aristocratic house of Mongolia.124 This perennial concern about the possible emergence 
of a new center of power in Mongolia could not have been far from the emperor’s mind. 
Yet in both the original mention of the urn in the confidential letter to Agūi in August and 
the famous promulgation of the new ritual in the Discourse in December, the stated 
                                                
124 Perdue, China Marches West, 440; and James Hevia, “Lamas, Emperors and Rituals: Political 
implications in Qing imperial ceremonies,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist 
Studies 16 (1993): 249. 
 67 
reason is the desire to stamp out doubts in reincarnate lamas and shore up faith in the 
Geluk school. The Thone’s intervention in the identification process was thus not simply 
an attempt to bring resolution to an old and thorny political problem unique to the court’s 
management of Inner Asia. Rather, it was an attempt to eliminate the threat that 
unsupervised communication with the spirit world posed to faith in Tibetan Buddhism 
and the political order that the court believed hinged on that faith. It was a reflection of 
the fact that the issues and concerns that preoccupied the court in dealing with sustaining 
its rule over China were beginning to bleed into the way in which it thought about Inner 
Asia. The Gelukpa arts of divination were no longer any less dangerous than those of the 
sorcerers of the interior. Seen in this light, the Golden Urn lottery is a perfect symbol of 
this moment: a Ming ritual brought out to solve a crisis of Inner Asia. The Golden Urn 
was not a new solution to an old problem, it was and old solution to a new problem.  
 It is probably the lack of attention to the Throne’s perception that a crisis of faith 
in reincarnation was spreading in Inner Asia that accounts for the failure of historians in 
both China and the West to ask the most basic questions about the urn ritual itself. 
Reduced to a cynical maneuver to assert the court’s supremacy over the lay and clerical 
nobility of Inner Asia, there is little incentive to examine the origin of the ritual. From 
where did the idea come? How did the emperor and his officials rationalize and 
legitimize this intervention in the recognition process? Why did they think this ritual 
would lay questions of authenticity to rest? To this historian’s relief, the emperor and his 
ministers left a number of remarkably frank and direct statements concerning the origins 
of the ritual and how it was to work in the archival record. Let us return again to the 
documents.  
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Among the Tibetan arts of divination, the Golden Urn lottery most closely 
resembles a category of practices generally referred to as “zentak” (Tib: zan rtag) or 
“zengyur” (Tib: zan bsgyur) respectively meaning “investigation with dough balls” or 
“dough ball transformation.” We have already been introduced to a version of this 
practice in the case of the Jédrung Lama Lobzang Danba who had encased various 
possible outcomes from the expected Gurkha attack within balls of tsampa, balanced 
them on a special plate and then gradually spun the plate until the correct answer fell off. 
This technology was widely known throughout Tibet and employed to assist with making 
a variety of decisions. The Oceanic Book, a major chronicle of the history of the Amdo 
region composed in the first half of the nineteenth century, describes numerous usages of 
the ritual, most frequently in the context of identifying the rebirths of tülku or assigning 
posts within the monastic bureaucracy. For example, the Oceanic Book records that in 
1707 the first Jamyang Zhepa (1648-1721) supervised the search for the Mindröl 
incarnation of Amdo and that this search involved conducting a dough ball investigation 
at Drépung monastery.125 It is important to note here that in this case, as in most other 
cases, the dough ball investigation was but the last of several divinations.  Only when the 
outcome of the zentak, the divinations of the Lamo and Néchung (Tib: La mo Gnas 
chung chos skyong) oracles, and the advice of the Dalai and Panchen lamas concurred 
was the reincarnation conclusively confirmed. In another case, when asked to assign a 
lama as regent to the domain of the Mongol Qinwang of Kokonor in the mid 1700s, the 
                                                
125 The Oceanic Book is also known by the abbreviated title History of the Faith in Amdo (Tib. 
Mdo smad chos ‘byung). Citations are from the recent PRC reprint under the latter title: Brag 
dgon pa dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas (“Drakgönpa”), Mdo smad chos ‘byung (Zi ling: Mtsho 
sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987 [1865]). This citation is from page 100. The full title of 
Drakgönpa’s work is Yul mdo smad kyi ljongs su thub bstan rin po che ji ltar dar ba'i tshul gsal 
bar brjod pa Deb ther rgya mtsho. 
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abbot of Labrang resorted to a zentak to determine whom to send. The abbot had first 
asked a certain qualified monk to take up the position. When the monk refused, the abbot 
performed a dough ball investigation. The divination confirmed that indeed the task 
should fall to that monk, yet he again rejected the appointment. Ultimately the abbot went 
in his stead. Shortly thereafter, the obstinate monk died, thus sending a warning that the 
results of the ritual were not to be taken lightly.126 The biography of the Third Jamyang 
Zhepa (1792-1855) reports that a dough ball investigation (Tib: zan bsgril kyis thag bcad 
pa) had also been the penultimate step in the recognition of the Fifth Dalai Lama.127  
Although Tibetan authors would later refer to the Golden Urn lottery as a kind of 
zentak, the structure of the ritual was in significant ways qualitatively different from 
indigenous methods of performing dough ball investigations. As I will discuss below in 
chapters two and three, for this reason and others Tibetan authors clearly saw the ritual as 
a novel imposition on their own methods of divination. This is not to say that Tibetans 
rejected the ritual outright as a foreign institution, but it is a bridge too far to claim, as 
recent Chinese historians have, that because both the new ritual and indigenous tradition 
involved “lots (籤),” it was easily accepted and assimilated.128 Just because China and 
                                                
126 Oceanic Book, 393-394. 
 
127 Mkhan po Ngag dbang thub bstan rgya mtsho, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhed pa sku 
‘phreng gsum pa’i rnam thar ([Qinghai]: krung go'i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1991), 37. 
The usage of the zentak to identify the fifth Dalai Lama seems to have been remarkable precisely 
because the technology was not widely used for locating reincarnations. Thus the Qing invention 
of the urn and the Tibetans’ reinterpretation of it as a zentak represented shift in divination 
culture. Post 1792, the use of dough-ball divinations for recognizing reincarnations became much 
more frequent, partially because, as will discussed below, Tibetans identified the Golden Urn 
ritual as a zentak. 
 
128 Yu Hong and Zhang Shuangzhi, “Jinping cheqian yu shenpan wenhua,” Xizang yanjiu no. 2 
(2006): 48-49. 
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Tibet both possess divination traditions (Ch. 神判) does not mean that they constitute a 
shared tradition. Moreover, the archival record makes it clear that neither Qianlong nor 
his associates took into consideration the indigenous Tibetan traditions when casting the 
Golden Urn. Their inspiration lay elsewhere. 
Qianlong himself states quite clearly that the idea for a lottery was borrowed from 
the Board of Civil Appointments, where drawing lots had been the standard method of 
appointing officials to open posts in the field administration of China since the late Ming. 
Among the emperor’s commentaries appended to the 1794 publication of his Collection 
of Poetry and Prose on the Ten Complete Victories (《御製詩文十全集》) is the 
following explanation of the origins of the ritual and its purpose: 
 
[The Golden Urn lottery] is similar to the manner in which lots are drawn 
in the boards of Civil Appointments and War. When established during the 
Ming, because it was like the tradition of using bamboo lots, there were 
those who mocked [the procedure], calling the Board of Civil 
Appointments the ‘Board of Lots.’  However if this matter had been 
entrusted to the ministers of those two boards, fair and honest ministers 
would have been unable to avoid pleasing some and offending others; self-
interested ministers would ultimately have handed out posts according to 
what they took in! There was no alternative but to institute [the lottery] to 
eliminate these maladies. My decree that the lamas must also draw lots is 
truly a replication of this.129 
 
Qianlong’s explanation directly references the controversy that erupted when Sun 
Peiyang (孫丕揚), the president of the Board of Civil Appointments, first introduced the 
practice of “drawing lots” (掣簽 or 拈鬮) in 1594. At the time, supporters of the measure 
                                                
129 Qianlong, Yuzhi shiwen shiquanji (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1993 [reprint]), 
642. “（金瓶掣签）犹之吏、兵二部掣签。在明创行时，即有作竹签传，又谓之签部以讥
之者。但若付之二部堂官，公正者不免恩怨，行私者竟得高下其手。无可如何，不得不行
如此以去弊。朕令喇嘛掣签，实仿此。” 
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argued that the lottery introduced fairness to the process of allocating administrative 
positions and eliminated the possibility that officials at the Board and candidates for 
office could collaborate in pursuit of their own “private interests.” Opponents feared that 
the lottery would make it difficult for the ministry to use its discretion to determine who 
was the right man for any given job.130 As Pierre Etienne Will points out, however, by the 
late seventeenth century, this debate had largely subsided. The lottery had become an 
unremarkable and routine step in the appointment system and had even been imitated by 
other boards.131 Both the Qing Huidian and various late-seventeenth and early eighteenth-
century magistrates’ manuals describe the basic procedure. First, before the assembled 
crowd of board officials and expectant magistrates, clerks of the board inscribed the 
various open positions on long bamboo slips. These lots were then placed in a tall, tube-
like vase, scrambled, and placed on a high table. Next, the magistrate-to-be knelt before 
the table and, without looking up, felt for a lot and plucked it out. Pierre Etienne Will 
argues that the mid-Qing authors of these magistrates’ manuals, unlike their Ming 
predecessors, were quite convinced that the procedure had succeeding in bringing 
impartiality to the appointment process and that the outcome was relatively difficult to fix 
in advance.132  
                                                
130 Pierre Etienne Will, “Creation, Conflict, and Routinization: The Appointment of Officials by 
Drawing Lots, 1594-1700” (unpublished manuscript shared with the author, June, 2009), 2.  
 
131 Will, 17, 21. 
 
132 Will, 16, 19. Will includes in his essay a long description of a lottery by the Portuguese Jesuit 
Gabriel de Magalhães who witnessed an instance of the ritual in 1669. Although he criticized the 
procedure as deeply corrupted, De Magalhães unintentionally backs up at least partially the 
opinions of the Qing observers cited above. According to de Magalhães, an expectant official 
bribed the ministers of the board to fix the lottery. Yet despite the expenditure of great wealth, the 
candidate still drew the wrong lot, condemning himself to a post in Guizhou when he thought he 
was about to draw a lucrative position in the Jiangnan region (Will, 18). 
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Given that Qianlong believed that personal greed and influence-peddling by the 
high lamas of Tibet had corrupted the recognition process, it is no surprise that he would 
turn to the administrative lottery of the Board of Civil Appointments—a measure that had 
been expressly designed to foil these sorts of human machinations. Qianlong’s mention 
of the old controversy is still striking however. Why would he want to remind his 
subjects that the magistrates’ lottery was initially unpopular? One could surmise that this 
is an admission by the emperor that he expected initial hostility to the new measure. 
However it is best understood as an expression of the Qianlong’s confidence: much as the 
merits of the lottery eventually won its widespread acceptance in the Chinese 
bureaucracy, he anticipated that the “lama lottery” would ultimately be embraced. 
But what was the metaphysical underpinning of the procedure and how did the 
court expect the ritual to be understood in Tibet? In February of the winter of 1792-1793 
(QL 57/12/29; 1793-02-09), four months after he had first been informed about the new 
ritual, Fukanggan submitted a memorial to the throne in which he recounted the 
reasoning he had used to justify the use of the Golden Urn to the Dalai Lama and other 
leading Tibetans. Fukanggan reported that he had discussed with the Tibetans the use of a 
lottery to make civil appointments in China proper and analogized it to the use of the 
Golden Urn. The memorial is significant also because it marks the first time that the 
connection between the two rituals is explicitly stated in a Qing government document.  
None of the palace memorials or court letters that I have read from the summer and fall 
of 1792, including the court letter in which Qianlong first introduces the Golden Urn, 
discuss its origins. It is still unclear, therefore, if the idea for a Golden Urn was 
Qianlong’s own, as he claimed in his commentary to his own poetry, or someone else’s. 
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Regardless, Fukanggan’s opinions on the importation of the ritual to Tibet are important 
as they contain a rich metaphysical exegesis of the ritual and thus deserve to be quoted at 
length:  
 
Your servants respectfully translated your edict. We compared the 
identification of reincarnations to the practice of drawing lots in the Board 
of Civil Appointments, which is truly an appropriate analogy. We observe 
that in the lotteries held by the Board of Civil Appointments the 
[expectant] officials (堂官) personally draw the lots, and although the 
clerks may attempt to indicate the post and cheat, only occasionally does 
this work and usually someone else gets the post.  In fact the clerks really 
have little influence (權) and one can see that a man's glory or obscurity 
depends on his fate/destiny (命數). This should all the more hold true for 
the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni, who, as the leaders of the Yellow 
Teaching have jurisdiction over Tibet, and having received the emperor's 
munificent kindness from above and the faith of the Mongols and Tibetans 
from below, already possess an exceptional fate (福命) regardless of 
whether they truly possess that innate endowment (根氣) [of being 
reincarnated buddhas].133 
 
According to Fukanggan, there was little difference between a kūtuktu and a magistrate 
who drew a fat post in a prosperous corner of the empire—“fate” had looked favorably 
upon them both. The lottery then is understood as a moment for luck to intervene and 
reveal a man’s fate. In the last sentence the general is remarkably direct: the Dalai Lama 
and Panchen Lamas may very well be charlatans, but they have still received a boon from 
destiny.  
Fukanggan’s explanation of the ritual reveals the degree to which the underlying 
Qing official understanding of the lottery could be at odds with the purpose the ritual had 
                                                
133 YHGSL 15:7 (《福康安奏為設立金本巴瓶確定呼畢勒罕事片》): “臣等敬譯聖諭，以指
認呼畢勒罕與吏部掣簽相比，實為此事切喻。竊以吏部掣簽本系堂官親掣，即使書吏指缺
撞騙，偶爾符合，亦系其人應得此缺，並非書吏有權，可見一命之榮胥關命數，何況達賴
喇嘛、班禪額爾德尼等總領黃教，管轄衛藏，上受聖主優渥恩施，下為眾蒙古番民信奉，
縱非實有根氣，其福命亦自不凡。” 
 74 
to serve in a Tibetan Buddhist context. In the latter context, a divination ritual is not a 
testament to a man’s “fate” as Fukanggan implies. Instead it is a revelation that exposes a 
hidden and preexisting inner truth, a truth that has arisen dependent (Tib: rten ’brel) upon 
the chains of cause and effect that link all things and all generations of things. As I will 
discuss in greater detail in Part Three, Tibetan divination rituals were designed to provide 
beings possessing omniscience and keen foresight—either adept lamas and kūtuktus or 
deities and gods—with the opportunity to provide signs or indications of that truth. This 
difference is most obvious in the case of divining the location of a reincarnation. 
Although the early Manchu-language discussions of the urn often conflate all the 
candidates as “hūbilgan” (reincarnations),134 Tibetan texts refer to them as “suspects” 
(Tib: dogs gnas, literally meaning “point of doubt”), among whom the “unmistaken” 
(Tib: ‘khrul med) reincarnation had already taken rebirth.135 
Qing officials were not unaware of Tibetan understandings of reincarnation. 
Hening (1741-1821), the Mongol bannerman from Jiangnan (绍兴 Shaoxing, to be 
specific) who replaced Cengde as assistant amban in 1793 and resided in Lhasa until 
1800 personally picked several lots from the urn. He was also a prolific writer. His 
literary corpus, published shortly after his death, Collected Poems from the Yijian Studio 
(《易簡斋詩鈔》), contains the following poem that illuminates the experience of 
participating in the urn ritual:  
 
 
                                                
134 MWLF 154:0982. 
 
135 See for example the Biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa (JYZP03), 37, passim. 
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Drawing Lots from the Golden Urn to Locate the Hūbilgan 
 
In ancient hall a golden vessel rests,  
Propitious morn, let the search for the Buddha commence! 
Where art thou bright and timely child, 
Who entered the world through enlightenment’s door? 
Never having suffered the torments of Hell, 
Thou relied only on the vehicle of the Six Virtues. 
Blessed Karma has preordained thy birth, 
Now trust my hand to pluck thee out!136 
 
《金本巴瓶簽掣呼畢勒罕》 
 
古殿金瓶設，祥晨選佛開。 
 誰家聰齡子，出世法門胎。 
 未受三塗戒，先憑六度媒。 
 善緣生已定，信我手拈來。 
 
 
In the amban’s poem, his grasp of incarnation is roughly in accord with that of his 
Tibetan contemporaries. Hening recognizes that well before the ritual the bodhisattva has 
transmigrated and taken rebirth in the shape of a small child.  The last line of the poem 
however, creates a powerful tension between that knowledge and the act of drawing a lot 
and thus reads like a riddle. Here, at the end of a profound chain of supernatural events 
lies the action of a very human, very mundane hand that leaves the reader wondering, 
“Why trust the hand? What guides it?” Hening is silent on this issue, attributing the 
                                                
136 Hening (和宁), Yijian zhai shichao (unpublished blockprint dated 1823, Harvard-Yenching 
Library). Hening, who towards the end of his life changed his name to Heying (和瑛) out of 
respect for a name taboo associated with the new Daoguang emperor, ended his career as Grand 
Councilor. Hening held a life-long interest in Tibet that began even prior to his assignment in 
Lhasa. Recent Chinese scholarship has identified him as the editor and author of much of the 
Weizang tongzhi. He also composed an epic prose-poem dedicated to Tibet, the Xizang fu (Ode to 
Tibet). Chi Wanxing, “Hening ji qi ‘Xizang fu’” (“和宁及其《西藏赋》”), Jinan daxue xuebao 
shehuikexueban (济南大学学报社会科学版) 18.4 (2008): 30-33.  
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selection neither to Fate nor to the intervention of the protector deities of Tibet. However, 
the challenge of reconciling the Golden Urn lottery with the indigenous tradition of 
divination—in other words, reconciling conceptions of fate with karma—would have to 
be surmounted by the court’s agents if they wanted to see Qianlong’s new measure 
accepted in Tibet. 
 
A Doctrine for Governing the World 
 
Let us return to the discussion that Qianlong had initiated with his officials when 
he first introduced the Golden Urn to the grand councilor Agūi in late August of 1792. 
When the emperor wrote to Agūi, the proposal for a Golden Urn lottery was more than 
tentative, yet still not fully formed. The throne was still looking for confirmation that its 
suspicions were correct and that the measure stood some chance of acceptance. In his 
letter, Qianlong directed Agūi, whom he flattered as “a man cognizant of opportunity and 
principle, possessing long experience with affairs,”137 to “at his convenience” submit his 
opinion about whether the proposal had either “not gone far enough” or, to the contrary 
was ill-suited to the moment and also solicit thoughts from among the kūtuktus and other 
ranking jasak lamas of the capital.138  
Specifically, Agūi was asked to make inquires of the Gomang Kūtuktu (Ma. 
G’umang Kūtuktu, Ch. 果蟒呼圖克圖 Guomang hutuketu) Gelek Namk’a (Ma.), the 
                                                
137 Qianlong’s appeal to notions of “opportunity” and policy are littered throughout these texts. 
Recall the emperor’s definitive statement on “opportunity” in the Discourse on Lamas that I 
quoted at the beginning of this paper. 
 
138 MWLF 154:0982-0983. 
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second highest ranking lama residing in Beijing during the spring and summer of 1792.139 
The lama’s opinion on the “matter of determining things by drawing wooden name-
cards140 from a golden urn,” appears to have been attached to Agūi’s memorial detailing 
his own thoughts on the issue. The kūtuktu reported to the grand councilor that, “while 
making inquires [I] have heard that it is indeed the case that there exists corruption when 
observing the prophecies of the Lamo Chökyong.”141 Although the Gomang Kūtuktu 
provided no examples of this corruption, with this statement the lama added a key voice 
from within the tradition confirming Qianlong’s suspicions. It is perhaps ironic that this 
lama, here called on to testify about the corruption of the selection process, had himself 
been the subject of Qianlong’s suspicions just a few years prior when he had been 
involved in the search for the reincarnation of his teacher, Changkya Rolpay Dorjé.142 
Moreover, the lama continued to bring credibility to the new ritual by reporting that he 
had also heard that previously the Panchen Lama had drawn lots (Ma. šusihe tatafi 
toktobuhengge) to determine the rebirth of the Dalai Lama. Finally, the lama concluded 
                                                
139 A list of “sutra reading lamas” in residence at Yonghegong (“雍和宮念經喇嘛”) dated QL 
57/04R/05 is included among the documents of YHGSL 14:348. The list begins with the three 
leading kūtuktu currently in residence, listed according to rank: Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu (噶尔丹錫
哷圖呼圖克圖), Gomang Kūtuktu (果蟒呼圖克圖), and Dongkor Kūtuktu (洞科尔呼圖克圖). 
 
140 In the early communications concerning the urn the Manchu word “šusihe,” meaning a small 
square of wood, was used to refer to the lot. Later, as the vocabulary for the ritual became fixed, 
this term was replaced by “sibiya,” referring to a more elongated “tally” stick. The shifting 
vocabulary probably reflected the shifting design for the ritual. From the beginning, Qianlong and 
his officials referred to the urn in Manchu as a “bum.” This term is clearly borrowed from the 
Tibetan term for squat, bulbous vessels: “bum pa.” In the Board of Civil Appointments, the 
lottery was conducted using a tall cylindrical vase (Ch. 筒). The fact that Qianlong and his 
officials selected a golden “bum” as opposed to a “tong” provides another argument for the case 
that the ritual was the product of close consultations with Tibetans in the capital. 
 
141 MWLF 154:0978. 
 
142 MWJXD: 03-138-3-050 (QL 51/06/28, 1786-07-23). 
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by expressing confidence that once the “Great Holy Lord Manjusri” (i.e. Qianlong) had 
dispatched the Golden Urn to Tibet (M. Dzang) “all sorts of corruptions would be 
completely eliminated.”143  
To this resounding endorsement, Agūi added his own, more nuanced assessment 
of the proposal in a separate memorial. The grand councilor raised the thorny question of 
what would happen if upon reaching adulthood, the child identified by the lottery proved 
to be “lacking in grandeur” (Ma. yokcin akūngge). “It cannot be predicted,” Agūi wrote, 
“if it will be possible to convince people.”144 As he went through the implications of such 
a scenario, he warned that it would be “unbecoming” (Ma. banjinarakū) for the dynasty 
to backtrack on the results of the lottery. Therefore the court had to be prepared to remind 
the people that the original candidates had been their choice and that multiple 
investigations had revealed that all the children were “endowed with the fortune of 
intelligence and wisdom” (Ma. sure ulhisu i hūturingga). 145  Yet despite these 
reservations, Agūi concurred with the Throne that the time to act had arrived. In fact his 
diagnosis of the problem went much further back in time and higher up the hierarchy of 
the Geluk church. 
Agūi placed before the emperor the argument that the Dalai Lama was more than 
just a weak ruler inclined to nepotism. Worse than this, the grand councilor reported that 
his inquiries revealed that the Eighth Dalai Lama (actually the Seventh Dalai Lama from 
the perspective of Qianlong-period officialdom) was in fact a false incarnation and the 
morally bankrupt core of an administration and religion in crisis. He wrote:  
                                                
143 MWLF 154:0979. 
 
144 MWLF 154:0985-0986. 
 
145 MWLF 154:0986. 
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The comportment and speech of the present Dalai Lama are incapable of 
inspiring feelings of respect among the people. This is because he 
possesses but meager fortune (Ma. hūturi). When he was selected, the 
matter was not handled seriously and cautiously.146 Thus, the Gurkha 
bandits out of disrespect encroached on borders of Tibet like madmen. 
The Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni are great lamas to whom all the 
Mongols and Tibetans (Ma. monggoso tanggut se) sacrifice. Surely if 
[they] possessed a perfected fortune (Ma. hūturi yongkiyame)  [consisting 
of] wisdom, perception and virtue these events would not have occurred 
and they would have been able to work for the benefit of the Yellow 
Teachings.147 
  
Here Agūi has turned back the clock to the contest surrounding the recognition of Eighth 
Dalai Lama in 1760, and, in an oblique criticism of Changkya Kūtuktu Rolpay Dorjé who 
oversaw the recognition process together with the Sixth Panchen Lama, argues that the 
traditional methods located the wrong man.148  
As evidence he points to recent events as signs that the Dalai Lama lacks the 
requisite attribute of hūturi, usually translated as “good luck” or “fortune” (Ch. 福氣).149 
The Chinese translation of this term, 福氣 fuqi, implies a closer connection to the concept 
of fate/destiny (Ch. 命, Ma. hešebun forgon) than exists in the Manchu usage.150 Whereas 
Fukanggan writing in Chinese argues that kūtuktuhood, genuine or not, is a function of an 
external fate (Ch. 命), hūturi is an internal quality and a measure of authenticity unique to 
                                                
146 This would be an allusion to the succession crisis that followed the death of the seventh Dalai 
Lama (d. 1757). 
 
147 MWLF 154:0984. 
 
148 For a description of the succession crisis that followed the death of the Seventh Dalai Lama 
see Chen Qingying, Dalai lama zhuanshi ji lishi dingzhi (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 
2003), 63-64. 
 
149 Jerry Norman, Concise Manchu Lexicon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 141.  
 
150 Hu Zengyi, Xin Manhan da cidian (Urumchi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe,1994), 434. 
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the Manchu-language discourse. In the Manchu text of the tetraglot Discourse on Lamas 
Qianlong writes that, “A person must be found to have wisdom, intelligence and hūturi to 
be considered a reincarnation.”151 The Chinese and Tibetan versions of this text translate 
this term as “福相 fuxiang” and “sonam” (Tib. bsod nams), respectively. Both words can 
be conventionally translated as “fortune” or “luck,” but the Tibetan word has more 
nuanced implications. Rangjung Yeshe defines sonam as “merit, moral virtue, 
happiness,” and “the positive karmic result from meritorious actions.”152 The Tibetan 
gloss then also, in contrast to the Chinese, conveys the idea that hūturi is a reflection of 
inner qualities, not the blind will of fate.  
I find the English word “genius” an apt interpretation of hūturi as it is deployed 
by Qianlong and his officials, especially in light of the word’s Latin etymology and early 
English usage. “Genius” originally referred to the spirit that accompanied a man into the 
world at birth and governed his character, temperament, intellectual capabilities and 
finally, his fortune. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that by the nineteenth-century 
“the word had an especial fitness to denote that particular kind of intellectual power 
which has the appearance of proceeding from a supernatural inspiration or possession, 
and which seems to arrive at its results in an inexplicable and miraculous manner.”153  In 
this context I advance that hūturi be similarly understood as that innate endowment of 
                                                
151 Ma. “urunakū emu sure ulhisu hūturi bisire niyalma be baifi. hūbilgan obufi.” Qianlong 
Discourse, Manchu text, line 7. 
 
152 “bsod nams,” Tibet and Himalaya Digital Library, Tibetan Translation Tool, Rangjung Yeshe 
gloss, accessed September 26, 2013,  http://www.thlib.org/reference/dictionaries/tibetan-
dictionary/translate.php. 
 
153 “Genius, n.,” OED Online, Oxford University Press, accessed September 26, 2013, 
http://www.oed.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/Entry/77607?redirectedFrom=genius. 
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genius that defined a man’s fundamental disposition and of which his behavior and 
speech, charisma and influence, success and failure were unconscious reflections. Thus 
Agūi finds both the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni to be lacking what one would expect 
from a birth attended by the genius of a Buddha. 
The grand councilor also agreed with the emperor that the crisis of faith in 
reincarnation represented an opportunity for intervention. He wrote, “At this moment the 
Dalai Lama can no longer rely on the support of all Tibetans. If we pursue this 
opportunity and convincingly explain [things to the Tibetans], we can rectify [matters]. 
How can the Dalai Lama do anything but obey?”154 Agūi is suggesting here that, with the 
Dalai Lama’s political influence at its nadir his secular authority could be seized by the 
dynasty. 
During the same month that Agūi submitted his opinion, Qianlong began to 
receive advice from other quarters via the efforts of the chief grand councilor Hešen. 
Among the early reports forwarded to the Throne was letter from the Galdan Siretu 
Kūtuktu.155 This lama’s advice was evidently deemed significant as it was quoted in a 
                                                
154 MWLF 154:0984-0985. 
 
155 Ma. G’aldan Siretu Kūtuktu: I have yet to positively identify this lama. “G’aldan Siretu,” 
meaning “golden-throne holder of Ganden [Monastery],” is a fairly generic title frequently 
attached to monks who had served as the chief throne-holder at Ganden Monastery in Lhasa (the 
“Ganden Tripa”), the highest position in the Geluk church. In the mid-late Qianlong reign it was 
customary for the government of the Dalai Lama to dispatch former “Golden-throne” holders 
from Lhasa to serve as chief of the Geluk mission in Beijing and minister to the Throne. These 
men are not to be confused with the similarly named (Ma:) “G’aldan Siretu Kūtuktu,” a major 
reincarnate lineage from Amdo affiliated with Lamo Dechen and Labrang monasteries that 
maintained an estate in Beijing and whose “portfolio” traditionally included assisting with 
Buddhist projects in the capital and providing diplomatic services for the court in Amdo. In the 
early 1790s, the current incarnation of this lineage (Tib: Gser khri rin po che “Serkhri Rinpoché” 
04 Ngag dbang thub bstan ‘phrin las rgya mtsho, 1773-1815) was just emerging from childhood 
and therefore was in no position to serve as an advisor in Beijing. For more on this lineage, see 
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draft of the first Manchu-language court letter to bring the proposal for a Golden Urn to 
the attention of the court’s chief officers in Tibet and Fukanggan, who at the time was 
still campaigning in Nepal. The Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu provides both a clarification for 
the emperor on the nature of the oracles of Central Tibet and a larger ritual context for the 
new urn ritual. Hešen’s court letter quotes the lama as follows:  
 
‘The Lamo chökyong is a protector deity (Ma. sakigūlsu enduri)156 and not 
at all human. In addition to the Lamo chökyong, there are also three other 
chökyong: the Néchung (Ma. Neijung), Gadong (Ma. G'awadung), and 
Samyé (Ma. Samye). Whenever an hūbilgan emerges, a prophecy will 
certainly be sought to determine his location. After the direction [in which 
the rebirth will be found] has been indicated, it is appropriate to conduct a 
detailed search. Henceforth, the matter of investigating and verifying 
where a hūbilgan has been born (i.e. identifying a rebirth), having been 
assigned to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, good and virtuous 
mediums157 having been selected, prophecies shall be sought successively 
from the chökyong. When the instructions of the oracles are all in accord, 
people shall be commissioned to search in those places. Once several 
places where hūbilgan [may] have emerged have been located and 
investigated, if the true year and month of their birth are suitably 
auspicious and lucky (Ma. hūturi fengšen), then their names should be 
written down and placed in a vase to be selected.’158 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Sangs rgyas rin chen, “Laa mo bde chen dgon pa'i sku phyag gser khri rin po che'i sku phreng rim 
byon gyi lo rgyus mdo bsdus ngo sprod,” Mdo smad zhib 'jug 1 (1999): 108-118. 
 
156 Much like “kūtuktu” and “hūbilgan,” the Manchu term “sakigūlsu enduri” (protector, guardian 
spirit or deity) was originally imported from Mongol. The original Mongol term is sakigulsun, 
Lessing, 662. 
 
157 Ma. gurdemba, Tib. sku rten pa: “Gurdemba” is the Manchu transliteration of the Tibetan 
word for the human medium that channels the instructions of the protector deity. As I will note 
later, Qing authors found this term roughly parallel to their own concept of “saman” (i.e. 
shaman). Their transliteration of this term, as well as numerous other Tibetan words, reflects an 
Amdo-based pronunciation, which makes sense given that the court’s major Tibetan interlocutors 
primarily hailed from the Amdo region. A compelling case can be made therefore that the Qing’s 
Manchu translators of Tibetan were most familiar with Amdo Tibetan. 
    
158 MWLF 154:0491-0492 (QL 57/07/25, 1792-09-11). 
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In this letter the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu sanctions the new ritual, yet avoids 
mentioning any culpability or corruption on the part of the oracles. On the contrary, his 
argument that the chökyong are in fact powerful deities reveals no loss of faith in the 
oracles and provides a counterpoint to Qianlong’s argument that the oracles were merely 
self-interested humans. Moreover, although he consented to the urn as the penultimate 
step in the recognition process, he argued that the oracles and the involvement of the 
Dalai and Panchen lamas remain unavoidable and necessary aspects of the search. In this 
respect, the kūtuktu’s letter posed an obstacle to the Throne’s desire to see the oracles 
eliminated from the process. Yet the fact that Qianlong allowed this scenario to be 
incorporated into a court letter explaining the new procedure to his field officials in Lhasa 
reveals that the lama’s letter was seen first and foremost as legitimizing the Golden Urn 
ritual and offering a way to incorporate it into a search process that met the emperor’s 
basic requirement: that mechanisms to check the willful exercise of power and influence 
by the oracles and prelates of the Geluk school be established. Over the next several 
months, however, the Throne would continue to seek ways to completely eliminate 
oracles from the process. 
At this critical juncture the Throne had amassed not only damning reports from its 
own officials as well as prelates of the Geluk Church attesting to the corruption of the 
Dalai Lama and the oracles and the spreading suspicions about the authenticity of major 
kūtuktu, but also support for a possible remedy. In the draft court letter, the emperor then 
paused to take stock of the underlying significance of the reform measure he was about to 
circulate to his officials. In the following quotation, I have underlined the sections that 
the emperor crossed out and placed his amendments to Hešen’s draft in brackets.  
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Previously when identifying the hūbilgan of the Dalai Lama, Panchen 
Erdeni and all other kūtuktu, only the prophecies of the Lamo Chökyong 
were considered. The Buddhist  [Edit: Tibet’s (wei dzang) old] way (doro) 
was deliberately established and [Edit: for a long time until now] the 
Buddha's doctrine (Ma. Fucihi doro) alone was paramount [Edit: therefore 
the teaching (tacin) declined and corruption arose]: everything is 
emptiness, nothing exists, and there is nothing else. If one does good, that 
is good. If one does evil, that is also okay. As for people's personal 
behavior, it will of its own accord lead to rebirth. The Buddha does not 
restrain people at all (umai darkū).  
 
The way of the emperor (hūwangdi ojoro doro) is different. He who does 
good will certainly be encouraged. He who does evil will be handled with 
punishments. [Edit: However] According to way of the Buddha one 
merely waits upon karma (karulan) to of its own accord mete out 
punishment or reward. This is improper. [Edit: Truly, not only did this 
give rise only to evil but, despite their best intentions, neither virtue nor 
sin ever received its just reward.] Therefore due to the raids committed by 
of the Gurkha bandits, a large army had to be quickly dispatched, which 
defeated and destroyed them. Similarly, it would not have been 
appropriate to, in the manner of the Buddha, do nothing to restrain them, 
and just wait for karma to act of its own accord [Edit: which would have 
been just like saying ‘let’s just wait and see what happens to everyone’s 
virtue and sins.’]. This matter was handled according to the way of ruling 
the world (jalan be dasara doroi gamahabi). If it was the case that the 
Buddha took care of everything, then how was it that the Šamarba was not 
killed and the Gurkha bandits were not stopped?159 
 
Unfortunately, our draft court letter is a fragment and cuts off shortly after the last 
sentence above. Yet the drift of the emperor’s thinking is quite clear: One cannot expect 
to govern the temporal world by Buddhist principles alone. As a governing philosophy, 
the “way of the Buddha” is little more than a recipe for non-action. The “old way of U-
Tsang,” which Qianlong reduces to a near parody, is so enthralled with the theory of 
karma that the rulers have failed to establish laws and codes. Lacking immediate 
inducements or punishments, the people exist “untamed” (Ma. darkū) without moral 
                                                
159 MWLF 154:0492-0493. 
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guidance. Here then, Qianlong is offering a crucial explanation to his officials about why 
“Tibet is entirely without fixed laws,” as Heliyen had put it just a month earlier.160 
Ecclesiastic governments, Qianlong argues, by their very nature, do not produce laws. In 
contrast, the “way of the emperor” is a practical and tested “doctrine for ruling the 
world.”161 Thus Qianlong explicitly rejects and delegitimizes the underlying rationale 
behind the Buddhist government of the Dalai Lamas, paving the way not only for greater 
supervision of reincarnation but also the appropriation of the authority of the Ganden 
Podrang as suggested by Agūi.  
 
Conclusion: “Improve their Laws, Don’t Replace their Traditions” 
  
 Fukanggan’s response to Qianlong’s proposal reveals how far his opinion had 
evolved since he first reported his impressions of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni 
seven months earlier. In his lone Manchu-language letter concerning this subject to the 
emperor, dated September twenty-fifth, 1792 (QL 57/08/10) the general wrote:  
 
These days the long-held teachings (Ma. inenggi goidafi tacin) have fallen 
into decay. All reincarnations now (reappear) within their own [original] 
gentry families. Many [reincarnations] have emerged from the same clan 
(Ma. mukūn) of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni. As the edict has 
pointed out, in the first place, because the Lamo Chökyong grasps at 
material goods, [he] has become corrupt and now points out his own 
relatives. In the second, since the Dalai Lama himself is secretly pleased, 
it is impossible for him to think that these identifications are not entirely 
authentic (Ma. dalai lama se jendu gūnin bahabufi joribure be yargiyan i 
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gemu akū obume muterakū). Yet even having rooted out all these various 
corruptions, we certainly still must locate genuine reincarnations.162 
 
At the time of his first audience with the Dalai Lama, Fukanggan praised the Dalai Lama 
as possessing the “Buddha’s wisdom.”163 Yet here Fukanggan impugns his Buddha 
nature by suggesting that the lama is not without attachment to friends and family. At 
least, however, Fukanggan’s paraphrase of the emperor’s decree implies that the Dalai 
Lama’s weakness for his relatives was unintentional and involuntary, whereas Qianlong’s 
original wording stated that the repeated recognition of fellow clansmen as was a result of 
the lama’s deliberate manipulation.164  
 Regardless of the legitimacy of the current crop of kūtuktu, Fukanggan states 
explicitly that “genuine rebirths” do exist and that it is, “the [emperor’s] fundamental 
intention” to arrive at an effective way of locating them. 165  Both Qianlong and 
Fukanggan recognized, however, that how to do so was still subject to discussion. At this 
point the idea for a “lottery of hūbilgan” was merely a sketch. Who would draw the lots? 
Where would it occur? How were names to be located? What role were the oracles and 
the protectors to play? The fact that over the next several years the ritual would be 
performed in several different ways and in different locations demonstrates the degree to 
which the details and significance of the ritual was subject to negotiation, debate and re-
interpretation by the court, its field officials and Tibetan elites. The Throne had instructed 
Fukanggan to not only discuss the proposal for the Golden Urn with the two other 
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163 Huibian, 705-708. 
 
164 MWLF 154:0981-0982. 
 
165 MWLF 154:1352. 
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officials resident in Lhasa, Heliyen and Ohūi, but also consult with Tibetan elites. 
Qianlong wrote, “If after discussions with the Dalai Lama and Tatsak Rinpoché (Ma. 
Jirung Kūtuktu), it will be appropriate to handle things in this manner, then immediately 
promulgate the edict. If there are any aspects of this measure that are not suitable, then 
please compose a memorial informing me of the complete truth.”166 
 It appears however, that Qianlong did not wait for further advice from his general 
before beginning the process of formalizing and promulgating his new ritual. On October 
14, 1792 (QL 57/08/29), the Throne issued a formal decree in Manchu to the “inner and 
outer jasaks” (i.e. the Mongol aristocracy), appraising them of the new stance on the 
legitimacy of the major kūtuktus of the Geluk school, the prohibition against locating 
reincarnations within aristocratic households and the establishment of the Golden Urn 
lottery to supplant the oracles as the final step. This was the earliest public promulgation 
of the new ritual and predated the earliest Chinese-language proclamation, the famous 
Discourse on Lamas, by over two months. In this edict, Qianlong articulated in no 
uncertain terms both the importance he placed on the elimination of doubt in the 
authenticity of reincarnations and his conviction that the current generation of major 
kūtuktus were false: 
 
Only if all the people are convinced that the hūbilgan of the Dalai Lama 
and Panchen Erdeni are definitively true will the Yellow Teaching flourish 
and spread. From the beginning, when identifying [possible] hūbilgan, 
only the prophecies of the oracles/protectors (Ma. cuijung) have been 
sought and those whom they have indicated have become hūbilgan. For 
the past several years, it has been impossible for the divine (Ma. enduri) to 
descend because the mediums (Ma. gurdemba) possess only ordinary 
abilities. The Dalai Lama, Panchen Erdeni and Jebtsundamba kūtuktu are 
all from one clan perhaps because, having accepted requests from various 
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people, [the oracles] falsely identify [hūbilgan]. In my opinion, because 
[they] have all appeared among close relatives, I cannot consider them to 
be genuine… Truly [this] joke has reached the point of destroying the 
Yellow teachings. In my opinion this is greatly unbearable.167 
   
Already these comments stand in stark contrast to official pronouncements made just a 
year earlier when the emperor praised the fortitude of the Dalai Lama and his closest 
advisors for their organization of the defense of Lhasa.168 Yet Qianlong went further still, 
questioning the very legitimacy of reincarnation as embodied by the major kūtuktu of 
Tibet: 
 
I have zealously examined the Buddha’s sutras and thoroughly understand 
the way of the Buddha. The Buddha has neither going nor coming. 
Moreover, the existence of the oracles has never been proclaimed in the 
sutras (Ma. inu umai cuijung bisire babe nomulahakū). It has been written 
that even the Buddha is without achievements (faššan) and that the root is 
emptiness and nothingness. It has been said [by the Buddha] that all 
exploits (faššan) are but the deceits of dreams. Even though the 
oracles/protectors are meritorious (faššan), the mediums then, on the 
pretext of channeling the instructions of the Protector, act corruptly. None 
of this is the way of the Buddha. However there is nothing we can do but 
carry on their old customs. We can only plan on suppressing their private 
corruptions. Similarly, it is naturally their private and public opinion that 
if there were no hūbilgan there would be no one to protect and govern the 
disciples of the Yellow Teaching.169 
 
Qianlong incorporated major elements of this Manchu-language proclamation into 
his more famous and polished Discourse on Lamas, most significantly his conviction, 
based on his claim of authoritative knowledge of Buddhism, that directed rebirth 
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168 KKFL, 102 (edict of QL 56/09/20). 
 
169 MWLF 155:2860-2861. The meaning of the Manchu term faššan poses some translation issues 
here. It seems to stand for several different concepts in English.  
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(“tülkuhood”) was not part of the Buddha’s original teachings, as well as his resignation 
to the fact that it would be impolitic and un-pragmatic to attempt its full elimination. In 
the Discourse Qianlong wrote, “As for [our] high esteem for the Yellow Hat teaching, it 
is in accordance with the desires of the Mongols and is therefore not only important but 
also necessary.”170 
It is this tone of political expediency that has made the Discourse on Lamas such 
a familiar face to Qing historians.171 Few historians have failed to comment on the 
significance of Qing patronage of the Geluks with regards to the dynasty’s rule in 
Mongolia. Yet the singular focus of these early pronouncements on the Mongols has not 
been previously noted. It should not be surprising then that the Throne’s first public 
edicts on the Golden Urn were both addressed primarily to the Mongol aristocracy and 
the court officials charged with their supervision, not to the Tibetans. The degree to 
which the Geluk school, and Tibetans more generally, were important only as they 
related to the court’s strategic interests in Mongolia is readily apparent in both of these 
edicts. In the earlier of the two edicts, the Tibetans (Ma. fandze) are only mentioned once 
whereas the Mongols are mentioned five times. Similarly, despite the fact that the 
Discourse is “about lamas,” the most significant of whom reside in Tibet, “Tibetans” are 
explicitly referred to only once in contrast to seven mentions of the significance of the 
faith of the “Mongols.” In the latter document, the emperor partially justifies his new 
measures by explaining that they are “in harmony with the wishes of both the outer and 
                                                
170 Discourse, Tibetan, line 11. 
 
171 See for instance comments on this aspect by Berger (2003, 35-36), Elverskog (2006, 3), and 
Rockhill (1910, 54). 
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inner Mongols.”172 For Qianlong, the primary strategic challenge the dynasty faced in 
1791 was the potential political instability in Mongolia that would be the inevitable 
fallout from the spread of doubts in the authenticity of reincarnation. The predicament at 
hand seemed to the court to be brought about primarily due to the moral failings of its 
governing elite in Inner Asia, both lay and ecclesiastic. Thus the Gurkha invasion of 
Tibet was understood in the first as a symptom of a personnel crisis, not a crisis of 
sovereignty. From Qianlong’s own writing it appears that the military campaign against 
the Gurkhas was motivated neither by the cant of conquest nor by any fear that the 
Gurkhas represented a serious competitor to Qing interests in Tibet as had the Zunghar 
Mongols a generation earlier. Tibet, Tibetans, and their neighbors to the south, remained 
but an ancillary to the perennial concerns of the northwest. 
 The fact that directly controlling Tibet was not end in and of itself from the 
perspective of the Throne explains why Qianlong’s pledge to extend the application of 
the “king’s law” (Ma. gurun i fafun, Tib. rgyal khrims, Ch. 王法) to the elite of Tibet in 
1792 was so novel, a situation that he himself recognized. The Discourse, as well as 
several other major imperially-sanctioned pronouncements issued in the immediate 
aftermath of the Qing intervention trace the relationship between the dynasty and Tibet 
back to the arrival of emissaries from the Fifth Dalai Lama at the court of Hung Taiji, 
prior even to the Qing conquest of China.  The Qing reform of Tibetan governance in the 
1790s coincided with a veritable explosion of writing including gazetteers, saga-length 
prose poems, and especially stele, the latter of which sought to inscribe the 
unprecedented Qing achievement permanently on the landscape of Lhasa. In the Small 
                                                
172 Discourse, Tibetan, line 34. 
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Pox Stele (Ch.《整飭西藏風俗碑》) erected outside the Jokhang in 1794, the chief 
amban Heliyen gushed in Chinese, “From the Tang and Song [dynasties] on, although 
[Tibet] had contact with China it was not part of the latter’s territory. During the time of 
emperor Taizong Wenhuangdi (Ma. Hung Taiji, r. 1626-1643) they sincerely returned, 
and over the past hundred-odd years, due to the influence of the imperial instruction, have 
gradually been transformed.”173 But lest we misinterpret what were evidently overly 
enthusiastic and patriotic re-interpretations of the historical scope of the Qing domain, no 
one less than Qianlong himself provided an important corrective. Among the annotations 
to his poetry, the emperor offered the following information on Tibet: “Although [Tibet] 
came to an imperial audience during the Chongde reign (Chongde seven, 1642), their 
territory still was not ours… Even during the early Shunzhi reign when the Dalai Lama 
arrived for an audience and received his original golden seal [of office], their territory 
was still not possessed by China.”174 Full control of Tibet had not been realized, Qianlong 
argued, until after the Gurkha War, when “everything is handled by [my] ministers and I 
have but to command and it will be obeyed.”175 He contrasts this new state of affairs to 
that which prevailed even earlier in his own reign when the “resident ambans entrusted 
everything [to the kalöns] and took responsibility for nothing.”176 
                                                
173 Reprinted in Zhang Yuxin, Qing zhengfu yu lama jiao: fu Qingdai lama jiao beikelu (Lhasa: 
Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1988), 497: “唐宋以來，雖通中國，未隸版圖，自我朝太宗文皇帝
時歸誠，迄今百有餘年，熏陶王教，漸臻於化矣。”  
 
174Gaozong, Shiquan, 644: “崇德雖入覲。其地非我有... 至順治初年。達賴喇嘛入覲。亦曾
敕賜金冊印。雖時其地尚非中國所有也。”  
 
175 Gaozong, Shiquan, 644. 
 
176 Gaozong, Shiquan, 645: “向來藏中大小事務，均由噶布倫四人辦理，而駐藏大臣，一切
付之不問。”  
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 The discussion of the subjection of Tibetan lay and clerical officials to what the 
Tibetan version of the Discourses on Lamas identifies as the “king’s law,”177 echoes 
previous statements we have already examined, most importantly the justification of the 
execution of the monk from Trashi Lhünpo and the draft court letter submitted by Hešen 
quoted at length above.  In this treatise, the emperor makes the case that “the royal law is 
indispensable”178 first because Buddhist codes alone have proven incapable of providing 
the necessary restraints on immoral self-interests (as we saw in the Hešen court letter)—
thus Qianlong feels obliged to legislate a permanent prohibition on tülku taking rebirth 
among their relatives; and, second because setting anyone above the law, even monks, 
threatens the governing system as a whole, which is what the emperor states had brought 
down the Yuan.179 Reflecting on the execution of the monk from Trashi Lhünpo, the 
Tibetan version of the Discourse has the emperor explain that, “Those who incite turmoil 
will be punished according to the law in the same manner as subjects of the interior (Tib. 
nang gi ’bangs mi).”180 The Manchu version of this sentence is slightly different, noting 
                                                
177 Tib: rgyal khrims: “Royal law,” “king’s law,” or even “dynastic law” are all appropriate 
English translations of this term and closely match the connotation of the term in both Manchu 
(gurun i fafun, “law of the dynasty”) and Chinese (wangfa, “law of the king”). The Tibetan term 
also connotes “temporal law” as it is implicitly contrasted against religious law (Tib. chos 
khrims). 
  
178 Discourse, Tibetan, line 25: sangs rgyas pa la rang don med/ rgyal khrims med mi rung (“The 
Buddha had no concern for himself. The royal law is indispensable”). The Manchu text (line 13) 
reads slightly differently: fucihi de ainahai cisu bini. tuttu fafularakū oci ojorakū (“How can the 
Buddha have any self-interests? Thus it is not acceptable that [I] do not pass laws.”). The Chinese 
text reads: “佛岂有私？故不可不禁。” 
 
179 Discourse, Tibetan, line 29. 
 
180 Discourse, Tibetan, line 31: de tsho ‘khrug long bskyed yod na nang gi ‘bangs mi dang ‘dra 
bar khrims kyis ‘da. Ch: “而惑众乱法者， 仍以王法治之，與內地齊民無異。” Ma. line 16: 
ere dade. geren be hūlimbume fafun be facuhūrahangge be kemuni dorgi ba i irgen i emu adali 
gurun i fafun i gamahabi. “From the first, those who disobey the law concerning deluding the 
people will have been dealt with according to the laws of the dynasty just like the people of the 
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that it is specifically the law against “misleading the people” (Ma. geren be hūlimbume 
fafun) that is now to be extended to Tibet and Tibetan divination practices. With this line, 
Qianlong established a legal precedent with enormous potential significance. The 
underlying principle here was that both Tibetan and Chinese subjects of the dynasty were 
to be universally under the authority of laws granted by the emperor and supervised by 
his appointees. It was this change that Qianlong later identified as the removal of toose—
“sovereignty,” from the indigenous elite.181 
 It is important to clarify, however, that the Chinese, Manchu and Tibetan versions 
of the Discourse on Lamas discuss expanding the jurisdiction of the laws of the dynasty 
and not necessarily those of China. Although in the case of the Tibetan monk-diviners, 
Qianlong applied the law code of the interior (specifically the law on deluding the 
people) as his standard, it is evident that he is arguing for the universal application of his 
sovereignty, not the universal application of the codes of the interior. Yet this was a fine 
and often blurred distinction. The degree to which the goals of Qing sovereignty were to 
be defined in terms of Chinese content or “Chinese territories” (中國版圖) varied. The 
conflation of the boundaries of the Qing realm with “China” (Ch. 中國) that appears in 
the quotes from the emperor’s poetry and Heliyen’s stele text is quite exceptional. In all 
three versions of Discourses, the emperor is exclusively concerned with the relationship 
of this Inner Asian subjects—Mongol aristocrats, lamas, and to a lesser extent Tibetans, 
to the dynasty (Tib. gur, Ma. gurun, Ch. 朝). “China” is alluded to only as another 
                                                                                                                                            
interior.” One wonders if the shift from “delude the people” to “incite turmoil” reflects the 
possibility that the criminal use of divination was not a readily understood category in Tibetan 
thought. 
 
181 MWLF 159:1202. 
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subject of the dynasty.182 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Tibetan texts from the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries such as the Biography of the Eighth Dalai 
Lama are also quite consistent in maintaining this distinction between China and the 
emperor. Although Tibetan texts do frequently refer to the Qing state as “China”—in fact 
the term “Qing” is rarely used, the political relationship is with the emperor, not with 
“China.”  
 The Tibetan-language text of the Small Pox Stele, for instance, does not record 
Tibet as having “entered the map,” implying becoming part of the territory of China (Ch. 
zhongguo). Instead the Tibetan text explicitly states that Tibet has become subject/allied 
to the emperor.  In contrast to the Chinese passage quoted above, the Tibetan-language 
version reads: “The land of Tibet (Tib. bod gyi yul) owed no allegiance (Tib. chab 
'bangs) to the great royal house of the land of China during the times of the Tang and 
Song kings (Tib. rgyal po). During the time of our emperor (Tib. gong ma chen po) 
Taizong Wen, dependency (Tib. chab 'bangs) was established. Since then more than a 
hundred years have passed and everyone has come to understand the practices of the 
King's law.”183 The Tibetan text, far from suggesting “return” and “transformation” to 
what are implicitly Chinese ways, conveys the idea that Tibetans have become familiar 
with imperial standards of law and order. 
That emperor Qianlong recognized the delicate balance between imposing 
sovereignty and imposing an alien culture is evident from his careful use of a passage 
                                                
182 Discourse, Tibetan, line 10. 
 
183 My translation based on transcription of the original Tibetan-language text in Hugh 
Richardson, Ch’ing Dynasty Inscriptions at Lhasa (Serie Orientale Roma 37. Rome: Instituto 
Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1974), 56-57. One wonders why the Yuan and Ming 
periods were not mentioned in this abbreviated chronology. 
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from the Book of Rites (《禮記》) just prior to making his point that Tibetan hierarchs 
must be subject to imperial law: 
 
Although I supported the teaching of the Yellow Hats, [I] have done so 
according to a passage that appears in the System of the King: “One should 
improve their teachings, not replace their teachings. One should improve 
their laws, not replace their traditions.”184 
 
The fact that he included this statement, and that Tibetan translations of these original 
Manchu or Chinese language pronouncements on Qing aims in the region distinguish so 
clearly between the emperor and China, suggest that the emperor (or perhaps his 
translators) was at least somewhat sensitive to their reception among the laity and clergy 
of Tibet.  
Still, one cannot underestimate the difficulty of conveying the dynasty’s policies 
to the Inner Asian elite. Moreover, if the dictum from the Book of Rites was to be the 
guiding principle of Qing colonial rule, it was a highly subjective one. Fukanggan, for 
one, also noted the sensitivity of this task. Upon first learning of the new procedure for 
recognizing hūbilgan he wrote, “Just as we must locate people possessed of virtue and 
genius (Ma. erdemungge hūturingga) [who are hūbilgan], we must also persuade the 
honest clergy and laity.”185 How were the emperor’s officials to explain to the ruling elite 
of Tibet, both lay and clerical, that dynasty’s goal was to locate genuine reincarnations 
without in the same breath insulting them? Thus, as the idea for the Golden Urn passed 
beyond the emperor’s inner circle of Manchu-speaking advisors into the wider world of 
                                                
184 Discourse, Tibetan, Lines 30-31. The System of the King is a chapter of the Book of Rites. The 
original reads as follows: “修其教，不易其俗，齊其政，不易其宜。” 
 
185 MWLF 154:1353. 
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the Qing dynasty’s polyglot empire, the ritual faced two hurdles: Could an administrative 
lottery be re-interpreted as a moment of prophecy? And would Mongol and Tibetan elites 
adopt a ritual if it was proclaimed in edicts that expressly rejected their claims of 
Buddhist attainment?  
Even Qianlong’s own words posed a potential obstacle to their reception. How, 
for instance, was the Dalai Lama to reconcile the contradictory statements within both the 
Discourse on Lamas and its Manchu-language precursor? As we have seen, Qianlong’s 
opinion of reincarnation was ambiguous at best. In both of these proclamations he 
simultaneously dismissed reincarnation as heterodoxy that should be eliminated and then 
claimed that his ultimate goal was the discovery of “genuine rebirths.” The exact scope of 
his prohibition against reincarnation among the aristocracy is ambiguous as well. For one, 
the emperor sends different signals about whether it is the lay aristocracy that is 
manipulating the process or the tülkus themselves. He concludes the Discourse by stating 
that “eradicating the selfish desire of tülku to emanate among their kinsmen” has been his 
priority.186 But the cases cited primarily involve the attempts of Mongol and Tibetan 
aristocrats to secure kūtuktuhoods for their sons. In order to prevent successive rebirths of 
hūbilgan within Mongol lineages, the emperor established an “avoidance clause:” “It is 
definitely unacceptable that the hūbilgan of the kūtuktu revered by a given tribe (Ma. 
aiman) shall emerge among the sons or grandsons of the jasak prince or duke of that 
tribe.”187 This phrasing seems to leave open the possibility however, that hūbilgan could 
be found among other noble lineages of other tribe. And finally, although Qianlong 
enumerated a list of the noble ranks that he believed had no right to “struggle for the 
                                                
186 Discourse, Tibetan, line 34. 
 
187 MWLF 155:2862. 
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fortune (Ma. jabšan) of the Yellow Teachings by taking possession of a hūbilgan within 
their household,” he did not do the same for the Tibetan aristocracy.188 This was possibly 
a reflection of the continuing lack of knowledge about the Tibetan gentry. This lack of 
clarity about who actually fell under the jurisdiction of the prohibition led to serious 
confusion, most famously in the case of the search for the reincarnation of the Jamyang 
Zhepa in 1796. 
While Qianlong’s Discourse on Lamas was certainly intended to put the 
Mongolian nobility and Geluk hierarchy on notice that the dynasty would no longer 
tolerate their cozy, nepotistic relationship, the wording of the piece poses yet one further 
challenge. In his efforts to covey a universal and simultaneous message to all his 
constituents, Qianlong chose the Chinese text as the master template. Although the text 
was designed for a Mongol, Manchu and Tibetan audience, the translations depart only in 
shades from a root Chinese text that was composed in a manner that reflected the 
assumptions and prejudices of a Chinese audience and a Chinese-literate author. The 
demands upon the translators to stay as close to the original as possible in order to convey 
a universal message to all the emperor’s subjects, unavoidably resulted in a disconnect 
between the intended audience and the actual content. This is most evident in the 
numerous annotated passages designed to elucidate strange and foreign aspects of 
“Tibetan Buddhism” (Ch. 番經 fanjing, Ma. tanggūt nomun, Tib. bod chos) to the 
Chinese readership. The result for a Tibetan or Mongol reader are frequent detours into 
pedantic and often mistaken explanations of Buddhist religious history and terminology 
that at best might have informed Tibetan Buddhists about how their tradition was 
                                                
188 MWLF 155:2860. 
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translated into Chinese and at worst could only have reminded them of the vast gulf that 
separated their tradition from that of the interior.  
As will become apparent in the next chapter, the Tibetan reception of the Golden 
Urn policy did not rely on the translation of the Discourse on Lamas. Instead, the new 
policies were initially conveyed to the Tibetan elite in the form of oral instructions from 
officials such as Fukanggan and Heliyen on the basis of Manchu-language court letters 
and memorials such as the Manchu-language edict of October 14, 1792 (QL 57/08/29). 
Unlike the Discourse on Lamas, in this edict the Throne seemed to make a more 
sympathetic attempt to relate to the Inner Asian elite. In the unique conclusion to the 
edict, Qianlong humbly noted that he too obeyed what he preached. “My handling things 
in this manner is expressly for the protection of the Yellow Teachings. It is my desire that 
true hūbilgan be located. It is definitely not my intention to bring them grief. If I were to 
appoint one of my own sons a hūbilgan, I fear that as a matter of course this would be 
greatly derided by everyone and surely could not be carried out.”189 What was absurd for 
the Mongol princes was equally so for the emperor (the crown prince Jia, be damned!). 
Although the Discourse of Lamas was very much an omnibus of new policies that 
had gradually percolated through the court over the year of 1791-1792, the Throne did 
leave out an import detail in this proclamation. This penultimate statement establishing 
the Golden Urn did not mention the corruption of the Lamo Chökyong or the other 
oracles of central Tibet. Perhaps the court had resigned itself to the idea that the 
traditional divination arts would have to be included in the process and therefore felt it 
was a waste of effort to include these criticisms in the edict. Regardless, this omission has 
had a profound effect on modern scholarship. When analyzing the significance of the 
                                                
189 MWLF 155:2862. 
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Qianlong reforms in the aftermath of the Gurkha wars, historians have, unsurprisingly, 
understood the concerns of the court to be those of the famous tetraglot stele. Their 
attention has naturally been drawn therefore to Mongolia and the court’s seemingly 
Machiavellian patronage of the Geluk school. As this chapter has shown, the Manchu-
language record reveals that the court was as much concerned with the strategic 
implications of divination and faith as it was with the potential reemergence of challenges 
to its rule in Mongolia. As I turn to the reception and implementation of the Golden Urn 
lottery in the following sections, I will start with the previously unstudied campaign 
against the oracles that burned with intensity over the winter and spring of 1793. 
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Chapter Two: Shamanic Imperialism 
 
 
Introduction: The Campaign to Discredit the Oracles 
 
 
In the late fall of 1791, the monk Nawangdasi arrived in Lhasa from Mongolia to 
commence the search for the reincarnation of his master, the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu, a 
reincarnate lama whose home estate was located in the territory of the Sain Noyan tribe 
(Ma. aiman) of the Khalkha Mongols.190 As steward (Ma. šangjotba, Tib. phyag mdzod, 
Ch. 商卓特巴) of the estate of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu, it was Nawangdasi’s 
responsibility to supervise the search. 
The steward would later explain to his interrogators in Beijing that the search had 
been complicated from the outset by the fact that his master had passed away without 
providing a clear testament concerning where he would be reborn. In such cases it was 
the custom to first travel to Tibet (Ma. Dzang) and request a divination from the Lamo 
Oracle (Ma. Lamo cuijung) concerning the location of the rebirth. Once the location was 
ascertained, candidate children could be identified and tested. Finally, the searchers 
would return once more to central Tibet to confirm their identification with the Dalai 
Lama and the Lamo Oracle. It was, “only at this point,” stated the steward, that 
“everyone will believe [in the reincarnation].”191 Yet, as Qing investigators would later 
observe, the steward did not follow his own prescriptions. 
                                                
190 Ma. Nawangdasi; Tib. Nga dbang bkra shis; Ch. 那旺札什. Ma. Erdeni bandida kūtuktu; Tib. 
er de ni paNDi’i da ho thog thu; Ch. 額爾德尼班第達呼圖克圖. 
 
191 MWLF 156:1399. 
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After arriving in Lhasa and attending a brief audience with the Eighth Dalai 
Lama, the steward proceeded to the monastery of the Lamo Oracle. There, he presented 
various gifts and then began making inquiries about the reincarnation of his master. The 
initial instructions from the oracle were not very satisfying. The Lamo Oracle merely told 
him to “recite the appropriate sutras” and that news would be forthcoming. Several 
months later, shortly after the start of the new year (QL 57/01, late January-early 
February, 1792) the steward visited the oracle again, presented gifts, and received a 
divination instructing him to seek out the rebirth of his master among commoner 
households (Ma. an i jergi niyalmai boo) in the eastern area of his tribe (Ma. aiman). 
According to the steward, this advice was also disappointing. He later told his 
interrogators that, having “squandered” over ten thousand in silver on a long journey to 
Tibet, he was disinclined to believe that his master had reincarnated among a non-noble 
family.192  
The steward resolved, therefore, to approach the Lamo Oracle a third time with 
the names of two candidate children who, although from noble families, had at least been 
born within the eastern districts of his tribe. Nawangdasi wrote the two names on separate 
slips of paper and presented them to the oracle. While possessed by the Lamo protector 
deity, the medium immediately placed a mark on the name of the son of Cedendorji, the 
Tüsiyetü Khan.193 The Dalai Lama would later testify that, “having always found the 
speech of the Lamo oracle to be reliable,” he personally confirmed the authenticity of this 
                                                
192 MWLF 156:1380-1381, 1401. 
 
193 MWLF 156:1402. 
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divination.194 Thus considering the matter successfully and “truthfully” resolved, the 
steward returned to the Khalkha lands and reported the results of the search to his league 
head. The latter subsequently ordered Nawangdasi to submit a final report to the 
Lifanyuan in Beijing.195  
A year later, in the winter of 1792-1793, when Nawangdasi’s report eventually 
reached the Lifanyuan it encountered an environment that, as we have seen in Chapter 
One, had not only grown hostile to the oracles of central Tibet but had also proscribed the 
identification of kūtuktu among the sons of Mongol aristocrats such as Cedendorji, the 
Tüsiyetü Khan. In his own defense, the steward claimed that he was unaware of the new 
law concerning the use of the Golden Urn—an edict that had been promulgated well after 
he had departed central Tibet. Considering that Qing officials in outer Mongolia first 
began to report receipt of the Discourse on Lamas edict only in March of 1793, 
approximately five months after the first urn was dispatched from Beijing to Lhasa on 
October 25, 1792, it is easy to imagine that the steward knew nothing of the statute when 
he filed his report.196 Yet the investigators were unswayed and found even the act of 
filing the report suspicious. They wrote, “After you returned from Tibet, in principle you 
could have not reported [to the Lifanyuan]. Instead, feigning ignorance, you wrote 
requesting that the old customs be [observed]. How can you say that [you] were not 
                                                
194 MWLF 156:1385-1386. 
 
195 MWLF 156:1404. 
 
196 The earliest report of receipt of the Discourse on Lamas edict was from the Qing official 
stationed in Uliasutai. The Uliasutai official filed his report on March 13, 1793 (QL 58/02/02). 
See, YHGSL 15:14 (doc. #5). Although the exact date that Nawangdasi’s petition arrived in the 
Lifanyuan is unknown, it was certainly no later than March 16, 1793, the day that the emperor 
ordered the investigation of the case (MWJXD 23:194-199). 
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seeking your own advantage?”197 The lineage of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu was 
evidently one of many Mongol reincarnations that had not previously reported its rebirths 
to the Court of Colonial Affairs. 
Upon receiving word of the steward’s request from the officials of the Lifanyuan, 
the emperor was immediately suspicious. In his first pronouncement on the case, 
enclosed in a court letter of March 16, 1793 (QL 58/02/05), the emperor opined that the 
Dalai Lama’s identification of the khan’s son as a kūtuktu was, “clearly the result of the 
bribery and corrupt actions of the khan Cedendorji and the steward Nawangdasi.”198 The 
Throne’s suspicions were surely exacerbated by the unfortunate coincidence that in the 
edict promulgating the new Golden Urn lottery, the Qianlong emperor had singled out the 
father of the current Tüsiyetü Khan for ridicule. The Discourse on Lamas presented the 
failed attempt of the Tüsiyetü Khan to have his yet unborn child recognized as the 
Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu in 1758 as the case-in-point for how Mongol nobility had 
corrupted the recognition process.199 Although the emperor was convinced that the 
recognition process had been corrupted, he could not definitively identify the source of 
the corruption. Was it the steward, the khan, or the Dalai Lama himself? The emperor 
queried:  
Previously, when the steward arrived in Tibet, he repeatedly presented 
various gifts to the Dalai Lama. Was it Cedendorji who planted the idea of 
seeking out the Dalai Lama in the head of the steward and spoke to [the 
                                                
197 MWLF 156:1404. 
 
198 MWJXD 23:194-195. 
 
199 Discourse on Lamas, lines 19-21. In the 1750s the previous Tüsiyetü Khan, the father of 
Cedendorji, had publically predicted that his pregnant wife would give birth to the reincarnation 
of the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu. Thus subsequent birth of a daughter not only embarrassed the 
khan, but also served, as noted in Chapter One, as evidence for why the Qing court should 
prohibit the search for the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu among noble Mongol families. 
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steward] of how to approach the Dalai Lama? Or was it the steward who 
sought to pass on his requests via the servants or close family members of 
the Dalai Lama? Or was it the Dalai Lama himself, who, because he 
wished to receive the usual alms from Cedendorji and had come to see the 
benefit in considering this [request], signaled that it was his son?200 
 
Just three days later, the emperor received a transcript of the interrogation of 
Nawangdasi. On the basis of the interrogation, the emperor concluded that the idea to 
identify the Tüsiyetü Khan’s son as the reincarnation of Erdeni Bandida originated with 
the khan himself. Yet according to the emperor, the testimony of Nawangdasi not only 
confirmed his preexisting suspicions that Mongol aristocrats had corrupted the search 
process, but it also revealed that Inner Asian elites possessed certain fixed notions that 
stood in the way of the successful implementation of his reform measures, most 
importantly the statute on the Golden Urn. Furthermore, the testimony of the steward 
revealed to the consternation of the Throne that faith in the efficacy of the oracles and the 
divination skills of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama remained strong and that the 
repeated reincarnation of kūtuktu and other influential lamas among the households of the 
Mongol or Tibetan aristocracy was not considered corrupt.201 On the contrary, nobility, 
wealth, power, and religious attainment went hand-in-hand: If the wealth and status of the 
Inner Asian nobility could be attributed to the karma they had accrued by means of their 
meritorious activities on behalf of Buddhism, then it was but the natural order of things 
that they also produced miraculous offspring. In the course of his interrogation, the 
steward was brought to admit that indeed there was corruption among the Mongol nobles 
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201 MWJXD 23:200-206 (QL 58/02/08; 1793-03-19). 
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as a result of “struggles for profit and fortune,” and that the Golden Urn might suppress 
these conflicts, but he did not budge on the authenticity of his choice.202 
When asked why he had followed neither his own original plan nor the prophecy 
of the Lamo oracle, the steward replied that it would be a waste of money to search for a 
child among commoners because the majority of the people would not believe in such a 
candidate. Nawangdasi testified:  
The children of the common ranks are not are not as good as children from 
the lineages of the nobility (Ma. taiji). Among their children there are 
many who are intelligent and handsome. And after they become hūbilgan, 
every khan, prince, and so forth will prostrate before them. [However,] if 
the [child] is from the lineage of an ordinary family (Ma. albatu), it is 
impossible to predict whether everyone will be convinced and have faith 
in his authenticity.203  
 
In response, Qianlong wrote:  
Nawangdasi has stated in his deposition that, “the Mongols’ nature is such 
that they reverently believe that the emergence and identification of all 
reincarnations of kūtuktu in the households of great families is simply [a 
sign] of their innate endowment of genius and good fortune (hūturi 
fengšen bimbime).” Observing this, it would appear that the Dalai Lama 
must also hold similar opinions. Moreover, since Nawangdasi only 
reported the sons Cedendorji and Erincindorji, the Dalai Lama’s selection 
of the son of Cedendorji was merely a matter of calculating whose rank 
was higher.204  
 
The Qianlong emperor rejected the steward Nawangdasi’s petition and launched 
an investigation of the case. The importance that the Throne placed on this matter was 
underscored by the dispatch of several high-ranking officials with expertise in Mongol 
                                                
202 MWLF 156:1403. 
 
203 MWLF 156:1400-1401. This document is a Manchu-language transcript of a deposition of 
Nawangdasi conducted by officials of the Lifanyuan. The archive catalog dates this document to 
QL 58/06, yet evidence indicates that this document dates to QL 58/02 and is most likely the 
interrogation cited by Qianlong in his court letter dated QL 58/02/08.  
 
204 MWJXD 23:202-203 (QL 58/02/08, 1793-03-19). 
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affairs. No less a personage than Sungyun, a vice-minister of the Board of Revenue 
recently appointed to the Grand Council, was ordered to personally travel to the pastures 
of the Tüsiyetü Khan to probe the origins of the relationship between the khan, the 
steward, and the Dalai Lama. Another Mongol bannerman, Kūišu (Ch. 奎舒, d. 1809), a 
vice-minister of the Lifanyuan who had previously served as Qinghai amban, together 
with a senior monk from the Gelupka establishment in Beijing, Gelek Namka,205 were 
commissioned with the task of leading a new search for the reincarnation of the Erdeni 
Bandida Kūtuktu. This time the emperor ordered that the child be recognized in 
accordance with his decree on the Golden Urn: Candidate children were to be identified 
among non-noble households in the nearby pastures and, because the estate of the kūtuktu 
was located in Mongolia, the final lottery would be conducted not in Lhasa, but at the 
Gelukpa monastery at Yonghegong in Beijing.    
Yet even though the Erdeni Bandida search involved Mongols and was to be 
resolved in Beijing, the emperor coordinated the prosecution of the affair closely with his 
chief representative in Lhasa, Heliyen. The emperor justified this in an a Manchu-
language letter to Heliyen, one of several he posted to Lhasa just days after the steward’s 
petition reached Beijing. The emperor informed Heliyen that: 
I have dispatched Kūišu and Gelek Namk’a and ordered them to locate 
several children in the vicinity of Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu and select one 
by drawing lots. [You] must devote great attention to this first case and 
resolutely uphold the law, punish these people, and identify this one 
reincarnation (hūbilgan) in exactly this [manner]. Afterwards, only when 
the corrupt habits of the Lamo Oracle have been rectified and the Dalai 
                                                
205 As noted in Chapter One, Gelek Namka (Ma. Gelek Namka) was also involved in the search 
for the reincarnation of Changkya Rolpay Dorjé in 1786 and seems to have been well-known to 
the emperor. Given his connections to the Chuzang Kūtuktu, it is likely that this monk hailed 
from the Amdo region. If this is the case, then here again is a good example of the court making 
use of monks from the Amdo region to handle delicate matters that involved both Mongolia and 
Tibet.  
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Lama’s independent authority over identification [of rebirths] removed, 
and we have elucidated the stupid and muddleheaded Mongols, will it be 
possible to consistently carry out this edict (i.e. the Golden Urn lottery).  
 
Once an identification of a [kūtuktu] of a rank such as this has been 
successfully accomplished, in the future the Dalai Lama, Panchen Erdeni, 
and other major hūbilgan will have no need to seek divinations from the 
Lamo Oracle. Having entrusted [matters] to the ambans resident in Tibet, 
the names of all auspicious and miraculous children shall be collected 
from across Tibet and subjected to a lottery in the Jokhang. Thus at this 
point authority over all the affairs of Tibet will be consolidated in us.206  
  
Even at this early stage in the investigation of the Tüsiyetü Khan case, it was 
apparent to the Qing court that introducing the new recognition procedure—the Golden 
Urn, and finding acceptance for the law among Mongols and Tibetans would be much 
harder than initially thought. As the quote from Qianlong’s letter to Heliyen reveals, the 
emperor recognized that the act of promulgating the new statute was insufficient on its 
own. Moreover, the Golden Urn ritual could not merely be appended to the recognition 
process. The emerging details concerning the involvement of the Lamo Oracle and the 
Dalai Lama in the identification of the khan’s son as a kūtuktu persuaded the emperor 
that the Golden Urn could not compliment or otherwise coexist with the existing 
tradition. So long as the oracles and the Dalai Lama remained credible prognosticators, 
the possibility remained that the indigenous leadership could settle on a final candidate 
without reference to Qianlong’s new law. Therefore, to paraphrase Qianlong, if the 
                                                
206 MWJXD 23:204-205: “Te Kūisu, Gelek Namk'a be unggifi Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu i hanci 
bade udu juse baifi, sibiya tatame toktobuki sehenge, cohome fafun ilibure tuktan de teng seme 
gūnin jafafi, esebe weile arafi ere emu hūbilgan be uttu toktobuha manggi, lamu cuijung sei 
jemden yabure ejehe tacin be tuwancihiyafi, Dalai Lama i saligan i toktobure toose be maribufi, 
monggosoi hūlhi mentehun banin be neileme subufi sirame ere gesengge be teni uttu icihiyame 
mutembi. ere jergingge be uttu toktobume mutehe sehede amaga inenggi uthai Dalai Lama, 
Bancen Erdeni jergi ambaka hūbilgan be lamu cūijung de lungdan tuwabure be baiburakū. 
Dzang de tehe abasa de afabufi bubci Dzang ni šurdeme bade fulu udu hūturingga juse baifi, 
amba joo de doboho bumba de sibiya tatame toktobume ohode, ere namašan de Dzang ni eiten 
baita toose be muse uthai salici ombi.” 
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dynasty was to have any success in meeting its goals of instituting the new law and 
reversing the loss of faith in the authenticity of the reincarnate lamas of the Geluk School, 
it would have to dislodge the indigenous tradition first. This would require an aggressive 
campaign to discredit the oracles and the Dalai Lama and persuade Tibetans and 
Mongolians that the Golden Urn was a more effective method. Moreover, this campaign 
would have to be carefully coordinated between Mongolia and Tibet.  
This chapter will examine the court-orchestrated campaign to persuade Tibetan 
Buddhists to abandon the oracles in exchange for a new method drawn from the practices 
of the bureaucracy of China proper. This campaign was conducted over the spring and 
summer of 1793 and consisted of two critical components: First, the emperor ordered the 
careful management of the search for the reincarnation of the Erdeni Bandida in Khalkha 
Mongolia and the dissemination of incriminating evidence concerning the Tüsiyetü 
Khan’s attempt to have his son recognized as a kūtuktu. The Throne hoped that the 
exposure of the collusion of the Tüsiyetü Khan and the steward as well as the influence of 
money and gifts on the decisions of the Dalai Lama and the oracles would persuade 
Tibetans and Mongols that the existing procedures were in need of reform. The eventual 
dissemination of news of the “successful” identification of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu 
would establish the legitimacy of the new law. Second, the emperor ordered his agents in 
Lhasa to organize a series of public tests and trials intended to discredit the claims of the 
oracles and undermine their reputation for accuracy. 
Both elements of this campaign shared an overt concern with the arts of 
persuasion, or more specifically, a desire to achieve compliance not through force but by 
getting Tibetans to obey the new law on the basis of personal conviction. Letters 
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exchanged between the court and field officials in Tibet and Mongolia during this 
campaign convey this concern through their frequent discussion of whether witnesses at 
public spectacles were “genuinely convinced” or “genuinely persuaded,” expressions 
captured (perhaps interchangeably) by the Manchu phrases gūnin dahambi or gūnin 
dahabumbi, respectively.207 Similarly, the emperor hoped that the influence of the oracles 
would naturally fade away or “self-defeat” (Ma. ini cisui duin cuijung ni gebu be šuwe 
manambuci ombikai, or ini cusui nakambi, Ch. 自敗) once the Tibetans and Mongols had 
a chance to test the accuracy of the oracles against the Qing court’s divination 
technologies.208 What is significant about the deep interest in persuasion is that it was 
premised on the assumption that there were shared standards of evidence and 
understandings of divination, and that Manchus, Mongols and Tibetans could arrive at 
similar conclusions through a process of empirical investigation. 
This chapter consists of five sections. Section one will begin the chapter by 
recounting how prior to the emergence of the scandal involving the Tüsiyetü Khan the 
emperor had been compelled by his advisors to accede to a continued role for the oracles 
in the recognition process. Section two describes how the Lhasa amban Heliyen 
orchestrated the public campaign to expose the oracles as frauds and charlatans. 
Simultaneously, Heliyen also began to assemble incriminating evidence concerning the 
involvement of the Dalai Lama in the original search for the reincarnation of the Erdeni 
                                                
207 See for example the exchange of letters between Heliyen and Qianlong concerning the 
persuasion of the Dalai Lama: MWJXD 23:236-238 & YHGSL 15:281-283. While discussing the 
Tüsiyetü Khan case Qianlong also used the phrase gūnin bahabufi, which expresses the idea of 
“planting an idea in someone’s mind” (MWJXD 23:197). 
 
208 YHGSL 15:85a (#28) (QL 58/03/15, 1793-04-25). Contemporaneous Manchu-language texts 
phrase this slightly differently: “The names of the four oracles will completely fade away of their 
own accord.” Ma. ini cisui duin cuijung ni gebu be šuwe manambuci ombikai, MWJXD 23:262 
(QL 58/04/01, 1793-5-10). For “ini cisui nakambi” see MWLF 156:0050 (QL 58/04/19). 
 110 
Bandida Kūtuktu. This evidence primarily consisted of depositions of the Dalai Lama and 
the Lamo Oracle. Once submitted to court, the statements of the Dalai Lama, the oracle, 
the steward, and the Tüsiyetü Khan would be selectively quoted and included in a series 
of widely disseminated public pronouncements that argued for the necessity of the 
dynasty’s new statute on the Golden Urn. Sections three examines these statements and 
why it took two months for the Throne to finally issue an edict reporting the selection of 
the reincarnation of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu. Section four examines the translation of 
imperial instructions into Tibetan, and the careful response of the Eighth Dalai Lama to 
them. This section will explore the degree to which the emperor’s message was conveyed 
directly into Tibetan-language proclamations, as well as the degree to which the Dalai 
Lama and other Tibetan elites deflected some of the court’s harsher accusations. Section 
five will conclude the chapter with a discussion of Sungyun’s supervision of the 
identification of the Pakbala Lama, the first major Tibetan kūtuktu to be recognized using 
the urn. Fresh from his service to the emperor in Mongolia, Sungyun had been transferred 
to Lhasa in 1794 to manage what the court viewed as the penultimate test of the new law. 
This chapter also continues to build on an argument advanced in the previous 
chapter: That the articulation of the emperor’s sovereignty over Tibet was intimately 
linked to his concern with controlling the arts of divination. As the emperor stated in his 
private letter to Heliyen quoted above, he believed that the practical exercise of Qing 
authority over all matters Tibetan required as a prerequisite a monopoly over the use of 
divination. Yet as noted in Chapter One, this idea had germinated over time. The 
documentary record reveals that more than any other factor, it was fears of the misuse of 
divination that prompted the emperor to assert control first over divination and 
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subsequently over Tibetan affairs more generally. It was in the process of discussing 
divination with his field officials that the Qianlong emperor made increasingly articulate 
and comprehensive claims to authority/sovereignty over Tibet. 
In this light, it should come as no surprise that the Imperially Sanctioned Twenty-
Nine Articles—the Tibetan-language omnibus proclamation of all the reform measures 
approved by the emperor and delivered to the Dalai Lama by Fukanggan on April 4, 1793 
(QL 58/02/24)—begins with the statute instituting the Golden Urn ritual. Discussion of 
the urn had begun in Beijing nearly two months before Fukanggan had even been ordered 
to consider drafting reforms of the Tibetan administration. And further discussion of 
these twenty-eight measures is nearly non-existent in the months and years following 
Fukanggan’s departure from Lhasa. Meanwhile, discussion of the Golden Urn and 
divination more generally remained the dominant subject of communications between 
officials in Lhasa and the court in Beijing throughout the remaining days of the Qianlong 
emperor’s life and into the first several years of the Jiaqing reign. With the notable 
exception of Fukanggan’s memorials on the subject, the discussion of divination was 
conducted in Manchu and considered separately from other issues pertaining to the 
reform of Tibetan administration. Moreover, the numerous imperial rescripts on these 
documents attest to the fact that this issue also remained a priority concern of the emperor 
despite his advancing years and gradual withdrawal from the daily oversight of other 
issues. Thus, these records constitute a distinctive deliberative process that was accessible 
only to a select number of Manchu-speaking officials. As a result, previous scholarship 
on the aftermath of the Gurkha war that has not made use of Manchu sources has 
overlooked both the importance of divination in Qianlong’s thinking on sovereignty and 
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the significance of the emperor’s belief that the effort to impose the Golden Urn ritual 
was incumbent on stamping out the oracles of Central Tibet. 
 
“Legislating the Possible:” The Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu, Fukanggan, and the 
Negotiated Existence of the Oracles 
 
From the very moment when the idea for the Golden Urn began to circulate 
among Qianlong’s inner court advisors, the emperor intended for it to completely replace 
the custom of seeking prophecies/divinations (Ma. lungdan, Tib. lung bstan) from the 
oracles (Ma. cuijung, Tib. chos skyong) especially the Lamo oracle.209 Yet the emperor 
was initially forced to compromise and the public promulgation of the Golden Urn—the 
Discourse on Lamas—included the oracles in the recognition process. Two individuals in 
particular seem to have been instrumental in negotiating the initial configuration of the 
new statute: A Beijing-based Gelukpa monk—the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu, and General 
Fukanggan in Lhasa. 
Recall that we have met the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu previously in the context of 
the Throne’s initial solicitation of advice regarding the proposal to institute a lottery. As 
the highest-ranking Gelukpa monk in residence in Beijing in the summer of 1792, the 
emperor had sought him out to provide an explanation of the nature of the oracles of 
Central Tibet as well as an assessment of the feasibility of the new procedure. The 
Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu’s advice was subsequently included in the first letter concerning 
                                                
209 Letter to Agūi, MWLF 154:1351-1354 (1792-08-17, QL 57/06/30). 
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the new ritual dispatched to Fukanggan in Tibet.210 As noted in Chapter One, the kūtuktu 
sanctioned the Golden Urn yet also advised the emperor to retain the oracles in the 
process. A later document, however, reveals more clearly the role of this monk in both 
legitimizing the ritual within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition and also forcefully rejecting 
the emperor’s wish to proscribe the use of the oracles. 
Labeled “A draft letter from the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu to the Dalai Lama and 
Panchen Lama translated into Manchu,” this document recounts how the monk traveled 
from Dolonnor to the emperor’s summer retreat at Chengde and subsequently learned of 
the new “process for drawing lots.” The monk wrote to the Dalai Lama and Panchen 
Lama that upon hearing the news he was “deeply persuaded and appreciative,” and 
confident that the new measure would “eliminate the corruption of the mediums.”211 He 
also added the following observation: “Having thus established this change, it is exactly 
in accord with the manner in which the hūbilgan of the Fifth Dalai Lama and previous 
Panchen Lama were identified…Truly the edict of Manjusri, the Great Holy Lord of the 
East, resplendent like the sun and moon, has reached the point of clearly perceiving the 
state of affairs of our western land and the feelings of the people.”212 The Fifth Dalai 
Lama had actually been identified using a zentak (“dough-ball”) divination, a process 
qualitatively different from the Golden Urn Lottery (and a difference that did not go 
                                                
210 MWLF 154:0491-0492. 
 
211 MWLF 155:0314-315. 
 
212 MWLF 155:0315. 
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unnoticed by subsequent Tibetan observers).213 Yet this bold comparison would have 
major repercussions for the subsequent reception of the ritual among Tibetans. As we 
shall see in Chapter Three, later Tibetan commentators would make a similar comparison.  
Placing the Golden Urn ritual within the same category of practices that had located the 
Great Fifth Dalai Lama had a powerful effect on legitimizing the new ritual.  
However, the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu did not offer unreserved support. He 
informed the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama that he had told the grand councilor (most 
likely Hešen214) and assembled Qing officials that he disagreed with the recommendation 
to prohibit the use of the oracles. He wrote, “However, if the prophecies are not consulted 
concerning the place where the reincarnation is located and children’s names are 
submitted according to people’s desires to be selected from the urn, petty quarrels will 
arise and it will be impossible to convince the clergy and lay people [of the authenticity 
of the child].”215 The monk then continued by telling his correspondents that he had 
advised that once “good and virtuous mediums” had been located, the four protector 
deities (Ma. Lamo, Neichung, G’awadung, and Samye) could be invoked to provide 
information on the location of the rebirth. As noted in Chapter One, the grand councilor 
                                                
213 Fifth Dalai Lama Losang Gyatso, Rgyal dbang lnga pa'i rang rnam du kU la'i gos bzang 
(Autobiography of the fifth Dalai Lama), (Kawring, India: Tobdan Tsering, 1979-1983), 53 
(Ka:28a). TIBRC # W23956. 
 
214 Hešen conveyed other contemporaneous documents containing the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu’s 
opinion on this matter to the emperor. For example, see MWLF 155:0490 (QL 57/07/25). 
 
215 MWLF 155:0316. “damu aika fe songkoi hūbilgan i tucire ergi be lungdan baime fonjirakū, 
geren i cihai hūbilgan inu seme joriha jusei gebu be foihori bumba de dosimbufi tatabuci, balai 
temšendure demun banjinambime, geren suwayan kara ursei gūnin be inu dahabume muterakū.” 
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Hešen relayed to the emperor the kūtuktu’s proposal for continued use of the oracles but 
dropped mention of the monk’s underlying rationale for the disagreement.216 
This letter from the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu is but one of a large body of Manchu-
language translations of letters that passed between Tibetan elites between 1791 and 
1793.217 These letters were collected and translated by the Grand Council in Beijing. The 
flattering tone and formal organization of the letter, in addition to the indication that this 
was a “draft letter,” suggests that either the monk was well aware of the possibility that 
the court would inspect the contents of his letter or that the letter was actually drafted 
under the supervision of the court. Regardless of the impetus behind its creation, the 
existence and content of this letter indicates the degree to which the Qing court officials 
were able to use monks based at imperially-sponsored institutions such as Yonghegong to 
convey imperial policy to local elites in Tibet and Mongolia. The term degree is crucial 
here because, as this letter demonstrates, Gelukpa elites could be counted on to support 
imperial initiatives, but not in an unqualified manner. The letter exposes not only the 
power of the emperor, but also the advisory authority of the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu.   
                                                
216 MWLF 154:0491-0492. So the question remains, would the emperor have learned of the 
kūtuktu’s specific reason for retaining the oracles? There is no direct evidence in written 
communications involving Hešen, the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu, or the emperor. But the existence 
of this “draft letter” as an attachment to a palace memorial means that at least in principle the 
document could have been read by the emperor and certainly circulated within inner court 
agencies such as the Grand Council. The exact reasoning was later also restated by Fukanggan. 
See Fukanggan’s memorial of QL 58/01/08 (YHGSL 15:10-12). 
 
217 Approximately thirty such letters are listed in a recent catalog of Tibet-related materials at the 
First Historical Archives. See, Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan, Zhongguo Zangxue zhongxin, 
eds., Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguang suocun Xizang he Zangshi dang’an mulu, Man, 
Zangwenbu (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1999), 480-481, 485-487. These letters, plus 
numerous other Manchu and Tibetan-language letters that do not appear in the above catalog, can 
be located at the beginning of microfiche roll #155 of the reproductions of the Manchu-language 
Grand Council file copies of palace memorials held by the First Historical Archives, Beijing. The 
existence of these letters suggests that Tibetan elites across the empire were utilizing the presence 
of resident Qing officials and their postal system to exchange information. 
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The Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu’s sketch of the ritual was included in Qianlong’s court 
letter to Fukanggan that first informed the general, then still in Nepal, of the idea for the 
lottery. As a result, this kūtuktu’s draft configuration of the Golden Urn ritual would 
influence both Fukanggan’s understanding of the statute and all subsequent public edicts 
concerning the Golden Urn until Qianlong categorically outlawed the use of the oracles 
in a major decree issued eight months later (QL 58/04/19, 1793-5-28).218 The Discourse 
on Lamas proclamation of December 1792, for instance, accorded the oracles a major 
role. Ironically, this proclamation had only just begun to circulate widely in Mongolia 
when the Tüsiyetü Khan case broke and the emperor began to push more forcefully for 
the eradication of the oracles. In light of this, it is perhaps understandable that Qing field 
officials in Mongolia and Tibet, as well as local Mongols and Tibetans, would not have 
understood the institution of the Golden Urn as an attempt to supplant the oracles.  
Of additional significance is the fact that the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu’s blueprint 
for the lottery interpreted the emperor’s edict as implying that it would be either the Dalai 
Lama or the Panchen Lama who drew the lot from the urn.219 In his early formulations of 
the ritual, Qianlong had not explicitly addressed the issue of who would physically draw 
the lot. Major imperial pronouncements on the issue of the Golden Urn that were handed 
down in the first month after the idea was initially floated stated ambiguously that the lots 
                                                
218 MWLF 156:0043-0052. This edict was issued in Manchu and subsequently translated into 
Tibetan for distribution in Tibet. The emperor had, however, a month earlier demanded the end of 
the oracles in a Manchu-language court letter to Heliyen, MWJXD 23:236-239 (QL 58/03/17; 
1793-04-27). 
 
219 MWLF 155:0315.  
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would be “selected jointly by the Dalai Lama and the resident ambans.”220 On this latter 
issue, Fukanggan’s own first blueprint of the ritual, submitted to the throne in December 
of 1792 just a week after concluding his first meetings with the Dalai Lama and other 
Tibetan elites after having returned from Nepal, recommended that the Dalai Lama and 
Panchen Lama personally draw the lots. In the event that there was a search for a Dalai 
Lama or Panchen Lama, the living member of the pair would identify the reincarnation of 
his colleague, “in imitation of the spirit of the master-disciple relationship.”221 In all 
cases, the ambans resident in Tibet would supervise the lottery. General Fukanggan’s 
advice probably reflects the influence of local Tibetans if not the original input of the 
Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu. 
It seems, however, that Fukanggan felt obliged to modify the proposed statute on 
the Golden Urn in one significant way. Although he evidently concurred with the Galdan 
Siretu Kūtuktu that a place for the oracles was necessary, he seems to have anticipated a 
potential problem: If the oracles were permitted to arrive at a set of unified instructions 
for where and how to search for candidates, what was to prevent them from unifying 
around the candidacy of a single child, thus preempting the need for a lottery? To solve 
this problem, Fukanggan proposed a control test in which a lot bearing the single 
                                                
220 See edict dated QL 57/08/27 in KKFL, 622-626: “令達賴喇嘛等會同駐藏大臣公同念經，
對眾拈定，具奏作為呼畢勒罕.” In the earliest extant formulation of the ritual, the emperor 
states that, “the ambans resident in Tibet together with the Dalai Lama et al will observe as sutras 
are recited and one [name] is selected from the urn” (MWLF 154:0981-0982). See also, MWLF 
155:2862 (QL 57/08/29). This document reads: “The Dalai Lama together with the ambans 
residing in Tibet shall supervise the identification of the hūbilgan by drawing lots” (“dalai Lama, 
dzang de tehe ambasai sasa tuwame tatame gaifi hūbilgan toktobukini.”). 
 
221 YHGSL 14:382 (QL 57/10/23, 1792-12-6): “駐藏大臣親往監視。凡達賴喇嘛、班禪額爾德
尼之呼畢勒罕，即仿互為師弟之義，令其互相拈定。” This document was also reproduced in 
the Weizang tongzhi. See Hening, Weizang tongzhi (Lhasa: Xizang yanjiu bianji bu, [reprint] 
1982), 263-264.   
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candidate’s name would be placed in the urn along with a blank lot. If the blank lot was 
drawn, the general wrote, the candidacy of the child would be thrown out and the search 
would have to start anew.222 Although this amendment to the statute did not arrive in 
Beijing in time to be included in the emperor’s formal proclamation of the ritual in the 
Discourse on Lamas, it was established as a precedent the next year after Fukanggan 
himself oversaw just such a test in March of 1793 (QL 58/02/11).223  
It was in direct response to Fukanggan’s initial blueprint for the lottery that the 
emperor first broached the idea of testing the oracles more closely. Noting that 
Fukanggan had advocated the consultation of the oracles as the first stage in the search 
process, Qianlong was still resigned to their inclusion in the process, stating, “At the 
present we can only do like this.”224 The emperor was suspicious of the oracles, yet 
seems to have been open to their continued use, especially if it could be ascertained that 
they were effective and credible before the wider audience. Thus he ordered Fukanggan 
and the other Qing officials resident in Lhasa to, “examine the Lamo and other oracles.  If 
what they [divine] is not found trustworthy before the people, it merely becomes a joke, 
and thus we will be unable to use them in the future and we will have to cut through this 
thicket.” A separate court letter from the emperor to his field officials was more strongly 
worded: 
The protectors all use various heterodox methods to mislead the people. 
When the deity descends to them, they use a knife to stab themselves, yet 
their bodies are unharmed. These arts of illusion make their method appear 
true. Among the teachings of the Buddha these [arts] are the most inferior. 
If [these arts] are fraudulent, then they are not even worth a laugh! How 
                                                
222 YHGSL 14:384a (QL 57/10/23). 
 
223 YHGSL 15:30b-31a. 
 
224 Imperial rescript QL 57/11/29 (1793-01-11) YHGSL 14:383b. 
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could anyone believe in them as before?  Fukanggan and the rest should 
promptly put the methods of those four protectors to the test. Have them 
stab themselves! And if their methods are not efficacious, then 
immediately point out their absurd and unbelievable claims to the people 
to educate them. The monks and laity will then know of their presumption 
and shall not act in accordance with their foolishness. Thus in the future 
when an incarnation appears the use of oracles can be forbidden. [Instead,] 
the names of several candidates with similar dates of birth shall be [placed] 
in the golden urn, and the Dalai Lama will by drawing a lot come to a 
decision, and by means of this promulgate what is equitable and fair.225  
 
Although in this command the emperor communicated more strongly his distaste for the 
oracles and expectation that they would be found false, it is important to distinguish this 
request to investigate the oracles from subsequent tests conducted by Heliyen. At this 
stage, the emperor was still only conditionally disdainful of the oracles—wary of the 
authority they might wield on the basis of certain abilities, base as they might be. It 
should also be noted that at this date that the emperor was not only willing to 
countenance some role for the oracles, but also still positioned the Dalai Lama front and 
center in the lottery as the man who would draw the lot. 
 A month later, Fukanggan, Sun Shiyi, Heliyen, Zhong-ling (忠齡), and Cheng-de 
(成德) submitted a joint memorial detailing the results of their investigations in Lhasa. 
The document deserves to be examined in detail because the results of the investigation 
forced the authors to walk a delicate line between affirming the ideas of the emperor but 
also conveying to the Throne the enduring influence of the oracles.  
The officials began by confirming the emperor’s impression that recent 
reincarnations had been poorly verified and were of dubious authenticity: 
                                                
225 This court letter is quoted inside Fukanggan’s memorial dated QL 57/12/29 (1793-02-09), 
YHGSL 15:7b-8a. Having been unable to locate the original court letter, I am assuming from 
contextualizing evidence that the court letter quoted by Fukanggan is the “separate edict” noted in 
Qianlong’s rescript to Fukanggan’s memorial of QL 57/10/23. 
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We find that during the early period following the founding of the 
teaching, when the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama and other great kūtuktu 
reincarnated, they did not lose their fundamental natures. Yet with regards 
to whether or not later reincarnations truly possessed the root essence, this 
matter has been vague from the beginning. There has not necessarily been 
irrefutable evidence or tests and [we] have not heard that there were any 
who truly could recall matters from their past lives or recognize objects 
from their previous generations.226  
 
Yet Fukanggan and his fellow officials then observed that despite a purported lack of 
confidence in the identifications, faith in these kūtuktus had been shored up because 
ultimately the emperor himself had sanctioned the selections:   
As it is the intention of the Holy Lord to promote the Yellow Teachings, 
and because all the Mongol tribes and Tibetans customarily worship the 
Buddhist teachings, they are therefore guided according to their situation 
and we facilitate their customs and pacify these foreigners. This [is the 
principle behind how,] in the past, whenever the chokyöng (oracle, 吹忠) 
pointed out a person, after the details were reported, an edict would be 
passed down recognizing them as a hūbilgan and thus all the millions of 
Mongols and Tibetans would have faith in [the child] as a true 
[reincarnation] and wholeheartedly worship them.227 
 
In other words, the officials were pointing out that even before introducing the Golden 
Urn, the actions of Qing rulers had been key in preserving the faith of Tibetan Buddhists 
in their reincarnations. And they were noting that the court had already been doing this 
despite reservations about the authenticity of the reincarnations—reservations that the 
authors imply were also held by Tibetans. The influence of the indigenous tradition on 
sustaining peace in Mongolia and Tibet led the dynasty to consider it politic to add its 
                                                
226 YHGSL 15:8a, QL 57/12/29 (1793-02-09): “竊查達賴喇嘛、班禪額爾德尼及大呼圖克圖轉
世，當其立教之初，前數輩或尚不迷本性，此後出世之呼畢勒罕是否實有根氣，其事原屬
渺茫，未必確有征驗，亦未聞有真能記憶前生來歷、認取前輩物件者。” 
 
227 YHGSL 15:8a: “仰維聖主振興黃教之意，亦因各部蒙古、番族（俗）崇信佛法，因勢利
導，以便方俗而安外藩，是以向來每遇吹忠指出之人，一經奏明，奉旨作為呼畢勒罕後，
遠近蒙古番眾數十萬人，悉皆信以為真，一心供奉。” 
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authority to the decisions of the Oracles. Fukanggan et. al. then turned to recounting their 
own personal observations of the activities of the oracles: 
Since your servants have arrived in Tibet, we have personally witnessed 
how a deity descended to chökyong in order to exorcise demons and the 
streets became crowded with tens of thousands who pressed in to watch. 
Long lines formed of those who wished to present kadak and others who 
wished to be touched on the head while they prostrated themselves 
bareheaded. They proceeded in an orderly line and galloped out like crazy 
people! Their absurdity reaches such a degree that there are even those 
who, having been accidentally cut by the knife of an oracle in the midst of 
their mad dancing, promptly recite a mantra and then happily look to the 
future thinking that all those who receive such an injury will never suffer 
misfortune or illness! When your servants brought this excessive faith to 
the attention of important lamas and Tibetan headmen (大喇嘛番目), and 
carefully explained to them the ridiculous aspects of such oracles, they 
looked at each other in astonishment and dared not reply as they feared 
their excessive guilt. When we consider such sincere faith, there are 
ultimately no words that will change their minds.228 
 
  
With regards to why the oracles held such widespread authority, Fukanggan provided the 
following reasons: 
As for the methods of the chökyong, regardless of whether they dress up 
as deities, read sutras or pray, carelessly claim that the deity has possessed 
their body, dance with knives, shake their heads and spit out hot air, make 
prognostications about the future of the harvest or smallpox epidemics; no 
matter what kind of test they are subjected to, after the spirit has left them 
they abruptly wake up. And if you ask them about what they just said, they 
look dumbfounded and can remember nothing.  Thus there is not a Tibetan 
who doesn’t believe them. Rumors about what they do while under the 
influence, are not at all reliable. Even claims that they can stab themselves 
with knives are all myths and unreliable hearsay. In fact nothing of the sort 
happens. Speaking of their skill, it really is not worth a laugh (here 
quoting Qianlong). While it is not even a match for the somewhat skilled 
sorcery of the shamans of the interior (尚不及內地巫師稍有障眼邪法), 
it is able to fool the stupid.229 
 
                                                
228 YHGSL 15:8b (QL 57/12/29, 1792-02-09). 
 
229 YHGSL 15:8a-b. 
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The comparison with the shamans of the interior in this memorial introduced a theme that 
would become increasingly prominent in later trials of the oracles. Although this 
particular report was filed in Chinese, it is clear that by the Chinese term “wushi 巫師” 
the authors were referring to the abilities of shamans. Later Manchu-language memorials 
and bilingual imperial proclamations in Manchu and Tibetan employed the term “saman” 
or “kutenpa” (Ma. gurdemba, Tib. sku rten pa) in Manchu and Tibetan, respectively, to 
refer to the human medium who served as the vessel or intermediary for the deity to 
speak through.230 The Qing officials stationed in Lhasa in 1792 seem to have felt that 
there was a similarity between their shamans and Tibetan mediums and that informing 
Tibetans about the relative inferiority of their shamans—and testing them against the 
purported skills of the Manchu shamans—would be an effective way of persuading 
Tibetans to give up their indigenous arts and support the Qing emperor’s efforts to stamp 
out the oracles. 
 Qing colonial officials placed the oracles within their own familiar category of 
“shamans.” But if the oracles were shamans they were at best degenerate shamans whose 
abilities paled in comparison with those of the superior tradition of the Manchus or the 
“interior.” This aspect of official thinking about the oracles recalls Homi Bhahba’s theory 
of “colonial mimicry,” the idea that colonial discourses find ways to portray the 
subordinate Other as similar yet not quite the same, and that their claim to authority lies 
in the conviction that the Other is fundamentally incapable of rising to the status of being 
                                                
230 See for instance the Manchu-language edict of QL 58/04/19 (1793-5-28) (MWLF 156:0043-
0052) and its Tibetan-language translation as the “Chu glung wang shu” (水牛年文書) in Chab 
spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, Bod kyi lo rgyus rags rim gyu yi phreng ba vol. 3 (Lhasa: Bod ljongs 
dpe rnying dpe skrun khang, 1989), 335-340. 
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fully the same and thus equal.231 The colonizer notices or establishes some sort of 
similarity, yet then continually “disavows” it.232 The subject can “mimic” or “ape” the 
colonizer, but never fully become assimilated. While Bhabha was primarily thinking of 
English colonialism in India, the Qianlong court’s “shamanic imperialism,” was very 
much a variation on this theme. The similarity of the oracles to the “shamans of the 
interior” (Ma. dorgi ba i saman)233 meant that the court naturally had a certain expertise 
in the oracles; such expertise then translated into an obligation to test, rectify, and 
transform. Moreover, Bhabha notes that what seemed similar could also seem 
“menacing.”234 As we have seen in Chapter One, the threat oracles and unregulated 
divination posed to the stability of the Qing order and the credibility of the Gelukpa 
served as justification for the imposition of Qing sovereignty.  
What seems unique in the Qing case is that Qing officials not only portrayed 
Tibetan shamans as charlatans, they took an ambiguous position on the underlying value 
and identity of the superior category, the “shamans of the interior.” By the end of the 
Qianlong reign, successive Qing rulers had established and codified an elaborate set of 
shamanic rituals and ritu235al sites dedicated to the state and banner elite, as well as 
individual clans, including the Aisin Gioro, the imperial clan. As Rawski notes, over the 
                                                
231 Homi Bhabba, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” October 28 
(Spring, 1984), 125-133. 
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235 Nicola Di Cosmo, “Manchu Shamanic Ceremonies at the Qing Court,” in State and Court 
Ritual in China, ed. Joseph McDermott (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 1999), 
352-398. See also, Rawski, (1998), 240. 
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course of this codification process, the Qing court had consciously “removed the ecstatic 
element from all the rituals except the palace evening services.”236 The court had 
eliminated rituals involving trance from the formal liturgies for court shamanic rituals.237 
As noted in Chapter One, the Qing Code also proscribed most of these activities among 
the Han of China proper. According to Donald Sutton, during the early Qing shamanism 
and specifically spirit possession had come under increasing attack from Neo-Confucian 
literati in China proper. From the perspective first of literati and subsequently Qing 
officials, shamanic practices transgressed proper social boundaries and threatened the 
position of educated Confucian men at the top of the social and ritual hierarchy. Spirit 
mediums were often female, worked frequently at night, and were generally of low status 
yet capable of providing ritual services across social classes. Literati attempts to suppress 
shamanism were infused with the argument that spirit mediums were avaricious 
charlatans who preyed on the naïve and impressionable.238 As Qing officials in Tibet and 
at court honed in on the oracles, their reports included similar language. Fukanggan et al. 
were therefore comparing the activities of Tibetan oracles to activities of shamans in the 
“interior” that were either forbidden or at least looked upon with increasing suspicion. It 
is unclear if Fukanggan had the Manchu shamanic tradition in mind or the activities of 
Chinese “sorcerers.” But regardless, both had been the focus of a kind of shamanic 
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imperialism—regimentation, rectification, and often, eradication, since the early years of 
the dynasty.239 
The Qianlong court’s assessment of the oracles as examples of the “low tradition” 
(Ch. 下乘)240 of Tibetan Buddhism would find an echo in the Orientalist scholarship of 
the late nineteenth century. Their studies of Tibetan religion attributed what they 
perceived as the degeneration of high, classical Buddhism to the influence of Tibet’s 
indigenous “shamanist” beliefs.241 Since the 1960s, the association of the pre-Buddhist 
tradition, and Bon in particular with shamanism has been the subject of much contumely. 
In a recent critique of the application of the label “shamanism” to the religious traditions 
of Tibet, Zeff Bjerken has argued that the concept of “shamanism” as understood by 
western Orientalists and later social scientists had no direct equivalent in Tibetan 
thought.242 Bjerken also makes the argument that although the application of the term 
“shamanism” to Tibetan religious culture was a novel, outside imposition by Western 
Tibetologists, their analysis (alternatively pejorative and glowing) has been strongly 
influenced by polemical arguments within the Tibetan tradition.243 For instance, Chandra 
Das may have identified Bon as “shamanism,” but his critique was largely based on a 
reading of Tukwan Chökyi Nyima, the famous Qianlong-period chronicler of Buddhist 
                                                
239 A similar process also occurred in Mongolia. The prosecution of shamans in Mongolia, 
however, began before Qing incorporation and often with Gelukpa assistance. See Elverskog 
(2006), 118-119. 
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schools.244 The Manchu-language sources permit us to modify Bjerken’s argument: 
Western Orientalists were not the first to apply the label “shaman” to Tibetan religious 
culture and do so pejoratively in a colonial context. 
 After dismissing the oracles as but a shadow of the their peers elsewhere in the 
empire, Fukanggan and his associates turned to the actual test they had conducted of the 
oracles: 
Then your servants, in accordance with your instructions, gathered the 
oracles together and ordered them to perform their conjuring arts in the 
Jokhang. They all stated that up until the present they had only practiced 
possession and transmission of the words of deities and that there were no 
other arts.  [We] tested them, ordering them to become possessed. What 
we observed resembled what we had seen and heard previously. We 
examined them by posing one or two questions about what kind of woes 
Tibet (藏) might soon face. Each oracle, speaking for their deity, said 
nothing more than that there will be an outbreak of smallpox as a result of 
the incoming spring winds. Given that the Tibetans (番民) fear smallpox 
more than anything else, at first we did not take [the oracles] seriously. 
Yet just a little more than ten days after the prophecy, over two hundred 
Tibetans came down with the pox. This was thus a small proof of their 
abilities.  
 
In conclusion, these sorts of absurd and preposterous matters are in 
principle impossible to believe in. Unfortunately, the inborn nature of both 
the Tibetan (唐古忒) clergy and laypeople is extraordinarily stupid. To the 
end of their days they will worship the Buddha and recite their sutras, 
thinking of nothing but what benefits the Buddha realm (福田). Although 
one can appeal to them to consider the higher way (上乘) and not follow 
those who speak empty gibberish, this can ultimately not be achieved, and, 
as if cast in iron, their habits will continue on. It is difficult to quickly 
break through their muddled perplexity.245 
 
The forceful official boilerplate about the “preposterous” claims of the oracles thus 
begins to feel a bit hollow by the end of the letter. The test of the oracles seems to have 
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left Fukanggan and his fellow officials not fully persuaded that they were without 
abilities, and if anything may have had the opposite effect. Seen in this light, much of the 
letter seems like a carefully calibrated attempt to convey the importance of reconciling 
the emperor to a continued role for the oracles. Fukanggan’s comment about the previous 
widespread credibility of imperially-approved and licensed kūtuktu seems intended to 
persuade the emperor that the pre-Gurkha War status quo had been working well enough 
to justify its continuation. Moreover, the general ultimately concurred with the Galdan 
Siretu Kūtuktu that the oracles were essential to the process of locating candidate 
children: 
Now our Enlightened Holy Lord promotes the Yellow Teachings and has 
issued a Golden Urn to be held at the Jokhang. All those incarnations 
identified by the chökyong, shall ultimately, as a rule, be selected using 
the urn lottery. Thus [we] will not only shore up the faith of the Tibetans (
番民) but also be able to covertly eliminate the evils of the existing 
practice of collaborating to selfishly transmit [tülkuhood] among 
themselves (彼此授意私相傳襲之弊). This is a good law with a profound 
intent. Although reincarnations recognized by the chökyong are not in the 
slightest believable, if some [candidates] are not identified by the 
chökyong, not only will there be no basis for writing names on the lots and 
no way of putting the lots into the urn, but [we] also fear that the many 
disciples and followers of the reincarnation will individually presume to 
make identifications, abuses will flourish, and the results will be even 
more unreliable. There are, after all, only four chökyong and the 
[candidates] whom they identify are not numerous… 
 
Now the exclusive use of the imperially-decreed Golden Urn lottery 
means that not only will [those candidates] indicated by the oracles be 
credible, but when lots are pulled from the urn, and the robes and bowl are 
inherited (i.e. the child is enthroned as the lama reincarnate), the clergy 
and laity will be naturally persuaded and in agreement, and the abuses of 
the past will be eliminated.246 
 
 
                                                
246 YHGSL 15:0a-9b. 
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Before the emperor received the report quoted at length above, he had evidently 
dispatched several other missives to Fukanggan that the general felt obliged to address. In 
particular, the emperor had again requested the general’s opinion on the possibility of 
banning the oracles and expressed hope that several searches for the reincarnations of 
kūtuktu from the Chamdo region of Kham could be resolved using the new Golden Urn 
law. Fukanggan’s response, penned on February 18, 1793 (QL 58/01/08) just a week after 
the long report quoted above, built on several of his prior arguments. Most importantly 
the general continued his attempt to dispel imperial misunderstandings about the oracles 
by distinguishing between rumors and the actual observed practices. Fukanggan argued 
that the oracles had not claimed the ability to stab themselves or swallow knives—an 
assertion that the Throne had fixated on previously. He also explained that the mediums 
themselves were reincarnations who had been carefully vetted by traditional means 
before being recognized.247 Fukanggan’s strategy seems to be to distract the emperor 
from the oracles by downplaying their strangeness or purported magical powers: “They 
are no match for the shamans of the interior. Do not exaggerate the mysteriousness of 
what they say, because in fact there is no such things.”248 The emperor, however, was less 
than satisfied. Next to Fukanggan’s closing statement that only the continued inclusion of 
the oracles would satisfy the local people, Qianlong penned in the margins with evident 
exasperation, “This too is little more than an expedient!”249 
With regards to the Chamdo reincarnations, Fukanggan cautioned against 
subjecting them to the new law. He noted that in the history of these lineages there 
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existed no indigenous precedent for seeking out divinations from either the oracles or the 
Dalai Lama or other authorities in Ü and Tsang. Thus, he argued that forcing the names 
of the candidates to be dispatched to Lhasa to be subject to the urn lottery would, “I fear, 
be more than what the Tibetan mood can accept.”250 Fukanggan seems to have been more 
aware both of the diversity of traditions concerning locating reincarnations, but also the 
historical tensions between outlying Tibetan regions and the Dalai Lama’s administration 
in Lhasa. Still, Fukanggan noted that if disciples of the kūtuktu in question heard about 
the Golden Urn and wished to have their candidates confirmed using the lottery they 
would not be refused.251 
The urn arrived in Lhasa on January 2, 1793 (QL 57/11/20) and was immediately 
installed in the Jokhang temple under the supervision of the Dalai Lama.252 Having 
promised on March 15, 1793, (QL58/02/04) to “test out the lottery” on some 
“insignificant reincarnations” at the earliest possible opportunity, on March 24, 1793 (QL 
57/02/13), Fukanggan reported that no less than five different searches had been 
subjected to the Golden Urn Lottery in a single day.253 The event established a number of 
important precedents, the least of which was a concrete format, cast, and procedure for 
conducting the ritual. The lotteries were held in the Jokhang cathedral and preceded by a 
ceremony of sutra recitation led by the Jirung Kūtuktu (also known as the Tatsak 
Rinpoché, the regent and day-to-day chief administrator of the Ganden Podrang 
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government) before the image of Tsongkhaba. “On the twenty-first day of the second 
month, the Dalai Lama descended from the mountain to the Jokhang. Your servants went 
in person to supervise as the lots were written and placed in the urn. The lots were drawn 
jointly.”254 Although the last clause does not state explicitly who drew the lots, it is most 
likely that the Dalai Lama drew the lots. As noted above, Fukanggan had previously 
advised that the Dalai Lama should draw the lot.255 When in later editions of the Golden 
Urn ritual the ambans personally drew the lots, this was always explicitly stated in the 
follow-up report.256  
A second precedent set by these lotteries was application of the Golden Urn 
statute to relatively insignificant reincarnation lineages (whom Fukanggan referred to as 
“not-great kūtuktu” 非大呼圖克圖). Furthermore, these were all lineages that had never 
previously had an obligation to report their reincarnations to the Lifanyuan. Only one of 
the five reincarnations had the status of “kūtuktu,” and even this lineage, according to 
Fukanggan, had historically been outside the purview of the Lifanyuan. The implication 
of this precedent was profound: It demonstrated that the Golden Urn could be used to 
extend imperial oversight over a category of local elites that had historically eluded the 
dynasty. Observing that the “mood of the audience was deeply moved and heartily 
enamored with this edict which their hearts are inclined to embrace,” Fukanggan wrote, 
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“from now on all reincarnations large and small, shall be identified by lottery according 
to the manner of this [trial].”257  
The first test runs of the Golden Urn were pivotal for two further reasons. First, 
all five of the reincarnation lineages in question had traditionally sought out the counsel 
of the Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama in making the final identification, yet none of them 
had a history of seeking out divinations from the oracles.258 The use of the Golden Urn in 
these five cases thus conveyed the message that the court intended the Golden Urn to 
supersede not only the oracles but also the divination authority of the Dalai Lama and 
Panchen Lama. Second, the native places of the five reincarnations subjected to the 
Golden Urn were also not without consequence. 
The first reincarnate lineage on Fukanggan’s list was the Sumpa Kūtuktu, who 
hailed from the jurisdiction of the Xining amban. Coincidentally, on the same day that 
Fukanggan submitted his memorial reporting the selections, the emperor dispatched a 
court letter to Tekšin, the Xining amban requesting the amban’s advice on whether it 
would be “more frugal” (Ma. malhūšame) to have the kūtuktu (plural) of that jurisdiction 
identified in Lhasa or Beijing.259 Of course, this decision was about more than just 
frugality. The statute on the Golden Urn had ethnic undertones with geopolitical 
implications. In the Discourse on Lamas, Qianlong had legislated that the urn at 
Yonghegong was intended for use by kūtuktus from Mongolia while the urn in Lhasa for 
kūtuktus of Tibetan regions. But he had not considered the status of kūtuktus from the 
jurisdiction of the Xining amban. This jurisdiction was home to a mixed population of 
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Mongols and Tibetans that could be conceived of from the perspective of indigenous 
historical memories both as the heartland of the Khoshot khanate of Gurshi Khan and as 
the northeastern province of “Greater Tibet”—Amdo. General Fukanggan’s decision, 
therefore, to include the Sumpa Kūtuktu in the ritual set a precedent that not only 
preempted any decision that the Xining amban might come to, but also made a de facto 
claim about the inclusion of the Qinghai Mongols within the sphere of influence of the 
Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa. 260  The identification of the Sumpa kūtuktu’s 
reincarnation using the Golden Urn could thus be understood as simultaneously setting a 
precedent for both the emperor’s control over Tibet and Lhasa’s authority over Amdo.261  
The other four lineages identified on day one of the Golden Urn hailed from the 
Khorchin (科爾沁) of Inner Mongolia. In contrast to the case of the Sumpa Kūtuktu, the 
identification of the reincarnations of the lamas from Khorchin was a kind of “anti-
precedent.” As subsequent generations of Mongolian reincarnations would be confirmed 
using the urn at Yonghegong, this moment was also symbolic of the gradual 
diminishment of the Dalai Lama’s authority to personally supervise his fellow Gelukpa 
lamas in Mongolia.    
Less than two weeks after overseeing the trial-run of the Golden Urn statute, 
Fukanggan took his final leave of the Eighth Dalai Lama and departed Lhasa on the road 
to Sichuan. In his last report from Lhasa, Fukanggan informed the emperor that during 
his final meeting with the Dalai Lama and a large assembly of Tibetan officials both lay 
                                                
260 There is perhaps a small irony here in that the reincarnation of the Sumpa Khenpo Yeshe 
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and clergy, he had presented the complete set of new regulations for the reform of the 
Tibetan administration in a Tibetan translation (“唐古特字”) and explained them point 
by point. Most likely this reference is to a version of the Imperially-Sanctioned Twenty-
nine Articles of Reconstruction, perhaps the copy that was stored in the Jokhang 
temple.262 The general and his associate officials assessed their accomplishments as 
follows: 
[Your servants] observe that the inborn nature of the Tibetans of Tibet 
have never in the slightest been regulated… Respectfully obeying the 
imperial instructions, [your servants] observed the state of the Tibetans, 
promulgated statutes, and gradually displaced their entrenched habits. Our 
reforms were instituted without aggravating or worrying [the Tibetans], 
and we legislated only what was possible to implement…Recently the 
Tibetans have absolutely changed their minds concerning their degenerate 
customs. There is now no major administrative issue about which the 
Dalai Lama will not inform your servant Heliyen, and officials from the 
kalön on down all acknowledge and respect the law.263 
 
Their stated concern with legislating within a band of what they perceived would be 
tolerated by their Tibetan counterparts seems well born out by the record of 
communications concerning the early implementation of the Golden Urn statute. The 
Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu and Fukanggan took actions that deflected early efforts by 
Qianlong (and perhaps other officials in Beijing) to fully eliminate the oracles from the 
process of identifying reincarnations. The Tibetan language version of the ritual 
Fukanggan presented to the Dalai Lama and assembled Tibetan dignitaries included, 
therefore, notification that the oracles would continue to play an essential part in the 
                                                
262 See the discussion of different editions of the Twenty-nine Articles in Liao Zugui, Li 
Yongchang, Li Pengnian, “Qinding zangnei shanhou zhangcheng ershijiutiao” banben kaolüe 
(Philological research on the “Twenty-nine articles of Reconstruction”) (Beijing: Zhongguo 
zangxue chubanshe, 2006).  
 
263 Huibian, 821-822 (QL 58/02/24, 1793-4-4). The last sentence: “進來番民疲玩積習頗絕改觀
，達賴喇嘛遇有公事無不向臣和琳告知，而噶布倫以下人等亦皆各知畏法。” 
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search and recognition process.264 Furthermore, the Qing officials’ complex descriptions 
of their investigations of the Tibetan oracles remind us that Qing official skepticism and 
hostility to Tibetan divination technologies should be understood as an expression not of 
a blanket disbelief in divination, but of a prejudice against indigenous technologies that 
existed in a seemingly unregulated and corrupt system. 
Fukanggan also recorded the Dalai Lama as responding to the presentation of the 
new regulations as follows: 
As for the regions of Ü and Tsang that are united under me, I shall not 
handle matters by myself. [Instead] I will trouble the Heaven heart of the 
great emperor and belabor the great ministers-who are his representatives, 
to provide advice. I and the other clergy and laity all share unsurpassable 
gratitude for the [emperor's] grace. Henceforth we will assiduously 
preserve the regulations, and manage every matter together with the 
resident ministers.265 
 
Recall, however, from Chapter One that the Démo Kūtuktu, author of the Biography of 
the Eighth Dalai Lama, who witnessed these events mentioned no such power sharing 
arrangement or even the Twenty-Nine Articles in his account of Fukanggan’s departure. 
But both accounts share an atmosphere of congeniality that perhaps attests to the abilities 
of Fukanggan and Tibetan elites to diffuse tensions that may have arisen from imperial 
imperatives to assert authority over the Tibetan government. Moreover, just days after 
Fukanggan’s departure, the Dalai Lama’s chronicler noted how the prelate had, “in 
accordance with custom, propitiated the Lamo chökyong, presenting him with many 
                                                
264 The Tibetan-language wang shu’i deb (Ch.《水牛年文書》), reproduced in Liao Zugui et. al. 
(2006), 15. Of the two versions of the Twenty-nine Articles that exist, the version stored at the 
Jokhang temple allows the oracles, but still accuses them of corruption. A later version of this text 
that had been held in the archives of the Ganden Podrang government, makes no mention of the 
possible corruption. See reproduction of this document in Liao Zugui et. al. (2006), 16. 
 
265 Huibian 821. 
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offerings of the faith. The protector, with unsurpassed sincerity, again agreed to promote 
the success of all affairs.”266 The remaining Qing officials in Lhasa, most importantly 
Heliyen, the chief amban, would soon have a very different agenda. 
 
Heliyen and the Prosecution of the Oracles 
  
 
Fukanggan’s report concerning the investigation of the oracles arrived at court at 
the same time as the Tüsiyetü Khan scandal broke. The emperor was greatly disappointed 
with both the outcome of the investigation and the manner in which it had been 
conducted. Qianlong expressed his displeasure by adding caustic interlinear comments 
directly on Fukanngan’s memorial. Next to the general’s description of having asked the 
oracles to make general predictions about potential afflictions that might affect the 
Tibetan people, the emperor scribbled, “You shouldn’t have asked about this matter!”267 
Asking open-ended questions was clearly not the way to entrap the oracles. As for the 
prediction concerning the ouTibreak of smallpox, the emperor observed that since such 
ouTibreaks occurred every year when the weather turned from winter to spring, “How 
can this possibly constitute an unusual prediction?”268 In a separate letter the emperor 
continued to dress down Fukanggan:  
The way you have handled things is really not suitable. Your knowledge 
of these matters is still rather crude. With regards to the matter of the 
oracles, the Tibetans have governed themselves for a long time and 
therefore it is difficult to break through [their accumulated malpractices] 
in just one go… Having brought everyone together, how could you not 
                                                
266 Biography of Eighth Dalai Lama, 210-kha-05. 
 
267 YHGSL 15:9a. 
 
268 YHGSL 15:84a. 
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test [the oracles] by requiring them to swallow swords or cut their own 
flesh? … You should present difficult tests!269 
 
In contrast to his initial instructions in January, 1793 (QL 57/11/29), it is clear that in 
March the emperor was interested in testing the oracles not out of curiosity about their 
potential utility, but in order to demonstrate to the Tibetans and Mongols that their 
abilities and claims were completely fraudulent.  
Just one day after instructing Fukanggan, who the court believed might have 
already departed Tibet, to conduct further trials of the oracles, Qianlong sent further 
instructions to Heliyen, who continued to serve in Lhasa as chief amban, ordering him to 
stamp out the oracles and interrogate the Dalai Lama concerning the search for the 
reincarnation of the Erdeni Pandida kūtuktu. The departure of Fukanggan from Tibet thus 
coincided with a turn towards a much more direct confrontation of Tibetan authorities. As 
stated in the introduction to this chapter, it was the letter to Heliyen on March 16, 1793 
(QL 58/02/05) and a subsequent letter posted three days later that marked the turning 
point in the Throne’s willingness to tolerate the oracles and the opening of a concerted 
campaign to discredit both the oracles and the Dalai Lama.270 The importance of this 
policy shift was made evident by the fact that the emperor demanded the transmission of 
these instructions to Tibet at the extraordinary speed of six hundred li (approximately 200 
miles) per day. These letters also marked the shift of communications concerning 
implementation of the Golden Urn statute and other matters concerning the investigation 
of the Dalai Lama back into being the sole provenance of the Manchu language.  
                                                
269 YHGSL 15:70a. Qianlong’s letter to Fukanggan, dated QL 58/02/04, is quoted in Fukanggan’s 
memorial dated QL 58/03/13 (1793-4-23):“所辦殊屬未當，尚且識見偏鄙。吹忠降神一事，
惟番俗相治日久,一時驟難革除。” 
 
270 MWJXD 23:194-199. 
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The emperor’s officials now understood that the Throne was demanding multiple 
tests in front of large audiences. On April 23, 1793, having already decamped Tibet for 
Sichuan, Fukanggan reported that the first tests of the Golden Urn (involving the 
reincarnations from Xining and Khorchin) had been designed in a manner to not only 
promote the use of the Urn, but also to expose the “wild talk” of the oracles.271 The 
oracles were initially asked to identify who the winning candidates would be. Their 
fraudulence was demonstrated, first, when they all returned different answers, and second, 
when none of their answers corresponded with the results of the lottery. Fukanggan 
explained that this test had been conducted before an “audience of ten thousand.”272 
Fukanggan admitted, however, that the results were mixed: the moment the mediums 
entered the trance, “there were no people who did not bow or pray with utmost 
respect.”273 But the emperor seemed placated by the knowledge that Heliyen would be 
continuing the trials, noting, “There are yet other methods by which to deal with this 
matter. No need for worry.”274 
With Fukanggan gone, the task of eliminating the oracles fell to Heliyen, who, as 
we have seen in Chapter One, arrived in Tibet with an agenda already quite different than 
the general. In the edict appointing him to the post in Lhasa, Qianlong implicitly noted 
that Heliyen was the first amban to serve in a capacity “equal” (平等) to the Dalai Lama 
                                                
271 YHGSL 15: 70a. 
 
272 YHGSL 15:70b. 
 
273 YHGSL 15:70b. 
 
274 YHGSL 15:70b. 
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and therefore had responsibility to “forcefully rectify the inveterate habits of Tibet.”275 
Heliyen concurred with the emperor’s focus on the oracles, noting how the dynasty had 
largely overlooked the significance of the oracles in Tibetan political and religious affairs. 
He memorialized, “It is well-known that the Dalai Lama is a leading person of the 
Yellow Teachings. But the Lamo Chökyong also reincarnates and has done many corrupt 
deeds that are revealed when people are asked straight on. Yet people not only do not 
consider him a leading figure, but also ignore his crimes.”276 
Heliyen submitted the results of his investigations to the court on April 25, 1793. 
In contrast to the memorials of which Fukanggan was the lead author, Heliyen’s 
memorials are less summary assessments of the events but rather detailed transcripts of 
the proceedings. Heliyen’s memorials and the “testaments” and “confessions” attached to 
them, recreated the exact dialog between the ambans, the Dalai Lama, and the oracles, as 
well as the spontaneous responses of onlookers, establishing an atmosphere of 
verisimilitude that Qianlong and his capital officials evidently expected. Qianlong had 
originally provided Heliyen with specific questions and scripts designed to entrap the 
Dalai Lama and the oracles.277 
                                                
275 Qingshi liezhuan (《清史列傳》) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 2230-2234: “和琳平素敬
佛，此次到藏，見達賴、班禪，自必照常瞻禮。其辦事原與達賴、班禪平等，應加義整飭
，力矯從前積習。” See also the similar instructions in the edict of QL 58/04R/24 (1793-6-13), 
in Qing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu (“Veritable Records of the Qianlong reign”) fascicle 1403, 
p. 852a. This edict instructs Heliyen that, since he should now consider himself an equal of the 
Dalai Lama, he should prostrate only before the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and not other 
Tibetan officials. Evidently, Heliyen, who had arrived in Tibet shortly before this edict was 
issued, interpreted “equal” as meaning he no longer needed to prostrate before the Dalai Lama. 
See further discussion in Chapter One. 
 
276 Manchu-language memorial, QL 58/03/15, YHGSL 15:86a. 
 
277 MWJXD 23:194-199. 
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Heliyen began his accounts by providing a new transcript of the first trial that had 
originally been conducted jointly with Fukanggan. This time Heliyen was careful to point 
out that before “a mass of monks and laypeople that had been gathered in the Jokhang 
temple,”278 they had in fact demanded that the four oracles stab themselves. When the 
oracles refused, the Qing officials rhetorically entrapped them: “If the deities really 
descend into your body, then naturally you should invisibly be receiving their support. 
Why then do you still fear the blade of the sword?”279 This point had the desired affect on 
both the oracles and the onlookers: “The oracles were thus obstructed and fell silent, their 
expression disordered. And the surrounding monks and laypeople were now only half 
believing.”280 Thus, Heliyen presented the prior test as having had a greater impact than 
Fukanggan originally had suggested. 
Shortly after receiving instructions to conduct further tests and just a day after 
Fukanggan had departed, Heliyen again gathered all four oracles in the Jokhang cathedral 
and asked them to “perform their arts” (令其各將法術演試) before an audience that 
included the Dalai Lama, the Jirung Kūtuktu (Tatsak Rinpoché), the Démo Kūtuktu, and 
a crowd of other prominent lamas and other secular Tibetan leaders. He informed the 
mediums that:  
The interior also has people similar to you who are able to serve as 
mediums and make predictions about the future trials and tribulations of 
the people. They are all able to swallow knives and cut of pieces of flesh 
and in doing so demonstrate their magical powers. Of course these are 
nothing more than small tricks of illusion. Yet even so officials forbid 
                                                
278 Memorial, QL 58/03/15 (1793/04/25) (rescript on QL 58/04/19), YHGSL 15:83b.  
 
279 YHGSL 15:83b-84a: “臣等詰以神果降體自必暗裡扶持。豈復畏懼刀劍。” 
 
280 YHGSL 15:84a: “吹忠等義阻語塞，神色支離。而查看在旁之僧俗人等半信半疑。” 
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these activities. And these [oracles] are without a doubt deluding the 
people in a similar fashion. Their crimes must be heavily punished!281 
 
Having concluded his speech, Heliyen wrote that he promptly handed out knives 
to the oracles. Where Fukanggan had primarily been testing the oracles against prior 
claims about the abilities of Tibetan oracles, Heliyen was more explicitly testing them 
against a catalog of skills possessed by shamans from the interior of the empire and 
making a justification for the extension of imperial law. Given the way Heliyen framed 
his challenge by pointing out that even shamans in the interior, skilled as they might be, 
faced punishment, it should come as no surprise that the oracles “threw themselves to the 
ground in fear, pleading that “the knives and swords are merely tools for attracting people. 
We do not dare make a game of our lives!” Having “truly frightened them,” Heliyen 
continued to ensnare the oracles: “I have heard that previously, when speaking on behalf 
the deity that has descended [to you], you wildly slash with your knives at onlookers. 
Why are you able to stab others when you cannot stab yourselves?” The oracles fell into 
the amban’s trap: “We have heard that among previous generations of oracles there were 
those who could stab themselves, and perhaps some, when they were truly possessed 
were able to act like that. However, we are truly not able to do this.” Heliyen then sprung 
the rhetorical trap: “Then you not only possess no [magical] arts but cannot even 
accomplish spirit possession! How then can you make such rash predictions?”282 
Heliyen reported to the emperor that by the end of this exchange, not only had the 
oracles provided a public admission that they “truly possessed no methods or arts and that 
everything relied on empty words,” but that the onlookers, “were laughing behind their 
                                                
281 YHGSL 15:84a-84b. 
 
282 YHGSL 15:84b. 
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hands.”283 With the indigenous technology thus thoroughly discredited, Heliyen reported 
that, “the fairness and credibility of the imperially-sanctioned Golden Urn” would be 
widely accepted. Heliyen placed the Dalai Lama on record as having been convinced by 
the trial. He quoted the Dalai Lama as stating, “I have always believed in the truth of the 
oracles, yet today I have finally learned that they are not trustworthy.”284 Heliyen 
requested that the Eighth Dalai Lama prepare a proclamation on this matter.285 The 
amban then optimistically concluded his memorial with the opinion that although 
Tibetans should be permitted to continue to seek out the oracles for divinations 
concerning other issues, the use of the oracles to identify reincarnations (hūbilgan) could 
be permanently forbidden without much opposition. 
 
With regards to the Erdeni Bandida case, the emperor provided Heliyen with an 
even more detailed script to follow should the Dalai Lama prove less than forthcoming. 
The fact that one of the emperor’s first official utterances regarding this case took the 
form of a court letter to Heliyen (dated QL 58/02/05, 1793-03-16), demonstrates not only 
the emperor’s interest in getting to the bottom of how the son of the khan had been 
identified as one of the leading reincarnations of outer Mongolia, but also his expectation 
that the prosecution of the case and resolution of the search using the Golden Urn at 
Yonghegong would help persuade Tibetan Buddhists of the advantages of the new 
procedure and the underlying fairness of the new law.  
                                                
283 YGHSL 15:84b. 
 
284 YHGSL 15:84b. 
 
285 YHGSL 15:84b. 
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Tibetan Buddhists in Tibet and Mongolia were not, however, the only audience. 
The documentation of both the trials of the oracles and subsequent interrogations of the 
steward, Nawangdasi, the Tüsiyetü Khan, the Dalai Lama, and the medium of the Lamo 
Chökyong oracle first circulated privately between Qing officials in Lhasa and at court. 
The production of these documents played an even more important role in persuading 
Qing officials and the Throne that their suspicions were justified and that their reforms 
were legitimate and would be broadly supported by both Tibetan and Mongol elites and 
their subjects. As we shall see in the following examination of the exchange of letters 
between Heliyen, the Grand Council, and the emperor, the court’s constant concern with 
assessing the mood of the Tibetans and the sentiments of leading Tibetans such as the 
Dalai Lama and the Jirung Kūtuktu is evidence of how their own feelings about the 
legitimacy of their efforts hinged on the response of the Tibetans. Moreover, the intensive 
concern with understanding the oracles and the local sentiments was a reflection of how 
little the late Qianlong court still knew about Tibetan affairs in general and especially 
those of central Tibet. Elliot Sperling’s short study of the visit to the Qianlong court in 
1792 by a lay official of the Tibetan government, the kalön Doring Pandita, amplifies this 
point. In his autobiography, Doring Pandita observed that Qing officials in Beijing had 
never seen Tibetan aristocrats before and expressed great curiosity about his costume and 
jewelry.286 The presence of Tibetan laypeople at court and their status as subjects of the 
Qing was still a novelty in 1792 despite a relationship with Tibetan Buddhists that 
stretched back to the early years of the dynasty prior to its conquest of the Ming. In this 
light, Qianlong’s early requests to Fukanggan and Heliyen to test the oracles can be 
                                                
286 Elliot Sperling, “Awe and Submission: A Tibetan Aristocrat at the Court of Qianlong,” The 
International History Review 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 329. 
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understood as expressions of not only hostility, but also a genuine need to acquire more 
credible information about their abilities, their influence on Tibetan affairs, and their 
potential to remain part of the recognition process.  
The prominent place that the comparison with shamans played in Fukanggan and 
Heliyen’s presentation of their tests of the Tibetan mediums is also more explicable when 
the need to persuade the home audience is taken into consideration. Tested against a 
catalog of skills drawn from the Manchu shamanic tradition, the Tibetan oracles could 
easily be placed at a low rung in the hierarchy of divination technologies known to the 
court. Yet, as we will see in the discussion to follow in section three, the analogy to the 
shamanic tradition of the Manchus papered over perhaps too easily fundamental 
differences between Tibetan and Manchu understandings of the work of spirit mediums: 
the “oracles as false shamans” trope was useful for delegitimizing the oracles before a 
home audience, but less intelligible from a Tibetan perspective. 
In addition to contrasting Tibetan divination technologies unfavorably with 
Manchu ones, another key strategy employed by Qing officials to undermine Gelukpa 
hierarchs and the oracles was to insinuate that these monks were fundamentally 
motivated by avarice and that the maintenance of their institutions—either the corporate 
estates of their reincarnate lineages, their monasteries, or schools more generally—had 
led them to immoral or at the very least problematic entanglements with noble patrons 
and lay support communities. As we have seen already in the introduction, where the 
interrogation of Nawangdasi highlighted the manner in which the steward had seemingly 
compromised his principles in the interest of financial expediency, Qing interrogators 
lingered on the accounts of gift-exchange and alms-seeking in order to insinuate 
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corruption or bribery. That bureaucrats of the Hešen-dominated late Qianlong court, an 
administration already infamous for its opulent gift culture and dogged by scandal and 
accusations of venality and bribery, would raise similar accusations against the Geluk 
establishment in Tibet and Mongolia is hardly remarkable.287  Rather the hunt for 
corruption (Ma. jemden) within the Gelukpa school was yet another reflection of the 
degree to which the perceived crisis of official malfeasance had become the overriding 
concern of the Qing officials in the 1790s.288 
The amban Heliyen’s reconstruction of his interviews with the Dalai Lama and 
the Lamo Chökyong oracle, as well as the transcripts of the testimony of these figures 
appended to his memorial, focused on the trail of gifts (Ma. belek, Ch. 伯勒克) presented 
by the steward. Ultimately Heliyen seems to have decided that the lists of gifts received 
by the Lamo oracle and the Dalai Lama provided the clearest evidence of corruption, 
since neither the Dalai Lama nor the oracle could ever be brought to state directly that the 
steward had told them to sanction the child of the Tüsiyetü khan as the next Erdeni 
Bandida Kūtuktu. Qianlong himself had demanded such an explicit statement when he 
first wrote about the case to Heliyen: “Only after the Dalai Lama himself has definitively 
said that it was the idea of the steward Nawangdasi will it be possible to punish the 
                                                
287 For a study of one of the main corruption scandals that rocked the Qianlong court see Elif 
Akcetin’s study of the embezzlement of the famine relief funds in northwest China in 1781: Elif 
Akcetin, “Corruption at the Frontier: The Gansu Fraud Scandal” PhD Dissertation, University of 
Washington, 2007. 
 
288 For a summary of the discourses surrounding the corruption crisis of the Qianlong court, see: 
David Nivison, “Ho-shen and His Accusers: Ideology and Political Behavior in the 18th 
Century,” in Confucianism in Action, ed. David S. Nivison et al (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1959), 209-243. One might also wonder if the reason that Hešen and his brother 
Heliyen were so keen on pursuing corruption in Tibet was to deflect attention from their own 
activities.  
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steward.”289 In order to arrive at such a statement, Qianlong provided Heliyen with the 
following script for the cross-examination of the prelate: 
Heliyen must meet in person with the Dalai Lama and ask him what is true. 
If the Dalai Lama spits out the truth, immediately and speedily 
memorialize what he hears. If the Dalai Lama does not report the truth, 
Heliyen should elucidate the Dalai Lama by inquiring, “This matter was 
definitely the idea of the steward Nawangdasi and since it has absolutely 
no connection to the Dalai Lama, certainly no harm can come to the Dalai 
Lama if he reports the truth. Besides, how can this be disguised with lies if 
the steward is currently being interrogated in the capital? After the steward 
has spoken, there will be even greater obstacles before the Dalai Lama!”  
 
If the Dalai Lama is still not forthcoming with the truth, Heliyen should, 
according to my words, thoroughly interrogate the Dalai Lama saying, 
“Among the Buddhist sutras there is the teaching/way called, ‘jeodun 
barihū ubadis.’ When one recites with conviction this dharani, the air will 
certainly change, and by the power of the dharani a dream/trance will 
occur. Ordinary people will know nothing of the [significance] of the 
dream. [Those] who understand their own dreams when they enter a trance 
with the power of the dharani, are able to clearly know the matters of other 
people in their dreams. In this there are three levels of ‘hūmhatu air/breath 
attainment.’ (The superior level is that of those who are able to know 
things [in advance]). In my opinion, does the Dalai lama’s talent rises to 
this superior level? If his capabilities do not rise to this level, how could 
he know that the son of Cedendorji is the only reincarnation of the Erdeni 
Bandida Kūtuktu?” After he hears this, the Dalai Lama with certainly 
reveal the truth.290 
 
                                                
289 MWJXD 23:198 (QL 58/02/05, 1793-3-16). 
 
290 MWJXD 23:196-197. This court letter is a draft. Underlining indicates Qianlong’s additions to 
the draft. The passage in parentheses indicates a phrase that was crossed out. The original text is 
as follows: “dalai lama aika yargiyan babe alarakū oci, Heliyen uthai Dalai Lama de ere baita 
urunakū šangjoTiba Nawangdasi i gūnin hono Dalai Lama de dalji akū. Dalai Lama yargiyan 
babe alaci umai hūwanggiyarakū. te aika holtome miyamišaci, gemun hecen de šangjoTiba de 
fonjime bi. šangjoTiba gisurehe manggi, elemangga Dalai Lama de ambula goicuka babi seme 
neileme ulbibufi Dalai Lama de fonjikini. Dalai Lama aika kemuni yargiyan babe tuciburakū oci 
Heliyen mini hese uthai fucihi nomun de jeodun barihū ubadis sere doro bi urunakū ereX nomun 
tarni be hūlame urebume gūnime, sukdun be forgošome, tarni hūsun de teni uthaiX tulgin 
tolgišambi. an i niyalma tolgin tolgišara de umai tolgin ojoro be sarkū. Tarni i hūsun de tolgišara 
de, beye tolgin tolgišara be same, tolgin i dorgide inu weri baita be iletu seme mutembi. erei 
dorgi hūmhatu sukdun jafara ilan jergi bi. X(baita be same muterengge uju jergi) mini gūnin 
de Dalai Lama i bengsen uju jergi de isinaheo bengsen ede isinahakū oci, ainahai cedendorji i jui 
be teile erdeni bandida kūtuktu i hūbilgan inu babe same mutembini seme dalai lama be 
mohobume fonjiha manggi gūnici Dalai Lama urunakū yargiyan babe tucibumbi.” 
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These instructions reveal that in addition to advising Heliyen to adopt the classic 
interrogation technique of threatening the subject with the incriminating testimony of an 
accomplice (in this case the steward Nawangdasi), the emperor was also prepared to 
reach for a highly technical argument based on a reading of a specific Tibetan Buddhist 
text. The emperor believed that such a move would force the Dalai Lama to admit that he 
possessed no ability to make the kind of difficult divination required to identify the 
rebirth of powerful Buddhist adept. 
 Heliyen’s report to the emperor notes no such recourse to technical discussions of 
divination abilities. To the contrary, the amban smugly reported that he had called on the 
Dalai Lama in the Potala Palace and taken advantage of a “casual conversation to discuss 
the [Dalai Lama’s] livelihood and the amount of gifts received from the various 
aiman.”291 He then made circuitous inquiries about the specifics of Erdeni Bandida case. 
The amban reported that on three different occasions the steward and the chamberlain 
presented gifts to the Dalai Lama and that the latter had freely admitted that he had 
instructed Nawangdasi to seek out divinations from the Lamo oracle. But in neither his 
primary, Manchu-language memorial recounting the interview nor the Chinese-language 
transcript of the interview attached to the memorial, did Heliyen record the Dalai Lama 
as admitting to having received any specific request to identify the son of the Tüsiyetü 
khan. 292  After detailing for the amban a long list of gifts he had received from 
Nawangdasi when he approved the Lamo oracle’s identification of the Tüsiyetü Khan’s 
son, the Dalai Lama stated, “We have always accepted all the gifts offered without regard 
                                                
291 YHGSL 15:89a. “Aiman” in this context most likely refers to outer/Khalkha Mongols. 
 
292 YHGSL 15:86a-90a (Heliyen’s Manchu-language report of QL 58/03/15). The “Transcript of 
the Dalai Lama’s Answers” (達賴喇嘛回覆單) can be found both in YHGSL 15: 270a-271a and 
MWLF 156:1384-1386.  
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to amount. When we receive things we make bestowals in return that reflect the value of 
the original gifts. The Tüsiyetü Khan never made any entreaties, nor did Nawangdasi 
ever beg for my help.”293 Despite this denial, Heliyen and the emperor seized on the 
record of gifts received (and elided the Dalai Lama attestation that he had bestowed gifts 
in return) as evidence that the Dalai Lama had been bribed. 
 The interrogation of the Lamo oracle presented further complications. First, the 
medium (Ma. gurdemba, Ch. 古爾丹巴, Tib. sku rten pa) refused outright to answer 
questions, claiming that, “When possessed by the deity, I cannot clearly remember 
anything that I say. I beg, therefore, that you ask my assistant (Ma. nirba, Ch. 業爾巴, 
Tib. gnyer pa) Döndrup Dorjé.” 294  Next, Heliyen reported that the assistant also 
repeatedly refused to talk and only did so when he was “frightened by the prospect of 
being tortured.” 295  Despite the initial intransigence, the account of the steward 
Nawangdasi’s visit to central Tibet in Döndrup Dorjé’s deposition corresponds closely 
with the presentation of events provided by the Dalai Lama and the original deposition of 
Nawangdasi taken in Beijing and forwarded to Heliyen in Lhasa. The similarities should 
                                                
293 MWLF 156:1385-1386. “向來遞伯勒克的無論多少我們俱是收。受回時，酌給物件，酬
發答其實。圖舍圖罕並未向我求情。納網達什亦實在並未求過我.” On the occasion of the 
confirmation of the selection by the Dalai Lama, the steward presented one thousand liang of 
silver, for which he accepted, on behalf of the estate of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu, eighteen 
juan of writings by Tsongkhaba, two bolts of fine cloth, a bowl of precious wood, twenty 
lacquered vases, ten bolts of monk robe-cloth, one hundred liang of saffron, eighty-four lots of 
Tibetan incense, three tubes of candles, ten sheets of woolen fabric (氌片), fifteen cases of 
women’s head ornaments (花細), ten further cases of a different type of headdress (布魯克巴花
細), thirty-six bolts of woolen fabric (氆氌), a sack of sugar, and another package of Tibetan 
spices. The steward was separately given a number of items as well. 
 
294 YHGSL 15:272a. This “confession” (供單) appears in both YHGSL 15:272a-273b and 
MWLF 156:1380-1383. 
 
295 YHGSL 15:272a. 
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not be surprising given that it was in the amban’s interest to provide the Throne with a 
clean case shorn of any conflicting details. Beyond adding some new information about 
where the divinations occurred, Heliyen’s transcript of the assistant’s interrogation 
devotes similar attention to cataloging the multiple gifts the steward distributed to the 
oracle and his assistant on the three different occasions when they sought divinations. In 
total, the assistant stated that the oracle had received four hundred liang of silver in return 
for his divinations in addition to other gifts. 296 Yet, Heliyen informed the emperor in his 
summary report that despite confronting the medium and his assistant with what he felt 
was overwhelming evidence of bribery at multiple stages of the divination process, the 
assistant continued to insist that, “Nawangdasi never requested an identification saying 
that the reincarnation was definitely one of these two people. Thus it is true that he never 
sought to bribe.”297 Still, in contrast to the deposition of the Dalai Lama that was labeled 
“Answers” (回覆單), Heliyen submitted the transcript of this later interrogation to the 
Throne under the title “Confession of the Lamo Chökyong and his Assistant Döndrup 
Dorjé” (供單). 
On April 25, 1793 (QL 58/03/15), Heliyen submitted his complete report on the 
investigation of the Tüsiyetü Khan case to the court. Heliyen’s assessment confirmed 
Qianlong’s belief that the steward had colluded with the Tüsiyetü Khan to bribe the Dalai 
Lama and the Lamo Oracle. Considering that Qianlong had initially pondered whether 
the idea of identifying the Tüsiyetü Khan’s son had actually originated with the Dalai 
Lama himself as a scheme for eliciting greater donations from the Khalkha, Heliyen’s 
                                                
296 YHGSL 15:272b-273a. 
 
297 YHGSL 15:87a. Ma. nawangdasi umai urunakū ere juwe niyalmai dorgici emke hūbilgan 
jorire be baihakū bime. inu ulintume baihakūngge yargiyan seme hengkišeme jabumbi. 
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insinuation that he had only been bribed was perhaps a more ideal outcome for the Dalai 
Lama.298 Yet even before the emperor received Heliyen’s report, the court had moved to 
resolve the Tüsiyetü Khan case.  
Just two days after Heliyen had dispatched his report from Lhasa, the emperor, 
clearly frustrated by what seemed like a delayed response from Heliyen (it had been 42 
days since he had dispatched the first court letter to Lhasa), wrote again to Heliyen 
updating him on events at court.299 Qianlong informed him of several decisions. First, 
reports from Sungyun and Kūišu in Mongolia had pinpointed the origins of the plot in a 
chance meeting of the steward Nawangdasi and the Tüsiyetü Khan at Erdeni Jui 
monastery in outer Mongolia. Second, Mongols would henceforth be permanently 
forbidden from seeking divinations regarding reincarnations in Lhasa. And third, 
preparations were already underway to recognize the reincarnation of the Erdeni Bandida 
from among three new candidates using the Golden Urn at Yonghegong.300 
The identification of the reincarnation of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu was finally 
confirmed using the Golden Urn at Yonghegong on May 10, 1793 (QL 58/04/01).301 This 
event marked not only the first instance in which a Mongol kūtuktu was identified in 
Beijing, but also a departure from the recommendations of the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu and 
Fukanggan that leading lamas draw the lot from the vase. In this case, although the 
                                                
298 MWJXD 23:196-197. 
 
299 If average postal time between Lhasa and Beijing is considered, receiving a response from 
Lhasa to a letter posted from Beijing in forty days would be extremely fast. The average turn 
around time for a piece of correspondence to travel from Beijing to Lhasa and back seems to have 
required 63 to 75 days (or nine to ten weeks), even at a postal rate of 600 li per day. 
 
300 Court letter to Heliyen, MWJXD 23:236-239 (QL 58/03/17, 1793-4-27). 
 
301 MWJXD 23:260-262. 
 150 
Gumang and Dongkor kūtuktus had been commissioned to lead three days of recitations 
before the ritual was to take place, and were present for the selection, it was an imperial 
prince and officials of the Lifanyuan who played the penultimate role.302 This seems to 
have set an important precedent because subsequently, in Lhasa as well as well as 
Yonghegong, it would be Qing officials who drew the lots instead of Tibetan lamas.  
Yet the court hesitated before widely circulating a formal account of the Golden 
Urn lottery at Yonghegong. News of the event spread first only in Manchu and Mongol-
language court-letters and edicts that were disseminated to inner court officials, officials 
of the Lifanyuan, Qing resident officials in Inner Asia, and select Tibetan and Mongol 
elites. It was not until July 1, 1793 (QL 58/05/25), when the court had fully assessed the 
mood of the Dalai Lama and the child had been enthroned, that the Throne issued a 
broadly distributed public announcement of the “successful” conclusion of the Erdeni 
Bandida case.303 The court was sensitive to the fact that because the recognition of the 
Erdeni Bandida was unprecedented, it would take continued careful management of the 
promulgation of this case to ensure that this particular event became an established legal 
precedent. The following section will explore the tenuous process of transforming 
precedent into repeated practice. 
 
 Managing the Identification of the Erdeni Bandida 
    
                                                
302 MWJXD 23:260-261, see also YHGSL 15:124. 
 
303 Manchu-language issued to Qing colonial officers dealing with Mongol affairs, YHGSL 
15:291-293. Information concerning the selection of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu first appeared in 
Chinese a day later, and at this point only in the form of a private court letter from the emperor to 
Sun Shiyi, the governor-general of Sichuan. See Heliyen’s Manchu-language memorial of QL 
58/05/09 confirming support among Tibetan elites and commoners: YHGSL 15:281-283. 
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The identification of the Mongol child Ciwangjab as the reincarnation of the 
Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu was momentous for several reasons. First, the child hailed, as 
Qianlong had ordered, from a non-noble family. Second, the recognition of this child 
using the Golden Urn at Yonghegong marked the explicit rejection and replacement of 
another child whose authenticity had already been vouchsafed by the Dalai Lama himself. 
The emperor’s decision also overruled the local jasak aristocracy of Khalkha Mongolia, 
most obviously the sanction of the league captain of the Sayin Noyin Khan League, not to 
mention the wishes of the neighboring Tüsiyetü Khan.304 Moreover, as interrogations of 
the steward Nawangdasi and the Tüsiyetü Khan revealed, the birth of the Khan’s son had 
been attended by a variety of auspicious signs that had also bespoke the child’s legitimate 
candidacy.305 That reincarnations of the kūtuktu should emerge in noble families was also 
not unusual: the first Erdeni Bandida was a son of the Sayin Noyin Khan and subsequent 
reincarnations had historically possessed both religious and secular authority, a fact that 
had been recognized by the Qing since at least 1737, when Qianlong confirmed his status 
as the jasak ruler of a “nomadic lama banner” in the Sayin Noyan Khan aimag.306 The 
appointment of child of “common rank” to a position that had historically been the fief of 
                                                
304 MWLF 156:1404. 
 
305 See Sungyun’s memorial of QL 58/03/14 (YHGSL 15:71-74). These signs were also noted in 
the bilingual Manchu-Mongol edict of QL 58/03/15 (YHGSL 15:121) and the Manchu-language 
court letter to Heliyen, MWJXD 23:236-237 (QL 58/03/17). 
 
306 Qinding Daqing Huidian shili lifanyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2007 
[1899]), 47; Jin Hai, Qingdai menggu zhi (Huhehaote: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2009), 394. 
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the local jasak nobility carried inherent risks.307 These reasons help explain why the court 
made careful preparations for the ritual and carefully managed the reception of the result.  
Well before the final identification of the Erdeni Bandida’s reincarnation was 
conducted on QL 58/04/01, the court began making public efforts to justify its 
intervention in this recognition process.  On QL 58/03/15, a bilingual edict in Manchu 
and Mongol was issued to officials in both Lhasa and Mongolia intended for widespread 
promulgation. This edict offered an extensive justification (sixteen pages and seventeen 
pages for the Manchu and Mongol versions, respectively) for the use of the Golden Urn 
that built on arguments that had appeared in the Discourse on Lamas proclamation of the 
previous year, yet should be understood as presenting a significant new analysis of the 
crisis that the emperor believed was besetting the “Yellow Teachings.” At the crux of the 
problem was the fact that, “nobody is completely convinced” by the recent generation of 
reincarnations.308 This new edict’s first departure from The Discourse was that Qianlong 
publically expressed his belief that the oracles had been corrupted. Echoing the results of 
Fukanggan and Heliyen’s interrogations, the emperor began by arguing that, “In the past 
several years, whenever it was time to identify a hūbilgan, because the mediums have 
attained no special talent, they are incapable of possession by the gods and simply affirm 
whatever is requested of them by other people.”309 For evidence, the emperor then turned 
to the details from the investigation of the Tüsiyetü Khan and the steward of the Erdeni 
                                                
307 As we shall see in Chapter Five, just two years later, in a similar case involving the search for 
the reincarnation of a kūtuktu who was historically the ruler of a nomadic banner in Qinghai, 
Qianlong conceded the right of the lama to reincarnate among local nobles, including his own 
relatives, provided that the final confirmation occurred using the Golden Urn in Lhasa.  
 
308 YHGSL 15:126: “geren i gūnin yooni daharakū.” 
 
309 YHGSL 15:126. 
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Bandida estate, most of which had just been received in court in the days before the edict 
was issued. As Heliyen’s final interrogations had yet to be received, this account was 
primarily based on memorials from Sungyun in Mongolia. The emperor then announced 
comprehensive punishments for the Tüsiyetü Khan and Nawangdasi.310 
The final third of the edict offered an extensive moralistic critique of the Geluk 
School based on the emperor’s claim to having cultivated an authoritative expertise in 
Buddhism unmatched by his contemporaries—the Dalai Lama included. In a passage that 
recalled his earlier advice to Heliyen on how to interrogate the Dalai Lama, the emperor 
for the first time publically introduced his argument that the Dalai Lama lacked the 
ability to perform divinations and interpret visions because he had not yet mastered the 
teachings concerning the dharani of the “jeodun jai sukdun barihū ubadis” tantra.311 
Moreover, he continued to cast aspersions on the whole notion of directed rebirth when 
he noted caustically that neither Sakyamuni nor Tsongkhaba had reincarnated.312 Yet this 
critique was also expressed in terms characteristic of an emperor who held an abiding 
concern with the preservation of traits he felt were crucial markers of Manchu—as well 
as Mongol and Tibetan—distinction. Behind the corruption of the oracles and the “rot of 
the old, pure, and simple manners of the Mongols and Tibetans,”313 Qianlong ultimately 
described a Gelukpa establishment that had become debased as it grew accustomed to 
ever more lavish donations from the faithful. Among these gifts (Ma. belek), the emperor 
even included standard offerings of support for the Sangha such as offerings of food, 
                                                
310 YHGSL 15:116-117. 
 
311 YHGSL 15:118. 
 
312 YHGSL 15:120. 
 
313 YHGSL 15:124: “monggo fandze se fe golo nomhon banin gūwaliyakangge.” 
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butter, and tea. Thus, in closing the emperor offered the Golden Urn as a means of halting 
the stream of corrupting gifts and an opportunity to return to a more frugal (Ma. 
malhūšara) existence.314    
 Just two days later, Qianlong dispatched a court letter to Heliyen. In his letter, the 
emperor reiterated the new prohibitions introduced in his edict, but was also clearly 
concerned about whether his extensive justifications had been persuasive. The emperor 
wrote, “Since there will definitely be no seeking out the Lamo Oracle when searching for 
rebirths [of reincarnate lamas] from the Mongol lands, there will also be no necessity for 
travel to Tibet. [Therefore] I write to Heliyen, ordering him to investigate and 
exhaustively memorialize on whether, due to their loss of authority and decrease in alms, 
the Dalai Lama and Jirung Kūtuktu are truly obedient or are not very pleased.”315 The 
emperor also provided Heliyen with a new blueprint for the conduct of the ritual, one that 
he expected the amban to follow in the future. Qianlong proposed that in the same 
manner as Kūišu, the vice-minister of the Lifan Yuan who had personally traveled to 
Mongolia to collected the names of candidate children, the two Lhasa ambans could also 
take over the task of personally locating candidates. The emperor then directed the 
ambans to supervise as, “the Dalai Lama together with the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu and 
                                                
314 YHGSL 15:112. 
 
315 MWJXD 23:238-239: “damu uttu šuwe lamu cuijung be baiburakū bime. monggo bade bisire 
hūbilgan be jorire jalin. geli inu dzang de generakū oho. dalai lama. lamu cuijung ni toose akū. 
fulehun komso be dahame. dalai lama. jai jirung kūtuktu se jiduji yargiyan i gūnin dahara. 
embici yebelerakū muru bisere akū babe Heliyen sede jasifi. gūnin werešeme fere heceme kimcifi. 
yargiyan be jafafi donjibure wesibukini (inu ume urunakū gese be dahara be memereme) sehebe 
gingguleme dahafi.” Parentheses indicate passages added by the emperor to the draft court letter. 
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other throne-holding great kūtuktus well-versed in the prayers jointly observe and make 
an identification by drawing lots.”316  
This latter instruction is remarkable for its break from what appears to be a 
studied reticence on the part of the Throne to spell out explicitly who would draw the lot. 
Less than a week after informing Heliyen that the responsibility for drawing the lot 
should fall to Gelukpa prelates, the emperor issued final instructions for the conduct of 
the Yonghegong ritual. Here again the Throne’s public instructions returned to their 
customary ambiguity: “After their names have been written on lots and placed in the vase 
that has been installed at Yonghegong, the Gomang Kūtuktu and Dongkor Kūtuktu, both 
seal-holding great jasak lamas, will be especially commissioned to gather together the 
lamas and from the Twenty-seventh through the Twenty-ninth earnestly and sincerely 
recite sutras/tantras for three days. On the first [of the fourth month] the Eighth Prince, 
Liobooju, and Delek will be delegated to jointly observe as one name is drawn to be 
confirmed as the rebirth of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu.”317 Although it is perhaps 
possible to read into the grammar of these sentences a relative emphasis on the influence 
                                                
316 MWJXD 23:238: “aniya se, gebu be sibiya de arafi aisin bumba de dosimbufi dalai lama jai 
g'aldan juktehen i g'aldan siretu (jai nomun de sain g'aldan siretu kūtuktu gūwa) besergen de 
tebuhe amba kūtuktu lama sa emgi tuwame tatame toktobuni. inu urunakū lamu cuijung be 
baibure be akū kai.” Underlined sections indicate sections crossed out by the emperor. 
 
317 Manchu-language edict (QL 58/03/24; 1793-5-4), YHGSL 15:158-157: “esei gebu be sibiya 
de arafi hūwaliyasun huwaliyaka gurung de doboho bumba de dosimbufi doron jafaha jasak da 
lama g'umeng kūtuktu dongk'or kūtuktu sede afabufi geren lamasa be gaifi orin nadan ci orin 
uyun de isibume hing seme unenggi gūnin i ilan inenggi nomun hūlafi ice de jakuci age liobooju 
delek be tucibufi sasa tuwame emke tatafi erdeni bandida kūtuktu hūbilgan toktobukini sehe.” The 
other significant public pronouncement issued in advance of the ritual was similarly vague on 
who would actually draw the lot: “Having reported the names to the Court of Colonial Affairs and 
written the names on lots and placed them in the urn, the seal-holding jasak lama kūtuktus will 
read sutras/tantras before the Buddha after which the officials of the Court of Colonial Affairs 
with jointly oversee the confirmation by drawing a lot.” QL 58/03/15, YHGSL 15:124: “monggo 
jurgan de getukeleme boolafi gebu be sibiya de arafi bumba de dosimbufi doron jafaha jasak da 
lama kūtuktu sa fucihi i juleri nomun hūlafi monggo jurgan i ambasai sasa tuwame tatame 
toktobukini.” 
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of the imperial prince318 and the two officials319 (the first of whom, Liobooju 留保住, a 
Mongol, was the president of the Lifanyuan 理藩院大臣) on the lottery, the main 
impression left by this account is that monks and officials were acting in concert.  
The lack of specificity should not be taken as a sign that the court was unaware of 
the significance of this issue. To the contrary, maintaining the ambiguity of this crucial 
moment in the ritual had several important implications. First, even if one presumes that 
the court wished to have Qing officials draw the lot as would ultimately be the case, the 
lack of clear directive on the issue left field officials with the leeway to negotiate a 
configuration of the ritual that would be acceptable to the Tibetan or Mongol audience. 
The lack of a strong directive on this issue leaves the impression that, at least in the 
spring of 1793, that the throne would be satisfied if the fundamental requirements of the 
statute were met. Second, the lack of specificity on this issue, even well after the 
selection of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu had been determined, indicates that the court 
purposely left room for both sides to flexibly interpret the official account, especially in 
the immediate aftermath of the event when the court was still unsure of whether the 
selection would be welcomed in Tibet and Mongolia. 
This interpretation is borne out by an examination of how the court managed 
information in the aftermath of the selection of the Erdeni Bandida reincarnation. In a 
private letter to Heliyen composed on the day of the ritual, the emperor’s description of 
the event left out all mention of the Gomang and Dongkor kūtuktus, signaling that only 
                                                
318 The “Eighth Prince” most likely refers to Yongxuan 永璇, 1746-1832 (Prince Yishen of the 
First Rank 億慎親王). 
 
319 Liobooju (留保住), an eight-banner Mongol, was president of the Lifan Yuan (理藩院大臣). 
Delek (德勒克?) cannot be positively identified, but was also most likely an official at the Lifan 
Yuan. 
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the imperial prince and the officials of the Lifan Yuan had been the main actors.320 Yet in 
the first mass dissemination of news of the ritual in Inner and Outer Mongolia on July 2, 
1793, the language was consistent with the promulgations that had preceded the lottery.  
Court officials and Geluk monks were both present yet when the winning lot was drawn 
neither was granted clear agency.321  
That the court was choosing its words with great circumspection is further 
demonstrated by the fact that nearly two months passed between the identification of 
Ciwangjab on May 10, 1793, and the dissemination of the news on July 2. The emperor 
was reluctant to issue a full account of the selection to the broader public until his field 
officials had fully assessed the impact this news would have on indigenous elites in 
Mongolia and Tibet. On the day the ritual had been held, Qianlong wrote privately to 
Heliyen that he believed the event had been “good and propitious”—the “selection was 
exceedingly fair and the weather…was clear and free of wind.”322 He ordered the amban 
to describe and explain the ritual to the Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama, Jirung Kūtuktu and 
other major lamas. Yet he was wary of their reaction: 
                                                
320 MWJXD 23:260-261 (QL 58/04/01): “Having searched out and obtained the names of five 
boys, the Eighth Prince, Liobooju, and Delek were delegated to write their names on lots and 
place them in the vase that had been donated to Yonghegong. After reading prayers for three 
days, on the first day of the fourth month they watched together as a lot was drawn and the name 
of Ciwangjab, the son of the Khalkha layman was selected.” (“sunja juse baime baihafi. uthai 
jakuci age. liobooju. delek be tucibufi esei gebu be sibiya de arafi. hūwaliyasun hūwaliyan 
gurung de doboho bumba de dosimbufi ilan inenggi nomun hūlabufi. duin biyai ice de uhei 
tuwame sibya tatabuci. kalkai kara šabi eitegel i jui ciwangjab i gebu be tatame tucibuhebi.”) 
 
321 Edict QL 58/05/25, YHGSL 15:292: “Having received [Kūišu's memorial reporting the names 
of the five candidates], I immediately commissioned the Eighth Prince to supervise together with 
Liobooju and Delek, the reading of sutras by lamas, after which, from among the lots that had 
been placed in the golden urn, the lot of the fifth candidate named Ciwangjab was drawn without 
prejudice and confirmed [as the reincarnation]…” (“bi uthai jakūci age be tucibufi liobooju. delek 
i sasa tuwame lamasa be nomun hūlabufi aisin bumba de dosimbuha sibiya i dorgici gūnin akū 
de uthai sungjaci de faidaha, ciwangjab i gebui sibiya be tatame tucibuhe bime.”) 
  
322 MWJXD 23:260-261. 
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With regards to the matter of this rebirth, we did not use the man selected 
by the Dalai Lama and instead made a determination by drawing lots. It is 
difficult to predict if we can do this without offending him. Heliyen must 
therefore with great care observe the mood and manner of the Dalai Lama 
and all the lamas and kūtuktus and with haste and secrecy report what he 
hears.323 
 
The court had also asked Kūišu to make another trip to the seat of the Erdeni 
Bandida Kūtuktu and assess not only the character of the child whose name had emerged 
from the Golden Urn but also the attitudes of the leadership of the monastery and the 
local nobility. Kūišu’s memorial, which arrived in court on June 15, 1793 (QL 58/05/08), 
and subsequent follow up audience with the emperor two weeks later (1793-7-2; QL 
58/05/15), surpassed imperial expectations, leaving the emperor ebullient. Upon returning 
to the monastery Kūišu learned that, of the five children who had originally been brought 
to the monastery as candidates, the fifth child, Ciwangjab—the boy ultimately chosen in 
the Golden Urn—had performed a number of acts that had left the monastic community 
persuaded that this was the genuine reincarnation. First, when parents had returned to the 
monastery to collect their children after the initial round of tests, Ciwangjab, unlike the 
other children, refused to return home with his mother and father. Adamant that he 
wished to remain in the monastery, his parents eventually acceded to his demand and left 
him in the care of an uncle. Over the next several weeks the small child won the affection 
of the community for his diligence and helpfulness around the monastery. Upon learning 
that the child had been identified as the reincarnation, further auspicious acts were 
witnessed. Kūišu and later, Qianlong, would seize on one detail in particular: while 
preparing for his enthronement, the child had refused to don the robes that the now 
disgraced steward had prepared for the occasion and would not take his seat until he had 
                                                
323 MWJXD 23:261. 
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been offered an alternate costume. Kūišu confessed that when first presented with these 
“kinds of miraculous matters” (Ma. hacingga ferguwecuke ba) he “hesitated in disbelief” 
(Ma. tathūnjame akdahakū). Therefore, he “secretly dispatched” investigators to 
“Chinese merchants” (Ma. hūdašara nikasa) residing in the vicinity of the monastery. 
After the merchants immediately confirmed that child’s brief history of residence in the 
monastery had indeed been “miraculous,” Kūišu posted his memorial and then rushed in 
person to the court.324 
 Kūišu’s testimony resulted in the immediate and widespread dissemination of 
news of the identification of the Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu using the Golden Urn. This 
occurred despite the fact that Qianlong had yet to hear from Heliyen in Tibet (although 
the amban had already penned his response on June 16, 1793 (QL 58/05/09). The 
discovery of a child who exhibited signs of being a genuine reincarnation resulted not 
only in an outpouring of confidence in the legitimacy of the Golden Urn but also in the 
addition of an entirely new explanation for the efficacy of the ritual to the public 
discourse. The emperor summarized his understanding of the ritual as follows: 
After receiving Kūišu’s memorial reporting that he had identified five 
boys, I immediately commissioned the Eighth Prince to supervise together 
with Liobooju and Delek the reading of sutras by lamas, after which, the 
lot of the fifth candidate named Ciwangjab was drawn without prejudice 
from among the lots that had been placed in the golden urn. The revelation 
of such a miraculous situation wherein Ciwangjab was already residing in 
that monastery, [makes] the principles of the Buddha especially clear and 
manifest. It must be said that what occurred as a result of having invoked 
the Protector Amitāyus Buddha and received his invisible blessing, is truly 
miraculous. My efforts to rectify the declining teaching of the Yellow 
Law/Religion were undertaken for the benefit of the Buddha’s law. The 
Buddha has found this proper as is evidenced by occurrences such as this 
that are genuinely miraculous. Henceforth, as the various corruptions are 
                                                
324 YHGSL 15:277b-27a, 292-293. It is interesting that the Qing field officials considered local 
“Chinese” (merchants nonetheless!) to be an objective authority on this matter. 
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eliminated, may the true traditions of the Buddha’s law come to be 
restored!325  
 
Here we learn for the first time that it was not human agency that orchestrated the 
successful outcome of the lottery, but rather supernatural agency. In this case, the 
emperor is referring specifically to Amitāyus (Ma. ayusi fucihi, Tib. a yu She or tshe 
dpag med) a manifestation of the Amitābha Buddha, who is associated in Tantric practice 
with the propitiation of long-life. It is perhaps not coincidental that the Yonghegong 
complex housed multiple images of Amitāyus, several of which were located in the 
Tantric Hall just to the east of the spot where Qianlong’s tetraglot Discourse on Lamas 
stele stood.326  
 The attribution of the successful selection to Amitāyus may also explain the 
seeming disinclination of the emperor to state explicitly who drew the lot. The ambiguity 
of the official pronouncements and the passive grammatical construction of the respective 
sentence enable the reader to envision a supernatural actor causing the lot to emerge (Ma. 
tucibuhe). Such a linguistic strategy compliments indigenous Tibetan Buddhist 
understandings of divination, particularly the practice of dough-ball investigation with 
which the Golden Urn was occasionally compared. Just as the fall of a ball from a 
rotating plate needed no direct human agency and could be explained as a divine 
                                                
325 YHGSL 15:191-192: “jaka kūišu sei baci. ere sunja jui be sonjome tucibufi wesimbuhe amala. 
bi uthai jakūci age be tucibufi liobooju. delek i sasa tuwame lamasa be nomun hūlabufi aisin 
bumba de dosimbuha sibiya i dorgici gūnin akū de uthai sungjaci de faidaha, ciwangjab i gebui 
sibiya be tatame tucibuhe bime. ciwangjab tubei juktehen de bifi. geli enteke ferguwecuke arbun 
serebuhengge. cohome fucihi i doro ten i gebun iletu. ayusi fucihi sakigūsun adistit bifi dorgideri 
aisiha ci banjihangge. ere yala ferguwecuke seci ombi. mini uttu suwayan šajin i eyehe tacin be 
tuwacihiyame icihiyabuhange. enteheme fucihi šajin de tusa okini sere jalin. fucihi urušefi uttu 
obuhangge. yargiyan i ferguwecuke. ereci eiten jemden yooni nakafi. fucihi šajin i yargiyan ulan 
be dahūbuci ombikai.”  
 
326 Ferdinand Lessing, Yung-ho-kung: An Iconography of the Lamaist Cathedral in Peking with 
Notes on Lamaist Mythology and Cult (Stockholm: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1942), 64-
65. 
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intervention, so too could the emergence of a lot from an urn—if the sentence was 
constructed with subtlety.  
  
Into Tibetan 
 
The arrival in Tibet in late 1792 of the Golden Urn and its installation in the 
Jokhang is perhaps the main reason why the temple became a focal point for formal 
encounters between Tibetan and Qing officials in 1793.327 By the end of the year, the 
Jokhang chapel also possessed a register of Tibetan-language translations of Qing official 
proclamations that had been issued over the course of the year. This register, known 
simply as the “Record of Royal Pronouncements from the Water-Ox Year” (Tib. chu 
glung wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb), has been extensively quoted in Chab spel tshe brtan 
phun tshogs’s “The Turquoise Garland Annals of Tibetan History” (Tib. bod kyi lo rgyus 
rags rim g.yu yi phreng ba) and is therefore available to serve as a rough guide to 
understanding what a handful of elite lay and ecclesiastical officials might have known 
about Qing policy as it evolved from 1792 through 1793.328 This register contained a full 
copy of the Fukanggan’s “Twenty-Nine Articles” as well as a Tibetan-language 
translation of an edict dated to May 28, 1793 (QL 58/04/19)—the same day that 
                                                
327 The documentary record suggests for the remainder of the dynasty, this was a role that the 
cathedral shared with the “Chapel of Victory over the Three Realms” (Tib. gzim chung sa gsum 
rnam rgyal, “Zimchung sasum namgyel”), a chamber in the older “Red Palace” section of the 
Potala. On the occasion of the enthronement of the Eighth Dalai Lama in 1762, Qianlong 
bestowed an image of himself that subsequently hung in this chamber. Moreover, the room also 
housed a complete set of the Kangyur translated into Manchu. See Gyurme Dorje Footprint Tibet 
Handbook (fourth edition), (Bath, UK: Footprint, 2009), 113-114. 
 
328 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, chu glung wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb (Lha sa: Bod ljongs 
bod yig dpe skrun khang, 1989), 334-340. 
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Heliyen’s final report summarizing his investigation of the Lamo Chökyong and the 
Dalai Lama arrived in the emperor’s hands (or perhaps more precisely, received the 
emperor’s rescript).329 
Known in Tibetan simply as the “Water-Ox Year Edict” (Tib. chu glung wang 
zhu), the document begins with a brief history of its long journey from Manchu to 
Tibetan and from Beijing to Lhasa. As noted above, the emperor handed down the edict 
to the Grand Council on May 28, 1793. The proclamation then appears to have 
languished for four months until on September 24 (QL 58/08/20) the Lifan Yuan 
produced a Chinese translation of the Manchu original. It was then forwarded to Tibet via 
the office of the Sichuan governor-general and arrived in Lhasa on October 19 (QL 
58/09/15), whereupon a Tibetan-language translation was finally produced.330  
This edict is significant for two reasons. First, this decree marked the second 
major articulation of the Golden Urn law since the Discourse on Lamas. Having just 
received Heliyen’s report on his final test of the oracles and the transcripts of the 
interrogations of the Dalai Lama and the Lamo Chökyong, as well as Sungyun and 
Kūišu’s earlier reports on Nawangdasi and the Tüsiyetü khan, the emperor felt he now 
had sufficient evidence from both Mongolia and Tibet to mount a renewed effort to 
forbid Mongol nobility from seeking reincarnations among their kin and introduce a new 
prohibition against the use of the oracles in the recognition process.  Second, considering 
that there is no evidence that the text of the Discourse on Lamas edict circulated in Tibet 
in 1792-3, the “Water-Ox Year Edict” is therefore the earliest formal, written, Tibetan-
                                                
329 Grand Council file copy of the original Manchu-language edict MWLF 156:0044-0052 (QL 
58/04/19, 1793-5-28). For the Grand Council file copy of Heliyen’s base memorial, see MWLF 
156:1395 (QL 58/03/15, 1793-4-25). 
 
330 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 334. 
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language statement of the underlying rationale for the law on the Golden Urn known to 
have circulated in Tibet.331 Contemporaries evidently recognized the import of this edict 
as well. It was included in the Tibetan compilation of key official documents from 1793 
held at the Jokhang and was reproduced by the Lhasa amban Hening in his 
“Comprehensive Gazetteer of Ü-Tsang” (《衛藏通志》).332 Moreover, the Eighth Dalai 
Lama issued a decree in response to the imperial edict that was also included in the 
registry of official pronouncements held at the Jokhang.333 
Of course, long before the “Water-Ox Year Edict” arrived in Lhasa, Heliyen, like 
Fukanggan before him, had been ordered to confidentially explain the Golden Urn and 
the related prohibitions to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan elites. The edict followed on 
the heels of several court letters from the emperor to Heliyen (QL 58/03/17 and QL 
58/04/01). Yet given the oral nature of those conversations, the “Water-Ox Year Edict” is 
the earliest and only record that reveals the exact wording by which the court attempted 
to communicate its policy and therefore provides a basis for beginning to think about how 
Tibetans might have understood the new policy.  
It is also important to note that production of this formal, public, and textual 
justification for the Golden Urn narrowed and limited the ways in which field officials 
such as Heliyen and indigenous interlocutors/translators could talk about the law. 
Committing the emperor’s message to paper committed the messengers to a single 
message, thus eliminating the ability of the court’s field officials to rephrase or otherwise 
                                                
331 For a Manchu-Mongol bilingual version of this edict: YHGSL 15:212-230. 
 
332 Chu glung wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb (“Record of Royal Pronouncements from the Water-
Ox Year”), 85-91; Hening, Weizang tongzhi, 267-269. 
 
333 Chu glung wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb, 108-110. 
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reconfigure the message in a form that might better accommodate indigenous sensibilities. 
And Qianlong was not unaware of these dangers. As illustrated in the proceeding section, 
the deliberate pace at which the Throne revealed information about the selection of the 
Erdeni Bandida’s reincarnation (and it should be noted that the “Water-Ox Year Edict,” 
although issued nineteen days after the identification of the reincarnation included no 
mention this event), its preference for personal, private communications, and even his 
reluctance to spell out all the details of the Golden Urn ritual, are all evidence of the 
degree to which the Qianlong emperor appreciated the utility of ambiguity.   
Although Qing officials familiar with the deliberative process at court or the 
Manchu-Mongol edict of QL 58/03/15 would have found little new in the emperor’s edict 
of QL 58/04/19, from the perspective of Tibetan officials the message of the edict must 
have been galling, and especially so for the Eighth Dalai Lama. The edict began with a 
succinct announcement that the steward Nawangdasi’s attempt to have the Tüsiyetü 
Khan’s son identified as a kūtuktu was “wrongdoing” (Tib. nyes pa, Ma. weile, Ch. 罪), 
and that the Dalai Lama’s sanction of the Lamo Chökyong’s decision constituted 
complicity in the crime.334 In the subsequent exposition of the Tüsiyetü Khan scandal, the 
edict construed the Dalai Lama’s statements into admissions of, if not quite guilt, 
certainly gross ignorance. Since the edict quoted directly from the depositions of the 
Dalai Lama and the Lamo Oracle, the edict accomplished the unprecedented act of 
compromising the authority and integrity of the Dalai Lama on record in Tibetan. 
Although the edict allowed the Dalai Lama to protest that he had “always found the 
Lamo Chökyong to be credible,” the subsequent presentation of evidence contradicted his 
                                                
334 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 335. 
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account.335 Translated back into Tibetan, the testimony of the assistant to the Lamo 
Chökyong asserted that the medium was bribed with goods and that the questions put to 
the oracle were contrived in such a manner that he could not but point to the son of the 
Tüsiyetü Khan.336 If the Dalai Lama actually read this text (which I suspect he did), he 
would, therefore, have been reading his own words after they had passed through a 
minimum of four stages of translation (Tibetan>Chinese, Chinese>Manchu, 
Manchu>Chinese, Chinese>Tibetan).337 One can only speculate about how familiar they 
sounded. Yet at least between the original Manchu-language edict and the final Tibetan-
language translation the content of proclamation underwent very little change. 
Qianlong’s message in the edict can be summarized as follows: First the emperor 
abrogated to himself the role of both patron and priest. He made this claim on the basis of 
the Dalai Lama’s relative youth and ignorance, expressed in the following terms, “Since 
this Dalai Lama is still young, he is still in the early stages of study, and it is impossible 
that he has acquired higher forms of perception. Thus when asked to identify a kūtuktu, 
he is only able to call upon the prophecies of the Lamo Chökyong.”338 In contrast, the 
emperor claimed a long personal history of Buddhist study as well as a tradition of 
patronage by his “royal state” (Tib. rgyal khab, Ma. daicing gurun, Ch. 本朝). “Since 
ascending the throne fifty-eight years have passed. I have sought out the learning of 
                                                
335 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 335. 
 
336 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 335-336. 
 
337 Although these confessions were submitted in Chinese, one wonders if there were Manchu-
language originals, or if the interrogations were conducted in Manchu and Tibetan, because there 
are a lot of Manchu words transliterated into Chinese. Most significantly, the term for “gift,” (ma. 
belek). 
 
338 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 338. 
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Mongolia and Tibet and, although I have studied for only fifty plus years, my dynasty has 
always protected the teachings of the Buddha.”339 Such knowledge also provided him 
with the following perspective: “Nowadays, the behavior of the clergy has not only fallen 
into wickedness, but the craving of the Mongols and Tibetans for material things bears no 
resemblance to before. They no longer possess the single-minded devotion to the 
religious laws of the Buddha.”340  
Faced therefore with a crisis in the Geluk church, the emperor argued that it was 
his obligation to subject Mongols and Tibetans to his law. Moreover, he felt that his 
recent success against the Gurkhas had proven the benefits of such control. Qianlong 
stated, “Recently there arose great discussion because of the conflict over property 
involving the Shamarpa [Kūtuktu]. Due to the vast strength of my dynasty (Tib. rgyal 
khag, Ma. gurun boo, Ch. 國家), peace was established. Similarly, the distant land of 
Tibet and the all the Mongol jasaks must necessarily be placed under the Court of 
Mongol Affairs (i.e. the Lifan Yuan, Tib. mong gol sbyor khang, Ma. tulergi golo be 
                                                
339 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 336: “nged khri du khyon nas lo lna bcu nga brgyad song 
bar mong gol dang bod kyi slob gnyer sogs kyang lo lnga bcu lhag tsam skyong bar sangs rgyas 
kyi bstan pa de bzhin nged kyi rgyal khab nas bsrungs thog/ ” The Manchu original contains a 
longer, if not stronger statement. MWLF 156:0046: “I have studied the Buddhist sutras in the 
mongol and Tibetan script since the eighth year of my reign, which now amounts to over fifty 
years. In my spare time from handling affairs, I have acquired a general understanding of the 
Buddha's way through intense focus, explanation and discussion. Our Great Qing state's 
continuous protection of the Yellow Teachings stems from our observation that the Mongols in 
particular are by nature sincere believers in the Buddha and thus we appropriately honor their 
teachings.” (“mini beye abkai wehiyehe i jakūci aniya ci monggo tanggūt hergen i fucihi nomun 
be tacifi. te susai funcere aniya otolo. baita icihiyara šolo de gūnin girkūfi giyangame leoleme. 
fucihi i doro be murušeme ulhihebi. musei daicing gurun suwayan šajin be karmadaragge. 
cohome geren monggoso banitai hing seme fucihi de akdame ofi. tuttu ceni tacin de acabume 
wesihulere be tuwabuha.”)  
 
340 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 336-337. 
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dasara jurgan), which will render fair justice if conflicts again arise.”341 However, it 
must be noted that the translator of this passage made a significant adjustment between 
this text and the Manchu and Chinese-language versions. Where the original edict states 
that, “all the Mongol jasaks should be placed under the governance of the Lifan Yuan,” 
the Tibetan text has added “Tibet and the Mongol jasaks.” thus clarifying that now Tibet 
would also fall under the jurisdiction of an institution that, from its Tibetan-language 
name at least, would seem to have only supervised Mongol affairs. This specificity is 
important because at several points in the text, the emperor’s attention seems focused on 
Mongols and not Tibetans. For instance, the injunction against seeking reincarnations 
among aristocrats explicitly pertains to Mongol nobility.342 The Tibetan aristocracy is not 
mentioned, potentially raising questions about whether this restriction would apply in 
practice in Tibetan regions.343  
Having asserted the sovereignty of the dynastic house (Tib. rgyal khag, Ma. 
gurun boo) over Tibet, the edict culminated with an exhibition of how the emperor’s 
representative had exposed the oracles as charlatans: 
                                                
341  Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 337: “dper na zhwa dmar bas chas dngos la rtsod gzhi 
byung ba’i stabs gleng che byung rung/ nged rgyal khag gi stobs shugs che ba'i stabs zhod 'jags 
su song ba/ de mtshungs phyogs mtha'i bod dang/ mong gol dza sag bcas nas kyang ma mong gol 
sbyor khang du 'bul dgos la su thad nas rtsod gzhi'i rigs byung tshe drang bzhag gi dpyad 
mtshams dgos rgyur/” The Manchu version speaks only of subjecting “Mongol jasaks” to the 
Lifanyuan. MWLF 156:0048: “te gurun booi horon erdemu goro selgiyebufi. geren monggo jasak 
sa. gemu tulergi golo be dasara jurgan de kadalabume. yaya boigon hethe be temšere jergi baita 
be gemu tondoi lashalame icihiyambi.”  
 
342 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 337. The Tibetan reads: “Similarly, the self-serving practice 
of [finding] rebirths among the descendants or brothers of royals is henceforth prohibited. With 
regards to this law, the Mongol khans, beile, beise, and gong, already possess their own 
inheritable positions. Therefore it is not appropriate that they carry off the wealth of the 
reincarnated lamas as well.”  
 
343 As I will discuss in Chapter Three, the lack of clarity on who was an aristocrat and whether 
this statute applied to Central Tibet and Amdo, did in fact turn out to be a source of confusion and 
contention. 
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As for the Chökyong’s mediums, they are the equivalent of the spirit 
possession that occurs in China. In China, people who are possessed by 
gods and ghosts build faith among the people by means of magical 
displays involving stabbing with knives, swallowing swords, and hatchets. 
Recently, when the resident amban in Tibet, Heliyen, gave the mediums 
knives to see what they would do, they all went into a state of panic. 
Seeing that they could not match the skills of those possessed by gods and 
ghosts in China, they obviously have no ability to recognize tülku.344 
 
Thus the Throne restaged the contest between the shamans of the interior and the 
oracles of Tibet in written form for widespread distribution. On the basis of this test, the 
emperor rested his case for why, “It will never again be acceptable to make 
identifications using the Chökyong.” As the Manchu language original makes clear, the 
emperor envisioned the elimination of the oracles from this process as a “victory by 
means of legislating” (Ma. eteme fafulaha).345 Yet he also hoped that such tests would 
eventually accomplish what lawmaking alone could not—thorough change and 
transformation (Ma. halambi or webumbi, respectively) of Tibetan and Mongol 
customs.346 While the edict firmly decreed that oracles could no longer be consulted in 
the process of locating reincarnations, it recognized that its ability to enforce its will 
through the law was limited. He was confident, however, on the basis of Heliyen’s report 
that when presented with the failures of the oracles, they would arrive on their own at the 
                                                
344 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 338-339: “chos skyong gi sku rten pa de bzhin yang rgya'i 
yul gyi lha 'dre zhugs pa lta bu yin 'dug/ rgya yul gyi lha 'dre zhugs mi nas gri rgyag pa dang/ gri 
lces lcag pa/ sta gri sogs kyi cho 'phrul bstan nas mi mang yid du 'ong ba byed cing/  da lam sku 
rten pa de bzhin la bod sdod blon chen ho lin nas gri sprad lto jus ji 'dug bltas par tshang ma 
'jigs rngams byed pa yod 'dug pa/ des na rgya yul gyi lha 'dre zhugs mir yang ma do ba'i sprul 
sku ngos 'dzin byas pa de dag mngon gsal ltar yin n'ang/ bod mi rnams kyis cha 'jog byas nas lo 
mang song bar sdon byas la brtsad gcod med pa dang/ phran bu'i brtag pa bden pa'i stabs lha 
lung bstan btsan 'dzul ('gog) gyi 'phal gang bkod pa gtong ma dgos pa/”  
 
345 MWLF 156:0046. This phrase is used in several edicts to convey the sense that the Qing 
suppression of the oracles was achieved not through brute force, but through law.  
 
346 MWLF 156:0050. Qianlong used these verbs frequently to describe the overall effect he 
wished to have on Tibetan Buddhism. 
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intended conclusion: that the mediums were frauds. Thus the emperor, noting that it was 
“provisionally impossible to change” (Ma. “taka halame muterakūngge”) widespread 
belief in the oracles, offered the following concession in the Tibetan-language edict: 
However, the Tibetans (bod mi) universally find [the oracles] credible and 
for many years have never tested them. Because when asked about trifling 
matters they may make accurate [predictions], it is unnecessary to issue a 
command instantly outlawing their prophecies. Naturally, it is not 
necessary to prohibit Tibetans (bod mi) from making inquiries of the 
chökyong [with regards to minor, personal matters]… As for the 
chökyong they will gradually weaken and over time will definitely 
disappear of their own accord.347 
 
The Qing strategy for the elimination of the oracles hinged on two assumptions: 
First, that Tibetans would recognize the shamans of the interior and the chökyong as 
comparable; and second, that Tibetans would also accept the method—public tests of the 
oracles by Qing officials–as an acceptable way of disproving the oracles. Both of these 
assumptions also reflect hierarchical systems of knowledge anchored in the intellectual 
authority of the emperor. The first operated from an implied hierarchy of divination 
technologies in which shamans/師巫  are superior to the mediums. The second 
assumption reflected the imposition of a particular method for generating and interpreting 
empirical information. The vision of a future Tibet free of oracles was a peculiar and 
paradoxical expression of Qianlong-era Qing imperialism. Yet although the shamans of 
the interior were superior, Qing officials contemptuously portrayed their abilities and 
maintained a regime of surveillance lest they get out of hand.  
                                                
347 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 339: “rang bzhin bod mi nas lung bstan zhus pa sogs la 
bkag 'doms byed ma dgos/ chos skyong gi skor yang rim bzhin nyams thag tu 'gro nges la de 
skabs rang shugs kyi bkag 'doms byed bde yong ba gzhir bcas/ ”  
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The depositions of both the Dalai Lama and the medium of the Lamo Chökyong 
oracle (and the edicts into which these depositions were incorporated) contain evidence 
that indicates that, although Tibetans may have seen the shamans and mediums as both 
speaking on behalf of deities and spirits, they had different expectations for the use of the 
oracles and different standards for evaluating the accuracy of their prophecies or actions 
more generally. Moreover a question can be raised about whether the Qing officials were 
talking about Manchu shamans or Chinese sorcerers. In Manchu, Heliyen and Qianlong 
spoke of “shamans of the interior” (Ma. dorgi ba i saman).348 Their descriptions of the 
abilities of these shamans would seem to place them firmly within the shamanic 
traditions with which bannermen like Heliyen would be most familiar: the traditions the 
Manchus inherited and adapted from Inner Asia. Still, the ambiguous meaning of “the 
interior” raises the question of whether they were in fact speaking of the traditions of 
China proper as well.349 The final translation into Tibetan identifies the “people who are 
possessed by gods and ghosts” as clearly being of China (Tib. rgya yul).350 From the 
perspective of the Tibetan translation then, regardless of whether Tibetans appreciated a 
separate Manchu divination tradition in other contexts, in this case the Manchu tradition 
was indistinguishable from the “traditions of China” much in the same way that Tibetan 
texts seldom distinguished “China” from the Great Qing.  
As mentioned in section two above, the Dalai Lama and the Lamo Chökyong 
medium engaged in several strategies to deflect Qing interrogations. They also asserted a 
                                                
348 MWLF 156:0049. 
 
349 The Chinese version of this text translated this expression as “內地師巫,” Weizang tongzhi, 
269. 
 
350 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 338. 
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vigorous defense of the oracles. First, both the medium and his assistant insisted upon the 
complex and often indeterminate nature of seeking prophecies from the oracle. The 
following exchange between Heliyen and the medium of the Lamo Chökyong is 
illustrative of these differing expectations: 
[Heliyen] asked: If you are truly able make requests of the gods, why did 
you not spontaneously and immediately point out the name of the rebirth 
when Nawangdasi had asked you to become possessed by the deity? Why 
was it that even after several attempts you still had not made an 
identification? You obstinately prevaricate saying that you had to wait for 
Nawangdasi to provide a letter stating the ages and year of birth of 
Cedengdorji and his wife along with that of their son. Then, only after 
they delivered silver and satins did you identify the son of Cedengdorji! 
How can you recognize the son of the Tüsiyetü Khan if you originally said 
that the [reincarnation] would emerge in an average household?! It is 
obvious that the son of the khan received special consideration. 
Nawangdasi bribed you. You most definitely have no innate ability with 
spirit possession! Moreover, it is obvious that on a daily basis you fake 
possession in order to trick the stupid Tibetans out of their money and 
goods! Today the truth has finally been exposed. Do you still dare make a 
false confession? 
 
The oracle prostrated and responded: I have been an oracle for generations. 
It is commonplace for people to come to Tibet to seek 
reincarnations. Some ask “in what place?” Others ask, “which of these one 
or two, or even of these three or five, names is the one?” Frequently there 
are identifications that are not correct and they are asked to renew the 
search. The first two times he approached us, Nawangdasi did not tell us 
the number of candidates or their names, he only asked where the 
incarnation had taken rebirth. Therefore, the prophecy told him to search 
in his home region. Without having returned to his home, he persistently 
asked us to see if it was either of the names that he delivered to us on the 
basis of previous answers. [I] could not refuse to make an identification 
for him. Therefore [I] again checked and [the protector] indicated that it 
was Cedendorji's son. The stamp of the chökyong placed above his name 
is authentic. This and similar types of matters have always been handled in 
this manner. Moreover, as for the relationship between myself and the 
Tüsiyetü Khan, there were no contact/dealings between us. Nawangdasi 
never insisted that [the Protector] choose between these two people. He 
only wanted to know if the [reincarnation] was one of those two people.351 
                                                
351  MWLF 156:1382-1383:“問拉穆吹忠初次那網達什托你降神時你如果真能請神自然即將
呼畢勒罕得名姓指出。何故數次總未指定？一味言語支吾必待那網達什遞字內寫出車登多
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In his response, one can observe that the medium provided Heliyen with an outline of a 
divination technology that delivered results not by means of singular or sudden 
revelations, but rather through an accumulative process. According to the medium, an 
accurate decision required multiple stages of inquiry, both by the protector deity and the 
supplicant. Moreover, there was no expectation that the process was infallible, especially 
if the deity was not provided with accurate or complete information.  
Other contemporaneous Tibetan-language commentaries about oracles make the 
same point. In his description of the search for the reincarnation of the Second Jamyang 
Zhepa in 1797 (the history of which will be the focus of Chapter Three), Drakgönpa 
recorded how the protector deities themselves, speaking through the mediums, expressed 
uncertainty about which candidate was the genuine article. In this case, the search party 
sought multiple prophecies from multiple deities, who all offered different assessments of 
the candidates. The author presented this not as a sign of the inaccuracy of the oracles, 
but rather the complexity of the task. Moreover, in this specific case, the deities not only 
hedged their predictions but also recommended the utility of subjecting the candidates to 
                                                                                                                                            
爾濟等夫婦年歲屬相及伊子等屬相並遞了銀子緞疋後你纔將車登多爾濟之子指定。況你先
說出自中等人家後又指定圖舍圖罕之子。可見是圖舍圖罕授意與你。納旺達什有賄托與你
。你毫無降神本事！並可知你平日托言降神欺誑愚番圖詐錢財！是實今事已全露。你還不
據實供麼？吹忠叩頭供稱：小的世當吹忠，凡有來藏求指呼畢勒罕者或係問出在何方或係
執一二人三五人名字來求降神指認者，往往亦有指為不真。令其再尋者。前兩次那網達什
並未將人數名姓說出。只問他們呼畢勒罕出在何處。故嚨單內指與他地方尋找。他又未回
去找尋，再三求看是以仍照前次回復迨他遞字呈出名姓不能不與他指定。故再 行看了，
即指為車登多爾濟之子。並於 名字上用過吹忠圖記是實。此等事件歷來俱如此辦理。況
圖舍圖罕與小的索常，並無來往。那網達什亦未求小的必在此二人內指定，不過求看此二
人內是與不是。令蒙大人如此嚴訊。還敢不實供什麼求詳情。” 
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further tests such as a zentak (a dough-ball investigation).352 Thus from an indigenous 
perspective, oracles delivered the best results when used responsibly in combination with 
other divination technologies and tests. 
 The Dalai Lama and the medium of the Lamo Chökyong both also attempted to 
defend the indigenous tradition by making more modest claims about the abilities of the 
oracles. In a sense their responses under interrogation seem strategically designed to 
lower imperial expectations. In this regard, the Lamo Oracle is reported as stating, “All 
Tibetans come to inquire about the harvest and whether or not there will be smallpox. 
However we respond in accordance with the statutes of the classics. Some of these 
[predictions] occasionally hit the mark. The Tibetans then disseminate [these predictions] 
as evidence of our powers.”353 Yet in the same breath that he minimized the abilities of 
the oracles, the medium also situated the technology firmly within a written legal 
tradition. In the transcript of his deposition, the Dalai Lama made a similar move, 
pointing out that the use of oracles in the Tüsiyetü Khan case was “in accordance with the 
ancient statutes.”354 Moreover, in these statements, both the Dalai Lama and the Lamo 
Chökyong medium also pinned the blame for misconceptions about the abilities of the 
oracles firmly on the common people, thus distinguishing the textual civilization of the 
Gelukpas from the rumor mongering of the illiterate hoi polloi. Given the degree to 
which Qing officials overtly spoke of indigenous practices of divination as a “low 
                                                
352 Brag dgon pa dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, Deb ther rgya mtsho (Oceanic Book) (Zi ling: 
Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987 [1865]), 432. 
 
353 YHGSL 15:84b: “凡番民向問年歲豐缺及本年有無痘症。不過依着經典照例答之或有時
湊巧偶中番民等即傳以為奇。”  
 
354 MWLF 156:1386. The full quote is as follows: “我向來總據吹忠所說為憑，彼時尚未奉有
欽頒金本巴瓶來藏，因此就照向來舊例，憑吹忠龍單上的話，給他批了。”  
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tradition” (Ch. 下乘), and Tibet more generally as a land without law, it is difficult not to 
view the Dalai Lama and the oracle’s statements as intentional moves to reassert the high 
status of their tradition according to what they perceived were the standards of the Qing 
emperor and his representatives.355  
The Eighth Dalai Lama’s personal decree issued in response to the Qianlong 
emperor’s “Water-Ox Year Edict” offers a further glimpse of the manner in which 
Tibetan elites might have understood the Golden Urn in the initial aftermath of its 
establishment. The decree conveys the Dalai Lama’s strong support for the new measure, 
yet also describes a configuration of the ritual that departed in crucial respects from the 
emperor’s instructions. Thus, much like the letter of the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu to the 
Dalai Lama described in the first section of this chapter, the existence of the Dalai 
Lama’s decree hints at the range of strategies the court employed to express its will in a 
Tibetan voice. In the case of this decree it is impossible not to suspect that the Qing 
officials resident in Lhasa had a hand in either drafting the document, vetting its contents, 
or at the very least encouraging its production. Yet the final product is perhaps a 
testament to the limits of Qing influence and the dangers the imperial message faced 
when exposed to the translation process.  
The Dalai Lama began the edict by thanking the emperor—the “Great Sovereign 
Emperor Manjusri, the Cakravartin/Heaven-sent,” for his support of both the “doctrine of 
the those who wear yellow” (Tib. zhwa ser ‘chang b’ai ring lugs) and Tibet more 
                                                
355 In his report on the oracles of QL 57/12/29 (1793-2-9), Fukanggan quoted Qianlong as 
referring to the oracles as the “lowest tradition of Buddhism.” “吹忠多以邪術惑人，降神時舞
刀自扎，而於身體無害。此等幻術，即使其法果真，在佛教中已最為下乘…” (YHGSL 
15:7-8.) 
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generally (Tib. bod ‘bangs spyi byings).356 Echoing the structure of the emperor’s edict, 
the Dalai Lama then turned to the emperor’s claim to have studied the Gelukpa teachings 
yet then significantly embellished it: “The Manjusri emperor especially cherishes the 
monks who follow the doctrine of Tsongkhaba, zealously studies, and has personally and 
assiduously strived to achieve the goal of taking the vows of a renunciate.”357 From this 
passage it is unclear if the Dalai Lama believed that the emperor had already become a 
monk, or was working towards such a goal by observing the vows. The Démo Kūtuktu’s 
biography of the Eighth Dalai Lama describes the prelate as leading a ceremony of 
offerings to an image of Qianlong as a “Vajra-holding monk.” Démo reports that on the 
occasion of the ritual, because “there were those who were not enthusiastic,” the Dalai 
Lama offered a passionate defense of the Manjursi emperor.358 Thus, although it would 
seem that such veneration was not universally supported, it was promoted by the Eighth 
Dalai Lama (or his assistants, such as the Démo Kūtuktu) as justification for 
implementation of imperially-sanctioned measures such as the Golden Urn. 
The Dalai Lama then seconded the emperor’s observation that the recent crop of 
reincarnations had not elicited the deep faith of the past. He wrote:  
Nowadays, because the majority of reincarnated lamas do not study the 
dharma, when it comes time to identify a rebirth they are unable to make a 
clear/convincing decision. Therefore they do not receive unanimous faith 
and respect, even from the sangha. Similarly, when requests are made to 
the Protectors (chos skyong), whatever is revealed in the prophecies 
becomes a pretext for making an identification. In reality, in accordance 
with their greed they merely recognize the children of those who possess 
                                                
356 In Tibetan, Qianlong’s celebratory title is: “gnam gyi lha 'jam dbyangs gong ma bdag po chen 
po.” Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 341. 
 
357 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 341. 
 
358 Démo Kūtuktu, 'Jam dpal rgya mtsho'i rnam thar (Lhasa: Drépung Monastery, 1811; TIBRC 
W2CZ7847), 269a:2-269b:3. 
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material wealth, giving rise to debates among the people over whether or 
not they are really [rebirths].359  
 
Although the Dalai Lama shares the emperor’s sense that there is a crisis of faith in the 
reincarnations and his diagnosis that the oracles have been corrupted, his analysis in this 
passage is different in key respects. First, unlike Qianlong, he did not point to specific 
lineages as corrupt. The tone of this statement is thus greatly softened by the lack of 
direct accusations against leading monks. Second, the Dalai Lama did not single out 
particular clans or Mongol aristocrats for attempting to influence the selection process. 
There is no mention of the Tüsiyetü Khan’s attempt to have his son recognized as the 
Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu. In searching for the roots of the crisis, the Dalai Lama’s 
analysis led him not outwards, to the Mongol aristocracy, but rather inwards to the 
purported laxity of the contemporary training regime for monks.  
The most striking departures from Qianlong’s edict are contained in the final the 
final section of the decree, where the Dalai Lama laid out a blueprint of the Golden Urn 
ritual. First, where the emperor had limited the law to major kūtuktus, the Dalai Lama 
broadened the scope of the ritual to apply to “all reincarnations of lamas born in the land 
of Tibet.”360 Second, the Dalai Lama described the Qing ambans as drawing the lots.361 
And finally, despite the emperor’s forceful prohibition of the use of the oracles, the Dalai 
                                                
359 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 342. A similar statement from the Dalai Lama was reported 
in Heliyen’s memorial of QL 58/03/15: “However, the customs of the Tanggut are passed on 
from generation to generation, and it is impossible to inform every household. Now having 
witnessed several trials, it is apparent that the [oracles] possess not even the slightest magical 
ability.  The sanction of the Golden Urn by the emperor to be placed before the image of 
Tsongkhaba and used for drawing lots is both just and righteous.  There are neither clergy nor 
laypeople who are not persuaded.” 
 
360 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 342. 
 
361 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 343. 
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Lama still reserved a role for the oracles in the recognition process. Much as the Galdan 
Siretu Kūtuktu and Fukanggan had advised a year earlier, the Dalai Lama positioned the 
oracles as playing a role in the nomination of candidates for the final Golden Urn 
lottery.362 Given the fact that the Dalai Lama’s articulation of the Golden Urn ritual 
ignored the key injunction of the emperor’s public edict as well as private instructions 
ostensibly passed to him via the auspices of the ambans, it is not difficult to understand 
the degree to which the successful implementation of the new law remained a consistent 
concern of the Qianlong emperor through the remainder of his reign and into the first 
couple years of his son’s reign. In his decree on the Golden Urn, the Dalai Lama in 
certain respects accorded the Qing an even greater role than the court had anticipated. Yet 
the continued role for the oracles reveals the indelible stamp of the Dalai Lama’s 
administration on the ritual. 
 
The Golden Urn as “Law” and “Omen” 
 
 
The court had received mix messages about the reliability of the Dalai Lama over 
the spring and summer of 1793. In response to the emperor’s request that the Jirung 
Kūtuktu (Tatsak Rinpoché) be recalled to Beijing to serve again as head of the Geluk 
mission there, Fukanggan cautioned that it was not wise to return sole responsibility for 
the administration of the Ganden Podrang government to the Dalai Lama:  
The Dalai Lama appears to have truly understood the perfection of the 
emperor’s loving grace and be genuinely overjoyed and sincerely 
appreciative. Since your servants Fukanggan and Heliyen arrived in Tibet 
last year, we have observed that although the Dalai Lama is a good judge 
                                                
362 Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs, 342. 
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of people, and exceedingly zealous in his study of the sutras, he does not 
understand [worldly] affairs… [Although] he has heard the Lord’s edicts 
with their various instructions, only after your servants have elucidated the 
main principles numerous times will the Dalai Lama come to grasp what 
he previously [didn’t understand], genuinely appreciate the emperor’s 
perfect and loving grace, and comprehend the many ways of handling 
affairs.363  
 
In summary, Fukanggan argued that the Dalai Lama was loyal, but not a reliable vehicle 
for the execution of imperial policy because he was difficult to communicate with. He 
needed constant tutoring from officials both Qing and Tibetan in the realm of secular 
administration. According to Heliyen, the difficulty the Dalai Lama had in 
comprehending Qing policy was shared by Tibetans more generally. In the aftermath of 
the public tests of the oracles, Heliyen cautioned the emperor that the “muddleheaded 
Tibetans” (Ma. hūlhi tanggūt se) seemed unable to comprehend the “true way” (Ma. 
jingkini doro): “Having been thoroughly deceived, they firmly believe…thus false 
actions become ever more true.”364 
Several months later, Heliyen arrived at a more positive assessment. Having been 
asked by the emperor to secretly assess the mood of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan 
elites in the aftermath of the selection of the next Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu, he reported 
that among the “kūtuktu and important lamas” he had gathered for a meeting at the Potala 
Palace, “there were none who were not pleased.”365 Heliyen reported that the lack of 
dissent extended to the Dalai Lama who he quoted as offering his approval of the (re-) 
identification of the Erdeni Bandida and promising to spread word of the new statute 
                                                
363 YHGSL 15:138-139. Bilingual Manchu-Chinese Grand Secretariat copy of a memorial from 
Fukanggan and Heliyen dated QL 58/03/22 (1793-5-2). The memorial was rescripted four days 
earlier on QL 58/03/18.  
 
364 YHGSL 15:87b (QL 58/03/15). 
 
365 YHGSL 15:282a, Manchu language memorial, (QL 58/05/09, 1793-6-16). 
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through the entirety of “my Tibet” (Ma. meni dzang). According to Heliyen, the 
emperor’s fears that the Dalai Lama would react with hostility to the rejection of his 
original candidate and the potential loss of donations from Mongolia were groundless. 
Heliyen also put the Dalai Lama on record as referring to the new method as “fair and 
measured” (Ma. tondo kemun), a phrasing key to the court’s self-perception of its 
legitimacy.366 The Dalai Lama made these statements despite the fact that Heliyen 
claimed to have told the Tibetan elites that the configuration of the ritual he planned on 
recording as law prohibited the use of the oracles.367  
Upon receiving Heliyen’s report, Qianlong seized on the reports that indigenous 
Tibetans had found Qing law “fair” and had, in the aftermath of the public tests and 
promulgation of the Erdeni Bandida case, begun to reject the “old laws” (Ma. fe kooli).368 
Heliyen’s report implied that there had been a crucial shift in the way that both Tibetan 
elites and commoners thought about reincarnation. In a court letter to Heliyen composed 
on the day he received the amban’s memorial, the emperor wrote:  
Since Heliyen has explained things to the Dalai Lama et al, not only is the 
Dalai Lama overjoyed and thankful, but the regular people as well 
discussed among one another in a great hubbub that, “It is also possible for 
a reincarnation to emerge among us small folk!” Observing this it is 
revealed how, because all the reincarnations had only emerged among the 
                                                
366 YHGSL 15:282a-b. 
 
367 YHGSL 15:281a. With regards to the question of who would draw the lot, the statute drafted 
by Heliyen remained ambigious, stating that the lots would be drawn as the Dalai Lama et al 
together with the ambans supervised. “uthai aha i onggolo weimbuhe songkoi duin cuijung be 
šuwe baitalaburakū ci tulgiyen. hese be dahame. hūturi ulhisu bisire juse be udu baifi. banjiha 
aniya. biya. gebu be sibiya de arafi. amba joo de doboho bumba de dosimbufi. dalai lamasai sasa 
tuwame sibiya tatami toktobure babe dangsede ejefi endeheme kooli obuki.”  
 
368 YHGSL 15:282b. 
 
 180 
households of nobles and never among those of the common people, the 
common people were completely unconvinced.369 
 
Having been persuaded that not only had the selection of the Erdeni Bandida not 
been opposed, but had also been embraced by the common people, the emperor approved 
Heliyen’s request that the new statute “be entered into the records to become a permanent 
law.”370  
Yet despite these optimistic reports from the field concerning the response of the 
Tibetans and the Mongols to the introduction of the new law and the identification of the 
Erdeni Bandida Kūtuktu, the emperor appears to have been deeply concerned about the 
future implementation of the law. Over the summer and late fall as Qianlong’s mood 
swung from confident (that the oracles would “vanish of their own accord”) to 
pessimistic, he continued to badger the resident officials in Lhasa for any news, 
increasingly suspicious that the rebirth and identification of reincarnate lamas was being 
hidden from him. Upon receipt of a report from Heliyen that in fact there were no 
“suppressed reports,” of rebirths, the emperor remained unpersuaded that the “foolish 
Tibetans” had accepted the new law. He ordered Heliyen to warn the Dalai Lama and the 
oracles that they would be shown no leniency if caught violating the law.371 
                                                
369 MWJXD 23:291, Manchu-language court letter (QL 58/06/08, 1793-7-15): “te ere babe 
Heliyen i baci Dalai Lamasa de ulhibuhede, dalai lama se urgunjeme hukšere teile akū an i jergi 
urse gemu ereci meni buya ursei boode inu hūbilgan tucici ombi seme dur seme urgunjendume 
leolecehe be tuwaci ere uthai onggolo yaya hūbilgan gemu monggo wang gung (sei) taijisai booci 
tucime an i jergi niyalmai boode fuhali ubu akū de, geren gemu asuru gūnin daharakū sere muru 
tuyembuhabi.”  
 
370 MWJXD 23:292: “heliyen dangse de ejefi enteheme kooli obuki seme wesimbuhengge umesi 
inu. uttu dahame icihiyakini.” The fact that the emperor was only at this time ordering Heliyen to 
add the new law “to the books” in Tibet is yet a further indication of just how uncertain the 
process of making law in Tibet was from the perspective of the court. 
 
371 MWJXD 23:316, Manchu-language court letter to Heliyen (QL 58/08/14).  
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Anxious that new cases be found to test the law, especially since there had yet to 
be a rebirth of a kūtuktu from the territory supervised by the government of the Dalai 
Lama, during the winter of 1793-1794, the Lhasa ambans dispatched messengers across 
Tibet and to “all three [sects]—the Yellow, Red, and Black” to gather news of any 
ongoing or future searches regardless of the status of the lineage. In particular, the Qing 
was particularly vigilant for the emergence of hūbilgan in several districts of Kham—
Chamdo, Riboché, and Drakyab—that fell within the territory accorded to the 
administration of the Ganden Podrang. On February 25, 1794 (QL 59/01/26), Heliyen 
reported that he had received news that searches might commence for three different 
reincarnation lineages in those regions.372 This news prompted the Throne to insist a 
month later that these rebirths be confirmed using the Golden Urn, a decision that marked 
a reversal of Fukanggan’s advice from a year earlier that searches in the Chamdo region 
continue to be conducted according to local customs.373 This reversal can be attributed to 
the Throne’s stated desire to establish a Tibetan precedent for the use of the Golden Urn, 
and perhaps also to the strategic location of this region at the intersection of trade and 
communication routes between Sichuan and central Tibet. The Lhasa ambans would have 
to wait another five months, however, before they finally received word via a Qing 
logistics official stationed in Chamdo that a kūtuktu had actually died—the Pakbala 
Kūtuktu (Tib. Phagpa Lha, ‘Phags pa lha, Ma. pakbala kūtuktu).374 
                                                
372 Hening, Weizang tongzhi, 269. 
 
373 For the emperor’s court letter to Heliyen see, MWJXD 24:48-51 (QL 59/03/04, 1793-4-3). For 
Fukanggan’s original report on this matter, see YHGSL 15:10. 
 
374 Heliyen et al., MWLF 158:3415-3416 (QL 59/08/18, 1794-9-11). 
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In order to subject the search to final confirmation using the Golden Urn, the 
emperor and his field officials realized they faced an extremely delicate task. As 
Fukanggan had previously pointed out, the estate of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu had never 
accepted outside interference in the search process.375 For this reason Heliyen traveled in 
person to Chamdo and initiated negotiations with the estate of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu 
and other local elites well before the search for the kūtutktu’s reincarnation had even 
begun. Heliyen and the assistant amban Hening were both aware of stakes: they wrote to 
the emperor that selection of the Phagpa Lha would be the ultimate test of “over two 
years of continuous efforts to promote the use of the Golden Urn among Tibetans.”376  
In fact, deliberations about how to handle the Phagpa Lha case had begun in 
private among Qing officials even before they had received news of the monk’s death. 
Although the need to establish a Tibetan precedent for the use of the Golden Urn clearly 
outweighed Fukanggan’s concern for local sensibilities, the emperor still granted broad 
discretion to his officials to implement the new law flexibly. Qianlong’s instructions in 
this regard marked a rejection of several strict interpretations of the Golden Urn statute 
that Heliyen had floated in the winter of 1793-94. For instance, on February 25, arguing 
that even if the urn was used there was nothing to stop the stewards of the kūtuktus’ 
corporate estates from choosing candidates from among their relatives or disciples, 
Heliyen advised that the entire search process be turned over to local “Han officials.”377  
Heliyen furthermore proposed a blanket rule that all search parties be limited to searching 
                                                
375 YHGSL 15:10. 
 
376 Heliyen and Hening memorial, MWLF 159:1292-1295 (QL 59/11/10, 1794-12-3). 
 
377 Hening, Weizang tongzhi, 269-270. 
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within one to two hundred li of the place where the lama in question had passed away and 
restricted from searching within the same clan (Ma. mukun) as the man who had just died. 
The emperor approved of these latter two measures, yet in the same breath offered 
an exemption in the case of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu and the other leading kūtuktu of 
Riwoché, Drakyab, and Markham (Tib. Smar khams, Ma. Sak’a, Ch. 江卡). In court 
letters to Heliyen, Qianlong observed that these kūtuktus deserved special attention 
because they were not just influential monks, but also secular administrators. Out of 
apparent deference to the historical autonomy of these communities, especially vis-à-vis 
the administration of the Dalai Lama, the emperor advised Heliyen to allow these 
communities to locate their own candidates. He wrote:  
Although the Cagan Nomunhan is a monk, he governs people and has the 
responsibility of a jasak who handles the routine affairs of the pastures. I 
observe that the kūtuktu of the places of Chamdo, Rewoché, Zhaya, and 
Markham similarly administer common people. And moreover, the Dalai 
Lama has never administered any of their affairs. Therefore, it will be 
beneficial if identifications of rebirths are made in accordance with the 
wishes of their subordinates. Do not obstinately enforce the new laws. 
Handle matters by observing their old customs and taking into 
consideration what the people will find persuasive.378 
 
That the search for the reincarnation of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu would have 
special significance for the Qing is especially evident if one considers briefly the 
biography of the Seventh Phagpa Lha, Jigme Tenpai Gonpo (Tib. ‘Phags pa lha 07 ‘jigs 
med bstan pa’i mgon po, 1755-1794). The Seventh Phagpa Lha was born into a noble 
family of Litang and recognized as a rebirth of an august and powerful lineage that traced 
its roots to the fifteenth century and the generation that founded and promoted the spread 
of the Geluk teachings after the death of Tsongkhaba. During his lifetime, the Seventh 
                                                
378 Court letter, MWJXD 24:59-62 (QL 59/03/10). 
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Phagpa Lha had been responsible for the construction of a massive palace in Chamdo, 
had witnessed the enthronement of the Eighth Dalai Lama, and had even founded a 
temple in Lhasa in honor of the Qianlong emperor’s eightieth birthday.379 The Qing had 
reciprocated by confirming on him the title “nomunhan” which carried with it recognition 
of the monk’s secular authority.380 Thus, given the Phagpa Lha lineage’s ties to the 
dynasty, as well as noble families located in Lithang, well beyond the 200-li boundary 
proposed by Heliyen, the emperor had good reasons to consider an exemption from key 
provisions of the Golden Urn law.   
The emperor, however, was firm on the importance of subjecting the final 
candidates to the Golden Urn and preventing any recourse to the prophecies of the oracles 
of central Tibet. In this respect, the emperor’s instructions concerning the Phagpa Lha 
searched signaled to the realm that the fundamental purpose of the new statute had 
become the elimination of the oracles. The eradication of reincarnations among the Inner 
Asian nobility was now relegated to only secondary significance. Yet this shift in 
priorities resulted in a thorny problem: If the Phagpa Lha lineage’s historical ties to 
aristocratic households was now acceptable and the estate of the lama possessed no 
tradition of consulting the oracles of central Tibet, what then was the rationale for 
                                                
379 Treasury of Lives, “The Seventh Pakpa Lha, Jigme Tenpai Gonpo,” 
(http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Jigme-Tenpai-Gonpo/3783), accessed 2013-3-
14. 
 
380 The Qing court may, however, been confirming a title that the Dalai Lama had already granted 
to the Phagpa Lha. Previous generations of the Phagpa Lha had also held this title. Ibid. 
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insisting that the final identification be made in Lhasa using the urn? What improvement 
did the new method offer over the existing traditions?381 
Perhaps fortuitously for the Qing emperor, into this conundrum stepped the newly 
appointed Lhasa amban, Sungyun. Although modern Chinese scholarship on Sungyun’s 
tenure in Lhasa tends to view his appointment as the outcome of factional battles between 
the Hešen and his detractors (among whom Sungyun purportedly considered himself), the 
arrival of an official who was contemporaneously recognized as an expert in frontier 
regions and who had just successfully managed the investigation of the Tüsiyetü Khan 
case at such a critical juncture hardly seems like the unintentional result of banishment 
from court.382 Sungyun’s appointment was made a month before the court learned of the 
death of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu, but probably reflected the emperor’s desire to have 
someone competent in Tibet to implement the new statute.383 Before Sungyun departed 
from Beijing, the emperor issued the following instructions: 
The Pakbala is the major reincarnation of Kham, thus his rebirth is very 
important. If it is possible to determine his rebirth using the newly 
established method for handling the rebirths of the Dalai Lama, Panchen 
Lama and other major kūtuktu by means of drawing lots from the Golden 
Urn, [we] shall definitely take advantage of this and let it become a model 
for the identification of other major rebirths… This would be splendid.  
 
In the event that this is impossible, instead, in accordance with what they 
find persuasive, select several [candidates] from among the boys who are 
reported to have emerged among his subjects and have their names be 
                                                
381 As we shall see in Chapter Three, the emperor’s shifting agenda with regards to the Golden 
Urn statute also left his officials confused about who the court would permit to become a 
candidate for selection in the urn. 
 
382 For the argument that Sungyun was ejected from Beijing on account of his hostility to Hešen 
and so that the chief grand councilor could make space for the return of his younger brother from 
Tibet, see Zhang Yuxin, “Weizang Tongzhi de zhuozhe shi Hening,” 102.  
 
383 Sungyun was appointed Lhasa amban on QL 59/07/19 (1794-8-14). Phagpa Lha had passed 
away on QL 59/07/11. 
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placed into the urn. It will also be acceptable if [the rebirth] is identified in 
this manner. But it will surely be unacceptable if they are able to select 
one as they wish according to the previous ways.  
 
Because Sungyun will be passing through Chamdo, he should definitely 
probe deeply the [local] opinions and after arriving in Tibet, discuss 
together with Heliyen how to handle this matter. Overall, since it will be 
unacceptable for them to identify [a rebirth] in accordance with their 
previous customs as they wish from among the [children] of their own 
clan, you must handle the selection in a fashion that takes into 
consideration what will be both advantageous and what will probably 
cause them to be convinced.384 
 
Subtle almost to the point of being inscrutable, this directive required careful parsing. On 
the one hand the emperor repeatedly expressed his desire to control the entire search 
process. Ideally the candidates could be vetted to ensure that they hailed from particular 
locations and common households unrelated to the established aristocracy. On the other 
hand was the larger strategic picture: candidates, regardless of origin, had to be 
persuasive, which at least from the Throne’s perspective, required at a minimum the use 
of the Golden Urn. Thus the passage above demonstrates the degree to which a genuine 
concern for the believability of reincarnations (and fear of a crisis of faith) drove the 
deliberative process behind the creation and implementation of the Golden Urn law.  
Sungyun’s task was to balance the emperor’s desire to see all aspects of the 
Golden Urn law implemented with the need to ensure that the outcome was considered 
legitimate and would not upset the political status quo in Chamdo. Qianlong’s appointee 
appreciated this subtlety. The following day Sungyun advised the emperor to lower his 
expectations that the identification could be resolved quickly. He noted that if they 
immediately held a lottery, the Tibetans would complain that the candidate children were 
too young as it was the custom to wait until the children were at least able to speak. Yet if 
                                                
384 MWLF 159:0525-0526 (QL 59/10/04, 1794-10-27). 
 187 
they waited three or four years, there might be “no point in conducting a lottery.” Thus, 
he proposed that names be gathered in a little over a year.385 He also indirectly warned 
the emperor that the relationship between the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu and the central 
Tibetan government was more complicated than the emperor had previously stated. 
Sungyun wrote that, although the Phagpa Lha administered his own vast territory, he had 
also historically been a “close assistant to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama.”386 As a 
result the court would have to take into consideration the sentiments of Tibetans outside 
of Chamdo. Still, despite these complications, Sungyun concluded his memorial with the 
opinion that, “without resorting to coercion, I will handle things properly and arrange 
things such that everyone will definitely be convinced.”387  
A little more than a month later, Sungyun reported that he had arrived in Chamdo 
and reached an agreement to subject the search to the Golden Urn. Sungyun met with 
steward of the Phagpa Lha estate and the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu, who the amban described 
as, “seventy-seven years old but still lucid.”388 The Fourth Zhiwa Lha (Ma. Siwala 
Kūtuktu, Tib. Zhi ba lha 'phags pa dge legs rgyal mtshan, 1720-1799), had received the 
title “kūtuktu” from the Qianlong court in 1754 and overseen the search for the seventh 
Phagpa Lha shortly thereafter. This monk’s support was therefore essential, and Sungyun 
secured it. In fact, Sungyun presented the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu as being highly supportive 
of the new measure and advocating on its behalf among the other disciples of the Phagpa 
                                                
385 MWLF 159:0528. 
 
386 MWLF 159:0527. 
 
387 MWLF 159:0529: “heni ergelerakū bime. geli urunakū geren i gūnin be dahabure be bodome 
saikan toktobume icihiyaki.”  
 
388 Sungyun memorial, MWLF 159:1209 (QL 59/11/13, 1794-12-5). 
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Lha. Perhaps even more significantly, Sungyun quoted the Zhiwa Lha as presenting his 
own novel justification for the ritual. The monk was quoted as stating that, “The Great 
Holy Lord on High is the Manjusri Buddha. If a determination can be made by drawing 
lots after sutras have been recited, I will consider it appropriate. One can say that this is 
the true hūbilgan that has just been indicated by Tsongkhaba.”389 The attribution of 
agency in the ritual to Tsongkhaba was original in this document and a theme that 
Sungyun and Tibetan elites would return to in subsequent communications. Moreover, 
Sungyun reported that the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu had been “thoroughly convinced” (Ma. 
umesi gūnin dahame) that it would be “unprincipled” (Ma. doro akū) if the reincarnation 
was recognized within the same clan as that of the Seventh Phagpa Lha.390 In return for 
what Sungyun admitted was unprecedented outside interference, delegates from Chamdo 
were invited to travel to Lhasa the following year to observe the actual lottery.391    
Although Sungyun had informed the emperor that he had arranged to return to 
Chamdo in the summer of the following year to gather the names of candidates, by 
August of 1795, he still had reported no further progress on the identification of the 
Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu. Much as he had a year earlier with Heliyen, Qianlong began to 
                                                
389 MWLF 159:1209. The full quote: “siwala kūtuktu. jai geren šabisa de ulhibuhede. uhei 
hukšeme alarangge. dergi amba enduringge ejen. uthai manjusiri fucihi. uttu nomun hūlabume 
sibiya tatame toktobuci. mende derengge bime. ere teni dzungk'aba i joriha yargiyan hūbilgan 
seci ombi seme geren gemu urgunjeme hukšeme gūnin dahambi.”  
 
390 MWLF 159:1210. 
 
391MWLF 159:1211. Sungyun wrote, “Your servant observes that having thus dealt with things, 
not only is the Siwala Kūtuktu persuaded, but, when the disciples, who had previously by 
themselves conducted the search for rebirths of the Pakbala Kūtuktu, were told that this time the 
determination would be made according to the emperor's edict and that this was entirely 
appropriate, responded thanked [the emperor] joyously with utter sincerity and true earnestness.” 
(“aha tuwaci. uttu icihiyara babe. siwala kūtuktu se gūnin dahara teile akū. nenehe jalan i 
pakbala kūtuktu i hūbilgan be baire de manggai ini šabisa beye baime fujurulaha. ere mudan 
enduringe ejen i hesei uttu fujurulame toktoburengge. cende umesi derengge oho seme. yargiyan i 
hing sere unenggi gūnin i hukšeme urgunjenduhe.”) 
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again voice suspicions that searches were being undertaken in secrecy. He wrote to 
Sungyun asking if, “At this time, although everyone has come to realize the spuriousness 
of the Lamo Chökyong, have there been any cases of identification of hūbilgan according 
to the divinations of the Lamo Chökyong by lowly, muddleheaded people who still trust 
in the oracles?”392  
In his letter to Sungyun, the emperor had also identified the Golden Urn lottery 
for (perhaps) the first time explicitly as a “law” (Ma. kooli: “aisin bumba tampin de 
sibiya tatami toktobure kooli”).393 Sungyun’s detailed response to the emperor’s concerns 
revealed the extent to which the gradual establishment of the Golden Urn as law had 
entailed the construction of an enforcement apparatus within both the ambans’ office in 
Lhasa and the administration of the Ganden Podrang. This supportive scaffolding had 
apparently been erected in the two years since Heliyen had first requested that the 
measure be “committed to the records.”394 Sungyun reported: 
Since the establishment of the Golden Urn, there has not been a single 
case of the Tibetan people recognizing a reincarnation on the basis of 
secretly observing divinations. The reason for this is that after establishing 
the Golden Urn, Heliyen et al have respectfully obeyed the imperial decree 
and together with the Jirung Kūtuktu have collected the names and 
numbers of the major and minor kūtuktu and šaburung and reported them 
to the Board as well as placed them away for safekeeping in our office of 
seals. Moreover whenever it is time to recognize the reincarnation of a 
kūtuktu or šaburung, having received the name of the small child that has 
emerged from each respective monastery’s investigations, we can make 
accurate reports.395  
                                                
392 Sungyun memorial, MWLF 160:2028 (QL 60/06/29, 1795-8-13). 
 
393 MWLF 160:2027. 
 
394 See court letter to Heliyen, MWJXD 23: 290-296 (QL 58/06/08, 1793-7-15). 
 
395 MWLF 160:2028-2029. In this memorial, (Ma.) šaburung is the Manchu transliteration of the 
Tibetan term “zhapdrung” meaning “honored one” (Tib. zhabs drung). Sungyun appears to be 
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It is evident from Sungyun’s report that the reification of the Golden Urn as law also 
involved the cooperation of Tibetans. The regent of the Eighth Dalai Lama, the Jirung 
Kūtuktu (Tatsak Rinpoché), and the ambans had jointly established an inventory of 
reincarnate lamas, laying the groundwork for what Sungyun envisioned as the 
comprehensive management of tülku. Further classified as “major kūtuktus” and “minor 
kūtuktus and šaburung,” the different ranks of reincarnations would receive different 
bureaucratic treatments, with the former being handled via the palace memorial system 
and the latter being supervised via routine communications with the Lifan Yuan.396 
Sungyun also offered a striking assessment of the success of the new law:  
Previously the Tibetans (tanggūt sa) had trusted the chökyong and 
observed their divinations. And nothing could be done about the way they 
squandered wealth on the chökyong. Since the urn was established in 
accordance with the edict, once [the names of candidates] are reported, the 
selection of lots is immediately carried out. Their wealth is now spent 
much more frugally and they rejoice together, all having been convinced 
that the Great Holy Lord Manjusri’s identification [method] is very proper.  
 
I observe that the Tibetans are no longer deceived by the chökyong. 
Originally they found the chökyong credible, even in the matter of 
identifying hūbilgan, despite there being nothing reliable about it, and 
their arbitrary words were taken as omens (temgetu). Now, the Tibetans 
believe the determination of hūbilgan made according to the imperial 
decree by selecting lots from a golden urn after reciting prayers before the 
Buddha Tsongkhaba to be an unusual omen and are persuaded. Therefore 
the divinations [of the oracles] are not secretly observed by anyone 
anymore.397  
 
                                                                                                                                            
using this term to refer to those tülku/reincarnate lamas who had not been honored with the title 
“kūtuktu” by the Qing court. The “board” here refers to the Lifan Yuan.  
 
396 MWLF 160:2029. 
 
397 MWLF 160:2030-2031. 
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Sungyun’s interpretation of the Golden Urn lottery as an “omen” (Ma. temgetu), 
casts light on the amban’s strategy for implementing the law. According to Sungyun, the 
believability of the event hinged on transforming it into a spectacle more impressive than 
that of the oracles. The key to the success of the law was its reinterpretation by Tibetans 
as an “omen,” and Sungyun was nothing if not a consummate stage-manager of the 
Golden Urn ritual. As a result he adapted and modified the configuration of the lottery 
such that the agency of unseen forces (deities, Buddhas, emperors, etc.) could be 
imagined and appreciated. Moreover, this attention to the staging of the Golden Urn 
lottery carried over both to his advance planning—the cultivation of the search party 
members in the lead up to the drawing, and to his later representations of the event in 
subsequent celebrations and reports to Beijing. Thus it was Sungyun more than any other 
Qing official who served in Lhasa during the 1790s who appears to have influenced the 
organization and interpretation of lottery during the nineteenth century. 
It was not until another year had passed that the reincarnation of the seventh 
Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu was identified in the form of a one-year-old child from “commoner 
Tibetan” household in the Litang region (JQ 01/08/10, 1796-9-10). Sungyun’s subsequent 
report to the throne detailed a ritual that departed significantly from previous blueprints. 
His arrangement of the ritual offered an innovative interpretation of the Golden Urn 
statute. First he shifted the venue from the Jokhang cathedral to the Potala palace. As 
Sungyun described the event, the Dalai Lama, Jirung Kūtuktu, Démo Kūtuktu, several 
other monks with the rank of abbot, and two chamberlains of the Phagpa Lha estate 
brought the Golden Urn, along with various possessions of the previous Phagpa Lha 
Kūtuktu, to the Potala and arranged them before a painted image (Ma. enduringge 
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nirugan Tib. thangka) of the Qianlong emperor. This marks the second innovation: in 
contrast to early blueprints that positioned the urn and the prayer service in the presence 
of either the Jowo Sakyamuni or Tsongkhaba, Sungyun brought the ritual into the 
presence of the emperor. After these monks had led seven days of prayers the final lottery 
was conducted. Here too we find a difference: where the Erdeni Bandida lottery at 
Yonghegong had lasted only three days, the preparatory prayer service for the Phagpa 
Lha was stretched over a week. Finally, Sungyun offered the first unambiguous account 
of how the lottery was conducted. He personally made up the lots and placed them in the 
urn. Then, following another round of prayers, “both ambans genuflected before the urn 
and images and in a manner such that the audience could observe, the assistant amban 
respectfully drew the [name] of the Tibetan child from Litang.”398 This joint involvement 
of both ambans in the physical work of conducting the lottery subsequently became the 
model for all future Golden Urn lotteries.  
The structure of Sungyun’s written announcement of the lottery results was also 
influential. As he would subsequently do in later memorials that announced the results of 
other Golden Urn lotteries, Sungyun concluded this report with personal reflections on 
the meaning of the ritual and its reception among the Tibetan witnesses. In this case he 
first presented evidence of how the Tibetans had appreciated the ceremony, noting that 
they had immediately prostrated before the image of Qianlong and exclaimed, “The Great 
Holy Lord on High is truly the Manjusri Buddha!” He then followed this observation by 
stating that the “hūbilgan had definitely been indicated by Tsongkhaba,” an opinion he 
then conveyed in letters to the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu and other disciples of the Phagpa Lha 
                                                
398 Jointly submitted memorial from Sungyun and Hening, MWLF 162:2471-2472 (JQ 01/08/10). 
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in Chamdo.399 As a result of this careful framing, the presentation of the ritual itself 
served as a kind of public exchange of agency: The Qing officials attributed the accuracy 
of the lottery to Tsongkhaba, and the Tibetans credited Qianlong. Finally, Sungyun 
reflected on his own personal satisfaction with the ritual. He was very pleased: the first 
test of the Golden Urn in the case of a major Tibetan reincarnation had been successful. 
There was no evidence that Tibetan nobility had corrupted the process. And the oracles 
were absent from his account. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 The first mention of the Golden Urn in the Biography of the Eighth Dalai Lama is 
in the context of the search for the reincarnation of the Phagpa Lha Kūtktu. The author, 
the Démo Kūtuktu, who Sungyun recorded as having witnessed the event, arrived at a 
similar observation about the synthesis of forces that had come together to make this a 
successful identification. The idea for the method had originated in the “perfect wisdom 
of the emperor,” who had perceived that “corruptions stemming from human beings 
desire for status and power” had led to “ever greater disputes and quarrels.” But the 
correct result ultimately relied on the intercession of Tsongkhaba who had to be carefully 
propitiated before and during the lottery. The Démo Kūtuktu’s account noted that the 
emperor’s original edict had also listed two specific texts dedicated to Tsongkhaba that 
should be recited before conducting the lottery.400 
                                                
399 MWLF 162:2473-2474. 
 
400 Démo Kūtuktu, Biography of Eighth Dalai Lama, 250:kha-251:ka. These prayers were: 1) dga 
ldan lha brgya ma (“Hundred deities of Tushita,” a guru yoga of Tsongkhaba. Ch.《兜率上師瑜
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Démo’s account differed from Sungyun’s in a handful of ways, adding some 
details, but dropping others. The text reported the specific location of the ritual, the 
Chapel of Victory over the Three Realms (Tib. gzim chung sa gsum rnam rgyal) in the 
Potala Palace. While the mention of this site might have implied the presence of the 
Qianlong emperor to individuals familiar with the room’s association with the 
propitiation of Qing rulers, the Biography did not reference the painting of Qianlong as 
playing a role in the ritual as Sungyun had. Nor did the text mention the direct 
involvement of the ambans in selecting the lot. To the contrary, after names had been 
written on “golden cards” and the prayers to Tsongkhaba had been completed, they 
“entrusted the veracity [of the ritual] to the dharma protectors (deities) of the previous 
incarnations of the lama.” The subsequent description diverged even further: 
Having mixed the lots, because the one that was pulled out was the 
Lithang [candidate], a child who had already been greatly favored by all 
the people—from aristocrats to commoners—of Chamdo and had also 
been identified by the testimony of the Protectors, he was [celebrated] as a 
true Jewel and [people] swore that the emperor’s measures to avoid 
conflicts [over the identification of reincarnations] were in fact good. 
Among those witnesses [from Chamdo], the faith that comes from 
conviction (Tib. yid ches pa’i dad pa) increased very greatly.401 
 
In a sense, Démo’s description is a testament to the success with which the 
Qianlong emperor and his field officials in Inner Asia had integrated a Ming bureaucratic 
practice into the process of locating reincarnate lamas. Moreover, the metaphysical 
understanding of the ritual had evidently undergone a transformation. Qianlong’s ritual 
had worked as Sungyun (and the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu, perhaps) intended: The urn had 
become a venue for the unseen powers of Tsongkhaba and the deities to act and the 
                                                                                                                                            
伽母》), and 2) dmigs brtse ma: Miktsema prayer aiming at loving kindness, a prayer to 
Tsongkhapa. Ch.《緣悲頌》. 
 
401 Démo Kūtuktu, Biography, 251:ka-kha. 
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winning lot had become an omen/temgetu/mtshan ltas of their wishes. But far from 
displacing the oracles, from an indigenous perspective the urn had become a 
complimentary technology. The oracles were back. And despite Sungyun’s bluster, they 
had probably never left. The Démo Kūtuktu was willing to concur with the Throne that 
“mistakes” (Tib. ‘dzol ‘ga’ zhig) had been made in the identification of reincarnate 
tülkus.402 Yet at no point had Démo cited the oracles as the source of the corruption and 
lack of accord over the authenticity of tülkus. 
Evidence from Tibetan sources casts doubt on Sungyun’s claim to have 
completely eliminated the oracles. Prior scholarship has argued that the Tibetans never 
shared the Qing ruler’s sense of crisis or doubt in the incarnations and that Qianlong’s 
interest in reforming the system was either a pretext for asserting political supremacy 
over the Geluk School or was simply an expression of his ignorance of Tibetan 
understandings of reincarnation (or perhaps both).403 However, accounts such as that of 
the Démo Kūtuktu do suggest that some Tibetan elites from the Geluk School did in fact 
concur with the Throne fear that faith in the authenticity of the tülkus had been 
compromised. Moreover, the reports of both the Démo Kūtuktu and Sungyun focused 
attention on whether the identification process achieved a very specific type of faith. In 
this chapter we have seen the emperor, and subsequently Sungyun, speak explicitly of 
achieving obedience to the law on the Golden Urn not through force but as a result of 
“having become convinced” (Ma. gūnin dahabumbi). Similarly, the Démo Kūtuktu wrote 
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403 Matthew Kapstein, The Tibetans (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2006), 159: “…As an imperial 
intrusion penetrating the heart of Tibetan religious life, it was by far the most resented, so that 
every effort was made to circumvent its use.” Paul Nietupski, Labrang Monastery: A Tibetan 
Buddhist Community on the Inner Asian Borderlands, 1709-1958 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2011), 134. 
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that the use of the Golden Urn in the case of the identification of the Phagpa Lha had 
instilled in observers a particularly strong form of faith: “faith from conviction” or “faith 
from trust” (yid ches pa’i dad pa). The usage of these phrases in the documents above 
suggests that in both Manchu and Tibetan they express a form of faith based on the kind 
of conviction or trust that one acquires from personal observation.404  
It is striking that in the Manchu language the concepts of persuasion and 
obedience are intimately linked by the same root verb (gūnin dahabumbi and dahambi, 
respectively). In light of the court’s attempts to implement the statute on the Golden Urn, 
the link hardly seems coincidental. The gradual establishment of the Golden Urn as law 
and the concomitant reification of certain elements from the management of the Erdeni 
Bandida or Phagpa Lha cases into precedents, were attended by a constant concern not 
merely with whether the court’s directives were obeyed, but if they were obeyed out of 
personal conviction. As a result, we have seen how the dynasty directed its field officials 
in Mongolia and Tibet to orchestrate public tests of the oracles and criminal proceedings 
against the Tüsiyetü Khan and the steward of the Erdeni Bandida estate. These 
proceedings were staged not merely to expose the corruption of the Geluk School but also 
to demonstrate the superiority of Qing laws and administration. As Qianlong himself 
frequently stated, Qing success was a “victory of law-making.” The court’s strategy for 
the eradication of the oracles, therefore, hinged on the belief that when exposed to the 
Qing system, Tibetans would choose it over their own on account of its fairness and 
frugality. This explains the emperor’s pleasure in receiving the news that common folk 
had purportedly reacted with astonishment at the news that kūtutku could emerge within 
their families. This extended as well to the notion that the Qing was rule-based and 
                                                
404 See fuller discussion of this topic in Chapter Three. 
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systematized and therefore more just. Unlike the “way of the Buddha,” Qianlong’s “way 
of the emperor” promised not only equality before the law but justice in the here and now, 
without having to wait for karmic retribution.  
The degree to which the argument for the replacement of the oracles and the 
imposition of Qing sovereignty (Ma. toose) in Tibet was legitimized in terms of 
extending legal justice to Tibetans should not only give us pause to reconsider the 
importance of law and legal discourse in the expansion of Qing colonialism, but also 
draws our attention to the ways in which Qing expansion paralleled other 
contemporaneous empire building. As Elizabeth Kolsky argues with regards to colonial 
India, the belief that the British could deliver impartial justice and stronger legal 
protections to Indians than the indigenous legal traditions was the most important device 
for legitimating colonial rule, both in the home country and abroad.405 Qing official 
discourse in 1790s Tibet was little different.  
Yet how far, ultimately, was the late Qianlong court willing to go to delegitimize 
the indigenous legal system? What kind of role did it envision for Qing administrators in 
local jurisprudence? As a concluding vignette, a case handled by Sungyun at the same 
time as he was dealing with the Phagpa Lha search paints an extreme picture. On August 
13, 1795, Sungyun reported that he had been approached by a group of Tibetans who 
filed a lawsuit against the Néchung (Ma. Naicung) oracle. They claimed that the oracle 
had, on the authority of a decree (Ma. g’ašuk, Tib. bka’ shog) from the Dalai Lama, 
occupied their land and claimed their produce for three full years. Sungyun investigated 
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the case and, finding the medium guilty, had him caned thirty times. Sungyun 
summarized the case as follows:  
In Tibet there are only four major chökyong, the Lamo, Néchung, Samye, 
and Gwadung. In accordance with their faith, the Tibetans in a muddled 
manner inquire after the fortunes of their petty matters. Their divinations 
not being at all clear, their credibility is accordingly also minimal. Among 
the four protectors, the Néchung protector has willfully taken possession 
of the people’s fields. Because of this, our servants have frightfully 
punished and imprisoned him. The Néchung chökyong is the object of 
faith and worship by the Dalai Lama and all the monks of Drépung 
monastery. The Dalai Lama only knows how to read sutras. He 
understands nothing of the ways of things. Thus when we explain to him 
what we have done, he just approves and thanks us and states that he will 
not again issue decrees. The Tibetan people fearlessly point out how [the 
Dalai Lama] has wronged them and raise their grievances against the 
Oracles. Indeed these are clear signs that they no longer have faith in the 
protectors.406 
 
In this case the amban, in an unprecedented fashion, not only involved himself in 
a local property dispute, but also reversed the decision of the Dalai Lama. Given the 
timing of the case in the midst of the campaign against the oracles, it was clearly an 
opportune moment to further discredit the oracles. Yet the additional pressure the amban 
reports to have placed on the Dalai Lama to recuse himself from making further 
judgments on property issues, and the insinuation that he was complicit in the crime, 
suggests that agents of the court were now growing more comfortable in presenting to the 
broader public what previously had only been an internal discourse challenging the 
legitimacy of the Dalai Lama’s increasingly restricted role in local administration.  
In the following chapter we will explore in greater detail the implementation of 
the Golden Urn Law from the perspective of Tibetan-language sources. Just three months 
after the successful identification of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu, the dynasty received word 
that the monks of Labrang Monastery in Amdo had already commenced their search for 
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the reincarnation of the second Jamyang Zhepa. This case was to prove much more 
complicated than the Phagpa Lha case, and the tensions it generated both between the 
Qing state and Tibetan Buddhists, and among Tibetan Buddhists, reveals how, although 
there was a great range in ideas about divination and how to search for reincarnations, all 
sides strategically engaged each other in the shared pursuit of “convincing” 
identifications. 
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Chapter Three: The Power of Dreams 
 
Introduction: The Recognition of the Third Jamyang Zhepa 
 
In September of 1797, Sungyun reported to the Throne that he and the assistant 
Lhasa amban Hening had conducted the Golden Urn lottery to confirm the identity of the 
reincarnation of the Second Jamyang Zhepa (1728-1791). This was the first time the 
ritual had been conducted since the selection of the Phagpa Lha lama a year earlier and 
followed the same format: Tibetan dignitaries including the Eighth Dalai Lama, the 
regent Tatsak Rinpoché, and representatives of the Jamyang Zhepa’s estate were drawn 
together before the image of Qianlong in the Potala Palace, and, as the “scriptures of 
Tsongkhaba were recited,”407 Sungyun inscribed the names of three candidate children on 
lots. Hening drew the winning lot—that of candidate number two, a three-year-old 
Tibetan child named Kelzang Bum (Ma. G’aldzangbum, Tib. Skal bzang ‘bum), the son 
of Rinchen Gyamtso (Ma. Rincinjamseo, Tib. Rin chen rgya mtsho), a Tibetan from 
Xunhua subprefecture.408  Just as he had in his memorial concerning Phagpa Lha, 
Sungyun concluded by noting the various ways in which the outcome had received the 
support of the witnesses. In particular, he recorded that the Belmang Pandita (Ma. 
kaimong surulku, Tib. dpal mang paN+Di ta dkon mchog rgyal mtshan, 1764-1853), the 
chief representative from Labrang Monastery had prostrated himself before the image of 
Qianlong and exclaimed, “The Great Holy Emperor on High is truly the Manjusri 
Buddha! The determination that has been made by drawing a lot while reciting the sutras 
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appears to me to be completely proper. This can be considered to be nothing but 
Tsongkhaba’s indication of the genuine reincarnation. I myself am truly and joyously 
convinced.”409 The chosen child was duly enthroned at Labrang as the Third Jamyang 
Zhepa, Lozang Tupten Jikmé Gyatso (Tib. Blo bzang thub bstan ‘jigs med rgya mtsho, 
1792-1855).  
Sungyun’s Manchu-language palace memorial reporting this matter circulated not 
only within the court in Beijing, but also amongst the disciples of the Jamyang Zhepa. 
When the biographer of the Third Jamyang Zhepa commenced his work in 1859, he 
accorded the Golden Urn lottery a prominent place in the account of the identification 
process and included Sungyun’s memorial, translated in its entirety from Manchu into 
Tibetan.410 The Tibetan-language biography presented the official Qing account of the 
lottery immediately after its own description of the event based on Tibetan sources, 
giving the reader the opportunity to view the event from two different perspectives. In the 
account based on witness testimony, however, the prostrating monk was identified not as 
Belmang Pandita, but rather the chamberlain of the Jamyang Zhepa’s estate, who had 
been second-in-command of the delegation to Lhasa. The biographer wrote that 
immediately upon seeing the result of the lottery:  
                                                
409 MWLF 164:0393. 
 
410 The Tibetan translation of Sungyun’s Manchu-language memorial puts Belmang Pandita’s 
speech as follows: “The entourage of the Jamyang Zhepa with great respect knelt and said, ‘We 
request to prostrate with folded hands before the treasured image of the Great Emperor. The 
Cakravartin Great Sovereign Emperor is truly the same as the Manjusiri Bodhisattva (gnam gyi 
lha Gong ma bdag po chen po nyid rje btsun 'jam pa'i dbyangs).  It is difficult to imagine but this 
judgment on the identification of the tülku by means of shuffling the wooden lots after having 
completed the rituals has occurred according to the decision by means of prophecy having gone 
directly to the lord Tsongkhapa.’” See Ngag dbang thub bstan rgya mtsho, Kun mkhyen ‘Jam 
dbyangs bzhad pa sku phreng gsum pa’i rnam thar, (Pe chin [Beijing]: Krung go’i bod kyi shes 
rig dpe skrun khang, 1991 [1859-1889]) 54-55. This work is hereafter abbreviated as JYZP03. 
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The [chamberlain] from Labrang then zealously said in Mongol without 
pause, “The two previous incarnations of the Jamyang Zhepa Kutuktu, 
according to the word of the [Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama], 
accomplished the ‘stability of life’ in both Amdo and Ü. Likewise, the 
Great Sovereign Emperor also awarded seals and proffered unmatched 
support. Until now, due to the compassion of the Great Manjusri Emperor, 
the masters and disciples the monastery and colleges of the Jamyang 
Kūtuktu have existed in happiness and comfort. Now, because of the Great 
Sovereign Emperor’s grace, in front of the image which bears no 
difference from the real person himself, [and] under the principle direction 
of the Dalai Lama, and before a gathering of the emperor’s wise kūtuktus 
and the two ambans who appeared like the sun and moon; in accordance 
with the system (lugs srol) of the great emperor, the unmistaken high 
incarnation was identified. Because [the emperor] has bestowed the Great 
Wish-fulfilling Jewel on Labrang Trashi Khyil and the entirety of Amdo, 
[I] prostrate before [His] Grace!411 
 
Although the Biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa presents two differing 
accounts of the same speech, both convey the legitimacy of the Qing ritual and the 
authenticity of the selection. In this biography, as well as three other published Tibetan-
language accounts of the search for the third Jamyang Zhepa that were available to the 
Labrang community in the late nineteenth century, the urn was portrayed as a 
complimentary component of a complex search process. Moreover, according to these 
accounts, the Golden Urn confirmed the authenticity of a child whom the Labrang 
community had already identified as the leading candidate. 
Not without justification, contemporary scholarship on Labrang Monastery and 
the lineage of the Jamyang Zhepas has pointed to the “fact” that the lottery ultimately 
identified the candidate favored by the Tibetans as evidence that the Qing court exercised 
little more than ceremonial authority. On the basis of the description of the search in 
Biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa, Paul Nietupski has written that, “The Tibetans 
                                                
411 JYZP03, 50-51.  
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carried out their own selection procedure but at least went through the motions of the 
Qing policy. At once Tibetan tradition and authority were preserved and the Qing voice 
was heard.”412 The unstated implication of this assessment is that the leaders of the 
Jamyang Zhepa’s estate had the power and authority to guarantee that the results of the 
lottery could be fixed in their favor. Thus the use of the urn was but one of several 
gestures made by Tibetans from Labrang during the nineteenth century as a “diplomatic 
courtesy” to uphold the fiction of Qing authority.413 However, in light of new information 
emerging from the Manchu-language archives of the communications between Beijing, 
Lhasa, and Amdo, this assessment requires revision. 
In the days following the identification of Kelzang bum as the third Jamyang 
Zhepa, Sungyun had submitted not one, but two reports to the court—the formal 
memorial (Ma. bukdari, Ch. 奏摺, Tib. gre’u tsi) that appears to have been composed 
from the outset with a mind towards both official and non-official circulation and a 
second, secret note intended only for the inner court.414 In this second letter Sungyun 
informed the emperor that he had successfully ensured the correct outcome of the lottery. 
Seven months earlier, Qianlong had decided that among the three candidates whose 
names had been brought to the attention of the Qing court, the child listed first was 
unacceptable.415 Therefore, he ordered Sungyun to arrange the lottery in such a fashion as 
                                                
412 Paul Nietupski, Labrang Monastery: A Tibetan Buddhist Community on the Inner Asian 
Borderlands, 1709-1958 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 135. 
 
413 Nietupski, Labrang, 137. 
 
414 This second note was most likely dispatched to Beijing as an attachment to the longer 
memorial. Both documents are dated JQ 02/08/03 (1797-9-22). For the base memorial, see 
MWLF 164:0391-0395; for the attachment, MWLF 0388-0389. 
 
415 MWLF 163:1352-1355 (JQ 02/01/08, 1792-02-04). 
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to ensure that the name of the first child was not drawn. Sungyun’s mission was doubly 
complicated, however, because according to contemporary Manchu-language reports 
from the Xining amban, it was this child, Wangchen bum (Ma. wangcinbum, Tib. Dbang 
chen ‘bum), not Kelzang Bum, whom the Labrang community had identified as the most 
promising candidate.416 Sungyun and Hening would have to not only fix the lottery but 
also manage what, from the perspective of the delegation from Labrang, would now be an 
unexpected outcome. 
In his secret communiqué, penned just two days after the lottery had been 
conducted, Sungyun was confident that he had pulled the matter off: “Nothing has been 
divulged. We have ensured that their first-ranked child, the son of the Tibetan baihu 
Dula, was not selected. Having seen to it that the name of the second-ranked child, the 
son of a Tibetan with no official status, was drawn; we explained the benefits the of this 
[selection] to the Belmang tülku and the other of the disciples [of the Jamyang Zhepa] 
who were all completely thankful and convinced.”417 And his confidence appears to not 
have been misplaced. Starting in 1798 with the completion of the Biography of the 
Second Jamyang Zhepa418 and culminating with the production of the Biography of the 
Third Jamyang Zhepa 419  in the late nineteenth century, members of the Labrang 
                                                
416 MWLF 163:0645-0646 (JQ 01/11/21, 1796-12-19). 
 
417 MWLF 164:0388: “heni sereburakū de umai ceni ujude faidaha fandze tanggū da dula i jui be 
tatame tucibuhakū. emgeri jaide faidaha sula fandze i jui be tatame tucibufi sain i ulhibuhe de 
harangga šabi kaimong surulku se yooni hukšeme gūnin dahaha.”  
 
418 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar (Lan kru’u [Lanzhou]: kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1991 
[1798]). 
 
419 Mkhan po ngag dbang thub bstan rgya mtsho, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhed pa sku ‘phreng 
gsum pa’i rnam thar (Pe chin [Beijing]: Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, [1859-
1889]). Hereafter JYZP03. 
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community composed a series of written accounts of the search for the reincarnation of 
the second Jamyang Zhepa that legitimized the candidacy of Kelzang bum. These books 
were themselves transcriptions of the oral testimony of witnesses such as Belmang 
Pandita. Belmang’s student, Drakgönpa Könchok Tenpa Rapgyé (hereafter, 
“Drakgönpa,” Tib. brag dgon pa dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, 1800/1-1869), 
incorporated his teacher’s reminiscences about his trip to Lhasa into both his history of 
the Amdo region, The Oceanic Book (first printed in 1849, expanded edition 1865), and 
his biography of Belmang Pandita (1864).420 
Although the composition and printing of these books spanned nine decades, they 
constitute a coherent single narrative of the events of 1796 through 1797 that helped 
consolidate a historical memory within the Labrang community and the wider Amdo 
region that to the present day has remembered the rebirth of the second Jamyang Zhepa 
to be relatively uncontroversial. This is in stark contrast to the divisive search for the 
reincarnation of the first Jamyang Zhepa in the 1720s. That search resulted in two 
candidates, a division of the original Labrang community into irreconcilable camps, and a 
simmering feud that continued to generate bloodshed well into the early twentieth 
century. The historical record contains no trace of a comparable conflict in the aftermath 
of the identification of the third Jamyang Zhepa in 1797.421 
However, as this chapter will demonstrate, these works do contain evidence that 
at the time of the search, disciples of the second Jamyang Zhepa, members of the greater 
                                                
420 Brag dgon pa dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, Yongs rdzogs bstan pa’i mnga’ bdag rje btsun 
bla ma rdo rje ‘chang ‘kon mchog rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po’o zhal snga nas kyi rnam par thar 
‘dod ‘jug ngogs zhes bya ba bzhugs so (Pe chin [Beijing]: mi rigs dpe sgrun khang, 2001). 
Hereafter abbreviated as Drakönpa, BMNT. 
 
421 See Chapter Six and Nietupski, Labrang, 126-127. 
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Labrang community, and Tibetan Buddhists elsewhere experienced profound misgivings 
concerning the involvement of the Qing and the outcome of the search. Since the signs of 
these underlying tensions were camouflaged by the hagiographic conventions of these 
works, they become salient only when one reexamines the Tibetan-language record 
against the secret Manchu-language letters and the revelation that the Qing had 
manipulated the outcome of the Golden Urn lottery. This chapter will argue that, 
although certain Qing officials such as Sungyun made great efforts to cultivate 
indigenous authorities and make the lottery and its outcome palatable to Tibetan 
Buddhists, the key work of managing the reception of Kelzang bum as the reincarnation 
of the second Jamyang Zhepa fell to Tibetan-Buddhist elites in both Lhasa and Amdo. 
The case of the third Jamyang Zhepa—the “truth” of which never appears to have leaked 
beyond Sungyun, Hening, and the Qianlong emperor and his inner court advisors, 
demonstrates that the Qing could rig the urn. But the success of their intrigue hinged on 
the actions of a wide range of Gelukpa hierarchs, witnesses, and later chroniclers. These 
Tibetan Buddhists harmonized two seemingly incompatible systems for locating 
reincarnations and naturalized the result of a highly contentious and unexpected 
identification. Moreover, this was an ongoing process that was taken up by several 
successive generations of authors at Labrang, stretching from the return of the original 
search party from Lhasa in 1798 until the printing of the third Jamyang Zhepa’s 
biography in the 1880s. This chapter is therefore a story of indigenous agency in a 
colonial context, but one that flips the standard narrative of Sino-Tibetan relations during 
the Qing: No longer a story of how Tibetans slyly and astutely got their way in the face of 
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a weakening imperial authority, it becomes a testament to the lengths Tibetans might go 
in service of the Great Sovereign Emperor. 
In Chapter Two we have seen how over the course of several years the court 
attempted to manage the transformation of a bureaucratic lottery into an omen—a 
moment of divine intervention when the invisible became precipitate. During the period 
of Heliyen’s tenure in Lhasa, the Golden Urn was presented alternately as a moment 
when Amitāyus Buddha or perhaps a manifestation of the emperor himself (present in the 
form of a painting hung in the Potala) could be summoned to intervene. Sungyun added 
to these interpretations by promoting the notion that Tibetans could envision Tsongkhaba 
as the guiding force.422 The wealth of Tibetan-language sources from Labrang Monastery 
permit us in this chapter to explore the various ways in which Tibetan-Buddhists 
themselves interpreted and participated in the Qing ritual/law making effort.  
These materials lead towards new questions about the nature of “service” to the 
Qing state and Qing authority in Tibetan-Buddhist contexts. Several of the Gelukpa 
hierarchs portrayed in these texts as playing key roles in the search for the third Jamyang 
Zhepa also possessed strong ties to the Qing court. In particular, Tükwan Lozang Chökyi 
Nyima (Tib. Thu’u bkwan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802), Gungtang Könchok 
Tenpé Drönmé (Tib. Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me, 1762-1823), and 
                                                
422 Interestingly, aside from a grammatical change in tense, Sungyun reported the Zhiwa Lha 
Kūtuktu and Belmang Pandita as making exactly the same statement about Tsongkhaba’s 
influence on the lottery Zhiwa Lha’s statement: “dergi amba enduringge ejen. uthai manjusiri 
fucihi. uttu nomun hūlabume sibiya tatame toktobuci. mende derengge bime. ere teni dzungk'aba i 
joriha yargiyan hūbilgan seci ombi seme geren gemu urgunjeme hukšeme gūnin dahambi.” 
MWLF 159:1209 (QL 59/11/13, 1794-12-5). Belmang Pandita et al.’s purported statement: 
“dergi amba enduringge ejen. yala manjusiri fucihi. uttu nomun hūlambume sibiyan tatame 
toktobuha de . fuhali mende derengge bime. ere teni dzungk'aba i joriha yargiyan hūbilgan seci 
ombi. mei beyese yargiyan i urgunjeme gūnin dahambi seme alibuha.” From MWLF 163:0393 
(JQ 02/08/03). 
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Tatsak Tenpé Gönpo (Tib. Rta tshag bstan pa'i mgon po, 1760-1810) had not only 
received the title of “kūtuktu” but had also been elevated to the status of “kūtuktus 
resident in the capital” (Ch. 駐京之呼圖克圖).423 
Contemporary scholarship has identified the cultivation of certain lineages of 
reincarnate lamas by successive Qing rulers as a key component of the empire’s strategy 
for managing relations with Tibetan Buddhists in Inner Asia. The Qing tradition of 
inviting Tibetan Buddhist monks to reside at court began well before they had conquered 
the Ming and accelerated during the Kangxi reign as the empire turned from the 
pacification of China proper to the growing strategic threat posed by the Junghars.424 Yet 
these efforts were highly fraught. For instance, starting in the mid-1650s the Shunzhi and 
Kangxi emperors successively maintained the Ilayuysan Kūtuktu in Beijing to serve as 
the leading representative of the Geluk school and intermediary between the court and the 
Dalai Lama. However, when this lama was dispatched to Lhasa in 1689 with instructions 
to aid the court in working out a peace accord with Galdan’s Junghar khanate, he 
ultimately joined the Junghar cause.425 During the Qianlong reign efforts were made to 
establish a more permanent legal framework for hosting Geluk hierarchs and assigning 
                                                
423 See the section on “lamas” in the Jiaqing edition (1817) of the Daqing Huidian (“Collected 
Statutes of The Great Qing”), reprinted in Zhao Yuntian (annotator), Qianglong chao neifu 
chaoben Lifan Yuan Zeli (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 368.  
 
424 Wang Xiangyun, “The Qing Court’s Tibet Connections: Lcang skya Rol pai’i rdo rje and the 
Qianlong Emperor,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 60.1 (2000): 125- 63, 127. 
 
425 The Kangxi court subsequently liquidated the monk’s estate in Beijing and began casting 
about for another monk to take up the leadership of the Geluk teachings in Beijing, ultimately 
settling on the second Changkya incarnation. A decade later Kangxi managed to convince the 
next Junghar khan, Tsewang Rabdan to extradite the Ilayuysan Kūtuktu, who was then executed 
at the Yellow Temple (Huangsi) in front of a large audience of Inner Asian nobility. See, Chen 
Xiaomin, “Qingdai zhujing lama zhidu de xingcheng yu yange,” Manzu yanjiu 4 (2007): 111-121, 
115-116. 
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responsibilities. Internally circulated draft Statutes of the Lifan Yuan (c. 1756) record that 
following the establishment of the Yonghegong temple (1744) and the Office of Lama 
Seals and Service (Ch. 喇嘛印務處, 1745) within the Lifan Yuan, the court legislated the 
presence of three kūtuktu in the capital—the Changkya, Galdan Siretu, and Jirung 
(Tatsak) lineages.426 Thirty-three years later, after the death of Changkya Rolpai Dorjé, 
Qianlong undertook another major reevaluation of the situation and ultimately expanded 
the formal list of “kūtuktus resident in the capital” (駐京之呼圖克圖) to include twelve 
kūtuktu divided into left and right wings.427 Chen Xiaomin has suggested that the practice 
of inviting prominent lamas to Beijing, granting them titles, stipends, and residences, and 
delegating to them a range of formal administrative and religious responsibilities 
constituted by the late Qianlong period a full-fledged “system.”428 Yet considering that 
this institution was only formally articulated in 1786 (at the beginning of Qianlong’s final 
decade of rule) and that many of the kūtuktus living at the time of their enlistment in the 
statute would never visit Beijing, it is perhaps appropriate to think of the “kūtuktu 
resident in the capital” not as a fixed system but rather as a historical resource or 
ideological tradition that could be used strategically by both rulers and lamas. Thus in the 
nineteenth century, the legacy of the zhujing kūtuktu remained to be shaped and debated 
by contemporaries. 
                                                
426 See section on “Tibetan monk preceptors in the capital (京師番僧)” in Qianlong chao neifu 
chaoben Lifan Yuan Zeli, 125; and Chen, 117. 
 
427 See section of the Jiaqing-period Lifan yuan zeli, on “lamas resident in the capital (駐京喇嘛) 
in Qianglong chao neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli, 368. 
 
428 Chen Xiaomin, “Qingdai zhujing lama zhidu de xingcheng yu yange” (Manzu yanjiu 4 (2007), 
111-121). 
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The complexity of these institutions, and their continuous adaptation during both 
the Qianlong reign and subsequent reigns, suggests that what it meant to be a “resident 
kūtuktu in Beijing” was open to a range of interpretations. It is perhaps not a coincidence 
that Qianlong proclaimed a revised and expanded system of zhujing kūtuktu in the year 
that Changkya Rolpai Dorjé (1717-1786), the longest serving and most influential “state 
preceptor,” passed away. Understood by both contemporaries and modern historians to be 
the paradigmatic zhujing kūtuktu, Rolpai Dorjé’s career has been exhaustively studied by 
both for information on the nature of this role. However, preoccupied with the question of 
whether Changkya was an agent of Qianlong’s empire building or an advocate of 
local/Tibetan/Gelukpa concerns, modern scholarship has left unanswered the question of 
how contemporaneous understandings of his career, expressed in widely-read biographies 
such as those of his disciple Tukwan Lozang Chökyi Nyima (1737-1802) and Chuzang 
Rinpoché (Tib. Ngag dbang thub bstan dbang phyug, 1725-1796), influenced the 
subsequent development of Qing-Gelukpa relations and the role(s)/careers of later monks 
who traveled to court and undertook various tasks at the dynasty’s request. 429 
Furthermore, Yonghegong and Changkya-focused studies of Qianlong’s relationship with 
Tibetan-Buddhist hierarchs have rarely addressed the question of what these monks 
actually did in their home communities and how their affiliation with the court was 
perceived therein. Rolpai Dorjé’s court-centered career, which stretched from childhood 
                                                
429 See Marina Illich, “Imperial Stooge or Emmissary to the Dge lugs Throne? Rethinking the 
Biographies of the Chankya Rolpé Dorjé,” in Power, Politics, and the Reinvention of Tradition; 
Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, 
Königswinter, ed. Bryan J. Cuevas and Kurtis R. Schaeffer (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 17-32. Studies 
by Berger and Wang present a more nuanced interpretation of the activities of Rolpai Dorjé but 
still largely catalog his activities according to the for/against dichotomy. See Wang Xiangyun, 
“The Qing Court’s Tibet Connections: Lcang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje and the Qianlong Emperor” 
(Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 60/1 (2000), 125- 163); and Patricia Berger, Empire of 
Emptiness (University of Hawai’i Press, 2003). 
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to death, was an outlier from the experience of most zhujing kūtuktu who spent the 
majority of their time away from court. 
One of the few scholars to address these questions is Paul Nietupski, whose study 
of Labrang Monastery has cataloged the relationships of numerous local reincarnate 
lineages with the Qing state. Tibetan-language sources from Labrang identified monks 
who taught in neighboring Chinese communities or ministered at court “Chinese lamas” 
(Tib. rgya nag pa bla ma).430 Nietupski depicts these monks primarily as “emissaries” 
who periodically traveled to Beijing to take up translation or teaching tasks on behalf of 
the Qianlong court, but whose fundamental orientation was toward the interests of their 
home institutions and perhaps the Geluk School more generally: They “worked on behalf 
of Labrang Monastery.”431 Nietupski’s case in point is Lozang Tenpé Nyima (1689-
1762), the reincarnation of the forty-fourth Ganden Tripa (Lubum Ngawang Lodrö 
Gyatso, 1635-1688). He was invited to Beijing during the last year of the Yongzheng 
reign and under Qianlong was instrumental in the translation of the Tengyur into Mongol 
and the conversion of the Yonghegong princely residence into a monastery.432 Known at 
court as the “Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu” (Ma. G’aldan siretu kūtuktu, Ch. 噶爾丹錫勒圖胡
圖克圖 ), his was one of the first three estates to be permanently established in Beijing by 
                                                
430 Nietupski, Paul Kocot, “The ‘Reverend Chinese’ (Gyanakpa tsang) at Labrang Monastery,” in 
Buddhism Between Tibet and China, ed. Matthew T. Kapstein (Boston MA: Wisdom 
Publications, 2009),181-213; and Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, 123-125, 128-129. 
 
431 Nietupski Labrang Monastery, 128; (2009), 189. 
 
432 Nietupski, Labrang Monastery, 128-129; see also the Oceanic Book, 278-281. 
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the Qianlong emperor early in his reign.433 His exceptionally high status and long 
residency in Beijing suggests though, that this lama, much like Rolpai Dorjé, was much 
more than just an emissary from Amdo, he was also a servant of the emperor. 
Rather than approaching our interpretation of Labrang’s Beijing-affiliated lamas 
as a case of sorting out whether they were acting on behalf of the Qing emperor or 
Labrang, it might be helpful to interpret their project to legitimize the influence of Qing 
laws and officials as a product of what Johan Elverskog has referred to as the “Qing 
cosmopolitan culture” of Inner Asia.434 Elverskog defines this cosmopolitanism as, “the 
ability of the various peoples within the Manchu state to see, think and act beyond the 
local, be they Mongol, Tibetan, Manchu, or Chinese.”435 Elverskog elaborates this picture 
of Qing cosmopolitanism primarily by describing several examples of Qing literature 
composed in Inner Asia that not only combined literary traditions from China, Mongolia 
and/or Tibet, but also synthesized these components into a novel yet coherent product.  
Similarly, during the search for the third Jamyang Zhepa, a host of Gelukpa 
hierarchs from both Amdo and central Tibet fabricated an original Qing ritual out of 
Tibetan and Chinese components. In the aftermath, Tibetan-language chroniclers would 
over the span of eighty years engage in an ongoing revisionist project to produce a 
                                                
433 This “Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu” is not to be confused with the Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu mentioned 
in Chapters One and Two. See the Qianlong-period statutes on “Tibetan monk preceptors in the 
capital (京師番僧)” in Qianglong chao neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli, 125. 
 
434 Johan Elverskog, “Wutai Shan, Qing Cosmopolitanism, and the Mongols,” Journal of the 
International Association of Tibetan Studies 6 (December 2011): 255. Matthew Kapstein has also 
noted the contributions of scholars from Amdo to an “Inner Asian cosmopolitanism” that arose 
during the 18th century. See Matthew T. Kapstein, “Just Where on Jambudvīpa Are We?” in 
Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011), 336-364. 
 
435 Elverskog, 255. 
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narrative of these events that posited a legitimate place for the Qing emperor and imperial 
law in the search process. It should come as little surprise that court-affiliated 
reincarnate-hierarchs such as the Tükwan Rinpoché, whom Elverskog points to as an 
exemplar of Qing cosmopolitanism, should prove instrumental in the legitimation of the 
Golden Urn. The Tükwan Rinpoché was intervening neither on the side of the “Tibetans” 
nor would he have conceptualized himself as an “ally” of the dynasty—for it is unlikely 
that he saw himself as an “enemy” of Tibetan Buddhists. To employ such terms implies 
an anachronistic dichotomy dividing Tibetans/Gelukpas from the Qing. The resistance 
that had to be overcome in the case of the urn should not be understood as “Tibetan.” It is 
also based on modern, twentieth-century assumptions concerning the coherence and 
stability of “Tibetan” as a category of meaning during the Qing period. This is not to say 
that there was not a strong sense of local identity vis-à-vis China and perhaps even other 
regions of Tibet. Nor is it to say that cultural identity was not a factor in what was very 
real resistance to the notion of using the urn. Building on Elverskog, I would add that 
Qing cosmopolitanism did not necessarily hide the traces of its creation. Much as 
Tükwan frankly identified the elements of other non-Geluk religious traditions that had 
shaped his own teachings,436 in the case of the identification of the third Jamyang Zhepa, 
commentators did not hide the disparate origins of different elements of the search 
process and Golden Urn ritual.  
  The search for the Jamyang Zhepa fell at a unique moment. It was proceeded by 
a burst of legal reforms of Tibetan administration that intensified Qing imperial 
involvement in central Tibet and, as we’ve seen in Chapters One and Two, divination 
                                                
436 Roger Jackson, “Triumphalism and Ecumenism in Thu’u bkwan’s Crystal Mirror,” Journal of 
the International Association of Tibetan Studies 2 (August 2006): 15-16. 
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technologies. Yet it was followed shortly afterwards by the death of the Qianlong 
emperor and the first imperial succession in sixty-four years—the end of an epoch that 
had begun well before any of the major characters in the search had been born. The 
Tibetan-language narratives produced by this encounter between Tibetan-Buddhist elites 
and the Qing colonial bureaucracy thus had the potential to not only define the Qianlong 
legacy but also shape local understandings of the Geluk-Qing and local-center 
relationships more broadly. The proper management of the search for the Jamyang Zhepa 
was thus essential to the survival of the institutional innovations of the Qianlong reign 
and setting the right tone for the uncertain times that lay ahead. In the following section 
we will begin our examination of this event from the perspective of the Manchu-language 
sources. 
 
The Manchu-Language Record 
 
In the early winter of 1796-1797, the Xining amban Tsebak (Ch. 策拔克, Mongol, 
Bordered Yellow Banner, d. 1812) reported to the Throne that he had personally 
examined three children whom preliminary tests had indicated might be the reincarnation 
of the Second Jamyang Zhepa. During the winter months it was not unusual for the 
amban to head out to the pastures south of the Yellow River beyond the subprefectures of 
Guide and Xunhua to check the border posts (Ma. karun) that marked the Gansu-Qinghai 
frontier. Early winter, when the earth firmed up and the rivers froze over, and the animals 
were still fat and healthy, was the perfect time for the nomads from beyond the frontier 
(Ma. aiman i fandze) to launch raids on the Mongol banners of Qinghai or other 
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communities in Guide and Xunhua. And the frequency of these raids had been increasing 
of late.437 The amban claimed that since he was in the area, it was “convenient” (Ma. 
ildun de) to drop by the households of the candidate children to make a personal 
inspection. On the basis of his subsequent reports, one suspects that he may have been 
motivated by more than curiosity, but regardless, what he perhaps hoped would be 
perceived as earnestness in pursuing his official duties landed him in hot water instead. 
Tsebak’s memorial began by quoting the steward (Ma. šangjotba) of the Jamyang 
Kūtuktu’s estate, Lobdzangdarji. The steward reported that since the death of his master 
in the sixtieth year of the Qianlong reign, he had traveled frequently in the places of the 
“Mongols and Tibetans” (Ma. monggo fandze i ba) near the monastery and after much 
investigation identified three children: 1) Wangcinbum, the son of Dülagyel (Ma. dula, 
Tib. bdud la rgyal), a headman from Rangen (Ma. ranggan, Tib. rwa ngan) in Guide 
subprefecture; 2) Kelzang, the son of Rinchin Gyamtso, a “Tibetan subject of the 
Rongwo Nomunhan of Xunhua subprefecture” (Ma. rungbu Nomunhan i šabinar i 
fandze) of Xunhua; and 3) Bomandorji, the son of Nyima (Ma. nima, Tib. nyi ma), a 
“nomadic Tibetan from Nangra in Guide” (Ma. gui de i harangga nangra aiman i 
fandze). After reporting that he thought the first two candidates displayed the most 
potential, the steward requested, “Please send these names to Tibet and subject them to 
                                                
437 Tsebak, memorial MWLF 163:0638 (JQ 01/11/21, 1796-12-19). There is also a rare and 
uncataloged map of the five Mongol banners situated to the south of the Yellow River attached to 
this memorial (labeled 郡王納漢達爾濟等五旗遊牧地輿圖), MWLF 163:0649-0653. Scattered 
Tibetan (Ch. 番, Ma. aiman i fandze) raiding began to come to the attention of the court in 1782, 
but intensified during the 1790s. Tsebak was cashiered in 1797 for mishandling the raiding. See 
Wenfu, Qinghai shiyi jielüe (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1993 [1809-1841?]), 10, 15-25. 
While serving as chief Lhasa amban seven years later, Tsebak became embroiled in a bribery 
scandal. See Li Ruohong, “Dui cebake shouhui an de zai tantao,” Zhongguo Zangxue (1998.3): 
47-51. 
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the lottery in the Golden Urn!”438The depiction of the steward’s request to use the urn as 
voluntary here is significant. The Labrang leadership is presented as not merely obeying 
the law but rather actively seeking out the intercession of the Qing. During the nineteenth 
century, this became a constant leitmotif of all memorials from Xining to Beijing that 
introduced the names of search candidates.439  
Tsebak also filed a secret note that accompanied the memorial. This memo raised 
a thorny problem: he worried that the son of Dülagyel might be disqualified on account 
of his father’s status as headman (Ma. tanggūda, Ch. 百戶, lit. “hundred-household 
head”). According to Tsebak, the law stated that, “When rebirths arise, they cannot be 
recognized among the sons of Mongol han, wang, beile, beise, gung, jasak, or taijis. 
Recognize them only from among the sons of taiji with no official post or subjects of 
common status.” Tsebak wondered if this statute applied to Dülagyel’s son, even though 
the father was “a nomad [Tibetan]” (Ma. aiman i fandze)440 and, although an “indigenous 
official of the sixth rank” (Ma. ningguci jergi aiman i hafan), did not obviously hold one 
of the aristocratic ranks the Qing doled out to Mongols. Yet the problem was even more 
complicated:   
 
                                                
438 MWLF 163:0643: “ere ilan jui i se gebu be wargi dzang de yabufi. aisin bumba de dosimbufi. 
sibiya tatame tokobureo.” 
  
439 I found similar “requests” to use the urn in several other cases that I investigated from the 
nineteenth century. For example, in 1836, the coordinators of the search for the reincarnation of 
the fifth Cagan Nomunhan wrote to the Qinghai amban to request the use of the urn (MWLF 
206:2122-2125, DG 16/12/14). In 1890, representatives of the estate of the Tatsak Rinpoché (Ma. 
Jirung Kūtuktu) also requested the use of the urn ritual (National Palace Museum, Taipei, 
Qingdai gongzhongdang zouzhe ji junjichudang zhejian, doc. #171082, GX 16/07/20, 1890-9-3). 
 
440 MWLF 164:0392. In this document Dülagyel is not specifically identified as a “fandze” 
(Tibetan) unlike the other two fathers. In subsequent documents, however, he is labeled “fandze.” 
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Although it is not permitted to enter his child [as a candidate], however the 
birth of this child was auspicious and impressive. The steward 
Lobdzangdarji and every one else collectively acclaims this marvelous 
child as the reincarnation of the kūtuktu. This year Dula, in obedience to 
your servant Tsebak’s orders, delivered and promulgated [official] 
letters/instructions (Ma. bithe) among the raw nomadic Tibetans. In the 
course of recovering goods that had been stolen by bandits, he zealously 
made a great effort. Since Dula is after all merely a sixth rank indigenous 
official, he should not be compared to the Mongol khans, princes, dukes, 
and so forth. In violation of the statutes, your servant has rashly not 
withdrawn the name of his child... I politely request an edict indicating 
whether it is appropriate to enter the son of Dula into the determination of 
the Jamyang Kūtuktu by drawing lots.441  
 
Tsebak’s hope that his “rash” petition would find a sympathetic ear was not 
unprecedented in recent experience. Just a year earlier the emperor had granted a special 
dispensation to the community of the Cagan Nomunhan, a prominent reincarnation 
lineage that administered a “Mongol” banner in the pastures south of the Yellow River. 
In that case, the edict had cited the political power of the lineage and its recent assistance 
in rounding up bandits (much like Dülagyel purportedly had) in permitting the disciples 
of the monk to identify candidates as they saw fit without reference to the restrictions 
listed above.442 Unfortunately for Tsebak, he had misjudged the underlying goals of the 
law. 
According to the emperor, the problem lay not with the family background of 
Dülagyel but with the fact that the steward had already begun to promote the child as the 
authentic reincarnation. He dispatched the following orders to Sungyun in Lhasa: 
 
Tsebak has memorialized concerning the matter of identifying the rebirth 
of the Jamyang Kūtuktu. The name of the child of Dule, the tanggūda of 
Rangan has been placed at the head of the list. Moreover, he reports that 
                                                
441 MWLF 163:0646. 
 
442 Bilingual edict in Mongol and Tibetan, issued from the office of the Xining amban, QL 
60/04/15 (1795-06-01), held at Qinghai Provincial Museum, photograph in collection of author. 
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the steward Lobsangdarji has spoken with awe about how this child is 
probably the rebirth of their kūtuktu because the child's birth was 
auspicious and magnificent. I observe that the subordinate steward’s 
earnest opinion reflects only his selfish intentions. [He] obviously desires 
that the son of the tanggūda will be selected. Yet honestly, if things are 
done in this manner, for a long time afterwards it will be impossible to 
eliminate widespread skepticism. Therefore, I have passed down a secret 
order to Sungyun et al. At the time [of the ritual], regardless of which 
childrens’ names Tsebak sends to Tibet, discretely and without revealing 
anything, handle the selection in such a way that the name of the candidate 
who has been listed first—the son of the Tibetan tanggūda Dula, definitely 
does not emerge. Regardless of the artifice and cunning you employ, 
ensure that you disclose nothing to anyone.443 
 
In this letter to Sungyun, Qianlong clearly explained his priorities: the 
identification of persuasive reincarnations, free from what he perceived was the 
debilitating stain of self-interest and corruption of the Gelukpa establishment. In contrast, 
the status of Dülagyel was of perhaps only secondary concern and not even mentioned. 
Since Dülagyel’s son’s name was already circulating, it would be tactless to directly 
prohibit his candidacy. It would be up to Sungyun to identify a “convincing” rebirth by 
fixing the lottery.  
The emperor’s adamancy in this case suggests two additional rather speculative 
observations. First, given the emperor’s fixation on the role of the steward, it is hard not 
to wonder if the scandal involving the steward of the Erdeni Bandida estate was not also 
weighing on the emperor’s mind. And second, one wonders if the Throne was aware of 
the violence that had followed the contested identification of the second Jamyang Zhepa 
in the 1720s. Although never mentioned in any official archival source, memories of the 
1720s conflict might have provided sufficient justification for the Qing emperor to insist 
on the new law and incentive for Labrang-affiliated elites to engage strategically with the 
                                                
443 Quoted in Sungyun’s Manchu-language memorial of MWLF 163:1352-1353 (JQ 02/01/08, 
1797-2-4). Original instructions to Sungyun probably date to JQ 01/12/05, the day that Tsebak’s 
original report was received at court.  
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new recognition method. Regardless, the emperor’s apparent willingness to bend the law 
to accept Labrang’s favored candidate was a solid testament of his sincerity in this 
matter. 
Sungyun and Heliyen responded to the imperial instructions as follows: 
 
The Holy Lord’s continuous protection of the Yellow Strictures is 
authoritatively handled with completely lofty intentions. It will not do for 
the suspect and evil customs of the steward to flourish. At this time I still 
have not received the names of the three children from Tsebak. After the 
steward Lobdzangdarji has arrived, your servants will promptly in 
accordance with the existing [laws] take the Dalai Lama et al. before the 
image of the Holy One [i.e. the emperor] to read sutras/prayers. There in 
the presence of the steward and Dalai Lama we will inscribe the names of 
the three children on the lots. Yet your servants will covertly remember 
[which is which]. Your servant Sungyun will himself place the lots in 
order into the Golden Urn. When the recitation of prayers concludes, your 
servant Hening will choose from among the second and third candidates 
only. It will remain a secret that only the son of the Tibetan tanggūda Dula 
will not be be allowed to emerge. Therefore there will be no grounds for 
the old doubts to reemerge. Since the identification will have taken place 
according to the edict, the Dalai Lama will still be convinced and will not 
be persuaded by anything the steward Lobdzangdarji says. Additionally, 
here in Tibet there is the nephew of the former Jamyang Kūtuktu and also 
a chamberlain lama (jonir) named Šarab Coinjur. Könchok Sengge [the 
nephew of Jamyang Zhepa 02] has been in Tibet for fourteen years and his 
knowledge of the virtuous teaching of the sutras is great and he has 
attained the status of lharampa. The disciples of the Jamyang Kūtuktu all 
respect this Könchok Sengge. After the steward Lobdzangdarji has 
arrived, we will gather Könchok Sengge and the chamberlain Šarab 
Coinjur and let them both also observe selection of lots. After the 
reincarnation has been identified, these two [monks] will be sent back [to 
Amdo] to inform all the disciples. The new reincarnation will be entrusted 
to Könchok Sengge who will oversee his education in the sutras. This will 
also be beneficial. Your servants have secretly conferred and personally 
written this memorial. We urgently dispatch this to inform Your 
Highness.444 
                                                
444 Sungyun and Heliyen memorial, MWLF 163:1353-1355 (JQ 02/01/08, 1797-2-4): 
“enduringge ejen suwayan šajin be karmatara jalin tooselame yamara (?) teni gūnin fuhali 
akūnahabi. harangga šangjoTiba i uttu hiracara ehe tacin be yargiyan i yendebuci ojorakū. ne 
tsebak i baci ilan jusei gebu be kemuni bejire unde. sirame bejifi. šangjoTiba lobdzangdarji 
dahame jihe manggi. ahasi uthai dalai lama sebe nenehe songkoi budala de enduringge nirugan i 
juleri nomun hūlabume harangga šangjoTiba i dere tokome. dalai lama sade tuwabume. ilan 
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Sungyun and Hening’s strategy for manipulating the ritual reveals a keen 
attention to the use of witnesses and a more than passing knowledge of the biographies 
the monastic population of Lhasa. The ambans appear to have undertaken at least a basic 
survey of Labrang’s connections in central Tibet. Although the identity of the 
chamberlain has yet to be confirmed, Könchok Senggé (Ma. gongcuk sengge, Tib. Dkon 
mchog seng ge, 1768-1833) was indeed the nephew of the second Jamyang Zhepa and 
had recently received the highest scholarly credentials (Ma. jaramba, Tib. lha rams pa) 
from Gomang College at Dreprung Monastery.445 The ambans planned to affix the 
authority of this monk to the selection process by including him in the ritual and make 
him a stakeholder in the continuing legitimacy of the candidate by honoring him with the 
appointment of tutor to the next Jamyang Zhepa. The role of the Dalai Lama, in contrast, 
appears to have been considered rather insignificant. The emperor was pleased with this 
plan. In the margins of the memorial he jotted, “Good! Do not divulge this to anyone!”446 
                                                                                                                                            
jusei gebu be sibiya de arafi. ahasi dorgideri ejeme. ilan sibiya be. aha sungyun beye bumba 
tampin de faidame tebufi dobome. nomun hūlame šanggaha teisu. aha hening damu jaici 
ilacingge be emke tatami tucibufi. sereburakū de umai fandze i tanggūda Dula i jui be tatami 
tuciburakū be dahame. we ya fe ya gemu kenehunjere ba akū. yala hesei tacibuha adali. dalai 
lama hono gūnin dahara bade. ere šangjoTiba lobdzangdarji ai hendume gūnin daharakū. jai 
dzang de beleni jamyang kūtuktu i jalahi jui bimbime. kemuni šarab coinjur sere emu jonir lama 
bi. gongcuk sengge dzang de juwan dūin aniya nomun erdemu tacihangge sain ofi. aramba colo 
bihe. jamyang kūtuktu i šabisa yooni ere gongchuk sengge be kundulembi. šangjoTiba 
lobdzangdarji atanggi isinjiha erinde. hono jamyang kūtuktu i jalahi jui lama gongchuk sengge. 
jonir šarab coinjur sede sasa tuwabume sibiya tatafi. hūbilgan be toktobuha manggi erebe amasi 
unggifi. geren šabisa de ulhibume. ice hūbilgan be uthai gongchuk sengge de nikebufi eršeme 
nomun tacibume ohode. ele tusangga gese. ahasi narhūšame hebšefi. beye bukdari arafi. 
hahilame donjibume wesimbuhe.” 
 
445 Sonam Dorje, “Konchok Sengge,” Treasury of Lives, accessed March 22, 2013, 
http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Konchok-Sengge/3769. 
 
446 MWLF 163:1355. 
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Via the Grand Council, the emperor issued a court letter to Tsebak and 
Lobdzangdarji, the steward, with a very different message. Here, he permitted all three 
original names to be sent to Tibet. He admonished the steward, however, writing that, 
“When identifying any hūbilgan, [we] prayerfully seek a decision from the Buddha. This 
matter cannot be determined through the surmises of any human.”447 The emperor then 
encouraged Tsebak to send the steward to Tibet in accordance with his original plans: 
“Furthermore, having elucidated the steward, definitely have him sent to Tibet. If he 
observes things with his own eyes, perhaps regardless of which candidate is selected, his 
suspicions will disappear.”448 The Xining amban does not appear to have been informed 
about the plans to doctor the results of the Golden Urn. While it might be easy at this 
point to portray the emperor’s actions as purely cynical manipulation, one should not 
dismiss out of hand Qianlong’ insistence that the Buddha alone could identify 
reincarnations. The fact that the emperor insisted on secrecy in this matter should not be 
confused with an admission of wrongdoing. The emperor saw himself as removing a false 
candidate from the competition, not manipulating the ritual. As emperor and adept, his 
involvement was legitimate—it did not constitute biased human interference like the 
actions of the steward. Rather than narrowing the field, the emperor could have seen 
himself as opening it up, reminding his officials that in the implementation of the new 
statute, they should not take their cues from Gelukpa hierarchs and produce outcomes in 
accordance with local expectations. One suspects, however, that the steward was 
pressured to bow out. Although the emperor claimed that he did not mind if the steward 
                                                
447 Court letter quoted in Manchu-language memorial from Tsebak, MWLF 163:1701 (JQ 
02/02/28, 1797-3-26).  
 
448 MWLF 163:1701. 
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proceeded to Lhasa, the steward removed himself from the search. Labeling himself a 
“foolish Mongol slave” and “dizzy with fear,” Lobdzangdarji now claimed that his 
advanced years made it unwise to travel to “distant lands.”449 The monk now requested 
permission for a new party, consisting of nineteen monks and led by Belmang and Sherab 
Gyamtso, to set off for Tibet in the spring. 
As noted in the introduction, the Lhasa ambans followed through on their plans 
and selected from among only the second and third candidates. As intended, Könchok 
Senggé was in attendance and, together with the Dalai Lama and the regent, Tatsak 
Rinpoché, leant their authority to the proceedings. Sungyun reported that Könchok 
Senggé had agreed to return to Labrang and take up the job as chief tutor to the young 
reincarnation and that the Dalai Lama had bestowed not only a formal name on the young 
child, but also a new title on Könchok Senggé.450 Three months later, upon receipt of the 
emperor’s acknowledgement of the identification of the third Jamyang Zhepa, Sungyun 
reported that he had translated the edict (essentially a reprint of his original memorial 
reporting the selection) into Tibetan and that Belmang and the other disciples of the 
Jamyang Zhepa remained persuaded and would return to Labrang the following year to 
enthrone the child.451 Reflecting on the successful outcomes of both the Phagpa Lha and 
Jamyang Zhepa cases, Sungyun speculated that in the future it would “be easy” to deal 
                                                
449 MWLF 163:1701-1702. 
 
450 MWLF 164:0394. 
 
451 Sungyun et. al, Manchu-language memorial, MWLF 164:1708-1710 (JQ 02/11/20, 1798-1-6). 
Belmang is quoted as stating that he had recited prayers of Amitāyus Buddha (Ma. ayusi nomun) 
to promote the emperor’s long-life and that he would return to “Xining” in the following year 
(1798) “after the snow melted” (MWLF 164:1709). 
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with other reincarnations and that “their past customs could be thoroughly eliminated.”452 
He wrote confidently, “If your servants carefully handle each case of drawing the lots of 
hūbilgan, [no one] will dare consult the oracles. If prior to drawing lots we explain to 
them that this is proper and beneficial and make them understand the foolish blunders of 
the oracles, they will believe that obeying the imperial decree and drawing lots to make a 
determination is proper.”453 Although Sungyun claimed to have established “a model” for 
future searches that excluded the oracles, the Tibetan-language sources reveal that the 
amban’s claims were false, if not intentionally misleading. Sungyun and Hening may 
have had their secrets, but so did the Tibetans. 
 
The Tibetan-Language Record 
 
By the late 1880s, literate Tibetans and Mongols could have located an account of 
the search for the third Jamyang Zhepa in at least four published sources. These were the 
biography of the second Jamyang Zhepa by Gungtang Rinpoché, the biography of the 
third Jamyang Zhepa by Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso (Tib. mkhan po ngag dbang 
thub bstan ryga mtsho, 1836-1889), and the biography of Belmang Pandita and the 
Oceanic Book, both by Drakgönpa. The second Gungtang Rinpoché, Könchuk Tenpé 
Drönmé Pelzangpo (1762-1823), composed the earliest of these works, the biography of 
                                                
452 MWLF 164:1710. 
 
453 MWLF 164:1710. 
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the second Jamyang Zhepa, in 1798 at the request of Tukwan Chökyi Nyima.454 Both of 
these monks were instrumental in the search process. Gungtang Rinpoché had been the 
Throne Holder (chief abbot) of Labrang Monastery during the period of the search and 
also at Gonlung Monastery, the home residence of Tukwan, beginning in 1797.455 Thus 
one suspects that Gungtang’s chapter on the search for and enthronement of the third 
Jamyang Zhepa may also reflect the views of Tukwan Rinpoché. Although but a brief 
synopsis of these events—only five pages in the modern edition, Gungtang’s description 
laid down a basic narrative of key events during the search that would be reproduced and 
elaborated on in subsequent accounts.456   
Continuing chronologically, the next two works to appear were composed by 
Drakgönpa between 1849 and 1865. As a comprehensive history and geography of the 
Amdo region (Part One and Two) and a history of Labrang and its abbots (Part Three), 
the Oceanic Book probably achieved the widest contemporary readership of any of the 
texts that included an account of the search for the third Jamyang Zhepa.457 The account 
of the search appears in Part Three of the Oceanic Book, as part of the short biography of 
the Third Jamyang Zhepa, the twenty-seventh Throne-holder of Labrang. According to 
the colophon, Drakgönpa commenced his history of the Amdo region in his youth at the 
                                                
454 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar (Lan kru’u [Lanzhou]: kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1991 
[1798]), colophon, 490. 
 
455 Samten Chhosphel, “The Third Gungtang, Konchok Tenpai Dronme,” Treasury of Lives, 
accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Konchok-Tenpai-
Dronme/4730. 
 
456 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482-486. 
 
457 This assertion requires further substantiation. While this text has become enormously 
influential in post-1978 studies of the history of northwest China and Tibet, there have been few 
studies on the circulation of this text and similar historical works in Tibet prior to 1911. 
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urging of his teacher, Belmang Pandita. Although early drafts of the history of the 
“northern lineages” (i.e. the monasteries to the north and west of Labrang, the section 
labeled “Part one” in modern editions) appeared first in 1833, and again in 1849, it was 
not until 1865 that historical guide to Labrang, its abbots, and affiliated schools (“Part 
Two”) appeared in print.458 Slightly before this date, in 1864, Drakgönpa completed his 
biography of his teacher, Belmang Pandita. This biography included an entire chapter 
devoted to Belmang’s 1797 trip to central Tibet. 
On the basis of the title, “A Description of [Belmang’s] journey to Lhasa, the 
place of the dharma, where the All-seeing Victorious Pair presided harmoniously over the 
identification of the Supreme Incarnation according to the prophecy of the Superior 
Deities and the experience of the festival of the breadth of the dharma,” one might be 
forgiven for assuming that the Qing had little role to play in the search for the third 
Jamyang Zhepa. However, just four pages into the modern reprint of this chapter, 
Drakgönpa argued that the search for the reincarnation necessarily required the joint 
involvement of both central Tibet and “China,” i.e., the Qing court. He wrote that from 
the very beginning of the search, “The first sign indicated that this matter must be 
decided by means of the relationship between Ü (Dbus) and China (Rgya nag).”459 This 
sign, as we shall discuss below, was the fact that indigenous authorities in central Tibet 
and the emperor had directed the estate of the Jamyang Zhepa to seek a final decision 
using what people at Labrang would eventually perceive as the same ritual. 
                                                
458 Oceanic Book, colophon, 782-783. 
 
459 Drakönpa, BMNT, 155. Drakönpa’s description of the Golden Urn as a “sign” or “omen” (Tib. 
mtshan ltas) echoes that of Sungyun, who explained the importance of understanding the lottery 
as an “omen” (Ma. temgetu) in his memorial to Qianlong, MWLF 160:2030 (QL 60/06/29, 1795-
08-13). 
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Yet Drakgönpa is also clear that, especially in the early stages of the search, 
Belmang Pandita felt significant reservations about the imperial directive—reservations 
based on a sense that the imperial command and the monastery’s initial plans for the 
search were discordant. It is this frank admission of doubt that gives Drakgönpa’s 
retelling of the search a compelling and engaging narrative arc that sets it apart from 
other accounts. Belmang’s journey to Tibet is therefore not simply a journey to Lhasa to 
witness a preordained outcome concerning the identity of the third Jamyang Zhepa, but 
rather the climactic moment of a life-changing personal pilgrimage to Lhasa that 
simultaneously consolidated his faith and spread his own reputation as a competent 
administrator and learned Buddhist. This was the only trip to central Tibet that Belmang 
undertook during his life. Moreover, the confirmation of the identity of the third Jamyang 
Zhepa by means of both the Golden Urn and other tests affirmed for him the legitimacy 
of an order in which the Qing state and the Geluk School were integrally linked. As the 
disciple and life-long associate of Belmang Pandita, Drakgönpa was able to retell this 
story in considerable detail, recording both the inner thoughts as well as outward speech 
of his teacher, thus granting this account a degree of verisimilitude not found elsewhere. 
Whether intentional or not, Drakgönpa’s construction of a narrative journey from 
disbelief to deeply held personal conviction, makes for a highly effective argument for 
the legitimacy of the child who was ultimately identified as the third Jamyang Zhepa as 
well as the Golden Urn. And as a reincarnation who himself was confirmed by the third 
Jamyang Zhepa in 1804, Drakgönpa had ample personal reasons for promoting the 
authenticity of the Jamyang Zhepa. 
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 Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso began drafting his biography of the third 
Jamyang Zhepa four years after his death in 1855, but the final work does not seem to 
have appeared in print until 1889, the year the author died.460 This work was probably 
strongly influenced by Belmang’s account as transcribed by Drakgönpa since several 
long and important passages in this biography are either quotations or paraphrases of 
Drakgönpa’s biography of Belmang Pandita. Although this text lacks the emotional arc of 
Drakgönpa’s biography of Belmang, it does nonetheless indirectly signal in several 
places that the candidacy of the first child, the son of Dülagyel of Rangan, had been 
popular before the expedition set off for Lhasa and that the instructions to conduct a 
lottery had raised concerns both at Labrang and in neighboring communities. 
These four texts were themselves key components of an ongoing process of 
legitimation. Yet to the degree that they relate a common story, the events they describe 
reveal several ways in which Gelukpa elites with varying degrees of affiliation with 
Labrang intervened to resolve concerns with the accuracy of the search. These conflicts 
emerged not all at once, but gradually over the course of the search. The following 
section will simultaneously narrate the history of the search for the Third Jamyang Zhepa 
and examine the different tactics employed to solve the problems posed by the Golden 
Urn and the actions of Qing field officials stationed in Xining and Lhasa. 
 
The Power of Dreams 
 
                                                
460 Nietupski, 2011, n. 132 (pp. 162-163), states that the author of this biography began his work 
in 1859. The colophon is unclear on the date of printing, but suggests that it occurred in or before 
1889, the year the author passed away. See JYZP03, 382-383. 
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The emperor’s insistence on the implementation of the statute on the Golden Urn 
seems willfully ill-conceived when considered in light of the plans already circulating at 
Labrang for the identification of the reincarnation of the second Jamyang Zhepa. Unlike 
the case of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu wherein Heliyen and Sungyun had already laid the 
groundwork for the use of the urn well before search had commenced, there is no record 
of similar advance work by Qing officials at Labrang in the aftermath of the death of the 
second Jamyang Zhepa in 1792. Instead, prior to the visit of Tsebak, the Xining amban in 
the early winter of 1796, the Labrang community had already begun to lay plans for a 
recognition procedure modeled after the procedure that had identified the Great Fifth 
Dalai Lama. Not only did this model seemingly preclude any use of the Golden Urn, but 
it carried with it the sanction of an historical tradition independent of and prior to any 
Qing imperial claims of authority over Tibetan Buddhists or the tradition of 
reincarnation.  
According to the biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa, shortly after the passing 
of the second Jamyang Zhepa, a well-educated monk from Dongkor Monastery (Tib. 
Stong skor) traveled to “Tibet” (Tib. bod) to present an offering commemorating the 
Jamyang Zhepa.461 This monk then proceeded to request a divination from the Longdöl 
Rinpoché (klong rdol bla ma ngag dbang blo bzang, 1719-1794) on how to locate the 
reincarnation.462 According to his biographers, by the 1790s the Longdöl Rinpoché was 
one of the most august and influential teachers in central Tibet, having trained a large 
                                                
461 This monk is identified in both the biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa and the biography of 
Belmang Pandita as a “dka’ bcu.” This probably indicates that the monk had studied at 
Trashilhünpo in Tsang, where the dka’ bcu degree was the second-highest credential within the 
local system of geshé degrees. JYZP03, 37; Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155. 
 
462 JYZP03, 37. 
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number of students including most of the Ganden Tripa who served during the second 
half of the eighteenth century.463 Although hailing originally from Kham (from an early 
age he was a friend of the Zhiwa Lha Kūtuktu), he seems to have possessed no shortage 
of connections to Amdo and Labrang monastery specifically. Among his students was the 
nephew of the second Jamyang Zhepa, Könchok Senggé, whom we have already met.464 
The Longdöl lama advised the monk from Dongkor Monastery that the reincarnation of 
the Jamyang Zhepa should be identified by conducting a dough-ball investigation before 
the image of Manjuvajra at Reting Monastery (Tib. Rwa sgreng jo wo ‘jam pa’i rdo rje) 
as had been done when the reincarnation of the fourth Dalai Lama was determined in the 
early 1620s.465 Longdöl Rinpoché also specified that the divination should be conducted 
only after the disciples of the Jamyang Zhepa had completed a sadhana ritual from the 
Kadampa tradition.466 Finally, the biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa reports that 
Longdöl warned that no other method would deliver an accurate result: “Neither a lama 
nor a dharma protector [i.e. an oracle] is capable of making this decision. Only after one 
has completed the Kadam sadhana of the ‘sixteen spheres’ before the Manjuvajra of 
                                                
463 Samten Chhosphel, “Longdol Lama Ngawang Lobzang,” Treasury of Lives, accessed March 
22, 2013, http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Longdol-Lama-Ngawang-
Lobzang/3877. 
 
464 Ibid. 
 
465 The lama is quoted as referring to the doughball investigation as “zan bsgril:” “de rwa sgreng 
jo wo ‘jam pa’i rdo rje’i mdun nas zan bsgril gyis thag bcad pa red/” JYZP03, 37. 
 
466 That the Longdöl lama would recommend a sadhana ritual based in the Kadampa tradition is 
perhaps not surprising given the monastery’s historical affiliation with the Kadampa school. The 
original text reads, “rwa sgreng jo bo ‘jam pa’i rdo rje’i mdun lta bu zhig nas bka’ gdams thig le 
bcu drug gi sgrub mchod byas te zan bsgyur na ‘khrul med babs yong gsungs pa…” The Longdöl 
Rinpoché also elaborated a list of specific texts/prayers that the disciples of the Jamyang Zhepa 
should recite both at Labrang, and in central Tibet. In summary, he presented a detailed set of 
instructions for a full ritual cycle that was attentive to issues such as location, participants, texts 
and temporal sequence. The correct outcome of the ritual hinged on the precise execution of all of 
these elements. See JYZP03, 37. 
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Reting, will the correct [result] drop when one conducts the dough-ball divination.”467 
Both Gungtang Rinpoché and Drakgönpa record similar advice from Longdöl in their 
accounts of the search.468 The biographer of the third Jamyang Zhepa however, adds a 
further detail, noting that when the delegation from Dongkor Monastery returned to 
Amdo and reported the Longdöl lama’s advice, the Dongkor Kūtuktu469 dreamt that he 
had seen the Jamyang Zhepa return to Labrang, thus providing further confirmation that 
the Longdöl Rinpoché’s divination was correct.470  
Thus when the Labrang community received the imperial edict ordering them to 
use the Golden Urn in the spring of 1797, they not only already had alternate plans in 
place, but had been warned by a highly respected Gelukpa hierarch that any deviation 
from the elaborate ritual procedure jeopardized the accuracy of the result. Moreover, the 
Longdöl Lama’s placement of the Jamyang Zhepa lineage within a ritual tradition that 
evoked the “great wisdom, great auspiciousness, vast power, and immense generosity of 
                                                
467 “’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i sprul sku yang bla ma dang chos skyong gist hag chod mi yong/ rwa 
sgreng jo bo ‘jam pa’i rdo rje’i mdun lta bu zhig nas bka’ gdams thig le bcu drug gi sgrub mchod 
byas te zan bsgyur na ‘khrul med babs yong gsungs pa” JYZP03, 37. The second sentence of this 
quote also appears in the Biography of the Belmang Pandita. See Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155. 
 
468 See Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155. The Gungtang Rinpoché recorded the Longdöl Rinpoché as 
stating: “It is necessary to make the decision by conducting a dough-ball investigation (brtag 
sgril) before the Jowo Rinpoché. If the [recognition] is conducted in the same manner as that 
which [found] the previous Great Fifth [Dalai Lama], then there will be no possibility of 
deception/fraud.” “sprul sku'i don thams cad la lung zhus sogs byas te sku rim sgrub pa gal che/ 
'on kyang dngos gzhi jo bo che lta bu zhig gi mdun nas brtag sgril gyis thag gcod dgos pa yong/ 
sngar kun gzigs lnga pa yong de ltar byas pa yin pas bslu ba zhig mi yong gsungs shing/” See 
Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482. 
 
469 The Dongkor Kūtuktu was also considered, since 1789, a “kūtuktu resident in the capital” (駐
京呼圖克圖). 
 
470 JYZP03, 38. 
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the Great Fifth [Dalai Lama]”471 meant that departure from this program would also sever 
an association (both in metaphoric and effective terms) between the Jamyang Zhepas and 
the fifth Dalai Lama. 
The historical sources record that the imperial instructions were met with a 
mixture of concern and derision. Gungtang wrote that shortly after Labrang received the 
edict, they raised their concerns with the Tukwan Rinpoché, who had traveled to the 
monastery to examine the three candidates. “They insistently queried of the honorable 
Tukwang Rinpoché, ‘If the dough ball examination is performed using these three names, 
as a matter of course one will fall. It is very important that the root principle is not 
mistaken. Is it possible to hope that there is another method and that if the [ritual] is 
postponed the [true incarnation] will emerge?’”472 Drakgönpa provided further details, 
noting how monks at Labrang made light of the controversy by pointing out the 
underlying similarity between the two sets of instructions: “At that time, the lamas of 
Labrang Trashi Khyil sarcastically joked, ‘The dough-ball divination is definitely 
required!’”473 Belmang, however, upon learning of the emperor’s edict worried aloud, “In 
that case, other than follow [the emperor’s] command, is there any other choice? But will 
it be possible to truly get the unmistaken reincarnation?”474  
It was the Tukwan Rinpoché who appears to have played the key role in allaying 
these concerns. According to the biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa, after the names 
                                                
471 JYZP03, 37. 
 
472 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 483. 
 
473 “zen bsgyur” Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155. 
 
474 Drakgönpa, BMNT, 156. 
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of the potential candidates had been collected, Tukwan was invited to Labrang to consult 
with Gungtang and Hortsang, the two most senior of the four “Golden Throne-holders” of 
the monastery at that time. At the conclusion of this meeting, Tukwan announced, 
“Henceforth, the two Golden Throne holders and myself, having conducted the 
recognition tests, affirm that among the four there is indeed the true incarnation. Thus it 
is necessary to hold a dough ball examination (zan brtag) in the chapel that holds the 
remains of the two previous incarnations.”475 While it would seem from this statement 
that Tukwan was advocating yet another method of identifying the reincarnation, he 
modified his advice on the basis of a dream that occurred to him that evening. The 
biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa describes the dream as follows: 
 
That night in his dream, [Tukwan] found himself sitting together with the 
Great Sovereign Emperor at Rehol. A man appeared who claimed to be 
from the estate (Tib. lha sde) of the Jamyang Zhepa. In his sash, he had 
tucked four arrows. He then took three arrows into his hand. He shot the 
first, which missed the target. The second arrow, however, struck the 
target and afterwards he did not shoot again. [Later] when [Tukwan] stated 
that [this dream] was a sign that the unmistaken [reincarnation] was 
among the first two, all the monks were as ecstatic as magpies when they 
hear thunder.476   
 
In contrast to the previous dream of the Dongkor Kūtuktu that sanctioned the Longdöl 
Rinpoché’s method, Tukwan appears to have introduced his own competing dream, one 
that clearly legitimized the participation of the Qing emperor and approved of the method 
dictated by the new statute on the Golden Urn. The dream also performed two additional 
tasks. It winnowed the four candidates that had been located by the search party down to 
three and sent a clear signal that most likely it would be the second candidate who would 
                                                
475 JYZP03, 40. 
 
476 JYZP03, 40.  
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prove to be the genuine reincarnation. Although this dream is a fixture of all four of the 
published accounts, the different authors deployed the dream at slightly different 
moments in the chronology of events. 
 The author of the biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa, Khenpo Ngawang 
Tupten Gyatso, wrote that Tukwan announced his dream at Labrang well before the 
community had received word that they would be required to use the Golden Urn. As 
noted above, after conducting their first round of visits to households of promising 
children in the spring and summer of 1796, the leaders of the search party brought four 
names back to Labrang and requested Tukwan’s advice. Following this meeting and the 
promulgation of the dream, Tukwan then traveled to Xining and informed the amban of 
the status of the search.477 It was only at this point that the amban personally traveled to 
the pastures between Xining and Labrang to visit the candidates. The biographer writes, 
“At that time, because it became clear for the son of Dülagyel of Rangan, it quickly 
became common opinion that this was the true and unmistaken incarnation.”478 Here we 
have evidence for the accuracy of the amban’s report that Dülagyel’s son was widely 
viewed as the most promising candidate. However, this biography records that when the 
amban submitted his memorial to the emperor, he wrote that the second candidate, not 
Dülagyel’s son, was probably the actual reincarnation.479 Since the Manchu documents 
reveal that this was not the case, it seems likely that either the author or his sources 
                                                
477 JYZP03, 40. 
 
478 JYZP03, 41: “’di skabs rwa ngan bdud la rgyal gyi bu kha gsal ba byung bar brten/ mi mang 
nas de sprul sku ‘khrul med yin nges kyi gtam ‘ur rlung ltar mched pa byung/ ”  
 
479 See JYZP03, 41: “The amban reported three names from among the four candidates (dog 
gnas) to the golden ear (the emperor) for testing. However, among these [he] extolled the 
supreme incarnation (i.e. the child who was ultimately identified as the rebirth, candidate two) as 
being the most promising.”  
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revised this detail in the aftermath of the search.480 According to Khenpo Ngawang 
Tupten Gyatso, it was only after the amban’s visit that Labrang learned definitively that 
the Golden Urn would have to be consulted.481 The structure of this narrative would 
suggest, therefore, that the imperial command was but the fulfillment of Tukwan’s 
prophetic dream. 
Of Drakgönpa’s two works, the Oceanic Book does not mention the Longdöl 
Lama’s instructions at all and, in a fashion similar to the biography of the third Jamyang 
Zhepa, presents Tukwan’s visit to Labrang and his dream as occurring before the 
community learned of the imperial decree.482 However, Drakgönpa added a small yet 
telling detail. He writes that although prior to his dream, Tukwan had instructed the 
disciples to conduct a zengyur (Tib. zan bsgyur) at Labrang, after the dream, he stated 
that, “although representatives will be sent to Ü, the outcome will still be the same as in 
my dream.”483 In other words, Tukwan appears to be predicting that the site of the 
divination will be shifted to Lhasa. Thus this account not only minimizes the existence of 
competing instructions, but also presents Tukwan’s dream more directly as sanctioning 
the Golden Urn. 
Drakgönpa’s other account of the search, the one contained in his biography of 
Belmang Pandita, as well as the Gungtang Rinpoché’s recollection of the events, both 
position the emperor’s edict ordering the use of the urn as arriving shortly after the 
                                                
480 MWLF 163:0642-0644. 
 
481 JYZP03, 41-42. 
 
482 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 431-432. 
 
483 Oceanic Book, 431. 
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instructions from the Longdöl Lama. Tukwan’s dream is introduced later.484 Thus, in 
Gungtang’s narrative, Tukwan’s dream is more easily interpreted as reconciling two 
potentially conflicting sets of instructions. In fact, Gungtang records that Tukwan’s 
dream was the direct result of the request for a divination made by those at Labrang who 
were troubled by the two sets of instructions.485 Furthermore, Gungtang implies that it 
was only after Tukwan had approved the ritual that the emperor made the final decision 
to send the candidates names to Tibet for final selection.486 
The temporal proximity of Gungtang’s account, published in 1798, might support 
the argument that the utility of Tukwan’s dream was such that later authors pushed it up 
in the chronology of events, granting him a prophetic authority. Given the accuracy of 
Tukwan’s dream and its approval of Qing involvement, it is impossible not to take this 
argument a step further and speculate that the dream was a useful fabrication or 
embellishment of something that Tukwan had said. Regardless, given that Gungtang’s 
account was printed in 1798, at the latest the final version of the dream would have to 
have been produced shortly after news of the lottery trickled back to Amdo in late 1797 
or early 1798. The consistent focus on Tukwan’s dream in traditions written and oral 
surrounding the search for the third Jamyang Zhepa from 1798 through the 1880s, 
demonstrates that dream was understood as a key instrument for legitimating the 
candidacy of the second child.  
                                                
484 In the case of the biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa, Tukwan’s dream does not appear in 
the text until the very end of the account of the search process. See BMNT, 165. 
 
485 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482-483. 
 
486 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 483: “de nas gong du gre’u tse bzung ba’i lan du thag gcod 
rgyur dbus su ‘gro dgos kyi bka’ phebs te/”  
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Yet Gungtang also wrote that there were those who perceived a basic similarity 
between Longdöl and Qianlong’s instructions: both had ordered an “investigation by 
rolling” (Tib. brtag sgril, “takdril”).487 Drakgönpa also promoted this equivalency in his 
biography of Belmang Pandita. It was this seemingly coincidental agreement between 
two separately issued decrees, one from central Tibet and one from the Qing ruler, that 
was for Belmang a “sign” or “omen” (Tib. mtshan ltas) of the “connection” between 
Tibet and China.488 According to Gungtang, the fact that the emperor had also ordered a 
takdril “increased [people’s] trust and confidence in what the [Longdöl] lama had 
said.”489 
Gungtang and Drakgönpa’s claim of similarity between the Golden Urn and the 
dough ball divination hinged on the semantic incorporation of the urn into the dough-ball 
divination tradition. Drakgönpa, much like the other three authors of these works, rarely 
used the term “golden urn” (Tib. gser gyi bum). Instead, the imperially-sanctioned 
procedure is almost always referred to as either zentak (Tib. zan brtag, “dough ball 
investigation”), zengyur (Tib. zan bsgyur, “dough-ball transformation”), or takdril (Tib. 
brtag sgril, “an investigation by rolling [things up]”), thus firmly placing it within an 
indigenous category of divination technologies. Even where the words “golden urn” are 
used, they are usually found within a phrase that presents the urn as a type of brtag sgril 
as in the following example from Gungtang’s account: “Shortly thereafter, a golden edict 
arrived from the Manjusri emperor stating, ‘With regards to the tülku, the identification 
                                                
487 Ibid, 482. 
 
488 Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155. 
 
489 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482. 
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must be made by conducting a takdril within the golden urn.’”490 When describing the 
final ritual, Gungtang again avoided direct reference to the golden urn, recording instead 
that a “name-card transformation” (Tib. mtshan byang bsgyur ba), thus conveying the 
notion the cards had been “transformed” in the ritual in the same fashion as a dough-ball 
might be in the traditional ritual (Tib. zan bsgyur).491 If the Tukwan Rinpoché’s dream 
can be understood as a strategy for legitimating the urn, the semantic assimilation of the 
urn into an indigenous category was part of a related set of tactics that minimized the 
appearance of incongruity between the two traditions.  
Such efforts to harmonize the two ritual prescriptions can be found in several 
places in these texts. For instance, Gungtang’s account neglects to mention any of the 
specific details of the Longdöl Lama’s instructions (such as location or accompanying 
offerings and prayers) other than it should occur “before something like the Jowo 
Rinpoché” (emphasis mine). Thus when he writes in the following sentence that the 
emperor has also ordered that ritual be held before a “Jowo,” it appears that the monk and 
the emperor were talking about the same “Jowo” image.492 
That Gungtang would downplay the differences between the instructions of 
Longdöl Rinpoché and the emperor in his text is perhaps not surprising given that both 
                                                
490 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482: “ma ‘gyangs par ‘jam dbyang gong ma chen po nas/ sprul 
sku’i skor jo bo’i mdun du gser gyi bum pa’i nang nas brtag sgril gyis thag gcod dgos zhes gser 
gyi bka’ babs pas sngar gyi ibla ma’i gsung la yid ches rnyed/” Even the concerned petitioners 
quoted by Gungtang also refer to emperor’s method simply as “brtag sgril,” 483. 
 
491 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 483. Transformation from a mere ball of dough or wooden lot 
into a magical portent.  
 
492 Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me, Kun mkhyen ‘jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ‘phreng gnyis pa rje 
‘jigs med dbang po’i rnam thar, 482. 
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Drakgönpa and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso quote Gungtang as arguing that the 
venue of the ritual was of little significance. It appears that even as the search party 
prepared to depart Labrang for central Tibet there were still reservations about the 
imperial instructions. Just days before their departure, Belmang and the other leader of 
the search party, the chamberlain of Labrang, Shérap Gyatso (blab rang mgron gnyer 
shes rab rya mtsho)493 met with Gungtang Rinpoché who pointedly instructed them to 
obey the imperial instructions. According to the biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa, 
the Gungtang Rinpoché stated: 
 
Although it is not appropriate to perform the zengyur before the 
Manjuvajra at Reting Monastery, having completed the basic conditions 
by offering of the sixteen spheres there and reverently praying, is it really 
still necessary to roll up the dough balls at that place? While on the road, 
you should inquire in detail about this with the Tukwan Rinpoché.494 
 
Belmang’s biography also records this same statement, although modified slightly 
to suggest that Gungtang felt strongly that the ceremony of the “sixteen spheres” and the 
prayers were important prerequisites that should be completed even if they did not 
ultimately perform the zengyur at Reting monastery. 495  Gungtang’s advice was 
                                                
493 Drakgönpa and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso both report that after the steward backed out 
of leading the expedition, new leadership was selected (ironically!) by using a dough ball 
divination. See JYZP03, 42; BMNT, 157. With regards to the sudden withdrawl of the steward, 
Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso reports that the steward excused himself on account of old age 
and poor health. Nothing is mentioned about possible pressure on the steward to remove himself 
from the search. Drakgönpa does not discuss the steward. 
 
494 JYZP03, 42-43: “khri rin po che nas rwa sgreng jo bo 'jam pa'i rdo rje'i mdun du zan bsgyur 
rgyu stabs mi 'grigs kyang/ der thig le bcu drug gi sgrub mchod dang/ dad gus gsol 'debs sogs 
rgyu tshogs tshang bar bsgrubs na zan ril der bsgril ma bsgril la ltos pa ci yod/ lam bar nas thu'u 
bkwan rin po cher gsung bkod zhib mo zhus gsungs/ ”  
 
495 BMNT, 158-159: “thu'u bkwan rin po cher mjal dus gung thang rin po che'i gsung bkod ci yod 
gsungs/ rwa sgrengs jo bo'i mdun du zan bsgyur rgyu stabs mi 'grig kyang thig le bcu drug gi 
sgrub mchod gnad smin gal che/ dad gus dang gsol 'debs sogs rang ngos nas tshang dgos pa'i 
rgyu tshogs bsgrub na zan ril mdun du sgril ma sgril la ltos pa ci yod gsung tshul zhus pas/ ”  
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significant. First of all, he was unequivocal in his support for the imperial command. 
Second, he authorized the Belmang Pandita to reconcile the conflicting methods by 
incorporating elements from the original plan into Qianlong’s new ritual procedure. 
Regardless of whether the divination was held at Reting monastery or the Jokhang, the 
result would be accurate provided that they sincerely completed the preliminary rituals as 
spelled out by Longdöl.   
When Belmang and several assistants visited Tukwan near Kumbum monastery 
several weeks later, the latter affirmed Gungtang’s advice: 
 
The Tukwan Rinpoché clearly explained, “According to the words of 
Gungtang and the Qianlong emperor’s prior edict, ‘High status monks 
from [places like] Kumbum must be recognized through a trial of the 
zendril before the Jowo [statue] in Lhasa, whereas lower status tülku shall 
be tested before sandalwood Jowo.’496 However, nowadays because many 
people regard the zendril as no different from simply tossing lots there 
have arisen various controversies as to whether this actually makes 
accurate [identifications]. [For example] previously, the elder prince of 
Choné said sarcastically, ‘If one performed a zendril to determine who 
was the [incarnation] of Tsongkhaba—either myself or Khyagé pönlop,497 
of course one of us would be selected!’ Although some people understand 
things in this manner, due to our faith in the Jewel (i.e. the Dharma) we 
each have no qualms about the zengyur. It is a fundamental principle of 
the Dalai Lama that the most important matters of that honorable 
Government are decided before the Lhamo sungjönma.498 Moreover [this 
                                                
496 The “sandalwood Jowo” (Tib. tshandan jo bo) is a reference to the massive sandalwood (Ch. 
旃檀) statue of Sakyamuni housed in Yonghegong temple in Beijing. It is striking that Tukwan 
has evidently interpreted the substatute relegating the selection of Mongol kūtuktu to 
Yonghegong and Tibetan Kūtuktu to Lhasa not as an ethnic or geographical distinction but rather 
a status distinction between “low” and “high” tülku.  
 
497 Tib. “khya dge dpon slob”: a monastic official named “Khyagé.” 
 
498 “Lhamo Sungjönma” (Tib. lha mo gsung 'byon ma) is a painting before which important 
divinations are frequently conducted. Apparently this image is still possessed by the government 
of the fourteenth Dalai Lama in exile and still used in divinations. 
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course of action] accords with my own previous dream.  It resembles what 
will befall us.”499   
 
The quotation above is from Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso’s biography of the 
third Jamyang Zhepa. Drakgönpa’s biography of Belmang Pandita also records this 
exchange but also adds, however, that Tukwan also provided Belmang with several 
prayers/texts dedicated to Tara (Tib. sgrol ma) written by Changkya Rolpai Dorjé that he 
could recite en route for good luck.500 Such actions further legitimized the journey and 
embellished this increasingly hybrid recognition process with a liturgical framework. 
Overall, Tukwan’s statement accomplished several important tasks. First, he again 
reminded Belmang (and, of course, the readership of these narratives) of the overlapping 
endorsement of the imperial command by himself and Gungtang Rinpoché, as well as 
supernatural authorities in the form of his dream. Second, he compared the imperially-
sanctioned divination ritual to the set of divination practices historically conducted before 
the Lhamo Sunjönma by the central Tibetan government. The point Tukwan appears to 
be making here is that these things are fundamentally similar and therefore of little 
concern. Finally, Tukwan argues that the broader category of divination technologies 
labeled zengyur or zendril are legitimate Buddhist practices. Both Gungtang and Tukwan 
                                                
499 JYZP03, 43-44: “gung thang tshang gi gsung bkod dang/ sngar gong ma chen lung nas sku 
'bum yan chad kyi bla sprul rnams lha sa'i jo bo dang/ de man chad kyi bla sprul rnams tsandan 
jo bo'i mdun nas zan bsgril gyi thag gcod dgos par bka' phebs yod kyang/ deng dus mi mang gis 
ngag la zan bsgril brgyan 'phangs pa lta bu yin pas nges pa yod med kyi gleng brjod sna tshogs 
byung/ sngon co ne dpon rgan gyis/ khya dge dpon slob la nged rnam gnyis kyi nang nas rje rin 
po che gang yin zan bsgril na gcig la babs yong rgyu red ang zhus tshul sogs rgyu mtshan 'ga' 
zhig gseng bkrol nas zhus par/ rang res dkon mchog la blo gtad kyis zan bsgyur pa yin pas dogs 
pa ma dgos/ rgyal dbang gong ma'i du yan du gzhung gi sku don la rgya 'gengs che ba'i rigs lha 
mo gsung 'byon ma'i mdun nas brtag bsgril gtso bor 'dzin pa yin/ sngar nged rang la byung ba'i 
rmi lam de dang 'grilgs dgos la/ de'i thog tu babs 'gro ba 'dra zhes gsung bkod lhus theng pa 
gnang/ ”  
 
500 BMNT, 159. 
 241 
maintain that those who have faith in the dharma and conduct the ritual with sincerity 
need not fear the results.  
This leads us to an interim conclusion: we should not assume, as modern 
scholarship does, that Tibetans from the outset viewed the establishment of the Golden 
Urn as foreign “interference.” 501  From the perspective of Gungtang, Tukwan, and 
ultimately, Belmang and later disciples of the third Jamyang Zhepa at Labrang monastery 
such as Drakgönpa and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso, it was the apparent incongruity 
of the two ritual configurations that posed a problem, not the “Chinese” origins of the 
Golden Urn. Belmang and his biographer did not shy away from characterizing 
Qianlong’s instructions as symbolic of “China.” Yet the foreignness or (perhaps more 
appropriately) strangeness of the ritual could be elided or obscured by discussing it in 
terms from a familiar indigenous tradition. Moreover, as the critique of the Choné prince 
reveals, it was the overall category of divinations known as zengyur that were suspect, 
not the Golden Urn in particular. Tukwan’s commentary suggests that he was aware of a 
strand of thinking circulating in Amdo that considered dough ball divinations in general 
to be nothing more than “lotteries” that could be easily twisted and warped by human 
self-interest. The problem the Qing court faced in implementing the Golden Urn policy 
was therefore a problem indigenous elites in Inner Asia also faced whenever they 
engaged in divination: they had to overcome the possibility that divinations could be 
mistaken for lotteries.  
                                                
501 See comments in Derek F. Maher, “The Eight Dalai Lama Jampel Gyatso” and “The Ninth to 
the Twelth Dalai Lamas” in The Dalai Lamas: A Visual History, ed. Martin Brauen (Chicago: 
Serindia Publications, 2005), 117-127 and 129-135, especially 127, 130; Kapstein (2006), 159-
160; and Nietupski (2011), 135-136. Blanket assessments such as, “Tibetans disliked the 
interference intensely” (Maher, 127), ignore the diversity of views among “Tibetans” and the 
geographic diversity of these views.   
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The Trials of Lhasa 
 
 The search party undertook a methodical journey across the Amdo region before 
departing for central Tibet. After spending several weeks at Kumbum Monastery, they 
proceeded to Dongkor Monastery where they resided for another two months before 
setting off for Nakchu on June 23, 1797 (JQ 02/05/29). Belmang’s biographer reports that 
during their residency at these two monasteries the party conducted numerous ceremonies 
to ensure the success of their venture and met with scholars from across the region. While 
at Dongkor Belmang had time to read “most of the Kangyur and Tangyur.”502 Even once 
they had again taken to the road, Belmang recalled that their progress was, “like that of 
an elephant plodding.”503 
 The pace sped up dramatically shortly after the party crossed over the mountains 
into the territory of Nakchu (JQ 02/07/13, 1797-9-3), the first major outpost within the 
jurisdiction of the Ganden Phodrang government. Before arriving at the town of Nakchu, 
they were met by two “Tibetan lay officials”504 who delivered confidential letters from 
the senior Lhasa amban, Sungyun. Sungyun informed Belmang that although he had 
planed to travel to Tsang on an inspection tour, he had delayed his departure and urged 
the delegation from Labrang to hasten to Lhasa before September 20, 1797 (JQ 
                                                
502 BMNT, 159. Belmang Pandita also apparently engaged in extensive discussions of “religion 
and politics” (chos srid). 
 
503 BMMT, 160. 
 
504 BMNT, 160. “Two Tibetan lay officials (Tib. “bod pa drung ‘khor gnyis”): This term bod pa 
is rarely seen in nineteenth-century documents, although in the twentieth century it would become 
the standard ethnonym for “Tibetan.” Here, it is functioning not as a general ethnonym but as an 
adjective identifying people representing the central Tibetan government.  
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02/08/01).505 As it turned out, this was the date the amban had set to conduct the Golden 
Urn lottery, a date that the amban had decided was “auspicious according to the Chinese 
calendar.”506 The sudden speed demanded of the delegation seems to have taken them by 
surprise. Although neither Drakgönpa nor Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso record any 
overt complaints regarding the sudden speed demanded of the delegation, the narratives 
do reveal that it created hardships for Belmang and his co-leader, the chamberlain. These 
later narratives also imply that Sungyun’s timing forced them to circumscribe some of the 
activities they had anticipated completing before the divination using the Golden Urn. 
Belmang and the chamberlain were provided with fresh mounts by Tibetan 
officials and proceeded ahead of the rest of the delegation, arriving in Lhasa on 
September 12 (JQ 02/07/22), just six days after departing Nakchu. Since the arduous 
journey had sickened the chamberlain, Belmang “had to shoulder the responsibilities 
alone.”507 He immediately met with Sungyun. Drakgönpa and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten 
Gyatso leave the impression that the amban was kind and accommodating. On learning 
that the chamberlain had become ill, he offered to postpone their meeting. Belmang did 
not delay, however, and when he “met with the amban it elicited feelings of pleasure like 
the encounter between a mother and son.”508 Sungyun advised Belmang that they should 
promptly handle the matter. At this point, Belmang appears to have attempted to slow 
                                                
505 BMNT, 160; JYZP03, 44. 
 
506 “brgyad pa’i tshes gcig nyin rgya tshis ltar na legs pa” JYZP03, 46; BMNT, 162. 
 
507 BMNT, 162. 
 
508 BMNT, 162; JYZP03, 45. Both of these sources record that similar feelings arose between 
Belmang and the junior amban, Hening, when they met a day later. 
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down the process, raising concerns that the date could not be set until he had met with the 
Dalai Lama and the regent, Tatsak Rinpoché.509  
Sungyun agreed to this request, but it is difficult not to suspect that ambans 
seemingly sincere desire to “handle the matter expeditiously” 510  harbored ulterior 
motives. For instance, the less time that the delegates spent in Lhasa, the fewer 
opportunities there would be for them to settle on a final candidate by other means or 
raise objections to the procedure. The separation of Belmang and the chamberlain from 
the rest of the party also meant that there would be fewer witnesses to deal with when the 
ritual was conducted. Within two days of their arrival, Drakgönpa reports that the ambans 
had fixed the date and ordered the Golden Urn moved to the Potala to begin a week of 
preparatory services under the watch of the Dalai Lama. At his second meeting with 
Sungyun, although Belmang does not appear to have a problem with selecting a date 
based on a “Chinese calendar,” he raised concerns about the timing more directly. “He 
informed the amban that he had grave concerns about the upcoming identification of the 
tülku because they had not even had the slightest opportunity to request the advice of the 
Panchen Lama.”511 Sungyun agreed to settle this issue by sending a letter to the Panchen 
Lama on behalf of Belmang. There are hints in several of the sources that the lack of 
consultation and involvement by the Panchen Lama was considered problematic, both at 
the time and by later authors.512  
                                                
509 BMNT, 162; JYZP03, 45. 
 
510 BMNT, 162; JYZP03, 45. 
 
511 BMNT, 163. 
 
512 The biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa notes in some detail that: “The Panchen Lama, who 
had exchanged very important vows with the previous Jamyang Zhepa and thus had a unique 
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While in Nakchu, Belmang had also received a separate letter from the Tatsak 
Rinpoché in addition to those from the ambans. The contents of this letter, and the 
conversations that subsequently transpired between Belmang and the regent, reveal that 
both these monks had other concerns that they did not share with the ambans. These 
concerns led to a series of activities that the ambans may not have known about. 
Drakgönpa, the primary source for this information, claims that the subject of these 
conversations was confidential and that the activities undertaken as a result were 
conducted in secret.  
In his letter to Belmang, the regent asked, “How many candidates are there for the 
reincarnation? Among these candidates, who is the most promising? What did you report 
to the Xining amban and the emperor? How do you plan to report to the amban here? […] 
The Jamyang Zhepa is more important to [me] than the Buddhas of the Three Epochs. 
Therefore, on account of his grace, I will diligently offer all assistance here to him.”513 
Drakgönpa offers no comment on whether and how Belmang responded to this inquiry. If 
the tone of these questions seems to imply that the regent had already received news 
about the search and possibly a conflict between the estate of the Jamyang Zhepa and the 
Qing, course of the conversation that transpired when Belmang first met the regent 
confirms this hunch: 
                                                                                                                                            
relationship with him, however, was not in the slightest informed about these proceedings and, 
thus vexed, sent a letter to the amban. The Panchen responded to a request for assistance and a 
letter describing the situation of the mission from Labrang. He responded with one letter stating, 
‘Because the Jamyang Zhepa is the unrivaled mainstay of both the faith and its followers, he 
thought there should be no mistake in this important matter. Having investigated, various 
ceremonies shall be completed here [at Jashilumpho / bkra shis lhun po] by the Great Assembly 
and the Tantric College. And on the day of the decision, I will go in person to each of the Mgon 
Khang (chapels of Maitreya) to place crowns [on the images] and earnestly place your cause 
before the Protectors.’” JYZP03, 47. A similar passage is also found in the Oceanic Book, 432.  
 
513 BMNT, 161. 
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When the Tatsak Rinpoché held a private audience with Belmang Pandita, 
he asked, “Among the three candidates, which is the most promising or 
preferred?” 
  
[Belmang] replied, “There is no difference.” 
 
“Then why is the one from Rangan514 more famous?” 
 
[Belmang] jokingly replied, “It is just like the saying, ‘The Amdowas send 
signals and the Khampas feign ignorance.’”515 
 
[Tatsak Rinpoché] laughed at this. 
 
Belmang then recounted [for the regent] the advice that had been 
successively given by Longdöl Lama, Tukwan Rinpoché, and Gungtang 
Jamyang. [Belmang Pandita] then made the following detailed request:  
 
“At Trashi Khyil [Monastery],516 when we departed, it was widely known 
that the zengyur would be conducted before the Lhasa Jowo. But now it 
seems as though the ritual will take place in the Potala. Although [we 
realize] it makes no difference, because [they are people] of a remote 
place, it is possible that their expectations will not be satisfied. If things 
thus transpire, if someone like you were to conduct the ritual before the 
[Lhasa] Jowo rinpoché, the people would be satisfied. But who would dare 
ask such a thing?” 
 
At this the [regent] replied, “I can do the ritual myself in front of the Jowo, 
but it must be kept as secret as possible.” He then continued, “I plan on 
going before the Jo[wo] on the twenty-sixth and will conduct the zengyur. 
Furthermore I will bring pieces from the zentak that was conducted before 
the Manjuvajra Jowo [of Reting monastery] and offer them before the 
naturally occurring Lokeshvara [image] in the Potala.”517 
 
 
The regent had already independently received information concerning the 
relative standings of the three candidates. However, Belmang was unwilling to divulge 
                                                
514 The candidate originally favored by the steward and the Xining amban, the son of Dülagyel. 
 
515 BMNT, 163: “a mdo’i brda zhogs dang khams pa’i ldob kyi dpe yin ‘dra/” 
  
516 I.e. Labrang Monastery. 
 
517 BMNT, 163. Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso also records parts of this conversation, 
JYZP03, 47-48.  
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any further information or state his own preferences. Drakgönpa offers no explanation for 
his teacher’s silence. Belmang might have been reluctant to state a preference or discuss 
the situation at Labrang because he did not want to present any grounds that might bias 
Tatsak Rinpoché if and when the regent conducted additional zengyur. For Belmang, the 
overriding concern was that the format of the divination ritual had been changed yet 
again. They had not expected Sungyun to shift the venue to the Potala. The Tibetan-
language accounts concur that the emperor’s original edict positioned the ceremony in the 
Jokhang.518 And on the basis of what Qing officials in Gansu and Qinghai claimed to 
have discussed with local people, it is not surprising that the Labrang community would 
have had this expectation. The Xining amban’s original Manchu-language reports from 
the time of his visit to Labrang state that the ritual was to be held in the Jokhang cathedral 
(Ma. amba joo de).519 It appears, however, that from the time when he first learned of the 
search for the Jamyang Zhepa and the need to fix it, Sungyun had intended to hold the 
ceremony in the Potala, “before the painting of the Holy One”—i.e. Qianlong.520 This 
was where he had also conducted the ritual on behalf of the Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu. 
Sungyun had probably not intended to make the upcoming ceremony less credible 
to the delegation from Labrang. But from the latter’s perspective, the shift in location had 
far-reaching implications because different sites were home to different combinations of 
tutelary deities, protectors, and Buddhas. Different sites therefore required different ritual 
preparation and the associated deities might look on the affair with unequal degrees of 
                                                
518 Gungtang, biography of second Jamyang Zhepa, 482; Drakgönpa, BMNT, 155; JYZP03, 43. 
The Oceanic Book merely records the emperor as stating that the ritual would have to occur in Ü-
Tsang (431). 
 
519 MWLF 163:0643-0644 (1796-2-19; JQ 01/11/21). 
 
520 MWLF 163:1354 (1797-02-04; JQ 02/01/08): “enduringge nirugan i juleri.”  
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benevolence. The change in location thus called into question the carefully laid plans that 
Belmang, Tukwan, and Gungtang assembled before the delegation departed Amdo for 
central Tibet. The sudden change of location and the accelerated schedule provoked a 
flurry of secret activity by Belmang and other Gelukpa hierarchs in Lhasa in the days 
leading up to the Golden Urn ceremony.  
Some of these activities had already been planned well before Belmang Pandita 
arrived in Lhasa. Most importantly, the delegation sought the assistance and prophecies 
(Tib. lung bstan, “lungten”) of the oracles (Tib. chos ‘byung, “chökyong”) and the Eighth 
Dalai Lama. The biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa and the Oceanic Book describe in 
detail the results of these inquiries. Given the seemingly comprehensive solicitation of 
the oracles around Lhasa and the importance of the Jamyang Zhepa within the Geluk 
establishment, it is unlikely that these activities were unknown to the ambans. Drakgönpa 
summarized the advice of the oracles as follows:  
 
Prophecies were sought from several chökyong/protectors. The Néchung 
stated that, “For the time being, it appears that the first [child] is 
authentic. At the time of the zentak, [I] will indicate the authentic one by 
means of an invisible action.” The Tenma521 prophesied, “The second one, 
Kelzang, the son of Rinchen Gyatso, is the true emanation body. During 
the zentak he will be [identified] through an invisible action.” The Gadong 
stated, “The first one has a beautiful appearance. However, you must still 
do prayer services for each one in accordance with the proper order of the 
recognition process.”522 
                                                
521 “Tenma” (Tib. bstan ma). This female protector is identified as Drakgyelma (Tib. drag rgyal 
ma) in the biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa, 45-46. 
 
522 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 432. With regards to the oracles, the biography of the Belmang 
Pandita briefly states, “Then [Belmang] sought oracles from the Dga' gdong, Gnas chung, and 
Drag rgyal ma, and carried out all the ceremonies (zhabs brtan) as they instructed” (162). The 
biography of the third Jamyang Zhepa adds that, “When they sought out the prophecies of the 
chökyong, they were told that nowadays it was good to make the identification according to the 
[advice] of the Gadong [oracle]. Secretly make a recognition and the best one will appear” (45). 
 
 249 
 
All three oracles qualified their predictions with tentative language, and the very 
diversity of their predictions necessitated further tests. It is ironic that although the 
emperor was insistent that the oracles be stamped out, in this case, their prophecies were 
interpreted as providing further impetus for the need to conduct the zentak in the Golden 
Urn. Contrary to what Qianlong expected and in line with the original expectations of the 
Galdan Siretu Kūtuktu and other advisors to the throne in years prior, the oracles could 
indeed facilitate the use of the urn.  
It was not until after the oracles had been consulted that Belmang finally had the 
opportunity to meet with the Eighth Dalai Lama. Belmang’s biographer states that his 
teacher was “filled with happiness and inspiration” at the sight of the prelate, then 
quickly turns to other matters. In contrast to the detailed presentation of Belmang’s more 
personal interactions with the ambans, the regent, and even other lamas in central Tibet, 
the impression is that the Dalai Lama’s influence on the proceedings was important, but 
not transformative. The Tibetan-language sources portray the Dalai Lama as being 
directed by the ambans to conduct various rites as opposed to taking any initiatives of his 
own accord. In Drakgönpa’s other work, the Oceanic Book, and in Khenpo Ngawang 
Tupten Gyatso’s biography, in response to a request for advice, the Dalai Lama is 
reported as stating simply: 
  
His honor the Jamyang Zhepa is an exceptional pillar of the teaching, 
therefore the [identification] of the incarnation is of great importance. 
Needing to provide ritual supports, the prophecies of several protectors 
have been sought. Regardless of this you should provide the sangha of the 
Three Seats with a major food service and request that they read the 
Kangyur and the names [of the Jamyang Zhepa]. Moreover, I will 
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personally and constantly keep in my heart the Precious Jewel and 
pray.”523 
 
From the perspective of the commentators from Labrang, the final significant 
event that occurred before the urn ritual was the completion of the so-called “Sixteen 
Spheres” sandhana that had been ordered by the Longdöl Rinpoché. According to 
Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso, this ritual was organized by the regent and conducted 
by monks at Reting Monastery.524 Gungtang also emphasized this event and noted that 
Könchok Senggé, the nephew of the second Jamyang Zhepa, played a leading role.525  
In the Oceanic Book, Drakgönpa described the ceremony involving the Golden 
Urn on September 20 (JQ 02/08/01) as follows: 
 
Holding the same wish, everyone came on the first day of the Auspicious 
Month to the palace [at the top of the Potala].526 The Supreme Victorious 
One arrived, treading on lotus, as did the pillars of the teaching of the 
Snowy Lands. Together with the two ambans who protect Tibet527 and in 
front of the likeness of the emperor,528 a determination was made by 
turning the Golden Urn. At that time, the Supreme Victorious One 
extemporaneously chanted true words so that there would emerge from the 
urn the authentic name card. When the great lamas together with the chief 
                                                
523 JYZP03, 46. In the Oceanic Book, the Dalai Lama makes a similar statement: “In response to a 
request for protection from the Lord of the Victorious ones, the sovereign [Dalai Lama] (gong sa 
rgyal ba’i dbang po) issued the following edict (bka’ lan), ‘The Jamyang Zhepa is not like other 
friends of the teaching (bstan pa’i rtsa lag), thus it is essential to not mistake [his] reincarnation. 
Moreover it is necessary to perform rites of worship. Not only should offerings of worship to the 
Dharma protectors not be few, but the spiritual community of the Three Seats should be given 
many donations to support the proclamation of the Kanjur, and thus request spiritual protection. I 
will also frequently keep these things in my mind and appeal to the Three Jewels” (432). 
 
524 JYZP03, 47. 
 
525 Gungtang, 483. 
 
526 Tib. “rtse’i gzims chung A wa.” 
 
527 Tib. “bod skyong Ambhan gnyis.” 
 
528 Tib. “gung ma’i ‘dra thang gi mdun nas”: a painting of the emperor. 
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cantor of Namgyel Monastery529 and its monks, together with the whole 
congregation were chanting prayers, the amban witnessed530 that the name 
card of [the Jamyang Shepa] leapt up. Finally, the “bstan ‘bar ma,” “chos 
rygal ma” and “bdag gzhan ma” were chanted rhythmically in unison, thus 
their pure intentions were conveyed.531 
 
Overall, this depiction legitimates the Qing ritual by attributing the agency of the 
correct selection to the Dalai Lama, protectors, and overall sincerity of the congregation. 
The ambans were merely the instruments or “witnesses” of the unseen forces invoked by 
the Dalai Lama and the other participants. In Gungtang’s account, the Qing elements are 
even further minimized. For instance, instead of holding the ritual before a thangka of 
Qianlong, he writes that it was conducted before the Jowo Lokeshvara image (Tib. “jo bo 
lo ki shwa ra”).532 In the two biographies, Drakgönpa and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten 
Gyatso offered accounts of the ritual that are broadly similar to that in the Oceanic Book. 
Although they both provide a more extensive list of participants and witnesses, they 
placed slightly more focus on the actions of the ambans. The ambans are reported to have 
performed the full kowtow (“nine-knocks”) twice, once before placing the lots in the urn, 
and once before drawing the lot.533 Again, human agency of the Qing officials was 
downplayed: Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso quotes Hening as turning to the audience 
                                                
529 Tib. “rtse’i rnam rgyal grwa tshang”: the private college/monastery of the Potala palace 
complex. 
 
530 Tib. “gzigs.” 
 
531 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 432. 
 
532 Gungtang, 483. 
 
533 BMNT, 164; JYZP03, 49. 
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and exclaiming, “the name card of the Supreme incarnation [the Jamyang Zhepa] leapt 
upwards of its own accord!”534  
According to the third Jamyang Zhepa’s biographer, the drawing of the winning 
lot was followed by a sudden and seemingly spontaneous ouTiburst from Belmang’s 
partner, the chamberlain, who had apparently roused himself from illness to attend the 
ceremony. The statement provided a summary judgment on the proceedings and asserted 
in no uncertain terms the significance of the emperor’s grace. As we have seen in the 
introduction to this chapter, the ambans were struck by it as well and reported it to the 
emperor. The biographer of the third Jamyang Zhepa commented on it as well, “There 
arose amazement among all with regards to the splendor of the un-coerced speech and 
actions [of the chamberlain] whose health had not been good on account of not 
acclimating well to the unfamiliar environment on account of his age.”535  
All three authors report that shortly after the ceremony using the Golden Urn, the 
regent, Tatsak Rinpoché informed the Labrang delegation of the results of his own, 
secretly conducted tests. According to Drakgönpa, Tatsak told Belmang that:  
 
Since [I] had heard that the one from Rangan was better known, I myself 
made up two dough balls [concerning the question] of whether he was or 
was not the reincarnation and rolled them before the [Jokhang] Jowo. The 
“no” fell. [I then] took dough balls [representing] all three candidates and 
rolled them together. The name of the second candidate fell for the second 
time. Then before the Lokishvara [I] again rolled the names of all three 
candidates at once it was the second candidate that again descended of its 
own accord. It is a fine thing that today’s [winning] name card from the 
Golden Urn is in accord with my previous results.536 
                                                
534 JYZP03, 49. 
 
535 JYZP03, 50: “ma non par bzo lta dang smra brjod”: “unforced actions and speech.” One 
wonders if it was perceived as odd because it was forced. 
 
536 BMNT, 164-165. Same statement can also be found in JYZP03, 50-51. 
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According to Drakgönpa, this news had a profound effect on Belmang. “When 
this was spoken, there arose feelings of great confidence and trust in the deities and 
lamas.”537 Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso’s account contains the same statement from 
the regent, but then adds another significant detail. He reports that representatives of “the 
lineage” of the Jamyang Zhepa also conducted their own “covert investigation using 
dough balls” (Tib. mngon chung gi zan brtag mdzad pa) at before the Manjuvajra (Tib. jo 
bo 'jam pa'i rdo rje) at Reting Monastery while en route home from Lhasa. As this trial 
also resulted in the identification of the second candidate, “it generated a faith of 
conviction in the deities and lamas that resulted in even greater confidence in the refuge 
[i.e. the candidate identified as the reincarnation].”538 According to Gungtang Rinpoché, 
the result of the successive tests was that, “Thus among the superior and inferior, deep 
conviction and faith in the incontrovertible truth of the supreme incarnation was 
established.”539   
These three appraisals share a common concern with a the creation of a specific 
type of faith, “yid ches.” As the third of the “four types of faith” in Tibetan Buddhist 
thought, yid ches connotes a higher order of faith or trust that has been attained through a 
logical process of reasoning (“valid cognition,” tsad mas drang pa).540 In these three 
                                                
537 BMNT, 165: “…gsungs bas lha dang bla ma la yid ches kyi thugs nges chen po ‘khrungs/”  
 
538 JYZP03, 51: “rgyud  zur zhal snga nas mar lam rwa sgreng du ched gnyer gyis phebs te jo bo 
‘jam pa’i rdo rje’i mdun du mngon chung gi zan brtag mdzad pa yang ang gnyis par babs pa 
bcas lha dang bla ma la yid ches kyi dad pas nges pa lhag par rnyed pa’i gnas su rgyur/”  
 
539 Gungtang, 484: “mchog dman kun gyis dkon mchog mi bslu ba’i bden pa ni /di lta bu’o sngam 
du gting nas yid ches kyi nges pa ‘drongs/”  
 
540 See definitions of the “four faiths” (Tib. dad pa gzhi) and “faith of conviction” (Tib. yid ches 
kyi dad pa) in Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1993), 1242-1243, 
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texts, the achievement of this particular type of faith seems to have hinged on a process 
that was explicitly empirical. Multiple tests and personal observation moved Belmang 
and the other participants beyond “blind faith” to a confidence in the outcome of the 
Golden Urn based on evidence. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the establishment of 
this sort of evidence-based faith was also a goal expressed by the Qing court in Manchu-
language documents. By stating that the process generated this type of faith, the 
participants and later commentators were intentionally making an even stronger claim in 
the legitimacy of the search. 
 Although Gungtang, Drakgönpa, and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso all 
mention the other dough-ball divinations, these zengyur tests were of subordinate 
significance to the Golden Urn. The regent claimed that his tests were conducted before 
the Golden Urn ceremony, but our three authors placed their discussion of the results of 
the tests after the Golden Urn in their narratives. Moreover, these tests were presented 
less detail than the ceremony involving the Golden Urn. In contrast, the Golden Urn 
ceremony is the central event, the culmination of the search process in these accounts. 
This common narrative structure suggests that far from being a symbolic, “diplomatic 
courtesy” that followed the “real” tests, the Golden Urn mattered and the dough-ball 
investigations were props—although not insignificant ones. These additional tests 
provided the empirical evidence for the reliability of the Golden Urn, the deities that had 
been invoked, and the monks who had participated in the ceremony. And for Belmang 
personally, it appears that the Golden Urn ceremony, and its confirmation by other 
means, was a transformative moment in the evolution of his personal faith. 
                                                                                                                                            
2573. Also, “yid ches kyi dad pa,” The THL Tibetan Dictionaries, accessed April 6, 2013, 
http://www.thlib.org/reference/dictionaries/tibetan-dictionary/translate.php.  
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Conclusion: The Circulation of Information in Qing Tibet 
  
What is there to prevent us from imagining that Tatsak Rinpoché fabricated the 
results of his “secret” dough-ball divinations to conform to the results of the Golden Urn? 
Is it not possible that the regent secured his information about the early popularity of the 
candidate from Rangan from the ambans whom he may very well have been assisting in 
this endeavor? Furthermore, to what extent were Gungtang Rinpoché, Drakgönpa, and 
Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso self-conscious revisionists when it came to the history 
of the search for the reincarnation of the second Jamyang Zhepa? What prevented their 
readership from having doubts about the accuracy and impartiality of these written 
narratives? 
This chapter has uncovered several strategies employed from the late 1790s 
through perhaps as late as the 1880s by Tibetan-language authors to bury a controversial 
selection process beyond the reach of historical memory: Tukwan Rinpoché promulgated 
a dream that sanctioned Qing supervision of the search process and identified the second 
candidate as the true reincarnation; Tukwan, Gungtang, Tatsak and other Geluk hierarchs 
sanctioned a new configuration of the search process that combined elements from both 
indigenous and “Chinese” traditions of divination; the strangeness and incongruity of the 
imperial instructions was obscured by the semantic incorporation of the Golden Urn into 
the category of dough-ball divinations; and finally the careful construction of the 
biographies themselves, about which several concluding points can be made.  
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All of these accounts begin their efforts to legitimate the candidacy of the second 
candidate by noting the auspicious nature of his birth and the host of signs that 
manifested his potential tülkuhood to his relatives and, eventually the search party. The 
other candidates are mentioned, but not with the same respect or aura of inevitability that 
surrounded the candidacy of the second child as it progressed towards confirmation in the 
urn. For instance, Drakgönpa writes in the Oceanic Book that the child was “absolutely 
and clearly identified” when he was first interviewed by the Golden Throne Holder of 
Labrang, Hortsang Rinpoché.541 In his biography of Belmang, Drakgönpa reports that his 
teacher’s fears that the search would fail evaporated when he realized that the second 
candidate turned out to be the nephew of a monk whom he had previously met by chance 
on the road. Moreover, he recalled that the monk had told him at the time that, “In the 
future our relationship will go deeper and deeper.”542 These two passages underline the 
degree to which the successful reception of candidate two hinged on Belmang Pandita’s 
credibility within the Labrang community and the subsequent dissemination of his 
personal confidence in the candidacy of the second candidate and the uncompromised 
nature of the selection process.  
The Manchu-language sources reveal, however, that at the time of the search, the 
opinions of leading figures at Labrang were significantly different than what is portrayed 
in the Tibetan-language biographies, even that of Gungtang, who composed his account 
within the year following the identification. From the steward of the Jamyang Zhepa’s 
estate to the Xining amban, there was much support for candidate one both at Labrang 
and in the wider Amdo region. Thus the authors of these later accounts were not merely 
                                                
541 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 431. 
 
542 Drakgönpa, BMNT, 156. 
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writing hagiographies of the third Jamyang Zhepa but making the case for his legitimacy 
against competing memories. Studies of Qing-period Tibetan biographies have 
underappreciated the political implications of the genre. But what is perhaps most 
striking about these histories/biographies is the degree to which signs of the conflict 
remained visible within them. Evidence for the persuasiveness of the first candidate and 
the difficulty of conducting appropriate divinations is not hard to find in these books. If 
Gungtang, Drakgönpa, and Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso were “revisionist” 
historians why did they not fully erase the traces of controversy from their works? At best 
they were incomplete “revisionists” and the label itself is probably of little analytical 
utility beyond reminding us that these biographies need to be read critically. These were 
books with an agenda that went beyond merely celebrating the Buddhist adept in 
question.  
The elisions and inclusions in both the Manchu-language archives and Tibetan-
language sources raise further questions about the circulation of information. The 
inclusion of complete Manchu-language palace memorials in published Tibetan-language 
texts suggests that Tibetan elites had access to official Manchu-language communications 
and understood how the imperial communications system functioned. Moreover, it 
appears that by the early nineteenth century at the latest, the palace memorial, originally a 
secret, inner court document, had already entered the public realm (a realm albeit limited 
to literate Tibetan and Mongol elites). It seems that Qing officials wrote their memorials 
with the expectation that they would be read by Tibetans. However, as the case of the 
third Jamyang Zhepa also demonstrates, the medium could still be used in secrecy.  
 258 
But did Qing officials read Tibetan? As we see in the case of the biography of the 
Belmang Pandita and the third Jamyang Zhepa, if they had they would have found a list 
of proscribed and suspect activities. The Tibetan authors from Amdo do not appear to 
have been much concerned about Qing officials reading their writings, probably because 
such a possibility seemed remote. The Court of Colonial Affairs periodically trained 
classes of bannermen in the “Tangut” (i.e. Tibetan) language in Beijing and would even 
dispatch them to Lhasa for further practice, yet there is little indication that bannermen, 
let alone Manchu bannermen, ever immersed themselves in the literary world of Tibetan 
biographies, geographies, and histories (despite the fact that many of these works were 
actually composed, at least partially, during sojourns in Beijing).543 But it is worth 
remarking that the Tibetan case was exceptional. Elsewhere in the empire the Qianlong-
period court did exercise varying degrees of censureship—most famously during the 
“literary inquisition” that accompanied the creation of the emperor’s compilation of a 
comprehensive catalog of Chinese-language literature (the Sikuquanshu), but also, as 
Walther Heissig has pointed out, in Mongolia as well.544 Why the Qing state never 
                                                
543 During the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns several groups of bannermen were sent to Lhasa for 
periods of five years for Tibetan-language studies. These students are expressly identified not 
monks but rather as laymen engaged in training to become secretaries and translators in the Qing 
colonial apparatus. It is uncertain whether these activities continued beyond 1850. Relevant 
documents are listed in Zhongguo di yi lishi dang’an guan, Zhongguo Zangxue zhongxin, eds., 
Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan suocun Xizang he Zangshi dang’an mulu, Man Zangwen bufen 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1999). It should also be noted that the evidence suggests 
that Qing bannermen learned, or at least commenced their studies in Beijing, with the Amdo 
dialect of Tibetan. Manchu transliterations of Tibetan words generally follow the Amdo 
pronunciation (the words for “steward:” Tib. phyag mdzod, Ma. šangjotba; and “medium:” Tib. 
sku rten pa, Ma. gurdemba). 
 
544 For information on the intertwined cataloging and censorship activities in China, see Kent 
Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasuries (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University Press, 1987). For censorship in Mongolia see, Walther Heissig, Beiträge zur 
Übersetzungsgeschichte des Mongolischen Buddhistischen Kanons (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 6 
Ruprecht, 1962), 43-53. 
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developed an interest or infrastructure for censoring texts from Tibet is therefore a 
question that deserves further investigation.  
Moreover, despite the best efforts of officials such as Sungyun and Tsebak, the 
court was able to amass only very incomplete information on local conditions and the 
backgrounds about the candidates. If their primary goal was to prevent successive 
rebirths within the same families, they failed. The child ultimately identified as the third 
Jamyang Zhepa was the scion of a local notable family and the nephew of the Shar 
Nomunhan, the leading tülku of Labrang’s chief rival in the Amdo region, Rongwo 
Monastery.545 If the Qing had hoped the introduction of the Golden Urn statute would 
prevent the consolidation of religious and political authority among Tibetan gentry, their 
efforts had come up short in this case. Qianlong’s rationale for rejecting the candidacy of 
the first child reminds us, however, that his overarching priority in instituting the statute 
was the elimination of the appearance of self-interest in the identification process. The 
Throne feared for the future of the faith and the institution of reincarnation if people had 
the impression that the steward could cherry pick his own candidates. In this respect, the 
emperor may have succeeded.  
In conclusion, the case of the third Jamyang Zhepa represents an impressive 
accomplishment for the Qianlong emperor: a Chinese bureaucratic practice, a lottery, had 
been transformed into a Tibetan Buddhist divination technology. But the court could not 
take full credit for the success of the Golden Urn. The work of repackaging the ritual for 
consumption by Tibetan Buddhists was undertaken primarily by indigenous elites. The 
result was a hybrid, “cosmopolitan,” divination technology invented in the context of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
545 JYZP03, 19; BMNT, 156. 
 260 
Qing colonialism. Khenpo Ngawang Tupten Gyatso, for instance presented the ritual as 
something that had closely “followed the legal system of the emperor” (Tib. gongma 
chen po khrims kyi lugs sol). The successful result, however, could be interpreted, 
alternately, as the result of the agency of the protectors, the “deities and lamas,” 
“Tsongkhaba,” as well as the emperor himself. The agent was perhaps ambiguous, but the 
result was anything but random. Yet the Tibetan-language sources also document that the 
new divination technology did not succeed in displacing the oracles. Sungyun’s claim 
that the oracles had been eradicated was therefore either grossly ignorant of the situation 
in Lhasa or a purposely misleading.  
A final testament to the success of Qing ritual-making came in the form of a letter 
from the steward of the Jamyang Zhepa’s estate in 1859. In his letter, the steward 
requested permission to submit the names of three children to the court so that from 
among them the reincarnation of the third Jamyang Zhepa could be identified using the 
Golden Urn ritual. All three children, he wrote, had correctly identified the belongings of 
the deceased Jamyang Zhepa and exhibited signs of being exceptional. The aid of the 
court was therefore requested.546 A year-and-a-half later, the Lhasa amban Manking 
reported that the first candidate on the list, a Tibetan boy from Yushu, had been 
recognized.547 This child would soon be brought to Labrang and installed as the fourth 
Jamyang Zhepa Kalzang Tubten Wangchuk (Tib. skal bzang thub bstan dbang phyug, 
1856-1916), of whom more shall be heard from in the following chapters. 
 
  
                                                
546 Manchu-language memorial from Fuji, MWLF 3-207-4442-047 (XF 09/10/28).  
 
547 MWLF 3-2-4458-071 (XF 11/08/13). On the same day, Manking also identified the 
reincarnation of the Chuzang Kūtuktu from Amdo: MWLF 3-207-4458-70. 
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Part Two: Local Encounters and Entanglements in Amdo 
 
Chapter Four: The Historians of Labrang 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1785 or 1786, Tukwan Lozang Chökyi Nyima paid a visit to his elderly master, 
Changkya Rolpé Dorjé, who was residing at Wutai Shan. As Tukwan recalled in his 
biography of Rolpé Dorjé, although his master was approaching his seventieth year, he 
was active and in good health. Thus, the younger reincarnate lama profoundly 
misinterpreted Changkya as he began to speculate about his immanent death. Tukwan 
described the incident as follows:   
Moreover, one day [Changkya Rolpé Dorjé] asked me, “Will you return to 
your homeland next year?” When I said I probably would not leave this 
place, he commented, “Oh, probably something of importance will befall 
my family.” [At the time] because he always spoke of the royal household 
as his “family,” I interpreted him as referring to a political matter. At that 
time I had heard speak of a difficult revolt in Hotan, thus I asked him, 
“I’ve heard that the matter in Hotan is becoming more grave, is that what 
you mean?” He replied, “It is not like that. Probably it is something major 
that will befall this very courtyard.” Yet still out of foolishness and 
ignorance I thought that by “courtyard” he was speaking of the royal 
court. So I said, “Surely in this courtyard is there not someone capable of 
handling this matter?” With a laugh [Changkya] responded, “Who knows? 
Some diviners have predicted this.” Later, upon reflection I realized that 
he had clearly entrusted me with the information that he would soon 
depart for another realm. However, in my great stupidity I was unable to 
perceive this at the time.548 
                                                
548  Th’u bkwan 02 Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, Ljang skya rol pa'i rdo rje'i rnam thar (Lan kru'u: 
Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1989 [1798]), 613: “der ma zad nyin gcig kho bo la/ khyed 
rang lo rjes ma'i nang rang yul du phyir 'gro rgyu e yin phebs pa la/ lo rjes ma 'dir mi thon pa 
'dra 'dir mi thon pa 'dra zhus par/ 'o na de rag tu nged tshang la do gal zhig yong ba 'dra gsungs/ 
kho bo'i bsam par ryal bo tshang la nged tshang zhes snga mo nas gsung gi yod pas chab srid kyi 
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 What is of interest here is not the bond of friendship between two lamas who both 
hailed from the same monastic community in Amdo,549 but the depth of identification 
with the Qing court conveyed in Tukwan’s narrative. From Tukwan’s perspective, it was 
quite natural for Gelukpa lamas resident in Beijing to view the imperial household as 
their own and the political stability of the empire, even in its most distant reaches, as a 
personal concern. From Tukwan’s perspective, Qing imperial expansion, whether on the 
Sichuan frontier in Jinchuan or the new Muslim territories in the far west, was a project 
indistinguishable from the spread of the Geluk teachings. New Qing subjects were also 
new converts to the Geluk faith, a fact Tukwan believed Qianlong, the “Manjusri 
emperor,” also explicitly recognized. In his account of the Jinchuan campaigns, Tukwan 
reported that the emperor had deferentially and publically acknowledged that victory had 
ultimately hinged on the support offered by Gelukpa lamas both at court and in the 
field.550  
For Tukwan then, the sentiments expressed in the contemporaneous Mongolian 
expression, “our Great Qing,” would probably not have seemed unfamiliar, especially 
since he had spent many years of his life traveling and teaching in both Inner and Outer 
                                                                                                                                            
don skor zhig yin thag chod kyis/ de dus ho thon 'ga' zhig ngo log skad kyang thos pa bcas ho 
thon phyogs kyi gtam de rtsa ba che ru song ba 'dra gsan pa yin nam zhus par/ de 'dra ma yin ra 
skor 'di ka'i nang du brel ba che tsam yong ba 'dra zhes phebs/ da dung 'ang blun po gti mug pa 
kho bo'i sems la/ ra skor zhes pa rgyal po'i mkhar la gsungs pa yin 'dug bsam/ ra skor 'di nang du 
phral du brel ba slong thub mkhan zhig med dam zhus par/ bzhad mo zhig gnang nas sus shes mo 
phywa mkhan 'ga' zhig gis de skad lab 'dug gsungs/ phyis su bsams na mi ring bar zhing khams 
gzhan du gshegs pa'i dgongs gtad gsal bar gsungs pa yin 'dug kyang/ blun rmongs shin tu tha 
chad pa kho boas ni don min gyi phyogs zhig tu dpyad nas ji bzhin ma shes pa 'dug go/” 
 
549 Changkya Rolpé Dorjé and Tukwan Lozang Chökyi Nyima both shared the same “seat” 
monastery, Gönlung Monastery (Ch. 佑寧寺) a day’s travel east of Xining. Their common roots 
are on display in this exchange in their use of certain colloquialisms unique to the Amdo dialect.  
For example, “lo rjes ma” for “next year.” 
 
550 Th’u bkwan 02, 552-553. 
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Mongolia.551 As Elverskog has argued, the identification of Mongol elites with the Qing 
as a “unified Buddhist Qing state” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries came 
to legitimize Mongol submission to the Qing court.552 Loyalty to the Qing ruling house 
came to be construed by indigenous Mongol historians as entwined with their Buddhist 
faith and the inevitable outcome of Mongol history. Thus disloyalty to the Qing was 
simultaneously a betrayal of one’s Buddhist faith and Mongol heritage.553 If such a 
historiographical complex had become a centerpiece of early nineteenth-century Mongol 
intellectual culture, did it have any parallel in Tibetan regions? How far did Tukwan’s 
sentiments echo within his home region of Amdo or in Central Tibet? 
Moreover, according to Elverskong, Qing promotion of the Geluk school over all 
other sects had led to a thoroughly “Tibetanized” Buddhist culture in the region, 
dominated by Gelukpa hierarchs of Tibetan extraction and Tibetan-language texts. As a 
result, Qing Buddhism became synonymous with Gelukpa Buddhism and the adoption of 
Buddhist teachings by Mongol elites led not to an indigenous “Mongol” adaptation of 
Buddhism, but rather an ever more widely entrenched Tibet-based Gelukpa orthodoxy.554 
If indeed the conversion of the Mongols to the Gelukpa teachings also entailed their 
“Tibetanization,” how might this have appeared in the writings of Gelukpa observers? 
Just how orthodox and Gelukpa were the Mongols and the Qing state from the 
                                                
551 Samten Chhosphel, “The Third Tukwan, Lobzang Chokyi Nyima,” Treasury of Lives, 
accessed June 08, 2013, http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Lobzang-Chokyi-
Nyima/3008. 
 
552 Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial 
China (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), 3. 
 
553 Elverskog (2006), 120, 125. 
 
554 Elverskog (2006), 123-4. 
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perspective of contemporaneous Tibetan-language texts? How did Tibetan elites 
understand the Qing state and memorialize the Qianlong emperor during the Jiaqing and 
Daoguang reigns? 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter will examine the historical 
writings of Belmang Pandita Könchok Gyeltsen (1764-1853), whom the previous chapter 
introduced in the context of the recognition of the Third Jamyang Zhepa. After returning 
to Amdo in 1798, Belmang resumed his post as abbot of the Lower Tantric College (Tib. 
rgyud smad grwa tshang, est. 1716), the second-oldest institute of monastic training at 
Labrang.555 Five years later he was enthroned as the Twenty-fourth Throne-holder, or 
overall abbot, of Labrang monastery, a post he held from 1804-1809.556 In the aftermath 
of his trip to Lhasa, Belmang also began delivering the “lessons” that would eventually 
be compiled into his History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia,557 which was completed 
                                                
555 Drakgönpa, The Oceanic Book, 407-408. For the Lower Tantric College see: Nietupski (2011), 
20. 
 
556 Drakgönpa, The Oceanic Book, 408. 
 
557 The full title of this work can be translated as “A Ladder for Guiding the Youth: Lessons 
Summarizing the History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia” (in Tibetan: Rgya bod hor sog gyi lo 
rgyus nyung brjod pa byis pa ‘jug pa’i ‘bab stegs.).  According to the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen 
mo, ‘bab stegs means a step-stool or platform, most often used in the context of dismounting 
from a horse (Zhang Yisun, Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1993), 
1965.). I have translated it loosely as “ladder.” Its use in this title seems intended to convey the 
idea that the text is meant to assist the reader in understanding the difficult lessons of past history. 
The translation of the title presents several complications. First, the term “rgya” could be an 
abbreviation either of “China” (rgya nag) or “India” (rgya dkar).  Previous English and Chinese 
translations of the title have translated “rgya” as “China” and “Han (漢),” respectively. See for 
instance, Nietupski, 2011, and the Chinese translation of the Oceanic Book: Zhiguanba 
Gongquehudanbaraoji, An duo zheng jiao shi, trans. Wu Jun et. al. (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu 
chubanshe, 1989), 9. Vostrikov briefly describes the work, but does not translate the title (153-4). 
Martin (1997) loosely translates the title as “China, Tibet, Mongolia and Shambhala” (148-149). 
My impression, however, is that Belmang intended “rgya” to be interpreted as “India.” First, as 
we can see from the quotation from the introduction above, Belmang stated that he had been 
asked to write a history of “India, Tibet, China, and Mongolia. Second, the overall structure of the 
book matches this interpretation: the book tracks the rise of the faith first in India, then Tibet, and 
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between 1819 and 1821.558 This underappreciated work is significant not only because it 
sheds light on the historical thought of a scholar who would educate several generations 
of Labrang-affiliated historians during his lifetime, but also because it presents a vision of 
the Qing and the proper ordering of politics and religion that strongly contrasted with that 
of Tukwan Rinpoché and the Qing colonial officials with which he had contact. In 
Belmang’s text, there are no “Manjusri emperors” and no “our Great Qing.” If Changkya 
Rolpé Dorjé was at “home” in the Qing court, Belmang suggests that he would have 
preferred life under the rule of Tsewang Rabdan and Galdan Tsering, the last khans of the 
Junghar state.559 The Manchu rulers of China appear only tenuously Buddhist in contrast 
with the zeal of the Junghars or Gushri Khan and his descendants. According to Belmang, 
the residents of Amdo inhabited a world in which numerous potential dynasts vied for 
                                                                                                                                            
finally China and Mongolia. There are numerous examples of titles of earlier literature in which 
the abbreviation “rgya” or “rgya bod” is clearly a reference to “India and Tibet.” See for instance, 
Co ne grags pa bshad sgrub (1675-1748), Rgyal rabs dang 'brel ba'i rgya bod kyi chos 'byung 
dgos 'dod kun 'byung (A history of the spread of the faith in India and Tibet), described in 
Vostrikov (151). And also Sumpa Khenpo’s 1748 religious history: 'phags yul rgya nag chen po 
bod dang sog yul du dam pa'i chos 'byung tshul dpag bsam ljon bzang (“The auspicious forest of 
wish-fulfilling trees: A history of the royal Lineages and rise of the Dharma in the countries of 
India, China, Tibet and Mongolia”). One further difficulty with the title lies in the translation of 
“hor sog.” Belmang (and also Drakgönpa) often use these words as a copula that refers 
“Mongolia” in a general sense. However, hor and sog are often used separately to refer to 
different phenomenon that are usually translated as “Mongol” in English. In some respects, the 
shifting uses of hor and sog, sometimes synonyms, sometimes separate categories, recalls the 
confusion in much earlier European scholarship between “Tatary” and “Mongolia.” See separate 
note for further discussion of the use of these terms by Belmang Pandita and Drakgönpa. 
558 The work lacks a clear statement of completion and/or printing. Since Belmang lists the 
Jiaqing reign (1796-1820) but not the enthronement of the Daoguang emperor, and because the 
last event mentioned in the text is the ascension of the second Tsemonling reincarnation (Tshe 
smon gling 02 ngag dbang 'jam dpal tshul khrims rgya mtsho, 1792-1860/62/64?) to the position 
of regent in 1819 and subsequent search for the tenth Dalai Lama, it appears that a date of 1819 
through 1821 is appropriate. The xylograph consulted for this text comes from Belmang’s 
Collected Works, which were printed no later than 1864. Page numbers are those given in the 
modern reprint of his Collected Works. See: The Collected Works of Dbal-maṅ dkon-mchog-
rgyal-mtshan. Reproduced by Gyaltan Gelek Namgyal [New Delhi, Laxmi Printers, 1974], vol. 4 
(nga), 480-665. 
 
559 Belmang, History, 627. 
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control of China, Mongolia, and Tibet, and offered varying degrees of allegiance, 
reliability, and service to the Gelukpa cause. His Amdo homeland was the “vital 
juncture” of this world: the strategic gateway to all these ambitions, both temporal and 
spiritual.560 
Belmang’s history was an groundbreaking piece of literature: the text was a 
genre-defying manual for would-be rulers and a strident argument for the legitimacy of 
Buddhist government and law—a system that, as recounted in chapters One and Two, 
had become the subject of increasingly vehement and public Qing official disapprobation 
and “rectification” during the late Qianlong reign. By defending the continued 
importance of Buddhism as the underpinning of just and effective governance, Belmang’s 
repost provided a legitimizing rationale for the increasing political power of the monastic 
polities of Amdo in the early nineteenth century.  
 
Belmang’s Historical Context 
 
Belmang Pandita presided over an unprecedented outpouring of historical and 
geographic writing at Labrang during the early nineteenth century. Belmang wrote or 
oversaw the production of much of this literature himself, most notably the “Labrang 
Gazetteer,” a history of Labrang Monastery, its affiliated colleges, and abbots. 561 
Belmang completed the Labrang Gazetter in 1800, just two years after he had returned 
from Lhasa. Among the better-known historical works composed during this period is 
                                                
560 Belmang, History, 625. 
 
561 Dbal mang dkon mchog rgyal mtshan, Bla brang bkra shis ‘khyil gyi gdan rabs lha’i rnga 
chen (Lan kru’u: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987).  
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Tsenpo Nomunhan’s Detailed Description of the World (‘dzam gling rgyas bshad), a 
geography of Tibet and the wider world based on knowledge gleaned from Western 
sources during the author’s periods of residency in Beijing and composed in the 1820s.562 
This work was completed and printed shortly after Tsenpo Nomunhan had spent time at 
Labrang.563  
Less well known is the work of Mongol scholars affiliated with the manor of the 
Mongol prince and patron of the monastery. According to Shingza Kelzang (Tib. shing 
bza' skal bzang, 1926-1998),564 a reincarnate monk whose seat monastery is located 
within the present-day borders of the Henan Mongol Autonomous County (河南蒙古自
治县), the second generation Henan qinwang Tendzin Wangchuk  (Tib. bstan 'dzin dbang 
phyug, 丹增旺舒克, r. 1735-1749) invited tutors from central Tibet to his manor at 
Labrang in order to train Mongol youths in the Tibetan language to serve as secretaries in 
his administration. Their progeny continued to serve as secretaries to successive qinwang 
                                                
562 Lobsang Yongdan, “Tibet Charts the World: The Bstan Po No Mon Han’s Detailed 
Description of the World, an early Major Scientific Work in Tibet,” in Mapping the Modern in 
Tibet; Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, 
Königswinter, ed. Gray Tuttle (Andiast, Switzerland: International Institute for Tibetan and 
Buddhist Studies GmbH, 2011), 82. Sections of this text were translated by Turrell Wylie: “The 
Geography of Tibet Accordign to the ‘Dzam gling rgyas bshad: Text and English Translation,” 
Serie Orientale Roma 25 (Roma: Instituto Italioano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1962).  
  
563 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 105, 441. 
 
564 Shingza Kelzang (Shing bza’skal bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan) was recognized as the 
reincarnation of the Shingza lineage as a child. During the course of his traditional monastic 
training he established a particular expertise in Tibetan medicine. After 1949, he served as vice-
chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) as well as vice-
county chief in Henan. Following Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, he was appointed vice-chairman of 
the Huangnan prefecture CPPCC and served on the standing committee of the provincial CPPCC. 
This information was drawn from the brief biography printed on the inside cover of Zhongyou 
Anqing jiabu, Xianzu yanjiao (Xining: Qinghai minzu chubanshe, 2008). 
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and junwang well into the republican period.565 These secretaries were also responsible 
for the production of at least two annotated genealogies, the first of which was “A Rosary 
of Pearls: Tales of the Ancestors”  (Tib. mes po'i gtam rgyud mu tig 'phreng pa) by Waka 
Tsering (Tib. wa ka tshe ring) of the first generation of secretaries. Wangchen Kyab 
(Dbang chen skyabs), a secretary to the sixth-generation junwang Trashi Wanggyel (Tib. 
bkra shis dbang rgyal 達錫旺扎勒, r. 1833-1850) completed a second, updated history of 
the Henan princes in 1848 titled, “Book of Lessons From the Ancestors” (Tib. deb ther 
mes po zhal lung or deb ther 'breng po).566 While Wangchen Kyab does not mention 
                                                
565 In 1770, following the death of the third generation qinwang (Tib. ching wang, Ch. 親王) 
without heirs, the Qing recognized a cousin as the new chief of the Oirat Khoshot banners south 
of the Yellow River, yet downgraded his official rank to junwang (Tib. jun wang, Ch. 郡王). 
Post-Qing republican governments later restored the ninth and tenth generation rulers to the rank 
of qinwang. 
 
566 This rare book has only recently become available but must be approached with caution. 
According to Zhao Shunlu, as the Cultural Revolution swept across Qinghai and into the Henan 
Mongol Autonomous County, Shingza Kelzang copied the contents of the original manuscript out 
on cigarette and tea wrappings and hid them in the roof of his house. In 1967, the original text 
and all the other materials held by the descendants of the Henan princes were publically burned.  
In 1973, Shingza Kelzang recopied the text out into a small, western-style school notebook. This 
notebook is currently held in the Henan Mongol Autonomous County Archive. Photocopies of 
this notebook have subsequently circulated in private. I acquired a poor-quality photocopy of this 
text in the spring of 2012. Although the work has yet to be formally published in Tibetan, a 
Chinese-language translation of the work with an introduction by Zhao Shunlu and numerous 
appendices concerning the history of the Khoshot Mongols of southern Qinghai has been 
published in Xining. See: Zhongyou Anqing jiabu, Xianzu yanjiao (Xining: Qinghai minzu 
chubanshe, 2008).  
Shingza Kelzang wrote a brief introduction to the reconstituted Tibetan-language 
manuscript in which he asserts that other than some minor editing and corrections, he has not 
altered the text. Much of the language in the manuscript, however, reflects vocabulary introduced 
either during the early 20th century or during the era of revolutionary socialism after 1949. The 
text uses terminology that did not exist in 1848 such the “minzu/mi rigs” vocabulary introduced 
by GMD and PRC “minority nationality” policies. One suspects that Shingza Kelzang adjusted 
the text in order to align the contents more closely with accepted historiographical discourse of 
the Maoist period. Although the phrasing and tone of the work seems to have been altered, the 
book still offers a wealth of historical detail that is not found elsewhere. In some sections, the 
book accurately quotes material from Drakgönpa and Belmang’s histories, suggesting that it 
would be a mistake to discard the text outright. Even were the text to prove a modern invention, 
the contents are still valuable because they represent a selection of historical events that had 
lingered within the historical memory of the Henan Mongol community more generally and 
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being the student of Belmang, it is difficult to imagine that they did not know each other, 
especially since the Mongol secretary’s book contains numerous references to Belmang’s 
History as well as the scholarship of his students.567 
Other than a short unpublished introduction to the life and times of Belmang 
Pandita by Paul Nietupski, it has been the works of his students that have been the focus 
of modern scholarly attention.568 Among his best-known students were Sherab Gyatso 
(shes rab rgya mtsho, 1803-1875), Ngawang Tupten Gyatso (1836-1884), and Drakgönpa 
Könchok Gyeltsen (1801-1865). The first of these men, Sherab Gyatso served on and off 
as Belmang’s personal secretary and is responsible for having transcribed several of 
Belmang’s compositions from oral teachings. He later served as the secretary to the Third 
Jamyang Zhepa and left a body of writing that amounted to seven volumes when it was 
eventually block-printed in Lhasa in 1945.569 Ngawang Tupten Gyatso, whom we have 
                                                                                                                                            
deemed significant enough by Shingza Kelzang to require retelling. Moreover, although the text 
seems to have an anachronistic interest in “class struggle” and commoner discontent, it is 
certainly possible to find equally dismissive and bitter analyses of the Mongol ruling elite in other 
Tibetan and Qing official sources from the 19th century that are couched in language that seems 
preternaturally Marxist (See Chapter Six for further discussion of this issue). The difficulties 
presented by the current state of this text suggest that it would serve as an excellent case study for 
understanding how Tibetans and Mongols in Qinghai reconstituted their libraries and recollected 
their history in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The text already has served as the basis 
for several articles on the history of the Henan Mongol Autonomous County that appeared in the 
county-level Wenshi ziliao series. Shingza Kelzang wrote or edited several of these articles. See: 
Rma lho rdzong gi rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad yig, vols. 1-3 (1996, 1999, 2003), (Srid gros rma lho 
sog rigs rang skyong rdzong rig gnas lo rgyus dpyad yig u yon lhan khang gis bsgrigs, 1996, 
1999, 2003). 
 
567 For citations of Belmang’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia and Drakgönpa’s Oceanic 
Book see the last chapter of Wangchen Kyab, Deb ther mes po’i zhal lung, 352-364. 
 
568 Paul Nietupski, “The World According to Belmang Pandita, Belmang Könchok Gyaltsan 
Palzangpo (1764-1853),” (unpublished manuscript, 2012). 
 
569 For information on Sherab Gyatso’s work as Belmang’s secretary and scribe, see the annotated 
table of contents to The Collected Works of Dbal-maṅ dkon-mchog-rgyal-mtshan, reproduced by 
Gyaltan Gelek Namgyal (New Delhi, Laxmi Printers, 1974), vols. 1-11, passim. And also: 
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already met in Chapter Three, composed eighty works during his lifetime including the 
biography of the Third Jamyang Zhepa. He also served as the 51st abbot of Labrang 
beginning in 1863. Drakgönpa Könchok Gyeltsen, the 49th abbot of Labrang and author 
of the Oceanic Book, a survey of the history of Gelukpa monasteries in the Amdo region, 
has been the subject of a handful of recent studies.570 The attention paid to the Oceanic 
Book is well deserved given the fact that from the time of its publication in the 1865 to 
the present, it has been the most widely read and cited historical work among literate 
Tibetans in the Amdo region.571 In a recent article that situates the Oceanic Book within 
the broader history of Tibetan literature and indigenous geographic sensibilities, Gray 
Tuttle has observed that at the time of its completion, in terms of both its size and its 
subject matter, Drakgönpa’s Oceanic Book was an unprecedented work within the 
                                                                                                                                            
Tsering Namgyal, “Sherab Gyatso,” Treasury of Lives, accessed June 09, 2013, 
http://www.treasuryoflives.org/biographies/view/Drungchen-Sherab-Gyatso/2495. 
 
570 For recent scholarship on this work see: Gray Tuttle, “Challenging Central Tibet’s Dominance 
of History: The Oceanic Book, a 19th Century Politico-Religious Geographic History,” in 
Mapping the Modern in Tibet; Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International 
Association for Tibetan Studies, Königswinter, ed. Gray Tuttle (Andiast, Switzerland: 
International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies GmbH, 2011), 135-172. And Anne 
Chayet, “A Propos de Notations Geographiques Dans L'Amdo Chos 'Byung.” In Tibet, Past and 
Present v. 1 edited by Henk Blezer, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 247-262. The Oceanic Book, with its 
enormous bibliography of historical sources for the study of the history of Amdo and Tibet more 
generally, has served as the backbone of several guides to Tibetan historical literature produced in 
the west. See: A.I. (Andrei Ivanovich) Vostrikov, Tibetan Historical Literature, trans. Harish 
CHandra Gupta (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994); and Dan Martin, Tibetan Histories 
(London: Serindia Publications, 1997). 
 
571 Since the work was block-printed following its completion in 1865, the work was probably 
readily available for collection both by monastic libraries and individual monks throughout Amdo 
and in the major monastic centers of central Tibet. Knowledge of the book within the lay 
population of Amdo during the late Qing is much harder to gage. The republication of the 
Oceanic Book by the Gansu People’s Publishing house in 1982 and again in 1987 in an 
inexpensive paperback version under the shortened title History of the Faith In Domé  (Mdo smad 
chos ‘byung) expanded the readership of the work exponentially, especially among laypeople. 
There is perhaps a danger of distorting the historical importance of this work on the basis of its 
current popularity. Evidence for the circulation and reception of the work in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries is sparse and all claims regarding the “importance” of the work 
should be regarded with caution. 
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Tibetan literary tradition. In attempting to identify the motivations behind the production 
of the text, Tuttle arrives at several admittedly speculative conclusions that bear on this 
chapter’s discussion of Belmang’s earlier History.  
At the beginning of the Oceanic Book, Drakgönpa provided his readers with an 
extensive bibliography that lists approximately 483 separate texts consulted over the 
course of his research.572 Included in this list are numerous “histories of the faith” or 
“religious histories” (Tib. chos ‘byung, literally, “rise of the dharma”), a genre of works 
that had proliferated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and typically took as 
the scope of inquiry categories such as “Mongolia,” “China,” “India,” or “Tibet.”573 
Tuttle proposes that under the influence of this tradition, Drakgönpa may have written the 
Oceanic Book as a “companion volume” to these “religio-national” histories, thus 
asserting the equivalence of Amdo with other more familiar countries/regions. Noting, 
furthermore, that Drakgönpa chose not to title his work a “history of the faith” but rather 
as a deb ther (“book”), Tuttle suggests that Drakgönpa’s work was a “political document” 
reflecting the assertion of a regional identity, one which viewed the Amdo region as a 
unified political entity demarcated from central Tibet and the administration of the 
Ganden Podrang by its unique geography and culture.574 Tuttle makes this assessment 
largely on the basis of the conventions and contents of previous works in the deb ther 
                                                
572 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 3-15. 
 
573 Ibid., especially 5-6. 
 
574 Tuttle (2011), 168-169. 
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genre—a class of historical literature that in the past had been written in order to assert a 
political claim to govern a particular territory.575  
Tuttle’s interpretation hinges primarily on Drakgönpa’s list of works cited and his 
apparent choice of genre. Consideration of the relationship between Drakgönpa and his 
mentor in the craft of historical writing, Belmang Pandita, suggests ways to modify and 
strengthen Tuttle’s interpretation. Drakgönpa himself recounts in the colophon that the 
initial idea for a new history of the Amdo region came from no one other than Belmang 
Pandita himself. According to Drakgönpa, Belmang had told him, “Other than the brief 
description in the honorable Drupé Wangchuk Kelden Gyatso’s history of the faith576 and 
the jottings in Sumpa Khenpo Yeshé Paljor’s history of the faith,577 there has been 
absolutely nothing written about the history of this land of Domé (yul mdo smad kyi 
ljongs). Since people knowledgeable of the situation of Amdo are rare, you must write 
                                                
575 Tuttle (2011), 166. 
 
576 A reference to Grub pa’i dbang phyug Skal ldan rgya mtsho’s 1652, Mdo smad a mdo'i phyogs 
su bstan pa dar tshul gyi lo rgyus mdor bsdud (A Short History of the Way the Teachings Spread 
in Amdo Domé). This text is often abbreviated to “The History of Amdo” (A mdo lo rgyus). It is 
available in the recently-republished collected works of Kelden Gyatso (1607-1677): Yab rje bla 
ma Skal ldan rgya mtsho'i gsung 'bum, vol. 1 (Xining: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999). 
577 In his bibliography, Drakgönpa lists three works by Sumpa Khenpo (sum pa mkhan po ye shes 
dpal 'jor): the “Chos ‘byung dpag bsam ljon pa” (also known by the title dpag bsam ljon bzang, 
“The Auspicious Forest of Wish-fulfilling Trees”), a history of Buddhism in India, Tibet, and 
Mongolia c. 1748; the‘dzam gling spyi bshad ngo mtshar gtam snyan (“A General Description of 
the World”), c. 1777; and the mtsho sngon lo rgyus tshangs glu gsar snyan (“The Annals of 
Kokonor”), c. 1786. It is unclear which of these works Drakgönpa is referring to as his “history of 
the faith,” but most likely it is the first one. It is possible that Drakgönpa is referring generally to 
all three of these works. For a recent reappraisal of the second book in this list, see Matthew T. 
Kapstein, “Just Where on Jambudvīpa Are We?” in Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern 
Asia, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 336-364. Kapstein translates 
the title of this work as the “General Description of Jambudvīpa.” For an introduction and partial 
translation of the third work, see Ho-chin Yang, The Annals of Kokonor (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Research Center for the Language Sciences, 1969). 
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something like this.”578 Having commissioned the work, Belmang was a demanding 
taskmaster. Several years later in 1833, at the age of thirty-two, Drakgönpa presented a 
draft of his work to his teacher. Belmang, however, rejected the work, stating that it was 
incomplete. Sixteen years later in 1849, having traveled extensively in northern Amdo in 
order to collect information directly from local scholars, Drakgönpa read the newly 
completed sections on northern Amdo to Belmang. His teacher advised him, however, to 
undertake yet further revisions. It was not until 1865 and a decade after Belmang had 
passed away that Drakgönpa produced the final version of the text.579  
At the conclusion of his life’s work, Drakgönpa thus credits his late teacher with 
encouraging him to expand the book beyond a simple narrative history of the region and 
its Mongol rulers and their relationship to Labrang monastery into an encyclopedic 
survey of Gelukpa monastic institutions with detailed biographical treatments of their 
reincarnate lineages. From the initial exchange between Belmang and Drakgönpa, it is 
clear that their starting point were the “religious histories” (chos ‘byung) of the first 
generations of Gelukpa historians in Amdo, yet they were dissatisfied with content of 
those texts. Moreover, the Oceanic Book was not the first history of Amdo to be labeled a 
“deb ther.” That status instead falls to his teacher’s History.  
While Belmang’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia, does not include the 
word “deb ther” in the title, when printed as part of his eleven-volume collected works, 
the printers identified the History as a “deb ther” in the margin of each folio.580 The text 
                                                
578 Oceanic Book, 783. 
 
579 Oceanic Book, 783. 
 
580 The collected works were block printed at Amchok Galdan Chökhor Ling (A mchog dga’ ldan 
chos ‘khor gling), the same printery that also produced Drakgönpa’s Oceanic Book in its final 
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has been colloquially referred to in Amdo and in later secondary literature as “Belmang’s 
deb ther” (Dbal mang tshang gi deb ther).581 It seems that contemporaries also identified 
Belmang’s book as a “deb ther.” For instance, the Mongol secretary Wangchen Kyab 
cites Belmang’s history as a “deb ther” in his own 1848 genealogy/history of the Henan 
Khoshot princes, and, significantly, entitled his own work a “deb ther.” 582  The 
unprecedented appearance of three historical works at Labrang monastery within thirty 
years all labeled deb ther and centered on the original scholarship of Belmang Pandita 
suggests that the choice of this label signaled the intention to do more than merely update 
previous chos ‘byung literature. Moreover, the fact that Belmang instructed Drakgönpa to 
attempt a new history of the region shortly after he himself had written extensively on 
Amdo and Labrang in his History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia, is an indication that he 
had a particular agenda in mind and intended for Drakgönpa to produce an original work 
that would go even further beyond the conventional concerns and generic boundaries of 
the existing chos ‘byung-style historical works on Amdo.  
In his bibliography of Tibetan historical works, Dan Martin also identifies dep 
ther as a separate genre from chos ‘byung. Unlike Tuttle, however, for Martin this genre 
is distinguished not by the existence of a political agenda, but rather by a particular 
                                                                                                                                            
form in 1869. This monastery was the seat of Belmang Pandita. The date of printing Belmang 
Pandita’s Collected Works was probably no earlier than 1864, the year in which Drakgönpa 
completed his biography of Belmang, which is included in volume 10 (tha). See The Collected 
Works of Dbal-maṅ dkon-mchog-rgyal-mtshan, reproduced by Gyaltan Gelek Namgyal (New 
Delhi, Laxmi Printers, 1974). For the final date of 1869 for the Oceanic Book, see Piotr 
Klafkowski, “Introduction” to Dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas Brag dgon Źabs druṅ, Yul mdo 
smad kyi ljoṅs su Thub bstan rin po che ji ltar dar ba’i tshul gsal bar brjod pa deb ther rgya 
mtsho, reproduced by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: Sharada Rani, 1975-1977), 1-4. 
 
581 Oral interviews, Labrang, 2012. See also, Vostrikov, 153-154. 
 
582 Bkra shis dbang rgyal, Deb ther mes po zhal lung, 352-352. 
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method of composition. Translating dep ther as “annals,” Martin defines them as, “a 
historical compilation based in some part on archival types of documentation.”583 This 
observation accurately describes the three dep ther analyzed in this chapter. Belmang’s 
History, Wangchen Kyab’s Book of Lessons from the Ancestors, and Drakgönpa’s 
Oceanic Book all display careful attention to the use and critical evaluation of sources, 
often of a documentary nature, as well as first-hand research through travel, interviews, 
and examinations of monastic libraries and archives. While it is unclear if Belmang and 
his students saw themselves as writing in a “genre” separate from the proceeding chos 
‘bung literature, it does appear that for these Labrang authors, the deb ther label 
expressed an affiliation with a certain type of scholarship and signaled an interest in both 
the history of the Dharma (Tib. chos) and political affairs (Tib. srid).  
Belmang Pandita was a pivotal figure in the intellectual history of the Amdo 
region in several respects. First, he served as a link between the great historically minded 
scholars of the Qianlong reign with the historians active during the mid to late nineteenth-
century. Belmang was familiar with the major pieces of historical scholarship that had 
been produced during the Qianlong reign either in Amdo or by Amdo-based writers, as 
well as major literary figures in Central Tibet. Many of these scholars, most importantly 
Tukwan Rinpoché, the Second Jamyang Zhepa, the Third Gungtang Rinpoché, Démo 
Kūtuktu, Tatsak Rinpoché, he had either met in person, corresponded with, or studied 
with during the course of his education and early career at Labrang.584 As indicated by 
                                                
583 Martin (1997), 13-14. 
 
584 As discussed in Chapter Three, Belmang met with most of the individuals listed here during 
the course of the search for the Third Jamyang Zhepa. Further details concerning Belmang’s 
associations with prominent scholars can be found in Drakgönpa’s Oceanic Book, 404-411; and 
in his biography of Belmang Pandita. 
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Drakgönpa, Belmang had read the works of Sumpa Khenpo Yeshé Peljor, the Günlong 
monastery based writer whose histories of Amdo, Tibet, India, Mongolia, and world 
geography were widely distributed throughout the Tibetan-Buddhist cultural area.585 
Second, Belmang was pivotal in the sense that during his lifetime the center of historical 
scholarship in Amdo shifted from the monastic centers of northern Amdo such as 
Gönlung and Kumbum monasteries southward to Labrang—a transition that may be 
partially accounted for by Belmang’s active mentorship and cultivation of younger 
historians. 
The accumulation of scholars at Labrang monastery was also a reflection of its 
growing wealth and political authority in the Amdo region, a context that is also essential 
to our consideration of Belmang and his students’ historiographical production. The 
Oceanic Book describes a political landscape where the highest level of political authority 
had passed from the descendants of Gushri Khan to “China” and the reincarnate hierarchs 
of the region’s monasteries, especially Labrang, had become governors of large segments 
of local Tibetan and Mongol society in their own right, superseding the influence of the 
Mongol nobility that had, in many cases, originally helped establish the monasteries and 
endowed the estates (bla brang) of reincarnate monks with property and tax-paying 
subjects. 586  In Drakgönpa’s words, the abbots of Labrang and numerous other 
monasteries throughout Amdo, had unified “both spiritual and temporal authority” (chos 
srid gnyis) in their personages where previously these twinned authorities had been 
                                                
585 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 783. For the influence of Sumpa Khenpo, see Kapstein (2011), 
Martin, 129-130, and Vostrikov, 151. 
 
586 Drakgönpa identifies the inclusion of Kokonor within “China” as beginning with the 
submission of the Khoshot princes of Kokonor to the Kangxi emperor “China” in 1697. See, 
Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 41. 
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divided between monks and Buddhist lay rulers.587 This expression, and its parallel 
phrase “to govern with the two traditions” (lugs gnyis), appear throughout the Oceanic 
Book to describe not only their duties as ritual experts and teachers, but also their 
obligations as administrators and jurists to affiliated lay communities. Tuttle points out 
that this aspect of Drakgönpa’s presentation recalls earlier texts within the dep ther genre. 
Those texts tracked, for instance, acquisition of temporal authority by the Sakya rulers in 
central Tibet when Yuan influence wavered after Qubilai as well as the Pakmodru Kagyu 
hierarchs in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.588  
In Drakgönpa’s history of Amdo, the shifting fortunes of the Mongols are best 
encapsulated in the biographies of two contemporary figures, the fifth generation chief of 
the Mongol banners south of the Yellow River, Trashi Jungné (bkra shis 'byung gnas達
什忠鼐, 1771-1840), who reigned from 1808-1835, and Könchok Senggé (Dkon mchog 
seng+ge, 1768-1833), who succeeded Belmang Pandita as abbot of Labrang in 1809. 
Könchok’s Senggé’s tenure at Labrang’s helm corresponded with the centennial of the 
monastery’s founding. And Drakgönpa’s depiction of the abbot and the qinwang leaves 
the impression that a nearly complete inversion of power relations had occurred during 
that century.  
In 1709 when Trashi Jungné’s ancestor, Cagan Danjin (1670-1735), invited the 
first Jamyang Zhepa to Amdo and presented the original endowment of revenue-
generating estates and novice monks to serve as the foundation of the new monastery, he 
                                                
587 The identification of both political and religious authority with monks and monasteries occurs 
throughout the book. For a some specific examples see for instance: the discussion of the 
Lamo/Cagan Nomunhan incarnations at Lamo Dechen Monastery, especially, 272 (and Chapter 
Six for further discussion); discussion of the role of abbot at Günlong monstery, especially during 
the era of Tukwan Lozang Chökyi Nyima, 66.     
 
588 Tuttle (2011), 167-169. 
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was the ruler of the Right Wing of the Khoshots, a polity that dominated southern Amdo 
from the border with Gansu province in the east to the Yellow River in the north and 
west. This polity was itself the smaller half of the Khoshot Khanate that was, during 
Cagan Danjin’s lifetime, overseen first by Trashi Batur (Bkra shi bA thur, the youngest 
son of Gushri Khan) and then, briefly, by Lobzang Danjin. Trashi Batur and Lobzang 
Danjin’s power base was the Left Wing, those principalities surrounding 
Kokonor/Qinghai Lake.589 According to Drakgönpa, Trashi Batur’s decision to respond 
to the Kangxi emperor’s summons to audience in Beijing in 1697-8 marked the end of 
their independence. Kangxi awarded Trashi Batur and Cagan Danjin with the titles of 
qinwang and junwang, respectively. Drakgönpa described the submission in striking 
terms: “Having bestowed these titles and having made great gifts, China and Mongolia 
were continuously (permanently) joined as one China.”590  
For Cagan Danjin, submission to the Qing appears to have only encouraged his 
local ambitions. His elevation to qinwang by the Yongzheng emperor in 1723 reflected 
further Qing approval of his incorporation of additional territories, even though they 
came at the expense of Lobzang Danjin and other Oirat nobility in Qinghai. As Katō 
Naoto has argued, Lobzang Danjin’s subsequent revolt was as much a revenge attack on 
                                                
589 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 42.  
 
590 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 41: “gzhan rnams la jun wang sogs 'os 'tsham dang gnang sbyin 
rgya cher mdzad pas rgya sog la rgya gcig pa'i 'brel ba lu gu rgyud du sbrel/”  When I initially 
encountered this passage I was so struck with its message of permanent unity between “China” 
and “Mongolia” that I wondered if this sentence had actually been inserted by modern, pro-PRC 
editors. An Indian reproduction of the original text contains the exact same sentence. See: Dkon 
mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, The Ocean Annals of Amdo, reprinted by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: 
Sharada Rani, 1975), 99:1-2.  
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Cagan Danjin as it was a rebellion against Qing authority in the region.591 Following 
Nian Gengyao’s instructions, in the aftermath of the rebellion the Mongols south of the 
Yellow River were reorganized into five separate banners. But as the author of the Deb 
ther mes po’i zhal lung notes, as a loyal Qing partisan, once confirmed as the jasak 
qinwang of the vanguard banner of the southern Khoshots (Ch. 和碩特前首旗, or more 
colloquially in Qing documents, 河南親王旗), Cagan Danjin remained in charge of a 
large part of the territories to which he had aspired to before the rebellion.592 Despite 
Nian Gengyao’s injunction that Tibetans be separated from the Mongol banners, it 
appears that Cagan Danjin retained a great deal of influence over Tibetans.593 At 
Labrang, for instance, his representative retained a position in the monastic council and 
his fortified manor on the eastern side of the monastery remained a major administrative 
center.594 Furthermore, when the Labrang community fractured over the search for the 
incarnation of the first Jamyang Zhepa in 1728, it was the Mongol prince (or perhaps 
more exactly, his wife, who strongly supported one side) who had the final word in this 
dispute, ultimately installing their own candidate in 1738 after a decade of bitter feuding 
between the followers of Labrang’s abbot, the first Sétsang lama (Ngag dbang bkra shis, 
                                                
591 Katō Naoto, “Lobsang Danjin’s Rebellion of 1723: With a Focus on the Eve of the 
Rebellion,” Acta Asiatica 64 (1993): 57-80. 
 
592 Wangchen Kyab, Deb ther mes po’i zhal lung, 262-263. Wangchen Kyab reports that 
Yongzheng asked Cagan Danjin what territories he wished to rule. Cagan Danjin responded by 
claiming the land between the Rma (Yellow), Tse, and ‘Bal rivers. These three rivers roughly 
approximate the northern, southern and western reaches of his territory, but leave his eastern 
borders vague. Are we to assume that he meant the Gansu provincial borders?  
 
593 Wangchen Kyab records that he did lose “18 communities” of Tibetans located in what now 
Ngawa prefecture of northeast Sichuan, deb ther mes po’i zhal lung, 263. 
 
594 Zhao Shunlu. “Anduo diqu dayuan manfa de hongzhuanzhe,” in Xianzu yanjiao [Lessons of 
the ancestors], auth. Zhongyou Angqing jiabu, ed. Xiangzha Gabuzang Queji Jianzan, trans. 
Duojie Renqing (Xining: Qinghai minzu chubanshe, 2008), 294.  
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1678-1738), and the steward of the Jamyang Zepa’s estate, the Detri lama (Blo bzang don 
grub, 1673-1746). Contemporaries and later commentators have seen the qinwang’s 
household’s successful intervention in this matter as confirming their status as the 
primary patron of the Jamyang Zhepas and supreme authority at Labrang for another 
generation.595  
Drakgönpa’s description of the Henan princes (Tib. wang) paints a literary map of 
a territory and populations much diminished from the glory days under Cagan Danjin 
(whom he refers to alternately as Dar rgyal bo shog thu or Jo nang rgyal po). While he 
credits Cagan Danjin with dominating a wide swath of territory stretching from the 
southwestern frontier of Gansu province down to Sichuan (from “reb gong stod mad” 
across to “the bo” (in present-day southern Gansu, Ch. 迭部縣), in addition to the core 
pastures south of the Yellow River, Drakgönpa records the fifth generation descendant 
Trashi Jungné as holding only a portion of the original core pastures.596 Although 
Wangchen Kyab quotes Drakgönpa’s description of Trashi Jungné in order to 
demonstrate just how much the prince’s domain had shrunk, Drakgönpa himself tries to 
put a better spin on things, noting that the territory was still rich and continued to provide 
large quantities of donations to Labrang.597 
                                                
595 Zhao Shunlu, 295. 
 
596 Drakgönpa discusses the history of the Henan princes in the context of his description of the 
monasteries established within the banner of the Henan qinwang/junwang, specifically the 
monastery affiliated with the governing encampment (Tib. urgé) of the banner. This monastery 
was named Urge grwa tshang gsang sngags smin rgyas gling. See Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 
247-257, especially, 249-250 (description of Cagan Danjin’s domain), 255 (description of Trashi 
Jungné’s domain). Drakgönpa cites Belmang’s Rgya bod hor sog gyi lo rgyus at several points in 
his description of the shifting domains of the Henan princes (248, 250). Wangchen Kyab, in turn, 
cites this section of the Oceanic Book for his own discussion of Trashi Jungné.  
 
597 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 255; Wangchen Kyab, 362. 
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In contrast, Drakgönpa’s depiction of Labrang under Könchok Senggé presents 
his abbotship as the moment when the monastery first emerged as a major power in its 
own right. First, the circumstances of Könchok Senggé’s return to the monastery were an 
unmistakable sign that the descendants of Gushri Khan had been displaced as prime 
arbiter of Labrang’s affairs. As discussed in Chapter Three, unlike in the case of the 
search for the second Jamyang Zhepa, the recognition of the third Jamyang Zhepa had 
been conducted on the terms of the Qianlong emperor. According to Drakgönpa, just 
days after his return to the monastery, a great ceremony was held in which the imperial 
edict confirming the identification of the third Jamyang Zhepa and Könchok Senggé’s 
new noble status as “Erdemu Mergen Khenpo” (Tib. Ertem thu mergan mkhan po) and 
tutor to the young monk.598 Thus, Könchok Senggé’s presence at Labrang bore witness to 
the legitimacy both of the new Jamyang Zhepa and the Qing emperor as the main patron 
of the monastery. 
Könchok Senggé returned home in the company of Belmang Pandita. 599 
Drakgönpa notes that the two monks had grown close while handling the search for the 
next Jamyang Zhepa, and Drakgönpa’s presents them as shouldering the bulk 
monastery’s administrative duties until well after the third Jamyang Zhepa formally 
assumed the abbotship of the monastery in 1817. In addition to overseeing the education 
of the young Jamyang Zhepa, Könchok Senggé was appointed steward (phyag ‘mdzod) of 
his estate in 1798 and subsequently to the post of abbot in 1809 on the eve of his charge’s 
                                                
598 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 416. 
 
599 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 415. 
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departure to pursue further education in central Tibet.600 According to Drakgönpa, the 
monk’s relationship with the Qing officials in the region also continued to deepen. 
Shortly after returning to Labrang, Könchok Senggé was invited to Xining by the amban 
resident there to receive further instructions from the emperor and also a letter from 
Sungyun, the Lhasa amban with whom he had evidently been on good terms during his 
residency there. Drakgönpa writes: “Henceforth, the Chinese officials (rgya dpon tsho) 
held him in great esteem, and they did whatever he requested of them. Because his 
actions were upright and honest in the law/because he upheld the law with fairness and 
honesty, the ambans called him a ‘Buddha.’ When the Lhasa amban Sungyun was 
appointed to the post of Lanzhou Governor-general, [Könchok Senggé] dispatched 
messengers to greet him, for which he received further praise and bestowals.”601  
Drakgönpa devotes considerable attention to Könchok Senggé’s relationship with 
the Qing field officials stationed in Gansu province. Compared with the accounts of 
previous abbots, especially those who were not recognized reincarnations, the quality and 
scale of the relationship appears unprecedented. This aspect of the biography suggests 
that from Drakgönpa’s perspective the true measure of the influence and importance of 
Labrang’s monastic officials was to be found not in the esteem shown to them by their 
traditional Mongol patrons, but rather in the degree of deference paid to them by Qing 
officials and the status they acquired within the Qing imperial hierarchy. For this reason, 
                                                
600 There are some interesting details here: Drakgönpa notes that the previous steward, Lozang 
(Blo bzang) passed away in 1798. This Lozang must be the same “Lobzang Dargyé” who ran 
afoul of the Qing court a year earlier (see Chapter Three). Könchok Senggé’s appointment to 
steward was made using a dough-ball divination (zan bsgyur). See Oceanic Book, 415. 
 
601 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 416: “de nas bzung rgya dpon tshos bkur gzos che zhing sku don 
gang zhus ltar yong ba zhig byung/ khrims lugs drang bor spyod pas am b+han sangs rgyas su 
grags pa lha sa'i bsung am b+han lan ju'i tsun dur phebs pa gsan pas 'tshams zhus pa mngags/ 
dgyes pa'i phebs sgo dang bdag rkyen kyang gnang/”  
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instead of describing the Qing court’s involvement in the selection and early education of 
the third Jamyang Zhepa, as meddlesome, Drakgönpa presents it as welcome and timely 
recognition of the importance of the monastery and the Jamyang Zhepas.602 The intimate 
relations between Könchok Senggé and Qing officials such as Sungyun were a testament 
to the monastery’s “arrival” as the court’s essential partner in the governance of Amdo. 
The fact that “Chinese officials” (rgya dpon) would honor Könchok Senggé—who was 
not a “kūtuktu” and identified himself humbly as only the place-holder for the next 
Jamyang Zhepa—was for Drakgönpa only further evidence of Labrang’s importance: 
High-ranking lamas and officials from all across Domé and especially 
China and Tibet came regularly to pay their respects. The visitors were 
granted gifts and showed concern according to their rank and with 
reference to the rules established during the lifetimes of the first and 
second Jamyang Zhepas. He carried out his duties as steward without 
partiality. As the servant of the Supreme Reincarnation and Jewel, he 
traveled to all of the Supreme Reincarnation's monasteries in the north, 
and from Nangra down to Tsha kho, and from Golok to Choné—and took 
up the burden of handling all the business of the two traditions [i.e. 
religious and worldly affairs]. It was said that his inner yogic force was 
such that wherever he went he overawed both gods and men.603  
 
The above statement is additionally significant because the borders Drakgönpa 
draws around the field of the abbot’s religious and political activity perfectly shadow the 
                                                
602 Oceanic Book, 450-451. Similarly, Drakgönpa expresses no reservations about the use of the 
urn in identification of the fourth Jamyang Zhepa in 1861. This search unfolded under the 
supervision of Detri Lama starting in 1859. According to Drakgönpa, once several candidates had 
been identified, Detri traveled to Xining to report the matter to the Xining amban, who then 
forwarded the names on to Lhasa. The use of the urn is presented as being “in keeping with the 
traditional procedure.” Unsurprisingly, this account notes that the wining candidate had been the 
one originally favored by Labrang. As seen in Chapter Three, this may not have been the case.  
 
603 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 416: “grwa tshang bzhis mtshon sku mdun du rgyug 'bul mkhan 
rnams la bdag rkyen/ rgya dbus kyi gtsos mdo smad lho byang gi bla chen dpon chen 'brel zab 
can rnams la 'char can gyi 'tshams zhus/ tshur sku zhabs su bcar mkhan drag zhan gyi rim pas 
shangs len zur gsos gnang sbyin sogs skyabs mgon gong ma'i dus ltar phyag mdzod zur gyi bar le 
shor med pa mdzad/ mchog sprul rin po che byang rgyud kyi dgon chen rnams dang/ snang ra 
nas tsha kho tshun dang/ mgo log nas co ne'i bar gar phebs kyi zhabs phyi mdzad de lugs gnyis 
kyi mdzad sgo gang ci'i 'gan khur bzhes/ de dus rje 'dis phebs gdong mnan pas nang gi rnal 'byor 
gyi stobs kyis lha mi thams cad zil gyis gnon pa zhig yod zer/”  
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territory he had identified previously as the domain of the first Henan qinwang, Cagan 
Danjin.604 The boundaries also completely encompass the shrinking domain of the Henan 
junwang Trashi Jungné.605 Moreover, among the activities undertaken by Könchok 
Senggé and Belmang within this region, many were devoted to shoring up the authority 
and territorial integrity of the weakened Mongol banners. In his biographies of Belmang 
Pandita and Könchok Senggé, Drakgönpa presents numerous cases in which the abbots 
were called in by either Mongol banners or Tibetan communities to deal with both small 
scale criminal cases and intra communal conflicts sparked by feuds over territorial 
boundaries, raiding, and the increasing migration of herders from Tibetan districts into 
pastures abandoned by the Mongols.606 In a striking role-reversal, Drakgönpa describes a 
political landscape in which monastic officials like Belmang Pandita guaranteed the 
security of the Mongol donor communities.  
Drakgönpa does not to present Belmang or Könchok Senggé as the sole political 
authority within the territory that he has staked out for their activities of the “two 
traditions.” That zone is inhabited by a variety of rulers and types of administration 
ranging from banner jasaks to Tibetan headmen, as well as monks from other monasteries 
and sects. Even within Labrang, Drakgönpa describes a system where power could easily 
be diffused between abbots and stewards (and ex-abbots and ex-stewards), across the 
various colleges that made up the monastery, and among the various reincarnate lamas 
                                                
604 For the scope of Cagan Danjin’s territorial claims, see Oceanic Book, 250. 
 
605 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 255. 
 
606 For Könchok Senggé’s work as jurist and administrator, see Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 420-
427. 
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and their retinues.607 But the book leaves the impression that it was only the Gelukpa 
hierarchs who had the authority to adjudicate between the various communities and rulers 
of southern Amdo and that Belmang Pandita and Könchok Senggé in particular exercised 
this authority in a way that contrasted with the situation a hundred years earlier when the 
first Henan qinwang founded the monastery.   
 
The tumult in the Mongol banners is captured perhaps more poignantly in the 
works of Belmang Pandita and Wangchen Kyab both of whom wrote from a perspective 
both temporally and personally closer to events. Belmang had been asked to compose his 
history by an aristocratic descendant of Gushri Khan from the neighboring Mongol 
banners, although it is unclear precisely who. It is likely that banner nobilities’ struggles 
to hold their patrimonies together had prompted the request. As discussed in the 
following chapter, the long-standing problems in the banners reached a crisis point in 
1821 when the majority of the Mongol banners south of the Yellow River and to the 
south and East of Kokonor imploded, sending the Mongol banner nobility and thousands 
of households of destitute Mongols fleeing into Gansu province. Although the specific 
events of 1821 through 1823 appeared to have unfolded shortly after he finished his 
book, the struggles of the Mongol princes and the Qing state to respond to the devastating 
effects of raiding by Golok and other bands of marauders active in the Amdo region is a 
major topic of the book. As noted in Chapter Three, as early as the 1790s, these raids had 
                                                
607 Drakgönpa writes that when Könchok Senggé finally retired and the abbotship was resumed 
by the Third Jamyang Zhepa that, “all religious and temporal (chos srid) matters were without 
reservation placed in the hands of the uncorrupted omniscient one.” The fact that Drakgönpa felt 
the need to clarify matters by adding this sentence reveals how complicated the political scene 
was. It was not always clear who was in charge and of what they were in charge.  
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already begun to cause consternation in the Qing court. This violence continued to grow 
in scale and frequency during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.  
In Wangchen Kyab’s Book of Lessons From the Ancestors, the Mongol secretary 
devotes the last three chapters to examining the attempts of the third through fifth 
generation princes to reverse the demographic decline of their banners and resist 
encroachments by neighboring Tibetans. Wangchen Kyab attributes the flight of Mongol 
subjects from the banners to the harsh ruling style of the jasaks. In the 1750s, in an 
attempt to stem the tide and break the cycle of raids and counter-raids, the regent of the 
third generation qinwang reinstituted a “traditional” Mongol law code with harsher 
punishments (referred to as “hos li” in Tibetan).608 This attempted re-regimentation of the 
banners backfired however, generating resentment not only within the banner populations 
but also tensions with Labrang, where the Second Jamyang Zhepa protested the harsh 
sentencing of criminals, especially capital punishment.  According to Wangchen Kyab, in 
the early Jiaqing reign (probably after 1809), Trashi Jungné abandoned these efforts, 
reconsolidated the rump of his banner, annulled the hos li, and even stopped collecting 
tax beyond what was due to the amban in Xining. “This prince himself was not strict 
when it came to criminal codes and the hos li were no longer observed. As for the 
responsibility for adjudicating disputes, they were left to the determination of the 
deities.”609 In other words, the traditional Mongol laws were abandoned and the handling 
of criminal cases and civil suits was handed over to the monastic establishment. Although 
                                                
608 Wangchen kyab, Deb ther mes po’i zhal lung, 335. “A Mongol legal code known as the hos li 
(sog po'i hos li zhes pa'i khrims yig).”   
 
609 Wangchen Kyab, 356: “wang 'di ba'i rang la sgrig khrims yang btsan po min la sngar gi hos 
lis go mi chod bar byas yod/ zhu bzhes bden rdzun la lha sgo 'jog pa gtso bor bzung bas mnga' 
'bangs gi bkur sti thob/” 
 287 
neither Belmang nor Drakgönpa explicitly mention this watershed moment, if such a 
transfer of judicial authority occurred (and as we have seen, Drakgönpa implies that had), 
it occurred during the abbotships of Belmang Pandita and Könchok Senggé.  
If, in its final form in 1865, the Oceanic Book documents the assumption of 
sweeping political and religious authority by Labrang and other Gelukpa monasteries 
from the faintly glowing embers of Mongol princely rule, Belmang’s c. 1819-1821 
History should be read as the first attempt to grapple with the shifting political landscape 
of Amdo. Belmang served at Labrang at the moment when the historical patrons of the 
Gelukpa were wavering. Moreover, while in Lhasa he had witnessed the Qianlong 
emperor stake his own unprecedented claim on the lineage of the Jamyang Zhepas and 
express a firm desire to replace “the way of the Buddha” with the “way of the emperor.” 
In response, Belmang argued that just rule had only one foundation: the Law as 
understood by Gelukpa. Gelukpa jurisprudence was the only possible path to political 
stability in the banners. And Belmang hints that if the Mongol princes proved unable to 
organize their domains in accordance with this dictum, Labrang stood ready to assume 
control.   
 
 Drakgönpa’s biography of Belmang Pandita depicts the monk as a man deeply 
interested in politics, especially as they related to his home region of Amdo. Prior to 
leading the Labrang delegation to Tibet in 1797, Belmang had had governing 
responsibilities both personally as an estate-owner in Amchok and while serving as the 
abbot of the Esoteric College at Labrang.610 In his account of Belmang’s mission to Tibet, 
                                                
610 Oceanic Book, 407. Drakgönpa states that Belmang “governed for four years by means of the 
two traditions” (lugs gnyis kyis lo bzhir bskyangs/). 
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Drakgönpa emphasized that while Belmang was traversing Amdo, he discussed both 
religious and political affairs with the monks he met along the way. For instance, while at 
Dongkor Monastery (a day’s travel west of Xining), he met with Arik Geshé, an 
influential scholar and the founder of Ragya Monastery on the bank of the Yellow River 
in southwestern Amdo. Drakgönpa writes that, “[Belmang] and this monk had previously 
known each other well. They primarily discussed sutras and tantras from the Stages of the 
Path (Lam rim), histories, and religious and political affairs (chos srid). They talked so 
much it was like a waterfall pouring off the mountain.”611 Of his journey through Amdo 
and in central Tibet, Belmang kept copious notes, eventually filling an entire case.612 
Drakgönpa also reports that Tatsak Rinpoché, the regent, advised him to remain in Lhasa 
and pursue a career in the upper echelons of the Geluk school. Another monk insinuated 
that within two years he would rise to the position of Ganden Tripa. The Demo Kūtuktu, 
who would later succeed Tatsak Rinpoché as regent (1811-1819), even offered him a 
position as chief preceptor at Tengyé Ling Monastery (Bstan rgyas gling) in Lhasa. 
Belmang declined these positions, arguing diplomatically that, “Having already 
renounced [the world], what use is there in striving for offices?”613 It seems however, that 
Belmang was more willing to take up service in his homeland since he accepted the 
                                                
611 Drakgönpa, BMNT, 159. 
 
612 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 408. 
 
613 The full statement as quoted by Drakgönpa reads: “sku zhabs blos btang nas go sa tsam don 
du gnyer nas ci byed snyam pa yin ches zhal nas thos te tshe blos btang zer ba 'di 'dra la bya'o/” 
Oceanic Book, 408. 
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appointment to abbot of Labrang Monastery six years later and would go on to serve in 
similar positions of authority, often concurrently, at other monasteries in Amdo.614 
In his History, Belmang does not hide his interest in government and the 
responsibilities of rulers, although he does allow that such matters are not the proper 
focus of monks. Belmang opens his book with the following statement:  
By means of the compassion of the most perfect Buddha, it is unbecoming 
for those who become monks to think upon the stories of kings and talk of 
war. However, several of those ‘Protectors of the Realm’ born to the 
lineage of the Dharma King and Benefactor Gushri [Khan] requested that I 
write a royal genealogy. Furthermore, several [people] possessing 
the discernment and wisdom of the two traditions of the Dharma and 
statecraft had repeatedly mentioned that it would be good if there existed a 
clear and succinct history of India, Tibet, China, and Mongolia. 
Combining these two types of work into one, on the basis of the discourse 
of the noble ones, I promptly began composing this history for the sake of 
instilling devotion in the ten [Buddhist] virtues among the people of this 
degenerate age.615 
 
Belmang’s final product thus combined two distinctive genres—royal genealogies 
and religious histories. It was also addressed to two different audiences: the Mongol lay 
Buddhist aristocracy and those monks who had responsibilities as temporal rulers. One 
suspects that Belmang may very well have been addressing this work to the third 
Jamyang Zhepa whose assumption of religious and political duties following his 
                                                
614 For instance, Belmang also served as abbot of his seat monastery in Amchok, as well as Tsang 
Monastery. Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 408-411; Biography of Belmang Pandita. Also, Nietupski 
(2012), 4. 
 
615 Belmang, History, 481:4-482:4: “yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas thugs rje can gyis/ rab 
du byung ba rnams kyis rgyal po'i gtam gyi sbyor ba dang/ dmag gi gtam gyi sbyor ba sogs bya 
mi rung bar gsung pa yang yid kyi yul du gyur mod/ 'od kyang ku shri bstan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal 
po'i gdung rgyud du 'khrungs pa'i sa skyong 'ga' zhig nas rgyal rabs shig 'bri bar bkas bskul ba 
dang/ chos srid kyi lugs gnyis mkhyen pa'i rnam dpyod can du mas kyang 'phags bod rgya sog 
rnams kyi lo rgyus nyung gsal re yod na legs tshul yang yang mol ba dang/ rnam pa gcig tu na ya 
rabs kyi gtam gleng ba tsam gyis kyang snyigs dus kyi skye bo 'ga' zhig dge bcu'i lam la dad pa 
skyes bar bya ba'i phyir du sngon gyi lo rygus 'ga' zhig cung zad 'god par bya'o//” 
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enthronement as abbot at Labrang in 1817 corresponds closely with the completion of 
Belmang’s history.616 Such speculation is perhaps supported by the fact that Drakgönpa 
portrays the third Jamyang Zhepa as showing a considerable interest in politics. For 
instance, he records that when Tsenpo Nomunhan accompanied the third Jamyang Zhepa 
home from Lhasa in 1812, they had “extensive discussions of the two traditions.”617 
Moreover, during the 1820s, when Tsenpo Nomuhan was in the midst of composing his 
famous geography of the world, the Jamyang Zhepa invited him to Labrang monastery.618  
Belmang’s opening statement reveals that the purpose of the book was overtly 
pedagogic: to provide those destined for positions of temporal authority with historical 
lessons demonstrating that the success and failure of kings, khans, emperors, and 
reincarnate lamas ultimately hinged on their mastery of Buddhism. This underlying 
agenda is particularly visible in both the full title of the book, “A Ladder for Guiding the 
Youth: Lessons Summarizing the History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia,” and in 
Belmang’s concluding comments where he states plainly the connection between just rule 
and Buddhist insight: “Regardless of whether the kings’ deeds are good or bad, the 
subjects will follow their example. Therefore, if rulers and ministers of the temporal 
world are familiar with the treatise of the two traditions in order to rule according to the 
                                                
616 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 439. On p. 405, however, Drakgönpa writes that the third Jamyang 
Zhepa began to assume responsibilities for “all spiritual and temporal matters” in 1812, shortly 
after returning from Lhasa. 
 
617 Dragönpa, Oceanic Book, 439: “btsan po no min han dang lhan rgyas chibs bsgyur mdzad par 
lugs gnyis kyi gsung gleng 'phel zhing/” The third Jamyang Zhepa also traveled to Gönlung 
Monastery to visit Tsenpo Nomunhan soon after he had settled back in at Labrang. 
 
618 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 441. 
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system of karmic causality, their powers of the mind and heart will increase, and, not 
being overwhelmed by negative things, they will moreover become victorious.”619 
Belmang’s book, with its textbook-like quality and focus on civics, was neither a 
traditional “religious history,” nor should it be understood as a “secular” since in 
Belmang’s view good governance was inextricably linked to Buddhist knowledge. The 
book is perhaps best described as a kind of “princes’ manual” or “mirror for princes.” 
Although the book does not contain any references to works within Tibetan literary 
history that shared a similar agenda, this type of literature appears to have become more 
popular over the course of the nineteenth century. For instance, Wangchen Kyab’s Book 
of Lessons from the Ancestors seems to have been strongly influenced by Belmang’s 
history. It too uses historical events to present moralistic lessons on good governance to 
contemporary rulers. The best-known work of this nature is the guidebook that Ju 
Mipham Gyamtso (1846-1912) prepared for the young ruler of Degé in Kham entitled, 
“An Ornament for Worldly Kings, A Treatise on the Way of the King.”620 The author of 
this book, a Nyingma monk from Kham, was unlikely, however, to have known or read 
Belmang’s history. 
   A number of prominent works from central Tibet influenced Belmang Pandita. 
He provides several citations from both Butön’s (Bu ston Rin chen grub, 1290-1364) 
history of Buddhism in India and Tibet (the Chos ‘byung) of 1322, one of the first self-
                                                
619 Belmang, History, 663:3-5: “ryal po rnams kyi spyod pa bzang ngan gang byed kyang/ chab 
‘bangs rnams de’i rjes su ‘brang pas na/ ‘jig rten skyong ba’i rgyal blon rnams kyis kyang las 
‘bras kyi srol bskyangs pa’i ched du lugs gnyis bstan bcos la goms par byas na/ blo dang snying 
stobs ‘phel zhing/ rkyen gyi zil gyis mi non par mi mthun phyogs las rnam par tyal bar ‘gyur ro//” 
 
620  'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, Rgyal po lugs kyi bstan bcos sa gzhi skyong ba'i rgyan in Gsum 
'bum/ Ju mi pham rgya mtsho'i vol 1. (ka) (Paro, Bhutan: Lama Godrup & Sherab Drimey, 1984-
1993), 1-158. 
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titled “chos ‘byung” in Tibetan literature, as well as the Fifth Dalai Lama’s 1643 history 
of Tibet’s rulers (Bod kyi deb ther dpyid kyi rgyal mo'i glu dbyangs).621 The text is, 
however, firmly rooted in the historical traditions of Amdo. Although Belmang admitted 
to his readers that as he was limited to Tibetan-language sources on account of his poor 
Mongol language skills,622 he was able to draw upon the archives, genealogies, and other 
historical works that had been prepared by successive generations of the secretaries to the 
Khoshot qinwang resident at Labrang Monastery. In particular, much of Belmang’s 
information on the genealogy of Gushri Khan is sourced from Waka Tsering’s “A Rosary 
of Pearls: Tales of the Ancestors” (Mes po'i gtam rgyud mu tig 'phreng pa).623 In terms of 
its overall structure, the History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia closely parallels Sumpa 
Khenpo Yeshé Paljor’s religious history, “The auspicious forest of wish-fulfilling 
trees.”624 Both texts begin with the history of Buddhism in India, and continue with its 
                                                
621 For example, Belmang cites Butön’s history for information on the collapse of the Tibetan 
empire (Belmang, 506:1), the origins of the Pakmodru (514:6), and finally in order to correct 
certain prevailing misconceptions about the connections between Chinggis Khan’s ancestors and 
the ancient kings of Tibet: Belmang, 527:5-6. Belmang cites the Fifth Dalai Lama’s deb ther on 
several points in his chapter on the history of Tibet (Belmang, 502, 506, 507, 515). 
 
622 Belmang, History, 533:1-2. The fact that he felt obliged to apologize for this deficiency, 
however, does indicate that there was still some expectation that those who wished to 
commentate on history and politics (such as himself) should have some Mongol-language 
abilities. His own home district of Amchok had a tradition of close relations with the Mongol 
banner nobility. See, Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 250, 252-3. 
 
623 Belmang cites this work under an alternate title, Ku shri bstan 'dzin chos rgyal gyi gdung 
rgyud rgyal rabs mu tig 'phreng ba. Belmang, History, 532. Unfortunately, this work was lost 
when the manor of the Henan junwang at Labrang was burned to the ground in 1883. Shingza 
Kelzang, in his introduction to his resurrected version of Wangchen Kyab’s Deb ther mes po’i 
zhal lung, writes that much of Belmang’s information on the history of the descendants of Gushri 
Khan was based on Waka Tsering’s history (see first unmarked page of notebook manuscript). 
 
624 Sumpa Khenpo Yeshé Paljor (sum pa mkhan po ye shes dpal 'byor), Chos 'byung dpag bsam 
ljon bzang (Lanzhou: Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1992) (TIBRC W7667). 
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spread in Tibet, China, and finally, Mongolia. 625  Belmang, however, devotes 
proportionally more attention to Gushri Khan and the history of his descendants in Amdo. 
This latter section, which in Belmang’s work occupies approximately three-quarters of 
the book, draws at least partially on Sumpa Khenpo’s chronicle of Gushri Khan and his 
descendants in the Annals of Kokonor.626 Sumpa Khenpo’s Annals of Kokonor (1786) had 
been written at the urging of the Beise Tsokyé Dorjé (Tib. Bi se Mtsho skyes rdo rje), a 
fourth rank prince from the Khoshot banners located around Kokonor Lake.627 As a 
result, this book has largely been read as a glowing homage to Gushri Khan’s 
descendants.628  Belmang’s history, written thirty years later, presents a more critical 
evaluation of Gushri Khan’s successors in Amdo. This was a reflection of the changed 
political circumstances and the existence of a new audience for works on politics—
monks. Where Sumpa Khenpo had addressed his work solely to his Mongol patron, 
whom he identified using the pre-Qing title “boshoqtu” and praised as “holder of both 
                                                
625 See also outlines of this work in Vostrikov, 151-152, and especially, Sh. Bira. Mongolian 
Historical Literature of the XVII-XIX Centuries Written in Tibetan, ed. by Ts. Damdinsüren, 
trans. by Stanley N. Frye (Bloomington IN: The Mongolia Society, 1970), 19-25. 
 
626 Belmang Pandita does not mention Sumpa Khenpo or his works by name. However, 
Belmang’s sections on Gushri Khan’s grandson’s Lobzang Danjin (Blo bzang bstan ‘dzin), 
attempt to eject the Qing from Amdo, as well as subsequent sections on the Junghar rulers 
Tsewang Rabdan and Galdan Tsering contain passages that closely resemble those in Sumpa 
Khenpo’s Annals of Kokonor. For Lobzang Danjin’s rebellion, compare Belmang, 630-631 and 
Sumpa Khenpo, Annals of Kokonor (PRC reprint) 25-26. For the sections on the Junghars, see 
Belmang, 627 and Sumpa Khenpo, 43-45. 
 
627 Sum pa ye shes dpal 'byor, Mtsho sngon lo rgyus tshangs glu gsar snyan zhes bya ba bzhugs 
so (Zi ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs  dpe sgrun khang, 1982 [1786]), 55. 
 
628 Ho-chin Yang, The Annals of Kokonor (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University, 1969), 9. 
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religion and politics,”629 Belmang addressed a broader audience: rulers of men and 
monasteries such as the third Jamyang Zhepa in addition to the banner nobility. 
The following sections of this chapter will examine the argument underlying 
Belmang’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia.  In this text, Belmang argues that, 1) 
the laws that structure human society must be based in Buddhism; 2) that historically, 
conversion to Buddhism necessarily entails not just a spiritual transformation, but also a 
thorough transformation of the temporal laws by which one lived; and finally, 3) that the 
history of the recent era demonstrated that only the Gelukpa interpretation of law was 
correct. The final section of this chapter will discuss Belmang’s assessment of the Qing 
polity in light of his vision of the proper ordering of human society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
629 Sum pa ye shes dpal 'byor, Mtsho sngon lo rgyus tshangs glu gsar snyan zhes bya ba bzhugs 
so, 55. 
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Introduction (481) 
 
Part I 
 
Chapter One: “The rise of the teachings and its benefactors in India and the origins of 
the world system” (483) 
 
Chapter Two: “A History of Other Countries” 
 
- Section 1: “The kings of Shambhala and the later Buddha teachers” 
(493:3) 
- Section 2: History of Tibet from early kings to 1757 (499:2) 
- Section 3: History of China from ancient times until Jiaqing emperor 
(approx.1820) (520:6) 
 
Part II 
 
Chapter One: “An account of the descendants of Gushri Khan and how they 
supported the teachings throughout the country.” 
 
- Further history of the Mongols until Gushri Khan (527) 
- Gushri Khan and conquest of Tibet (532) 
- History of the principalities of Gushri’s descendants in Amdo through the 
Qianlong reign (538) 
- Detailed narrative of Tibetan history and relations with outside powers 
from Chinggis Khan through the defeat of the Junghars (583) 
- History of Tibet and Amdo, especially relations with Qing court, 1750-
1819 (653) 
- Final essay on the legal history of Tibet and necessity of Buddhist 
governance (661) 
- Colophon (665) 
 
Figure 3: Contents of The History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia 
 296 
Law and Order 
 
As befits a book for rulers, Belmang’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia is a 
history of the spread and evolution or elaboration of “law” (khrims). To the extent that 
just law is based in Buddhism (chos), it is possible on first glance to mistake the work as 
a standard “rise of the Dharma” (chos ‘byung) history. But a closer examination the work 
reveals that rather than narrating the genealogies of various schools or teachings or the 
expansion of monasteries à la mode of previous chos ‘byung, Belmang’s book possesses 
a singular focus on the history of Buddhist-based legal systems and is a rigorously 
structured chronological narrative of those who have attempted to govern from within 
those systems.  
For Belmang Pandita, the history of India is synonymous with the creation of the 
“world system” (‘jig rten gyi khams) and the origins of human society. In summary: The 
basic necessities of human existence gave rise to families and agriculture, but also greed 
and social stratification. Wealth led to theft, the gravity of which ultimately resulted in 
the appointment of governors (dpon po) from among those of sound mind and body.630 
Further funds were raised (the first taxes) and “the temporal kings arose, the first of 
whom received universal acclaim and hailed from the mind-stream of king Sakyamuni of 
the unrivaled teachings.”631 This king proscribed stealing and lying. “And from this there 
gradually arose the making of laws.”632 Thus Belmang reminds his readers that from the 
                                                
630 Belmang, History, 484-486. 
 
631 Belmang, History, 486:2: “'jig rten 'di chags nas rgyal po'i thog mar byung ba mang bkur 
rgyal po 'di ni ston pa mnyam med shAkya'i rgyal po dang thugs rgyud gcig par gsungs so/ ”  
 
632 Belmang, History, 486:3: “de la khrims byed pa sogs rim gyis byung zhing”  
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outset, proper law-making has always been intrinsically Buddhist and that the act of 
temporal governance is not inimical to the Buddhist path. In just three more folio pages 
Belmang provides for his reader a genealogy of the princely lineage of Sakyamuni, 
introduces his first followers, and concludes with mention of Aśoka, the first Dharmaraja 
(chos rgyal mya ngan med).633  
After apologizing for leaving out any further account of kings of India or the 
development of the teachings in India, Belmang turns swiftly to the “history of other 
countries.”634 The second stop on his whirlwind tour of world history is Shambhala, or, 
more specifically, “northern Shambhala” (byang shambha la), which in his treatment is a 
vehicle for praising Tibet. The three folios that make up this chapter begin with a 
description of Shambhala based on the Kalachakra tantra.635 It is in this chapter that the 
author introduces the idea of the parallel development of both chos (“dharma”) and rgyal 
po (“kings”). He wraps up his description noting that the country has been ruled for 700 
years by a lineage of “great lamas,” the most recent manifestations of which are the, 
“Panchen lama the forceful wheel turner” and “his superior ministers, the Changkya 
Rolpay Dorjé and the all-knowing Jamyang Zhepa.”636  
                                                
633 Belmang, History, 492:6. 
 
634 Belmang, History, 493:1-2. 
 
635 Belmang, History, 493:3-496. 
 
636 Belmang, History, 498: 3-4. It is curious that Belmang makes no mention of the Dalai Lamas 
in this context, nor does he discuss them in the subsequent chapter on the history of Tibet. 
Mention of the Dalai Lamas occurs quite late in the text and at first only as supporting characters 
to Gushri Khan. The history of Tibet begins on page 499, Gushri is first mentioned on 509, the 
Great Fifth Dalai Lama on 518 and the first Dalai Lama on 520. 
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 Where Belmang’s chapter on Shambhala begins with a fleeting reference to 
tracing the “manner of the rise of both the dharma and kings,”637 the subsequent chapter 
on the history of Tibet allows him to elaborate on the bifurcation of law (khrims) into two 
separate categories: “religious law” (chos khrims) and “royal law” (rgyal khrims).638 
According to Belmang Pandita, the “religious king Songtsen Gampo” (or Dharmaraja, 
chos rgyal srong btsan skam po) was personally responsible for the introduction of both. 
Belmang first describes the establishment of the “superior chos” (dam pa’i chos kyi srol 
btod) following the arrival of his new Nepalese and Chinese wives in Lhasa. 639 
Specifically this entailed establishing the Jokhang to house the images brought to the 
capital by his two queens, “taming” the frontiers and various regions of the kingdom 
through the construction of chapels, dispatching missions to India to seek out Buddhist 
texts, and supporting the subsequent translation work into the new Tibetan script.640 He 
then describes the inauguration of the “royal law” (rgyal khrims) by means of three 
essential acts: palace construction, conquest, and finally the establishment of the “sixteen 
laws of pure human chos” (mi chos gtsang ma bju drug gi khrims). 641  Belmang 
                                                
637 Belmang, History, 493:2: “byang shambha lar chos dang rgyal po byung tshul/”  
 
638 For first use of the binary chos khrims and rgyal khrims in the summary of Tibetan history 
with which he opens the chapter on Tibetan history (499:3). It appears again on 506:4. Both cases 
the binary appears in the context of explaining the decline of these laws in the aftermath of Lang 
Darma’s suppression of Buddhism. 
 
639 Belmang, History, 503:3. 
 
640 Belmang, History, 502:6-503:3. 
 
641 Belmang, History, 503:3-4.  
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enumerates these “laws” (khrims) and notes that they represent an expansion on the 
Buddha’s “law of the ten virtues” (i.e. the ten Buddhist virtues, dge bcu’i khrims).642  
Belmang’s attribution of the first transmission of Buddhism to Tibet to Songsten 
Gampo was highly conventional for its day. He rejects other accounts containing stories 
of the arrival of Buddhist sutras from the sky to the palace of earlier kings as “absurd.”643 
He cites no less an authority in these matters than the Great Fifth Dalai Lama’s own 
history of Tibet, the Deb ther dpyid kyi rgyal mo’i glu dbyangs.644 Moreover, the idea that 
Songtsen Gampo’s sixteen “laws” (khrims) were merely an elaboration or adaptation of 
the Ten Buddhist Virtues had been mainstream since at least the twelfth century.645 What 
is important for our subsequent discussion of Belmang’s History is to point out that it is 
Belmang’s description of the origins of chos khrims and rgyal khrims under Songtsen 
Gampo that helps us interpret what he means when he uses the term “law” (khrims) or 
refers to the dichotomy of chos and srid or the “two traditions” (lugs gnyis) in subsequent 
sections of the book. 
As exposited by Belmang, rather than setting out a detailed penal code, Songtsen 
Gampo’s “royal laws” set out the “virtues” or moral principles by which the king 
expected his subjects to orient their social relations. In this respect, the “laws” reflect the 
original meaning of the word chos as “custom.” The king’s laws, therefore, were an 
                                                
642 Belmang, History, 503:4-504:2. 
 
643 Belmang, History, 502:2-4. 
 
644 Belmang, History, 502:3. 
 
645 Ian MacCormack, “Querying the Political and the Theological in Tibetan Intellectual History” 
(unpublished paper), 10. MacCormack traces the origins of this idea to at least the Testament of 
Ba (dba’ bzhed) an eleventh or twelfth century text. MacCormack also cites Stein (2010 [1986]): 
215), who has labeled this idea a “pious fiction” of later Tibetan scholars. 
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articulation of the “pure customs of the people,” the phrase by which the laws were 
popularly known. Although in this one case we can observe the older, imperial-period 
understanding of chos as “custom,” peeking through into Belmang’s History, in the rest 
of the text the author uses chos is to indicate the teachings of the Buddha—the Dharma 
and “religious” activities more generally. These usages of chos are in keeping with the 
understanding of the word following the second assimilation of Buddhism in Tibet after 
the tenth century.  
Belmang repeatedly notes the manner in which Songtsen Gampo’s sixteen laws 
have informed the later development of what might be called the “second tradition” 
(srid): the law codes or established practices that informed temporal administration and 
jurisprudence. Often translated in English as “politics” or the “mundane,” Belmang’s 
interest in srid seems focused on “administration” or “governance” (rgyal srid, chab srid) 
and the “laws” (khrims, bka’ khrims) or “statutes” (zhal lce’) issued by rulers.646 Over the 
course of the book he discusses several law codes that were applied to Tibet, including 
“Yuan law” (hor khrims) and “Chinese laws” (rgya khrims). 647  In Belmang’s 
presentation, these later codes are much more than moral precepts and refer both to 
criminal law as well as statutes delimiting the constitution of the government and 
regulating official behavior. For instance, Belmang uses the label “Chinese laws” to refer 
to the system of central administration of the Ganden Podrang government ushered in 
                                                
646 It is interesting to point out that the language Belmang uses to articulate or describe the “two 
traditions” is different at different points in his historical narrative. For instance, Belmang 
discontinues the use of term rgyal khrims after describing the laws of the imperial period and the 
chos khrims/rgyal khrims binary fades from view.  
 
647 See for example, “Chinese laws,” 519:4, 609; “Yuan laws” 589; “Mongol laws” (sog po’i 
khrims yig), 606; “the Mongol legal tradition” (khrims lugs sog po), 610; the laws of Desi Sangyé 
Gyatso’s “The Clear Crystal Mirror of Laws” (khrims yig dwangs shel me long), 610:3. 
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under Qing supervision during the 1750s.648 However at the conclusion of his book, 
Belmang Pandita engages in a final, yet essential excursus on the development of law in 
Tibet.649  
In this section Belmang identifies those laws and codes that represent the core 
legal tradition of Tibet in chronological order. The list includes Songtsen Gampo’s 
“Sixteen Laws of the Pure Human Customs,” the laws of the “Great Sakya” (which he 
admits he has not seen), the “thirteen regulations of the Desi Pakmodru” (which he notes 
were later expanded to fifteen), “the law code of the Tsang king,” and finally the laws of 
Gushri Khan. From this list are excluded the laws introduced under the Yuan or Qing as 
are the codes of the Great Fifth and his regent, Desi Sangyé Gyatso. Belmang finds, 
however, Gushri Khan’s laws are “in harmony with” all the preceding codes. In fact, 
Belmang’s subsequent presentation of an annotated list of fifteen laws precisely matches 
the legal code issued by the first Pakmodru ruler Jangchup Gyeltsen (Byang chub rgyal 
mtshan, 1302-1364).650 In Belmang’s treatment, then, Gushri Khan’s legal order is not a 
new or separate code, but rather the most recent articulation of a single stream of 
jurisprudence. Belmang’s list of the fifteen laws is best understood as a list of statute 
headings under which one might expect further detail. 651  But the list nonetheless 
                                                
648 Belmang, History, 519:4, also 655:1. In another interesting case, Belmang refers to the 
administrative and legal system imposed on Tibet during the Yuan as the “Chinese tradition of 
law” (khrims las rgya lugs, 609:6), suggesting the degree to which the Yuan/Hor could be 
conflated with China/Rgya in Belmang’s thinking. 
 
649 Belmang, History, 661-664. 
 
650 See Belmang, History, 661:6-662:3 and the “Code of Fifteen Laws” of the Phagmodrupa as 
listed in Krang dbyi su (Zhang Yisu), bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, 2380.  
 
651 Brief descriptions of the fifteen laws are as follows, in the order they appear in Belmang’s 
text: 1) Defending the country from external enemies (dpa’ bo stag gi zhal lce), 2) Surviving 
invasion by powerful external enemies (!! sdar ma wa’i zhal lce), 3) Compensation and fines for 
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succinctly conveys an argument for the appropriate scope of government jurisprudence 
and the moral principles that should guide it. And if there was any confusion about the 
significance of the laws, Belmang spells it out for the reader in the next paragraph. To 
paraphrase: the first two laws provide the method for defeating the external enemies of 
the state and establishing domestic peace; the third law, which prohibits capital 
punishment and establishes a schedule of compensation for murder is meant to 
“discourage killing,” as does the twelfth law; the fourth and fifth laws “discourage” 
stealing and adultery, respectively; and the eighth and ninth laws “tame the malevolent 
and ill-intentioned.”652 As in the case with the laws purportedly issued by Songtsen 
Gampo, Belmang explicitly points to their origin during the reigns of the enlightened 
Buddhist rulers, stating “Those laws are nothing more than the way in which the previous 
bodhisattva kings and ministers sought to spread the teachings and the happiness of the 
                                                                                                                                            
murder (bsad pa stong gi zhal lce), 4) Compensation and fines for theft (brkus pa ‘jal kyi zhal 
lce), 5) Fines for adultery (byi byas byi rin gyi zhal lce), 6) Methods for determining the truth of 
arguments made by litigants in lawsuits (zhu bzhes bden rdzun gyi zhal lce), 7) Methods for 
revealing treachery and falsehoods (by means of oaths, trials, seeking signs from deities, etc. 
bston ham mda’ dag gi zhal lce), 8) law on arresting and punishing criminals by restraining and 
binding (bzung bkyigs khirms ra’i zhal lce), 9) Law on recidivism (dran ‘dzin chad las kyi zhal 
lce), 10) Regulations for officials appointed to local office (sne mo las ‘dzin gyi zhal lce), 11) 
Regulations for the provisioning and support of officials by civilians (hor ‘dra za rkang gi zhal 
lce), 12) Punishments for those who have caused injury resulting in blood-loss (rmas pa grag gi 
zhal lce), 13) Law concerning serious punishments resulting in bodily disfiguration such as 
blinding or amputation (nag chen grag sbyor gyi zhal lce), 14) Law on assigning property or 
compensation in cases of divorce (nye ‘brel ‘bral ‘dum gyi zhal lce), 15) Law concerning the 
death of rented or borrowed animals (nam phar tshur gyi zhal lce). 
 
652 Belmang, History, 662:3-5. In this short exegesis of the fifteen laws, Belmang does not 
address the significance of laws nine and ten, which concern regulations of officials appointed to 
local offices and the provisioning and logistical support offered by subjects to officials in the 
field. Perhaps Belmang ignores these statutes because they would have been more obviously out 
of date by the nineteenth century and also of little relevance to the Amdo region where the central 
Tibetan government did not appoint local officials.  
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people,”653 and also, “In summary, in accordance with the discernment that arose from 
the instructions of the kings, these [laws] are elaborations of the Sixteen Laws of Pure 
Human Customs established during the time of the Three Buddhist Kings.”654 Thus 
Belmang advocates the continued use of these laws as the guiding principles for 
jurisprudence and governance in Amdo. It is also important to note that in doing so he is 
simultaneously positioning Amdo and central Tibet within the jurisdiction of a single 
legal regime—and asserting an even more expansive vision for the Tibetan legal tradition 
(and perhaps Tibet) than perhaps even the Pakmodrupa rulers had imagined. 
Belmang’s discussion of law in Tibetan history also makes a second argument. 
The principle characteristic of “law” in Belmang’s History is that it binds the ruler as 
much as it does his subjects. As both executive and exemplar, the ruler has only himself 
to blame if the realm is wracked by conflict. Belmang attributes the collapse of the first 
Tibetan empire to the inability of the rulers to rule within the laws (or perhaps more 
precisely, the “pure customs”) that they themselves had promoted. Belmang writes, “As a 
result of mistakes in the religious law (chos khrims) and royal law (rgyal khrims), royal 
authority (rgyal srid shor) over the base in Ü and Tsang slipped away, and the throne-
holder Trashi Tsekpa (Khri Bkra shis brtsegs pa) moved to upper Tsang.”655 Belmang 
                                                
653 Belmang, History, 662:3. 
 
654 Belmang, History, 662:5-6. 
 
655 Belmang, History, 506:4-5. Several pages earlier in his summary introduction to Tibetan 
history, Belmang explained the fragmentation of the Tibetan empire similarly: “During the time 
of king Lang Darma, as a result of the degeneration of the laws of the dharma and the laws of the 
kings, the descendants of the Dharma Kings moved to Ngari. Other than being known as the 
kings of Ngari, they were never again powerful kings” (499:3-4). Belmang also notes that the 
revolt against the Tibetan kings in the era following the rule of Lang Darma began with the 
“vassals of Amdo.” Perhaps he wishes to send potential rulers (or the banner elite) a less-than-
subtle reminder that the Tibetans in his home country were particularly unruly.  
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elaborates on this theme further in the conclusion of the book where he writes, 
“Regardless of whether the king’s deeds are good or bad, the subjects will follow their 
example. Therefore if rulers and ministers of the temporal world are familiar with the 
treatise of the two traditions in order to rule according to the system of karmic causality 
(las 'brang kyi srol), their powers of the mind and heart will increase, and, not being 
overwhelmed by negative things, they will eventually become the victorious one.”656 
Thus in Belmang’s interpretation, the “law” must tame the absolutist tendencies of a 
monarch as much as it does the “ill-tempered” subjects. 
 
 
The Conversion Narrative  
 
 
 The first part of Belmang’s book consists of four chapters that present concise 
histories India, Shambhala, Tibet, and China, respectively. At the end of the last of these 
chapters, Belmang offers a brief assessment of India, Tibet, China, and Mongolia, 
wherein he states that, “Generally speaking, if one compares their history, vast 
differences have arisen. However, if one compares the history India and Tibet in 
particular, although there are some minor differences, the original and pure explanations 
have been followed.”657 In other words, Mongolia and China are fundamentally different 
from Tibet, despite the fact that he notes that the “teachings” (bstan pa) arrived in China 
                                                
656 Belmang, History, 663:3-4. 
 
657 Belmang, History, 526:6-527:1. 
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(possibly from Mongolia/hor sog!) during Han dynasty.658 However, this assessment 
presents a paradoxical question: If Mongolia and China are both so different from Tibet, 
what makes Gushri Khan’s subsequent conquest of Tibet so praiseworthy from 
Belmang’s perspective, while his description of Qing rule leaves the impression that it is 
something to be endured not celebrated?  
According to Belmang, the answer lies in the particular and unique nature of the 
conversion of the Mongols that occurred following the meeting between Altan Khan and 
the Third Dalai Lama Sonam Gyatso in 1578. For Belmang, the continued significance of 
the conversion lies in the fact that it resulted in an explicit break from past Mongol 
customs and a thorough embrace of new traditions as expressed by the laws of Tibet. In 
other words, what distinguished the establishment of relations between first Altan Khan 
and later Gushri Khan from those established with the Qing, is that the former resulted 
not merely in political and material support for the Gelukpa, but entailed a transformation 
of civilizational proportions. And it was at heart a legal transformation. 
 Before turning to a more detailed examination of the ramifications of conversion 
as understood by Belmang Pandita, it is necessary to first address what is meant by 
“Mongol” in his text. Belmang employs two terms to refer to Mongolia, hor and sog. At 
four points in the text (as well as in the title of the book), they appear together as a 
                                                
658 Belmang, History, 522-523. Belmang’s determination that Buddhism arrived during the Han 
dynasty distinguishes his history from several other influential histories of China written by 
Tibetan-Buddhists in Tibetan during the 18th century. For instance, in the Rgya nag chos ‘byung 
(“History of the rise of the Dharma in China”) by printed in 1736, the author, Gombojab (Mgon 
po skyabs), traces the origins of Buddhism in China to the pre-Zhou period. See Guilaine Mala, 
“A Mahayanist Rewriting of the History of China,” in Power, Politics, and the Reinvention of 
Tradition; Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, 
Königswinter, ed. Bryan J. Cuevas and Kurtis R. Schaeffer (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 150. 
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copular expression “hor-sog,” also referring to “Mongols” broadly conceived.659 Yet the 
two terms also have distinct usages in Belmang’s text. For instance, in his chapters on the 
history of Tibet and China, the polity and institutions of the Yuan are referred to 
exclusively using “hor,” as in the “Yuan kings”660 (hor gyi rgyal po), the “Yuan military” 
(hor dmag), and the “Yuan laws” (hor khrims).  “Sog,” on the other hand, has a broader 
implications, referring to concepts that signal more fundamental aspects of “Mongol” 
identity such as “Mongol lands” (sog yul), the “Mongol written language” (sog yig), or 
the “Mongol tradition/customs” (sog lugs).  “A Mongol person” is also rendered used sog 
(i.e. sog po). Allowing for a handful of exceptions, in his treatment of the post-Yuan 
history of the Chingsids, Belmang’s label of choice for the Mongol princes and their 
polities, including those of Gushri Khan and his descendants is “sog.”661 Although 
Belmang occasionally refers to “Mongolia” as hor, the use of the term sog is much more 
frequent.662 Thus it might be possible to venture the idea that by including hor and sog in 
the title of his work, Belmang is not using the phrase “hor-sog” as a catchall for 
“Mongolia,” but rather “Hor and Sog,” referring to Yuan and then later Mongol khanates, 
especially that of Gushri Khan. These usages of hor and sog carried over into the 
scholarship of his student Drakgönpa in his Oceanic Book. Belmang further breaks the 
Mongols into three distinct groups. For instance, in his description of the Mongols just 
prior to the emergence of Chinggis Khan, he writes, “In general, there are three [sorts] of 
                                                
659 Belmang, History, 522, 596, 619, 625. 
 
660 Ibid., 525:6-526:1. 
 
661 The exceptions are generally from quotations of other authors. 
 
662 For instance sog appears 86 times in the text while hor appears only 41 times, and almost 
always in the context of the Mongol Empire/Yuan period or as a syllable in personal names. 
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Sogpo: Mongols (mong gwol), Khalkha (hal ha), and Oirat (o’u lod). Previously most 
were under the dominion of China. At that time the Tanguts had taken possession of 
some.”663 Although Belmang does not use the name “Mongol” (mong gwol) elsewhere in 
the text, it seems that he is referring here to the Tumed, Chahar, and other Mongol ulus 
residing in Ordos and other areas of “lower Mongolia” (smad phyogs kyi sog po i.e. Inner 
Mongolia).664  
 The positioning of the account of the meeting of Altan Khan and Sonam Gyatso 
in Belmang’s History is significant. Although Belmang mentions in passing the meeting 
at two points earlier in the text,665 and there are several places where one would have 
expected him to introduce it (such as his chapter on the history of Tibet), he withholds 
mention of the story until his discussion of the establishment of preceptor-donor relations 
between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushri Khan and subsequently the Shunzhi emperor. 
Belmang introduces the story at this point in order to draw into greater relief the 
contrasting results of the encounters between the lama and the two monarchs.  
According to Belmang Pandita, shortly after Gushri Khan had begun his military 
campaigns in support of the Fifth Dalai Lama (in 1640), the Second Panchen Lama 
suggested that they also reach out to the Manchus. The Panchen Lama advised, “Since 
                                                
663 Belmang, History, 528:4-5. “spyir sog po la/ mong gwol dang/ hal ha dang/ o'u lod gsum yod 
pa las/ snar phal cher rgya nag rgyal po'i mnga' 'og dang/ skabs 'dir mi nyag gis 'ga' zhig la bdag 
byas nas…” 
 
664 Several pages later Belmang presents another classificatory scheme for the period following 
the defeat of Ligdan Khan and the Chakhar by the “Jurchen”: “Having surrendered and given up 
the permanent seal (of the Yuan rulers), subjects were allocated to his two sons and they were 
known as the lords (dpon po) of the Chakhar. Although they had been the lords of all that was 
called the forty-nine great tsho of the Mongols of the lower area (smad phyogs kyi sog po tsho 
chen zhi dgu), it was said that the descendants of Chinggis Khan was no more. Similarly the rest 
[of the Mongol] royal lineages were distinguished as the Khalkha (hal ha), Torgut (thor god), and 
Junghar (jun gar), et cetera” (531:3-5). 
 
665 Belmang, History, 580, 587. 
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the Jurchen kings descended from Nurhaci  (nor gan cha’i brgyud jun jid kyi rgyal po) 
control all of Mongolia (sog yul) except the Khalkha and Oirat, as well as many 
thousands of cities of China, they possess vast power. Should they not be benefactors of 
the teaching?”666 This outreach bore fruit when, following the conquest of the Ming, the 
“Manchu King Shunzhi” extended an invitation to the Dalai Lama.667 According to 
Belmang’s narrative, by this point Gushri Khan and the Fifth Dalai Lama had already 
established a preceptor-donor relationship (in the “eleventh month of the iron-snake year” 
i.e. early 1642).668 Belmang writes, however, that Gushri also invited the Fifth Dalai 
Lama to visit him on the shores of Lake Kokonor before he departed for Kham. 
Unfortunately, “Although the Tibetans (bod pa rnams) had planned on traveling there in 
order to please the lords and kho lo chi [of Kokonor], they were unable to coordinate the 
timing.”669 Belmang then recalls for the reader what had transpired at that location 
seventy years earlier: 
 
Previously, when the Victorious One Sonam Gyatso was invited by Altan 
Khan [to Kokonor], the Arik donated a thousand horses and ten thousand 
head of cattle. Furthermore, it was widely proclaimed, ‘In general, in the 
past, after the death of a Mongol, according to his status there was the 
custom of killing his wives, servants and livestock. Having brought this to 
an end, a [new] custom of donating an appropriate number of horses and 
livestock to merit making was established.670 Previously murder resulted 
in execution and if livestock were killed [punishment] was imposed for the 
crime. If a monk was struck, the home of the one who raised their hand 
                                                
666 Belmang, History, 605:5-6. 
 
667 Belmang, History, 606:6-607:1. 
 
668 Belmang, History, 597:1. 
 
669 Belmang, History, 607:2. 
 
670 The Oceanic Book (28-29) conveys the meaning here more clearly, indicating that the 
livestock are to be donated to the sangha.  
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would be destroyed. Previously, there was the practice called “od 
god” that involved preparing an effigy of the dead and giving it a name. 
Offerings of flesh and blood would then be made to it. [Now] those who 
have not removed and burned their od god will have their homes 
destroyed. Whenever livestock are killed, the [robber] will be fined 
tenfold.671 In the place of od god, the custom will be introduced whereby 
each [household] shall install an image of the six-armed 
Mahakala and make offerings of the three whites to it. On the three ritual 
days of the month, one-day vows shall be observed; and in China, Tibet 
and Mongolia there will be no unnecessary robberies. Necessary laws will 
be established in accordance with those of Ü-Tsang.’ This is the 
unimaginable liberation that comes from the [encounter of] donor and 
preceptor.672 
 
The proclamation of the Mongol nobles contained in this passage is a close paraphrase of 
the Fifth Dalai Lama’s account of the meeting in his biography of the Third Dalai 
Lama.673 However, as repurposed by Belmang, it serves to remind the reader of the 
                                                
671 Sentence not in version in Oceanic Book. 
 
672 Belmang, History, 607:2-608:2. 
 
673 Rgyal dbang lnga pa chen po, Rgyal dbang sku phreng rim byon gyi mdzad rnam: sku phreng 
dang po nas bzhi pa'i bar gyi rnam thar [The life of the Third Dalai Lama] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
zangxue chubanshe, 2010), 554-555. In the original, the Fifth Dalai Lama attributes this speech to 
a great-nephew of Altan Khan, Sechen Hung Taiji (1540-1586). A translation of the larger 
passage from which Belmang drew his quotation is as follows:  
 
At the center of this crowd of a hundred thousand, the preceptor and patron were 
paired like the sun and moon. As Hung Taiji spoke it was translated by Gushri 
Bakshi: ‘In the past, the heavenly lineage of the Chakhar (Cha dkar) had great 
strength that halted karma. The three [countries] of China, Tibet and Mongolia 
(Hor) were vigorously subjugated, and having established a preceptor and donor 
relationship with the Sakya, the Dharma spread. Later after king Zi mur 
[Temür?], the Dharma was broken. Partaking of flesh and blood as food and 
doing evil, it was like a dark sea of blood. [However], due to the grace of the sun 
and moon-like pair of preceptor and donor, and relying on the holy Dharma, the 
sea of blood was transformed into milk. And by means of this kindness, in this 
direction, China, Tibet, Hor and Sog must all establish/abide in the law of the ten 
virtues. Today, the Chakhar Mongols (sog po) in particular institute these laws. 
Previously, after a Mongol (sog po) died, in accordance with their rank their own 
wife, servants, horses and other livestock would be slaughtered. Henceforth, a 
sum similar to the value of the horses and livestock that would have been killed 
will be given to the sangha and lamas, a dedication prayer (bsngo ba smon lam) 
will be requested. And [we] will not kill [anyone] in order to send them on to 
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implications of entering into a preceptor-donor relationship: True commitment to 
Buddhism requires a thorough replacement of one’s laws—from the traditions that have 
governed the domestic spaces of one’s household to criminal codes, and the model for 
that transformation can only be central Tibet, the model Buddhist realm. Moreover, by 
reimagining the establishment of preceptor-donor relations between Gushri Khan and the 
Dalai Lama using the imagery from the encounter of Sonam Gyatso and Altan Khan, 
Belmang presents Gushri Khan as the realization of the promise made by Altan Khan. 
Only after a further page praising the conversion of the Mongols, does Belmang 
finally turn to the Fifth Dalai Lama’s trip to Beijing and only lingers long enough to 
quote from the “emperor, King Shunzhi’s” (gong ma shun tsi rgyal po) edict bestowing a 
seal on his guest.674 Belmang then returns to the subject of Gushri Khan and spends the 
next four pages (2 folios) discussing the development of successive law codes under 
Gushri Khan, his sons, and later the regent Desi Sangyé Gyatso. As he does in the essay 
on law that concludes the book, in this passage Belmang also makes the case that the 
                                                                                                                                            
look after the deceased. In the past, if a murder of a person occurred, according to 
the law [the murderer] would be executed (Lit. their life-essence would be 
separated from their body). If horses or livestock were killed, those of the [killer] 
would be entirely confiscated according to the law. If someone wearing the attire 
of a lama or virtuous one was struck, the property/home of the one who struck 
with his hand would be entirely destroyed... (554-555) 
 
This is followed by the proscription of the use of effigies, here referred to as ong bkod. The 
speech concludes as follows: “‘[One] must not commit unnecessary robberies of China, Tibet and 
Hor. In sum, in our country here we must act according to what is done in Ü-Tsang of the Tibetan 
country.’ Thus the laws were proclaimed” (555).”  
For further information on Sechen Khung Tayiji, see: Veronika Veit, “The Eastern 
Steppe: Mongol Regimes after the Yuan (1368-1636),” in The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: 
The Chinggisid Age, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
157-181.   
 
674 Belmang, History, 608:5-609:2. 
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laws issued by Gushri Khan and his descendants represented legitimate improvements on 
the indigenous legal tradition.675  
Belmang, like several other authors from Amdo such as Sumpa Khenpo before 
him and Drakgönpa afterwards, strongly asserts the sovereignty of Gushri Khan during 
the years following his defeat of Tsang king in 1642 and his death in 1655.676 In his 
chapter on the history of Tibet, Belmang states, “The king ruled personally as king of 
Tibet for twelve years.”677 Later, he notes that the territory Gushri Khan granted to the 
Fifth Dalai Lama did not include all of the “thirteen myriarchies of Tibet” since Tsang 
had been given to the Panchen Lama.678 The adamancy of Belmang’s statement perhaps 
suggests that nature of Gushri’s bestowal and the potential sovereignty of the Ganden 
Podrang government was very much a subject of debate among Tibetan historians in the 
                                                
675 Belmang, History, 606, 609:5-612. For instance, he notes how Gushri Khan reformed various 
popular operas (zlos gar) that had flourished during the periods of Rinpungpa and Tsangpa rule 
(610:1). Much of this section concerns the reform of “regulations” (las tshan) and  “charters” 
(bja' yig) concerning the deportment, salaries, and organization of civil officials as well as 
military officers. The Desi Sangyé Gyatso’s 1689 Khrims yig dbangs shel me long (“Clear crystal 
mirror of the laws”) is mentioned in this context (610:3).    
 
676 Sumpa Khenpo repeatedly asserts Gushri Khan’s authority over Tibet and the Dalai Lama in 
his Annals of Kokonor. Yang Ho-chin (trans.), The Annals of Kokonor (Bloomington, 
IN:  Indiana University, 1969), 39-40. Gray Tuttle has noticed that in the Oceanic Book, 
Drakgönpa also asserted the ascendency of Gushri Khan over the Dalai Lama as ruler of Tibet: 
Tuttle (2011), 140-141. 
 
677 Belmang, History, 518:4: “rgyal po rang nyid kyis bod kyi rgyal po lo bcu gnyis mdzad/” 
 
678 Belmang, History, 535:4. The full sentence is: “In fulfillment of their desires, [Gushri] invited 
the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. The region of Tsang was granted to the Panchen Lama and 
the rest of Tibet’s thirteen myriarchies were bestowed on the Dalai Lama. As a result the prestige 
of this pair reached the highest level possible in cyclic existence.” (“de nas rgyal ba yab sras 
gnyis bsam ‘grub rtser gdan drangs te/ gtsang gis cha rnams paN chen rin p ocher phul zhing/ 
gzhan bod khri skor bcu gsum rgyal bar in p ocher phul bas/ yab sras dbu ‘phang srid rtse’i bar 
du mtho bar gyur/”). 
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early 1800s.679 Yet Gushri Khan, in this portrayal, is both sovereign and servant—to a 
Buddhist tradition of governance. Belmang also does not hide the fact that there were 
those who viewed Gushri Khan’s conquest as a “foreign invasion” (mtha’ dmag).680 Yet 
such commentators were supporters of the Tsangpa Kings and Gushri Khan’s conquest is 
clearly legitimate due to his manifest support for the Dalai Lama and the Gelukpa. In this 
respect, Belmang’s account is quite similar to that of Sumpa Khenpo, who takes pains to 
point out that Gushri Khan established himself as king specifically in order to ensure that 
the Gelukpa would prosper. Sumpa Khenpo writes:  
                                                
679 Some indication of the debate over the interpretation of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s historical 
significance appears just after the sentence concerning Gushri Khan’s division of Tibet between 
the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. In verse, Belmang writes: “Furthermore, according to the 
root tantra of Manjusri, ‘At the end of time when the world has deteriorated, there will be the 
royal way of the monk. With regards to this there are no doubts that it will occur…[unclear 
phrase].’ According to some, it was Phagpa Lama. Some others say that it was the Great Fifth. 
However I wonder how certain we are that there can only be one?” (“de yang 'jam dpal rtsa 
rgyud las// dus mthar 'jig rten nyams pa na// sddom brtson rgyal po'i tshul du ni// 'byung bar 
'gyur ba the tshom med// yi ge ma zhes gzhon nu zhig/ zhes pa 'ga' zhig gis/ 'gro mgon 'phags pa 
blo gros rgyal mtshan dang/ 'ga' zhig gis lnga pa chen po la bkral kyang/ gcig kho nar ma nges 
snyam mo//” 535:5-6).  
On the basis of this passage, it does not seem that Belmang would deny that the Fifth 
Dalai Lama, like Phakpa nearly four hundred years earlier, possessed political authority. However 
from Belmang’s perspective, it was authority wielded within the context of Gushri Khan’s 
sovereignty. In this passage, Belmang is expressing doubts about the overall historical 
significance of the Fifth Dalai Lama in light of what seem to be millenarian predictions of the 
Manjusri tantra.  
The subject of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s “sovereignty” vis-à-vis Gushri Khan elicits strong 
views among modern historians of Tibet. Samten Karmay, for instance argues forcefully for 
singular sovereignty of the Dalai Lama. See: Karmay, “The Fifth Dalai Lama and His 
Reunification of Tibet,” in Lhasa in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Francoise Pommaret (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003), 65-80. Elliot Sperling, on the other hand, has begun to formulate a more nuanced 
view of the power relations between the Dalai Lama and the Mongols. Sperling, “Pho-lha-nas, 
Khang-chen-nas, and the Last Era of Mongol Domination in Tibet” Rocznik 
Orientalistyczny LXV, Z.1 (2012): 195-211. However, this modern debate has perhaps missed the 
degree to which 18th and 19th century Tibetan historians also disagreed on this issue. This debate 
had significant contemporaneous implications because claims about the “true” nature of the 
Ganden Podrang government during the reign of the Great Fifth also served to legitimize local 
political structures (or political ambitions). The debate over Gushri Kkan’s political authority had, 
therefore, very real implications for both his princely descendants in Amdo and their monastic 
counterparts. 
 
680 Belmang, History, 595:4. 
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Then, many of the [Tibetan] people said: ‘All who are independent are 
happy; all who depend on others are miserable’; or, no matter what, one is 
narrow-minded if he does not give freedom to others. Nevertheless, the 
Khan himself still thought about long-range benefits; so in order to 
vanquish hatred toward the Dge-ldan-pa [i.e. the Gelukpa] if it should rise 
again, to be a military aide to the holy people, monks, and patrons who 
believed in [the Dge-ldan-pa], and to establish the custom of making his 
own descendants kings of Tibet, as stated above, [the Khan] first raised 
himself to the throne.681 
 
 As will be further discussed below, these portrayals of Gushri Khan as sovereign 
starkly contrast with Belmang’s description of the Qing rulers after their establishment of 
sovereignty in Tibet in the 1750s. At this point, however, I would like to suggest that 
Belmang’s juxtaposed descriptions of the establishment of donor-preceptor relations 
highlights the degree to which the encounter with the Qing paled in comparison to that of 
Gushri Khan/Altan Khan. In particular, the establishment of donor-preceptor relations 
with the Qing rulers as described by Belmang entailed no subsequent transformation of 
customs and laws among the Manchus or in China more generally. Unlike Mongolia, 
China remained irrevocably different to Belmang, a difference that appears most salient 
in the contrast between the legal systems of China and Tibet. 
In this sense, the account of the conversion of the Mongols under Altan Khan 
appears in Belmang’s hands to be a perfect inversion of prevailing Qing ideology at the 
time of composition, an ideology of which it is clear that Belmang was not unaware, 
especially since his own pilgrimage to Tibet coincided so neatly with the aftermath of the 
Gurkha campaign and the restructuring of the Ganden Podrang government that followed. 
As seen in Chapter One, for Qianlong the most important measure of a civilization was 
its justice system—an attitude Belmang appears to have shared. Yet Belmang’s 
                                                
681 Yang Ho-chin, trans. Annals of Kokonor, 40; for the original text, see: Sum pa Ye she dpal 
‘byor, Mtsho sngon lo rgyus tshangs glug sar snyan (Zi ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe sgrun 
khang, 1982 [1786]), 16. 
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conversion narrative implicitly rejects the Qianlong argument that Buddhism offered no 
framework for jurisprudence. On the contrary, Belmang explicitly asserts the legitimacy 
of Tibet’s legal tradition, especially its criminal codes, over both Mongolia and China 
and its essential basis in Buddhist virtues. Moreover, both Belmang and the Qianlong 
emperor’s arguments pivot on the same point: capital punishment. The underlying 
purpose of the conversion narrative is the avoidance of killing and shedding of blood 
regardless of the circumstances. The adoption of the “laws of Ü-Tsang” provides a 
framework for handling crimes and conflicts without resorting to further bloodshed. 
Therefore what for Qianlong represents the epitome of justice served, is for the abbot of 
Labrang Monastery the absolute mark of barbarity. 
 
 
“Gold Dust Mixed with Blood”: The Problem of Heterodoxy  
 
 
 
 Belmang’s message, of course, was not primarily directed at the Qing court, but a 
local audience including the jasak rulers of the Mongol banners and the hierarchs of the 
Gelukpa monasteries in Amdo. Thus, although he may have been trying to highlight for 
his readers the incompleteness of the Qing’s transformation into benefactors of 
Buddhism, the primary goal of Belmang’s discussion of the conversion of the Mongols 
and the establishment of donor-preceptor relations between the Gelukpa and Altan Khan 
and later Gushri Khan, was the promotion of Buddhist jurisprudence in Amdo. On the 
basis of Wangchen Kyab’s 1848 history of the Henan princes, we know that Buddhist 
jurisprudence was not a given and that the occasional execution of bandits in the banners 
was a major source of friction with Labrang and especially with the Second Jamyang 
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Zhepa. According to Wangchen Kyab, these frictions came to a head during the reign of 
the fifth-generation junwang Ngawang Dargyé. Belmang’s History devotes an impressive 
fourteen pages to a discussion of Ngawang Dargyé, and his scathing critique of the prince 
expresses a third major argument underlying the History: that not only must one’s 
jurisprudence be Buddhist, but one must support the Gelukpa to the exclusion of all other 
sects. 
 The account of Ngawang Dargyé begins on a positive note. According to 
Belmang, Ngawang Dargyé was well-educated in both Tibetan and Mongol literary 
traditions. He was proficient in the various “sciences,” had read numerous “histories and 
biographies.” Furthermore, although a layman, he had been extensively trained in the 
Gelukpa teachings. Belmang also writes that he was “kind to his subjects” and it was for 
this reason that we are led to believe that he was appointed junwang in 1771.682 The 
previous qingwang, Wangden Dorjé Palam (Dbang ldan rdo rje pha lam) had died in 
1770 without issue and, if Belmang is to be believed, the decision on how to replace him 
largely fell to Changkya Rolpé Dorjé and the second Jamyang Zhepa, both of whom 
happened to be in Beijing when the matter came to the attention of the court. In 
Belmang’s narrative, Changkya is presented as having authority over the nominations for 
the position. Although the names of two other Mongol nobles had already been added to 
the list of potential nominees, the Jamyang Zhepa suggested that Ngawang Dargyé, 
whom they had both just met because, coincidentally, the nobleman was also in the 
capital for an imperial audience, be nominated because “he had heard that the jasak [i.e. 
                                                
682 Belmang, History, 565:6-566:2. 
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Ngawang Dargyé] was good to his people, he should obtain the title of ‘wang’.”683 
Changkya subsequently nominated Ngawang Dargyé, who was duly confirmed by the 
emperor as prince.684  
 The presentation of this story reveals the extent to which the abbots of Labrang 
believed (or wanted to argue) that the power relations in Amdo had been flipped since the 
founding of the monastery. According to Belmang’s vignette, the Jamyang Zhepa and 
Changkya had not only inserted themselves in an unprecedented fashion into the 
nominating process for the highest ranking Mongol noble in the Amdo region, but had 
essentially abrogated the final decision-making authority from the emperor. Wangchen 
Kyab, in his 1848 retelling of this event presents the authority of Changkya Rolpé Dorjé 
in even stronger terms as he states that the hierarch submitted a nomination form (‘os tho) 
with only one name on it.685 The story also suggests that the new prince should have had 
a promising career and must have been on quite good terms with the Jamyang Zhepa. 
And, at least for a while, relations with Labrang remained strong. Belmang writes that 
Ngawang Dargyé “acted in the manner of a true ‘king of religion’” and proceeded to 
Labrang to meet with the Jamyang Zhepa before assuming his duties in the banners. The 
initial relations between the Jamyang Zhepa and Ngawang Dargyé were such that they 
“came together as one mind.”686   
 Only three folios later the reader is introduced to the “evil prince Ngawang 
Dargyé”—very strong wording for a patron of Labrang who had only passed away in 
                                                
683 Belmang, History, 565:3. 
 
684 Belmang, History, 565:5-6. 
 
685 Wangchen Kyab, 336-337. This account cites Belmang as its source. 
 
686 Belmang, History, 566:3: “thugs yid gcig tu bdros/”    
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1808.687 Belmang first criticizes the prince for maintaining a large military force, the 
burden of which fell heavily on his subjects. He notes that, “Although the land was 
peaceful, he asked for many hardships from his subjects… and they became utterly fed 
up with the army whenever it arrived.”688 The prince’s primary sin, however, was that he 
committed himself primarily to supporting and teaching the Nyingmapa tradition. 
Belmang suggests that the prince had been sympathetic to the Nyingmapa teachings for 
some time, but that it was the encouragement of an oracle (chökyong) in central Tibet that 
persuaded him to become a major proponent of the school in Amdo. Belmang records 
that even at the time contemporaries perceived this marked a major break with the 
Gelukpa school, one which the regent in central Tibet tried to reverse by counseling the 
prince that he had been mislead by the medium and that the deity he had spoken with was 
not a protector but rather a malicious trick.689 The History then relates how the prince’s 
faith in the efficacy of the Nyingmapa was deepened when Nyingma adepts were able to 
assist his wife in delivering a healthy son.690  
The prince’s mistakes culminated, according to Belmang, when he decided to 
convert the small monastery located near his primary administrative encampment (his 
“urgé”) in the vanguard banner of the southern Khoshots into a center for the 
Nyingmapa.  The first Jamyang Zhepa had helped found the monastery during the reign 
of Cagan Danjin (the founding patron of Labrang) for the sake of propitiating the 
Gelukpa teachings and ensuring the stability of the prince’s realm. For Belmang, the 
                                                
687 Belmang, History, 573: 3: “ngan wang ngag dbang dar rgyas” 
 
688 Belmang, History, 567:3-4. 
 
689 Belmang, History, 573:4-574:3. 
 
690 Belmang, History, 575-576. 
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attempted conversion of the monastery and the resulting dissolution of the monastic 
community marked the final straw.691  
Belmang writes that the political crisis of the Mongol banners derived from their 
support for the Nyingma teachings. “The prophecy of the beginning and end, rise and 
fall, of Kokonor came to fruition and a rain that was neither goats nor sheep fell… That 
which had been feared in the prophecies came to pass when many of the donor and 
preceptor relations maintained by the princes of Kokonor switched to Nyingma.”692 
Belmang traces the prophecies of which he speaks to the era when the Fifth Dalai Lama 
first established the preceptor-donor relationship with Gushri Khan. He reports that, “The 
Great Fifth stated, ‘In the future, if the Mongols, and especially those of Kokonor, in 
particular those of the lineage of Gushri Khan, do the Nyingma, it will not be good.’”693 
Perhaps in order to minimize the perception that such statements were merely made with 
the political interests of the Gelukpa in mind or that he himself was motivated by 
prejudice against the other schools, several pages later Belmang explains he is not 
necessarily opposed to the teachings of other schools, but that that the teachings cannot 
be mixed together without losing their logic and efficacy.694 The result according to 
Belmang was a dangerous and unrecognizable product: “neither goat nor sheep.”  Mixing 
the teachings led to clouded moral judgment and weak rule that undermined the political 
stability of Amdo.  
                                                
691 The full name of this monastery is U rge grwa tshang gsang sngags smin rgyas gling. See 
Ricard “Translator’s Introduction” xxii for information on this monastery. Some discrepencies 
from Belmang’s account.  
 
692 Belmang, History, 577:5-578:1. 
 
693 Belmang, History, 578:1-2. Belmang repeats this statement on 624:5. 
 
694 Belmang, History, 581. 
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He then moves on to an even more detailed and stern warning from another 
contemporary of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Tülku Drakpa Gyeltsen (Sprul sku grags pa rgyal 
mtshan) about the dangers of mixing the Nyingmapa teachings in with those of the 
Gelukpa: 
 
‘Having mixed blood with gold dust, the children of demons and hungry 
ghosts will run and jump about. The waves of the ocean will froth in 
turmoil.’ In accordance with this [prediction], many communities of 
herders were scattered because of enemies and bandits. Having gathered 
their treasure and [royal] encampments they crossed over from south of 
the Yellow River and regrouped in the area of upper and lower Gshi, Dgu 
dur, and Sdom. It then became necessary for them to offer tribute to the 
nomads of the snowy mountain of Rma chen [i.e. the Goloks]. Most of the 
other princes of Kokonor, were subsequently scattered by the hostile 
bandits, as was foretold in the prophecy: ‘In the year of the snake, a 
demoness will be reborn. The next dragon year will become infamous as a 
year of war. In the year of the horse, the turquoise lake will boil like a 
galloping horse, and in the year of the sheep the communities will all flee 
like the wind.’695 
 
 The historical record, Belmang therefore argues, has borne out predictions about 
the dangers of supporting the Nyingmapa. For the years of the dragon, snake, horse, and 
sheep (1796-1799), Qing official sources provide ample documentation of a major crisis 
in the Mongol banners of Kokonor. For instance, according Wenfu, who served as Xining 
amban between 1808-1811 and composed the “Concise Account of Events in Qinghai” 
for internal use within the amban’s office, the year 1796 marked a major turning point. In 
                                                
695 Belmang, History, 578:4-579:1: “gser sil ma'i phung bo khrag dang 'dres/ 'dre yi dwags phru 
gu rgyug cing 'phyong/ mtsho rba rlabs 'khrugs pas khad kyi nyams zhes 'byung pa ltar/ dgra jag 
gi rkyen gyis ru sde mang bo 'thor/ mdzod dang urge sogs mdor bsdus/ lho phyogs kyi rma chu 
brgal nas/ gshi stod smad dgu ngur sdom sogs brgyud nas/ rma chen gyi gangs ri bar du skyas 
'degs dgos pa sogs byung/ mtsho sngon gyi dpon khag gzhan phal cher kyang/ dgra jag gi rkyen 
gyis 'thor bas/ ma 'ong lung bstan las/ sbrul gyi lo la bdud mo sprul bzhin nyul/ 'brug lor dus 
'khrugs 'brug bzhin grags pa dang/ rta lor g.yu mtsho'i phyogs su rta bzhin rgyug lug lor sde 
rnams phal cher 'ur zhing 'bros zhes pa ltar byung ste/ ” 
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that year, the court approved a request from Ngawang Dargyé and the amban Tsebak to 
move the five banners from the region south of the Yellow River to new pastures north of 
the river and south of Kokonor Lake. However, citing memorials from 1797 through 
1799, Wenfu reveals that the migration triggered a cascade of further troubles as the 
raiders followed their quarry northward. In October of 1799 (JQ 04/09), the amban Kuišu 
memorialized that the violence had spread to such an extent that the previously 
unaffected banners situated around Kokonor Lake were also fleeing northward.696   
 Wenfu’s “Concise Account” also bears witness to the degree to which Qing field 
officials in Gansu and Qinghai struggled to solve the crisis. In both 1797 and 1799, 
Xining ambans were cashiered for failing to quell the violence. In the latter case, Wen-fu 
notes that Ngawang Dargyé forced the dismissal of the amban Kuišu when he traveled in 
person to Beijing and lodged the accusation that the amban was suppressing reports of the 
conflict.697 The fecklessness of “Chinese officials” is on view in Belmang’s History as 
well, where he accuses them of pursing a policy of appeasement against the raiders. He 
writes:  
 
The Chinese officials advised that, ‘The time has come when you must 
flatter them.’ In this respect, the chief Chinese official was thinking only 
of his own happiness. However, again [Mongol] herders gradually settled 
Rtse mdo as the base. Some settled where there were already herders, 
others scattered outwards. According to the emperor’s instructions the 
Chinese army launched a counter attack and some [bandits] fell, after 
which Sbra nag [in Golok] made an oath do not raid again, yet contrary 
[to the promise, the raiding] increased many fold.698  
                                                
696 Changbai Wenfu, Qinghai shiyi jielu (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1993 [1810]), 14-
16. “Changbai” was probably Wenfu’s sobriquet. It is possibly an allusion to the Manchu 
ancestral home, the Changbaishan mountains in Manchuria. 
 
697 Wenfu, 16. 
 
698 Belmang, History, 579:1-3. 
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In this passage, Belmang is most likely referring to the events of 1800 when, 
under the leadership from the new governor-general Sungyun, Qing military forces 
launched a punitive campaign against the Tibetans south of Xunhua subprefecture.699 The 
passage expresses disillusionment with the Qing dynasty’s ability to guarantee the overall 
security of the Amdo region. Belmang suggests that Qing capabilities were declining at 
several other points in the text as well. He describes, for instance, how the regent of the 
third generation qinwang had also raised the issue of raiding from Golok during two 
audiences with the Qianlong emperor prior to 1770. After the first audience, “The 
Chinese army made a show of force which established peace.” Several years later, 
however, when the prince reported threats against his nephew’s banner, the emperor 
merely said that, “Your own Mongol troops (sog dmag) should be self-reliant. If you 
cannot handle it yourself, make another request.” Subsequently, a Mongol military force 
was annihilated and raiders from Repkong (rong phyogs) killed numerous bannermen.700  
Although critical of the Qing’s anemic response to the problems in Qinghai, 
Belmang directs his censure primarily towards the Mongol elite for their support for the 
Nyingmapa.  Moreover, according to Belmang it was not just the Kokonor Mongols who 
were undone by their interest in the Nyingmapa teachings. When discussing the conflict 
between the Junghars, the Khalkha, and the Qing state in the late seventeenth century, 
Belmang again attributes the “calamitous history of the Mongols” to their “curiousity in 
                                                
699 Wenfu, 17-18. It is possible, however, that this is a reference to 1807, when the Xining amban 
Nayanceng and governor-general Cangling also organized military expeditions south of the 
Yellow River to push back the Tibetans (22). 
 
700 Belmang, History, 564:4-6. The emperor stated, “khyod rang gi thub tshod kyi dmag rgyob/ 
ma thub na nga la shod gsungs pa ltar/” 
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the Nyingma.”701 Here, Belmang again reminds his readers of the Fifth Dalai Lama’s 
warning that the Mongols should not study the Nyingmapa teaching. In order to clarify 
what might be perceived as hypocrisy on the part of the Great Fifth who was well known 
for his interest in the Nyingma, Belmang reports that although the Great Fifth studied the 
Nyingmapa teachings, he adamantly refused to share these teachings with Mongols.702  
Claims of impartiality aside, Belmang’s biography of Ngawang Dargyé and 
analysis of Mongol history more broadly was clearly intended to remind his readers that 
once established, the donor-preceptor relationship was an exclusive relationship. The 
marriage between Gushri Khan and the Gelukpa was intended to be monogamous. 
Moreover, Belmang argues that he was not alone in this belief. He states that, “with 
regards to what occurred in the past [i.e. the establishment of donor-preceptor relations 
between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushri Khan] I myself heard the Second Jamyang 
Zhepa give the same advice.”703 Later historians at Labrang such as Wangchen Kyab and 
Drakgönpa also leveled criticism at Ngawang Dargyé.704  
Ngawang Dargyé has, however, had his proponents. Shabkar, a Nyingmapa yogin 
from Amdo whose autobiography is considered one of the great achievements of 
nineteenth-century Tibetan literature, claimed the prince as his guru and extensively 
praised him. From Shabkar’s perspective, Ngawang Dargyé was much more than a 
                                                
701 Belmang, History, 614:3, 615:1. 
 
702 Belmang, History, 614-615. 
 
703 Belmang, History, 578:2. 
 
704 Wangchen Kyab, 339-340; Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 250, 255. Drakgönpa is less critical 
than either Wangchen Kyab or Belmang. Like Belmang he also praises Ngawang Dargyé for 
various meritorious activities on behalf of the Gelukpa and especially his great efforts to bring 
supplies to Central Tibet after the second Gurkha invasion. 
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layman with a passing or utilitarian interest in the Nyingmapa teachings. On the contrary 
he was a fully enlightened being possessing a complete mastery of the teachings of 
several schools and a generous and influential teacher himself. Ironically, Shabkar credits 
Ngawang Dargyé with encouraging him to study the Gelukpa teachings of 
Tsongkhaba.705  Belmang’s criticism of the prince appears to have been well known in 
southern Amdo, especially since the Labrang abbot also composed a separate work of 
poetry mocking the prince. In response to this poem, Shabkar himself is reported to have 
addressed a letter to Belmang Pandita in which he attempted to set the record straight.706 
Modern historians from the Henan Mongol Autonomous County have also perceived 
Belmang’s treatment of Ngawang Dargyé as a sectarian attack. One of these historians, 
Zhao Shunlu, has gone as far as to argue that Belmang was not merely offering an 
analysis of the prince’s declining fortunes, but actively seeking to undermine the prince’s 
authority and draw a wedge between the ruler and his subjects.707  
Belmang’s critique of Ngawang Dargyé is part of his larger project of outlining 
for his readers how a temporal ruler constitutes an ideal “benefactor” (sbyin bdag) or 
candidate for a donor-preceptor relationship. As outlined above, dedication to Buddhist 
jurisprudence and a commitment to thorough social transformation were essential. The 
biography of Ngawang Dargyé adds to this a third pillar: exclusive service to the 
Gelukpa. As previously mentioned, Gushri Khan was an exemplary benefactor. Yet when 
looking back on recent history, Belmang also singles out the Junghar rulers for praise. 
                                                
705 Shabkar, The Life of Shabkar, trans. Matthieu Ricard (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 
2001), 43, also “Appendix 3: Chögyal Ngakyi Wangpo’s ancestry,” 565-568. 
 
706 Zhao Shunlu, 298. 
 
707 Zhao Shunlu, 299-300. 
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Galdan Boshoqtu, Tsewang Rabdan, and Galdan Tsering are all model “benefactors” of 
the Gelukpa. With regards to the war between the Junghars and the Khalkhas, and 
subsequently the Qing (1686-1697), Belmang is sympathetic with the Junghar cause and 
finds merit in Galdan’s claim that the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu had insulted the 
representatives of the Great Fifth.708 However it is on the figure of Tsewang Rabdan that 
Belmang lingers the longest. He notes approvingly that when Tsewang Rabdan first came 
to power he purged 3,500 monks from the monasteries of the Ili Valley. The remaining 
thousand monks were subject to strict discipline and a Gelukpa curriculum (focused on 
study of the vinaya and Tsongkhaba’s Stages of the Path/lam rim). In this manner, “the 
assembly of learned monks increased to over ten thousand.”709  
 Belmang’s affinity for the Junghars is expressed at several other points in his 
History. This affinity stems in no small respect from the intimate historical ties between 
the Khoshots and Junghars. For one, both Belmang and his student Drakgönpa note the 
ways in which Gushri Khan’s conquests of Amdo, Kham and finally Ü and Tsang were 
facilitated with the support of their follow Oirats, the Junghars. The Junghar defeat of 
Lhazang Khan in 1717 is portrayed as an anomalous break from historically 
“harmonious” relations.710 Additionally, it appears that the potential support or at least 
refuge offered by the Junghars was a key part of Lobzang Danjin’s calculus when he 
decided to fight against the Qing in 1723.711 The ties that bound not only the Khoshots of 
                                                
708 Belmang, History, 626:5-6. 
 
709 Belmang, History, 627. 
 
710 Belmang, History, 618:6. 
 
711 Belmang, History, 630-631. 
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Amdo, but also Labrang to the Junghars are evident in the following vignette concerning 
the birth of Ngawang Dargyé’s son in 1771: 
 
Following the instructions of the interpreter of the oracle, several pure 
monks were invited and many rituals were performed and as a result our 
present prince Trashi Jungné was born. At that time the Vajra-Holder 
[Jamyang Zhepa] had a dream in which the noblewoman Rindzin 
Wangmo [the wife of Ngawang Dargyé] give birth to a son who 
immediately grew into adulthood. He was clothed in yellow and held a 
weapon. The next evening, he dreamed that he asked ‘Who are you and in 
what great battle have you passed away? [The warrior] replied, ‘I am 
soldier of Amursana.’ I personally transcribed this from the record book of 
the chamberlain Tenpa Dargyé.712 
 
Here, Belmang appears to be implying that the Trashi Jungné is a reincarnation of a 
Junghar noble. Amursana (d. 1757) was a Junghar prince whose attempt to reestablish an 
independent Junghar khanate in 1755 was ruthlessly crushed by the Qing in 1757, leading 
to a large-scale massacre of Junghar Mongols. There is evidence to suggest that either via 
the Khoshot or directly, Labrang Monastery maintained ties to the Junghars both before 
and after the Qing eliminated in the khanate in the 1750s. For instance, among the 
reincarnate estates at Labrang there was one known as the “Junghar estate” (Tib. cun gar 
tshang). Also, despite injuctions from the Qing court, Labrang dispatched donation-
seeking and teaching missions to Jungharia during the nineteenth century.713  Moreover, 
                                                
712 Belmang, History, 576:2-5: “smra ba mgon bla bcas rab byung gtsang ma kha shas gdan 
drangs/ rim gro mang du mdzad pas/ da lta'i bAang bkra shis 'byung gnas sku 'khrungs/ de dus 
rdo rje 'chang gi mnal lam du/ dpon mo rig 'dzin dbang mo la sras gcig dang/ de ma thag sras 
gcig 'khrungs pa dgung lo cher lon zhing go lag ser po gyon pa rmis/ de'i phyi nub dmag chen 
zhig 'gro gi yod par su yin dras pas/ a mur sa na'i dmag yin zer ba rmis zhes gsol dpon bstan pa 
dar rgyas kyi zin tho las bdag gis bshus so// ” 
 
713 Little is known about the so-called “Junghar estate” at Labrang. The lineage of reincarnate 
lamas who owned the estate were probably responsible for outreach and proselytization among 
the Junghars, much as Labrang’s “Chinese estate” (Tib. rgya nag pa tshang) was responsible for 
outreach to the Qing court. The history of Labrang’s outreach to the surviving Oirat and other 
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Belmang prefaces his segment on the history of the Junghar and Khalkha conflict with a 
suggestion that the Oirat polity represented the resurrection of Songsten Gampo’s empire:  
 
‘The territory of the Oirad is the territory of Songtsen Gampo; the territory 
of the Khalkha is that of Chinggis Khan.’ Having said this they heaped 
praise on the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and paid attention to their 
teachings and political administration. The Mongols also said, ‘As we are 
under the Dalai Lama and Panchen lama, by means of our respect and 
irreversible faith we pray.’ The Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama 
states furthermore, ‘The Mongols enjoy blood and meat, therefore it is 
difficult for them to take a rebirth in higher realm. However, the signs 
indicate that the majority of them are reborn as divine beings or human 
beings because of the power of their strong faith in the Three Jewels.’ I 
find this to be exactly so. And it is [their faith] that has subsequently 
differentiated them from the others.714 
 
In pointing out the congruities between the territory of the Tibetan empire and the Oirat 
state, this passage confirs a sense of historical legitimacy to the Oirat polity as the natural 
inheritor of Songtsen Gampo’s hegemony. It also presents a powerful statement about the 
underlying unity of Mongols and Tibetans—a unity achieved by the Mongol assimilation 
of Tibetan customs under the tutelage of the Gelukpa since the time of the Great Fifth. 
Here again one can observe the degree to which the establishment of preceptor-donor 
relations between Mongol rulers and Gelukpa hierarchs entailed the erasure of difference. 
                                                                                                                                            
Mongol communities in northern Xinjiang is well attested to in the documents concerning the life 
of Künga Gyeltsen (Tib. kun dga' rgyal mtshan), a Labrang-trained monk who was dispatched to 
Xinjiang in the 1850s and ended up playing a major role in suppressing the Muslim uprisings of 
the 1860s-1870s. See, Skal bzang legs bshad, Rje bstun byams pa mthu stobs kun dga' rgyal 
mtshan gyi rnam thar (Zi ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dbe grun khang, 1994). 
 
714 Belmang, History, 625:5-626:2. “o rod kyi gdan sa srong btsan gyi gdan sa dang/ hal kha jing 
gir gyi gdan sa yin gsungs nas bkur bzos che ba gnang ba sogs rgyal ba yab sras kyi bstan srid 
kyi thugs gtad sa yin la/ sog po rnams kyis kyang/ dA le bla ma dang paN chen 'og to zhes zlog tu 
med pa'i dad gus kyis gsol ba 'debs pas na/ du ku lar/ hor sog 'di sha khrag la spyod pa'i stabs/ 
mtho ris su skye dka' ba 'dra zhig 'dug rung/ skye brtag la mi'i yang srid bzung ba mang tsam 
yong gi 'dug pa/ mchog gsum la dad pa brtan pa'i mthu'm snyam/ zhes gsungs pa kho na ltar yod 
kyang/ phyis su rang gzhan gnyis ka de dang mi dra bar song/” 
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Belmang’s statement is also simultaneously a statement of unity with the people whom 
the Qing rulers considered to be their most dangerous opponents. 
   
The Manchu Rulers of China 
   
So what then, did Belmang Pandita make of the Qing dynasty? In contrast to the 
Mongols, and especially the descendants of Oirat benefactors of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth-centuries, the Qing, or more accurately the “Manchu” (manju) or “Jurchen” 
rulers of China remain a separate, yet sovereign presence in Belmang’s History.  
Belmang attributes the extension of Qing sovereignty to Tibet to the 
reorganization of Tibetan government that followed the “killing of Dalai Batur by the law 
of the emperor” in 1750. Dalai Batur, better known as Gyurmé Namgyel, was the 
younger son of the Polhané, who had reigned as the “king” (mi dbang) of Tibet from the 
1730s until his death in 1749. On the suspicion that Gyurmé Namgyel was preparing to 
ally the Tibetan government with the Zunghars, the two Lhasa ambans lured him into 
their quarters and personally killed him. Although Belmang writes that this occurred at 
the command of the emperor, Petech has pointed out that the order had not yet arrived 
when the ambans felt compelled to act. As is recounted in Belmang’s History, the “two 
Chinese officials” were subsequently killed in an outburst of revenge violence that swept 
the city of Lhasa. Of the several hundred “Chinese soldiers” and other camp followers, 
“not more than five or six survived the slaughter.”715 Yet according to Belmang, it was 
other Tibetans who eventually brought the situation under control:  
 
                                                
715 Belmang, History, 654:5. 
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Batur Kun [Doring Pandita] went to Tibet and suppressed the conflict 
between China and Tibet. For his intervention in what became known as 
the ‘War of the Dam Mongols, China, and Tibet’ he received the title of 
‘beise’ from the emperor and ‘Batur Daiching’ from the [Tibetan] 
government. However, various people including the chamberlain of the 
so-called Sde ba rwa sha [the household of Gurmé Namgyel] fell into the 
hands of China. As if in accordance with the laws of the God of Hell, for 
their acts of murder the leaders of Tibet were placed under the hand of 
China. At the command of the emperor, the system of the four kalön and 
stationing of ambans in Lhasa began.716 
 
The story of Gyurmé Namgyel’s death and subsequent establishment of the 
council of ministers (the “Kashag” consisting of four ministers, or “kalön”) are discussed 
in an equally dramatic fashion at the conclusion of the short chapter on the history of 
Tibet in the first part of his History: 
 
Although [Polhané's] son Dalai Batur Gyurmé Namgyel ruled for four 
years, he was killed according to the law of China, after which the four 
kalön were established. After the death of the Victorious One Kelzang 
Gyatso [1757], it has been said, ‘Thereafter the tradition was destroyed 
and supplications where made to beings on the outside.’ According to this 
statement, the tradition of the joint residence of the regent and ambans was 
instituted. Oh my! The three worlds are impermanent like the autumn 
clouds. Birth and death is like attending a dance. Our passing lives 
resemble lightening in the sky, transmigrating with the speed of a waterfall 
pouring off a precipitous mountain. All those things you have gathered, 
discard them without exception! Having reached the highest point, you 
can only come down; having been born you can only die! At that time, 
since the noble Dharma is the only refuge, solemnly discriminate between 
the consequences of good and evil actions!717 
                                                
716 Belmang, History, 654:5-655:1: “bA thur kun bod du phebs pas rgya bod kyi 'khrugs pa mgo 
mnan/ 'dam sog rgya bod 'khrugs pa'i grangs su 'bror ma bcug par mda' tshan du bkod nas gong 
mar phul bas be' si'i cho lo gnang/ gzhung nas kyang bA thu ta'i ching gi cho lo gnang/ sde ba 
rwa sha zhes grags pa mgron gnyer blo bzang bkra shis sogs kyang rgya'i lag tu tshud de/ dmyal 
ba'i gshin rje'i khrims lta bu'i gsod pa'i las la sbyar zhing bod kyi mgo rgya'i 'og tu tshud/ bka' 
blon bzhi gong nas bsko ba dang/ lha sar a 'ban sdod pa'i mgo tshugs/ ” 
 
717 Belmang, History, 519:4-520:1: “de'i sras dA le bA thur 'gyur med rnam rgyal gyis lo bzhi 
rgyal po byas kyang/ rgya'i khrims kyis bdad nas bka' blon bzhi bskos/ rgyal ba bskal bzang rgya 
mtsho gzhegs nas/ ji skad du/ de o'g lungs ni rnam zhig cing/ /gyi rol skye dgus nye bar spyod/ ces 
gsungs pa ltar/ rgyal tshab dang/ ambhan zung 'brel du sdod pa'i srol btod pa'o// e ma ho/ srid 
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As presented in this manner, Belmang leaves the impression that the 
establishment of “China’s” control over Tibet was not only a misfortunte for Buddhism, 
but marked the end of Tibetan history more generally, especially since the death of the 
Seventh Dalai Lama is the last event that the author discusses in his chronological 
summary of Tibetan history. Moreover, Belmang treats the establishment of Qing control 
quite separately from any discussion of the initation of patron-priest relations. Tibet “fell 
under the hand of China” in the 1750s not because Qing rulers had arrived at a new 
articulation of their support for the Gelukpa, but rather because Gyurmé Namgyel had 
failed to govern the country properly. Therefore, Belmang portrays the transfer of 
sovereignty to “China” as the punishing effects of negative karma. It must also be noted 
that for Belmang, the initiation of Qing sovereignty is also inaugurated with a 
characteristically non-Buddhist act: capital punishment. Thus Qing sovereignty is 
expressed primarily through the imposition of “Chinese law” and only secondarily by the 
presence of ambans and a Qing-sanctioned administrative arrangement (the Kashag). 
Belmang’s perception of the Gurmé Namgyel affair and its implications for 
Tibetan sovereignty presents a strong contrast with the understanding of the Qianlong 
emperor and Qing officials, both in the 1790s and in the 1750s. As Petech has 
documented in his history of Sino-Tibetan relations during the first half of the eighteenth 
century, when the Qianlong emperor and his staff approved the elimination of the 
position of “king” and the elevation of the Seventh Dalai Lama Kelzang Gyatso to a 
                                                                                                                                            
gsum mi rtag ston ka'i sbrin dang 'dra// 'gro ba'i skye 'chi gar la blta dang mtshungs// 'gro ba'i 
tshe 'gro nam mkha'i glog 'dra ste// ri gzar 'bab chu bzhin du myur mgyogs 'gro// 'dus pa 'bral 
zhing bsags pa mlus mdzad// mthon po'i mtha' rgud skye ba'i tha ma 'chi// de tshe dam chos kho 
na skyabs yin pas/ dkar nag las 'bras blang dor nan tan mdzod// ” 
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position of authority over temporal affairs in 1751, they were under the impression that 
they were restoring the regime that had existed under the fifth and sixth Dalai Lamas 
until 1705.718 This view persisted within the Qing court until the 1790s. As discussed in 
Chapter One, during the course of the Gurkha War, Qianlong and his inner court officials 
reappraised their Tibet policy and ultimately reorganized the Tibetan government in a 
fashion that explicitly established the two ambans resident in Lhasa as representatives of 
the Qing’s sovereign authority (Ma. toose). However, in keeping with his view of the 
killing of Gurmé Namgyel as the watershed moment, Belmang gives scant attention to 
the Gurkha wars and their aftermath.719  
Although Belmang identifies the Qing rulers as “Manchu kings,” their realm is 
indistinguishable from “China” and the sovereignty they exercise over Tibet is as “kings 
of China.” Thus, the History describes Tibet as becoming a subject of “China” and not a 
component of a greater, all-inclusive Gelukpa “Qing” empire. There is no concept of a 
“Greater China” either, as can be found in the geographical work of Belmang’s 
approximate contemporary, Tsenpo Nomunhan.720 Kokonor, Jungharia, and finally Tibet 
                                                
718 Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century: History of the establishment of 
the Chinese protectorate in Tibet (Leiden: E.J. Brill, Monographies du T’oung Pao vol. 1, 1972), 
232. 
 
719 Belmang, History, 567:5, 659:5-6. 
 
720 Bstan po no mon han ‘Jam dpal chos kyi bstan ‘dzin ‘phrin las, 'Dzam gling rgyas bshad 
(Gangtok: Dzongsar chhentse labrang, 1981 [1820/30], TBRC W22138), 128. Also see Turrell 
Wylie’s transcription of this text in The Geography of Tibet According to the 'Dzam-gling rgyas-
bshad (Rome: Instituto Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Serie Orientale Roma XXV 
1973), 10. According to Tsenpo Nomunhan the concept of a “Greater China” (rgya nag chen po) 
is analogous to the idea of “Greater Tibet” (bod chen po). He writes that much as “little China” is 
a part of “greater China,” “little Tibet” (by which he means Ü-Tsang) is not separate from but 
part of the “greater Tibet” to which Amdo and Kham also belong. It seems he was correcting 
those who spoke of “little Tibet” and “greater Tibet” as separate entities. 
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successively “entered under the authority of China,” but remained distinct, separate, and 
alienable entities, not constituent parts of a greater whole.721  
Belmang firmly places the history of the Qing within his chapter on the history of 
China and as the last representatives of a succession of Chinese rulers that has stretched 
“4,092 years” from the first “king” to the first year of emperor Qianlong’s reign.722 As 
portrayed by Belmang, unlike the Mongols, the “Manchu kings” appear to have had only 
a short historical existence prior to their occupancy of the capital of China. He presents 
no details about their history prior to the conquest of the Ming and makes no observations 
of any traits that might distinguish them from the Ming emperors. The court’s “ambans” 
in Lhasa and Xining, are “Chinese officials” and Belmang makes no observations that 
would distinguish them as bannermen. In this respect, the Qing rulers appear as a 
meteoric, almost supernatural historical force—an impression only enhanced by the 
unusual story Belmang relates concerning the fall of the Ming: 
 
The next year, the Jurchen obtained [the realm]. Prior to this Yongle, the 
king of China, painted a thangka and left a testament in his will stating 
that, “If the seal is ever broken by anyone, the capital will be lost. Do not 
open it!’ Seven generations later King Chongzhen broke open the seal and 
revealed a thangka that depicted Chinese offering food to a Manchu 
person. For these interdependent reasons Öndor Boktu [Shunzhi or 
possibly Dorgon?] of the Manchus became the king.723 
                                                
721 According to Belmang, Emperor Kangxi brought Kokonor under his control when the Khoshot 
princes of the region accepted his invitation to audience in 1697: “From then on, Kokonor began 
to enter under the authority of China” (626:4-5: “de nas bzung ste mtsho sngon rgya'i 'og du 
tshud pa'i mgo tshugs/”). As for the Junghars: “The Junghars as well fell under the dominion of 
China in wood-monkey year [1764?]” (631:3-4: “jun gar yang shing sprel lo rgya’i mgna’ ‘og tu 
chud/”). 
 
722 Belmang, History, 522:1. 
 
723 Belmang, History, 606:5-6: “de'i phyi lo rgyal jur jid kyis thob/ de yang sngon rgya nag rgyal 
po yong bus thang ka gcig bris nas rgya btab 'dis rgya sus bshig du/ rgyal sa 'chor bas ma bshig 
ces kha chems bzhag mi rabs bdun pa khrung ci rgyal pos bshig pas/ thang kar manju'i mi la rgya 
nag gis zan 'dren pa'i tshul 'dug de'i rten 'brel gyis manju'i on dor bo gto rgyal po byung/ ” 
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It is unclear from what source Belmang derived this apocryphal account of the end of the 
Ming dynasty. But his discussion of the Qing conveys an impression of unfamiliarity that 
strongly contrasts with the deep historical knowledge he possessed of the Oirat and the 
eastern Mongol peoples. 
 Writing from the perspective of early nineteenth century on the eve of the 
centennial of the Lobzang Danjin rebellion of 1723, in the world according to Belmang, 
the Qing remained a sovereign and an influential presence in Amdo. However, the 
continued status of the Qing rulers and their local representatives as “benefactors” (sbyin 
bdag) of the Gelekpa or “holders of the teaching” (bsdan ‘dzin) is much more ambiguous. 
As noted previously in this chapter, Belmang described in unequival terms how the 
Shunzhi emperor and the Great Fifth as establishing a patron-priest relationship: 
“According to the edict offered by the emperor to the one in the west who is omniscient 
of all directions, ‘As for the investiture of the [Great Fifth] as master of the teachings of 
the world, the Lord of the Teachings and the Benefactor of the Teachings (sbyin bdag) 
have achieved the unsurpassed liberation from having entered into a state of union.”724 
Furthermore, later in the book Belmang notes how both the Tukwan Rinpoché and 
Changkya Rolpé Dorjé entered into patron-priest relations with the Yongzheng and 
Qianlong emperors: 
 
In the year that Kelzang Gyatso went to Tibet, emperor Kangxi died and 
Yongzheng took the throne. This king presented the Reverend Ngawang 
Chökyi Gyatso with the title “Tukwan the Vajra-holder” and offered his 
forehead. After Yongzheng passed away in the year in which the Vajra-
                                                
724 Belmang, History, 609:1-2: “gong gi yi ge gsum gyis nyi ma nub phyogs mtha' dag shes su 
bcug pa'i 'ja' sa gnang ste/ 'dzam gling gi bstan pa'i bdag por mnga'i gsol ba ni/ bstan pa'i mnga' 
bdag dang/ bstan pa'i sbyin bdag zung du 'jug pa'i rnam thar bla na med pa'o/” 
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holder Changkya [Rolpé Dorjé] traveled to Tibet, Qianlong took the 
throne. Due to the beneficent force that arose from the [relationship] of 
preceptor and donor established between the Vajra-holder Changkya and 
this king, such joy and well-being arose that it rivaled that of the first 
Perfect Age [of the aeon] when the beings and teachings had still not 
differentiated.725 
  
In this passage Belmang is clearly arguing that both the Yongzheng and Qianlong 
emperors successively took Gelukpa hierarchs as their personal gurus. This is indicated 
both by the reference to Yongzheng bowing before the Tukwan Rinpoché (“offered his 
forehead”) and because these monks were titled “Vajra-holders,” which is the title a 
disciple offers to their personal tutor or “root guru.”726 The patron-priest relationship 
between the Gelukpa and the Qing seems to have born fruit in other, more concrete ways 
as well. For instance, Belmang argues that the eighth Dalai Lama helped the Qing prevail 
during the Second Jinchuan War of 1774: 
 
Although the ruler of Gyelrong possessed little military might, their 
geographic advantages allowed them to pursue the war vigorously. The 
cost of pack yaks rose to twenty or more taels of silver. The [Dalai Lama] 
brought together his treasure, power, superior knowledge and magical 
skills and by means of these forces destroyed the [Gyelrong]. The people 
were gathered as subjects of the emperor and the Bonpos were changed 
into Yellow Hats.727   
 
 
                                                
725 Belmang, History, 655:2-4: “gyal ba skal bzang rgya mtsho bod du phebs pa'i lo gong ma 
khang shi gshegs nas yung Ting khrir phebs/ rgyal po 'dis rje ngag dbang chos kyi rgya mtshor 
mtshan gsol pa thu'u bkwan rdo rje 'chang gi gong ma dbu'i gtsug tu mchod/ lcang skya rdo rje 
'chang bod du phebs pa'i lo yung Ti gshegs nas chen lung rgyal sar 'khod/ lcang skya rdo rje 
'chang dang rgyal po 'di gnyi mchod yon gyi bka' drin la brten nas ris med bstan 'gro rdzogs ldan 
'gran bzod pa'i bde skyid rgyas/ ” 
 
726 Tony Duff, “rdo rje ‘chang,” The Illuminator Tibetan-English Encyclopaedic Dictionary 
(Katmandu: Padma Karpo Translation Committee, 2000).  
 
727 Belmang, History, 655:5-6. 
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However, these relationships and the benefits that accrued from them are 
discussed in the past tense and there is no statement in the book that indicates that the 
preceptor-donor relationship had been reaffirmed in recent times. Both monks mentioned 
as having served as preceptors in the Qing court were figures of the Kangxi, Yongzheng 
and early Qianlong reigns. The Tukwan Rinpoché mentioned in this passage is not 
Lobzang Chökyi Nyima (1737-1802), but rather the second Tukwan, Ngawang Chökyi 
Gyasto (1680-1736). One wonders if from Belmang’s perspective, the relationship of the 
third Tukwan to the Qianlong emperor never rose to the importance of previous patron-
priest relationships. By the time that Belmang composed his History, perhaps thirty years 
had elapsed since the passing away of Changkya Rolpé Dorjé in 1786. There is no 
mention of the Jiaqing emperor as a “benefactor” of the Gelukpa, and concerning the 
later decades of the Qianlong reign, Belmang is silent on the court’s relations to Tibet or 
the Gelukpa. As a result, the impression Belmang leaves concerning the recent history of 
the dynasty is the one evoked by the emperors’ seeming abandonment of its Khoshot 
princely allies in Amdo and their inability to guarantee local security.  
Belmang’s presentation of the Qing rulers, and especially the Qianlong emperor, 
contrasts strongly with another influential work of historical literature produced around 
the same time as the History: Démo Kūtuktu’s (1778-1819) biography of the Eighth 
Dalai Lama (1811). In this work, Démo Kūtuktu, whom we recall as developing a close 
relationship with Belmang Pandita during the latter’s visit to Tibet, vigorously affirms 
not only the association between Qianlong and Manjursi, but the idea that the emperor 
had decided to become a monk in his retirement. As the passage below reveals, however, 
this was not an idea that received universal affirmation: 
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For the purpose of increasing the joy and well-being of central Tibet, and 
especially in accordance with the tradition of offering prostrations that is 
the custom of all the upper classes of China and Tibet, the Manjusri 
emperor bestowed a image of himself in the costume of a fully ordained 
monk and Vajra-holder. Because there were those who were not 
enthusiastic [about worshipping this image], the [Dalai lama] decreed, 
‘The emperor is himself Manjusri, the father of all the victorious ones [i.e. 
Buddhas], and complete exemplar of those lords of men. He is the object 
to which all the world, including the gods, prostrates. Since his commands 
express compassion for all the people of the snowy lands and in particular 
honors/worships the tradition of those who wear the golden-hued crowns, 
nowadays the precious teachings of the conqueror Tsongkhaba have 
flourished. This is due to the emperor's great kindness. Myself and all of 
us must with admiration for his accomplishments worship and serve all of 
his likenesses (‘dra thang).’728 
 
Belmang’s own student, Dragönpa would also later identify Qing rulers as 
“Manjusri” in the Oceanic Book, although only infrequently. 729  But it seems that 
Belmang Pandita might have been one of those who were “not enthusiastic” about the 
worship of Qianlong and other Qing rulers as Bodhisattvas had he been present for the 
unveiling of Qianlong’s thangka in 1798.  
 
Conclusion: The Defense of Buddhist Governance 
 
 Belmang Pandita’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia claims to have been 
written as a guidebook for the contemporary temporal rulers of Amdo. Yet, as a result of 
its explicit and implicit criticisms of the prevailing order, his history is as much a work in 
search of new “benefactors” as it is a celebration of the existing rulers. The first intended 
                                                
728 Démo Kūtuktu, 'Jam dpal rgya mtsho'i rnam thar (Lha sa: Dga' ldan pho brang', Bras spungs, 
1811, TBRC W2CZ7847), 269ka:3-269kha:2. This quote comes from a section dated to 
September 12, 1798 (JQ 03 “Earth-horse year”/08/03). 
 
729 Drakgönpa identifies Qing rulers as “Manjusri” approximately four times in 783 pages. 
Qianlong is the most common recipient of the moniker (ex. 72), yet Yongzheng (280) and 
Daoguang (442) also receive the label.  
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audience of the book, the traditional patrons of Labrang—the neighboring Mongol 
princes of Amdo, are portrayed as struggling to retain their people and maintain their 
historical commitments to Labrang. Belmang depicts the new junwang Trashi Jungné as a 
promising new ruler (after all, he may be reincarnated Junghar noble!), but facing major 
challenges ahead.730 As for the Qing emperors, they appear increasingly incapable of 
guaranteeing local security and disinterested in fulfilling the commitments implied by the 
establishment of preceptor-donor relations between previous emperors and Gelukpa 
hierarchs. Although Drakgönpa would later on describe the late 1790s and early 1800s as 
the moment when the Qing stepped into the role of primary patron of the Jamyang 
Zhepas and Labrang Monastery, this is not the vision of Belmang Pandita at the time. 
Moreover, Qing official sources reveal that in 1809, the Jiaqing court rebuffed an attempt 
by Labrang officials to send the third Jamyang Zhepa and the fifth Cagan Nomunhan to 
Beijing for an imperial audience.731 One could speculate that this incident as well 
influenced Belmang’s perception of Qing commitments to the monastery. 
The major arguments presented in Belmang’s History reflect a local political 
order in flux. Belmang’s sectarianism can be read perhaps not only as his diagnosis of 
why the banners collapsed but also as an expression of his worries about what might 
happen if the Mongol nobility of the region increasingly divided their patronage between 
the Gelukpa and other schools. Ngawang Dargyé’s sudden transfer of material and 
human resources to the Nyingma posed a problem to Labrang and other Gelukpa 
monasteries in Amdo if it was allowed to set a precedent. Belmang’s attempt to deter 
other Mongol nobles from following the example of Ngawang Dargyé by linking their 
                                                
730 Belmang, History, 582:5-583:1. 
 
731 Wenfu, 25. 
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political crisis to their support for the Nyingmapa was one possible strategy for 
containing the damage. A generation later the Fourth Jamyang Zhepa took a different 
track: Instead of attempting to proscribe the Nyingma teachings, he invited Nyingmapa to 
settle at Labrang, thus making the monastery a focus of patronage regardless of sectarian 
sympathies. 
Securing the undivided attention of the Mongol nobility in Kokonor meant more 
to Belmang than merely assuring the wealth and security of Labrang. Much as the 
Yongzheng emperor and Nian Gengyao had a century earlier, Belmang believed that 
“Since Kokonor is the vital juncture of China, Tibet, and Mongolia, it is essential to 
control it.”732 The region remained key to the overall security of the Geluk school in 
general. After all, it was the Gelukpa cultivation of the Mongols and especially the Oirats 
around the shores of lake Kokonor that had originally provided the military backing 
necessary to capture and transform central Tibet into the bastion of Gelukpa orthodoxy. 
The undoing of the Pakmodrupa and Tsangpa rulers, Belmang writes, had been the fact 
that they ignored Kokonor. The Gelukpa, on the other hand, had grasped early on the 
importance of the north and Kokonor in particular. And the region had not lost its 
strategic significance: “It has been said that at present, the teaching of those who wear the 
Yellow Hats depends on the peace of Kokonor and the benefactors of the north who are 
nearby.”733 The continued assimilation of the Mongols of Kokonor therefore was of 
strategic import to the Gelukpa cause. A key component of this transformation for 
                                                
732 Belmang, History, 624:6-625:1: “mtsho sngon 'di rgya bod hor gsum 'du ba'i sa gnad yin pas/ 
khur len gal che tshul/” 
 
733 Belmang, History, 625:3-4. “deng sang zhwa ser 'chang ba'i bstan pa 'di byang phyogs kyi 
sbyin bdag rnams dang khad nye bar/ mtsho sngon phyogs kyi dus bde dog la rag las gsungs 
nas/”  
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Belmang was the promotion of Buddhist jurisprudence based on the codes of central 
Tibet.  
In the early nineteenth century, Amdo was not only a pluralistic religious 
environment—a marketplace of “chos”—it had also become a pluralistic legal order.734 
Belmang’s argument that the aspiring “world guardian” (‘jig rten skyong ba)735 ground 
their temporal governance in the Tibetan tradition of Buddhist jurisprudence (the “second 
tradition”) implied a rejection of the other legal options available in Amdo. As the 
Mongol secretary at Labrang, Wangchen Kyab, reports in his 1848 history of the region, 
the second Jamyang Zhepa and Labrang officials such as Belmang had been critical not 
only of the Mongol princes’ dalliances with the Nyingmapa but also of their adherence to 
what were perceived as traditional Mongol criminal codes and traditions of punishment. 
As shall be discussed in chapters five and six, the establishment of the office of a Qing 
amban in Xining and subprefects in Guide and Xunhua also presented alternate venues 
for seeking justice that increasingly competed with Gelukpa authorities at Labrang and 
other monasteries in the region. Although Belmang does not mention the new Qing 
subprefectures in his book, his dislike of “Chinese” jurisprudence and administrative 
systems is a subtext to his argument that entering into a formal preceptor-donor 
relationship was an expression of faith in the teachings of the Gelukpa and also a promise 
to adopt Tibetan jurisprudence. 
                                                
734 Belmang’s History identifies several different types of chos or “religions” in the Amdo region. 
In addition to speaking of a “Nyingmapa chos,” he also discussed the “Salar chos lugs,” or the 
“religious tradition of the Salars,” i.e. Islam. With regards to the latter, Belmang notes the large-
scale violence in the region caused by the “conflict between the old and new religions of the 
Salar” (659:4: “Za lar chos lugs gsar rnying gi 'khrugs pa”). 
 
735 Belmang, History, 663:3. It is to this figure that he addresses his final exhortations to “observe 
the treatise on the two traditions” (lugs gnyis kyi bstan bcos). 
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For the abbot of Labrang monastery, faith and law were intimately linked. 
Jurisprudence was a crucial vehicle for promoting the Gelukpa teachings and demarking 
his Gelukpa-Tibetan civilization in the face of Mongol backsliding and new Qing 
magistrates to the north and east. By promoting Tibetan legal culture, Belmang helped 
create an infrastructure for a unified Gelukpa-Tibetan civilization that embraced the 
distant and peripheral regions such as Amdo in the absence of a centralized and 
independent political regime ruled from Lhasa. Although the Ganden Podrang 
government held some estates on the margins of the Amdo region (west of lake Kokonor 
and in the Chaidam region), it had no direct administrative control over the Amdo region. 
The expansion of jurisprudence based on the legal culture of central Tibet in the Amdo 
region was therefore entirely a local initiative—an ongoing transformation of legal 
culture driven from the bottom up and from the margins in.  
The adoption of Tibetan jurisprudence in the Mongol banners of Amdo was a 
result of the advocacy of Gelukpa hierarchs such as Belmang Pandita and the Jamyang 
Zhepas, but also a result of the contingent actions of banner subjects who sought out 
Buddhist justice from Gelukpa monks, advocated for its extension to their home 
communities, and in some cases, eventually chose to emigrate to “Tibetan” communities 
when their own banner nobility failed to deliver. As a result of these activities, one might 
argue that the availability of a parallel system of Gelukpa jurisprudence at neighboring 
monasteries may very well have been an important factor contributing to the erosion of 
the hereditary Mongol nobility’s authority in the banners. When Belmang argued that the 
Mongols nobles could save their patrimonies by rededicating themselves to the Gelukpa 
and the observance of Tibetan jurisprudence, he was essentially instructing them on how 
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to become proxies for the Gelukpa hierarchs of Labrang. One can imagine that this was 
hardly a receipe for continued autocracy in the banners, as the case of Trashi Jungné, the 
fifth-generation junwang demonstrates. Belmang praises the new prince and presents him 
as a contrast to his father, especially with regards to his dedication to the Gelukpa. 
Wangchen Kyab’s chronicle reveals, however, what such praise may have entailed: the 
prince apparently reconciled himself to diminished authority and handed over judicial 
authority to Labrang and its affiliated monks. The territorial integrity of his polity 
increasingly relied on the personal efforts of the third Jamyang Zhepa.736 In these details 
we can observe, possibly, an alternate explanation for a historical transformation that has 
been largely taken for granted. The long-term acculturation of Mongols in Amdo to 
Tibetan ways was not some sort of organic, inevitable process driven by the magnetic 
power of a superior Tibetan Buddhist civilization, but rather the contingent outcome of 
aggressive actions and policies of Gelukpa prelates such as Belmang Pandita, who as 
abbot of Labrang envisioned the assimilation of the Mongols to be a strategic necessity. It 
was furthermore a transformation in which Tibetan jurisprudence played a major role.  
As stated in his introduction, Belmang had a second audience in mind as well, 
namely other Gelukpa monks who held responsibilities for the administration of lay 
communities. With regards to this group, Belmang’s History insinuates one further 
argument: if neither the traditional patrons of the church nor the Qing rulers are capable 
of stepping up to guarantee the peace and stability of the Amdo region, this responsibility 
must and can be born by the Gelukpa hierarchs themselves. He makes this case not by 
any discussion of the Great Fifth, but rather indirectly through his repeated mention of 
the Cagan Nomunhan, a reincarnate lama who, as shall be discussed in more detail in the 
                                                
736 Wangchen Kyab, 356-357. 
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following chapter, had held joint political and religious control over a large community of 
Tibetans and Mongols in Amdo since at least the mid-seventeenth century. Belmang first 
mentions this reincarnate lineage in the context of the appointment of Ngawang Dargyé 
as the replacement prince in 1771. Perhaps more accurately, it is Changkya Rolpé Dorjé 
who mentions the Cagan Nomunhan in this context:  
When it was time to submit a list of names for the position, only the names 
of Tsézung Tusalakchi (?) and Tsépak Taiji, the sons of Apo Noyön were 
listed. However, [Jamyang Zhepa] suggested to [Changkya] that because 
he had heard that this jasak [Ngawang Dargyé] was kind to his people, he 
should obtain the title of prince. [Changkya] responded, ‘If, like the Cagan 
Nomunhan who is also both lama and jasak of Kokonor, you also similarly 
received ownership of the prince’s nomadic communities, there would be 
happiness and prosperity both for yourself and others.’ However, 
[Jamyang Zhepa] did not agree, finding this unsuitable. He suggested that, 
‘The steady protection provided by princes from a lineage of rulers is the 
better way.’ Things were handled according to this suggestion. Therefore 
the jasak [Ngawang Dargyé] obtained the title of prince.737 
 
We learn in this passage that no less a personage than Changkya Rolpé Dorjé had 
floated the idea that the Jamyang Zhepa should replace the descendants of Gushri Khan 
as the leading prince of Kokonor. According to Belmang, the Cagan Nomunhan had 
pioneered the combination of the “two traditions,” and the Jamyang Zhepa could 
replicate his success on an even grander scale. Lest the reader miss the significance of 
Changkya’s reference to the Cagan Nomunhan and in what would otherwise seem like a 
non-sequitor, Belmang returns to this lama again in the final pages of his book. He 
                                                
737 Belmang, History, 565:3-6: “di nas 'os tho phul ba la/ a po no yon gyi sras thu sa lag ci tshe 
gzungs tshe dpag the ji songs las med kyang skyabs mgon mchog nas/ ja sag 'di ru sde la byams 
pa sogs gsan nas/ bAng gi thob 'ong rgyu'i mgo 'dren lcang skya rdo rje 'chang la zhus par/ rdo 
rje 'chang gi zhal nas/ tsha gAn no mon han/ mtsho sngon gyi bla ma dang/ ja sag gnyis ka yin pa 
ldar/ khyed kyis kyang de 'dra'i thob cig blangs nas/ ching wang gi ru sde la bdag gnang na/ rang 
gzhan la bde skyid yong gsungs kyang/ de 'dra thugs 'thang med tshul dang/ dpon zhig gi rigs 
brgyud gtan 'jags kyis bskyangs na legs tshal zhus pa ltar/ khong nas mgo 'dren gnang ste/ ja sag 
la bAng gi thob byung nas/ rang yul du phebs/” 
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devotes a full folio to providing further documentation of how successive generations of 
the monk had served as both “lama and minister” and adds a magniloquent description of 
how the splendor of his royal encampment surpassed that of Ngawang Dargyé.738 
By turning to the Cagan Nomunhan at the conclusion of his book, Belmang 
suggests a future for the Amdo region and Tibet quite different from that envisioned by 
Qianlong and his ministers at the end of his reign. Where the Qianlong emperor had 
argued for replacing Buddhist-based governance with the “way of the emperor” and law 
codes based on those of China-proper, Belmang reasserted the importance of the Tibetan 
tradition of jurisprudence and advocated its expansion through the Mongol banners. This 
may have been the vision he had for the future of the third Jamyang Zhepa, who was 
assuming his temporal and spiritual duties as abbot of Labrang as Belmang finished his 
History. 
Shortly after Belmang composed his history, the attention of the Qing court would 
also turn to the Cagan Nomunhan. However, from the perspective of Qing officials 
dispatched to the grasslands of Amdo, this monk became a symbol of how untenable the 
prevailing system of governance in the region had become and the continued dangers of 
rule by reincarnate lamas. The Cagan Nomunhan served, therefore, as a catalysit for an 
attempt to thoroughy rethink Qing policy in the region. The head of the dynasty’s mission 
was the Manchu official Nayanceng, coincidentally a perfect contemporary of Belmang 
Pandita (both men were born in 1764). His collected memorials on Tibetan and 
Mongolian affairs were published perhaps just five years after Belmang completed his 
History. It is to Nayanceng’s reports of his encounters with the Cagan Nomunhan and 
other Gelukpa hierarchs of Amdo that we now turn.  
                                                
738 Belmang, History, 656-657. 
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Chapter Five: To Be “One’s Own Master:” The Monastic Domain of 
the Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu 
 
Introduction: The Collapse of the Mongol Banners of Kokonor 
 
In the winter of 1822-23, the Manchu official Nayanceng (Ch. 那彥成, 1764-
1833), president of the Board of Punishments and provisional governor-general of the 
provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu (Ch. 陝甘總督), submitted a memorial to the throne 
describing an unusual meeting between himself and the Fifth Lamo Cagan Nomunhan 
Kūtuktu (Ma. cagan Nomunhan, Ch. 察漢諾們罕呼圖克圖, 1797-1831), an influential 
reincarnate Gelukpa lama from the grasslands south of the Yellow River.739 This meeting 
had been sought by the monk and agreed to by the Qing official in the hope of resolving a 
series of conflicts that threatened to destabilize the western districts of Gansu Province 
                                                
739 Nayanceng, Pingfan zouyi 平番奏議 ([Qing]: Lanyuan a gong ci, 1853), fascicle 2:5b-10a 
(1823-1-5). This blockprint is hereafter abbreviated: PFZS 2:5b-10a.  
“Nomun han” is the Manchu transcription of a Mongol title combining the concepts of 
“khan” (ruler) with expertise in the Buddhist sutras (“nomun”). The title has its origins in India 
and is therefore often glossed as “Sutra Prince” or “Dharma Raja.” See for instance, William 
Frederick Mayers, The Chinese Government (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1897), 115. During the 
seventeenth century, successive Dalai Lamas bestowed the title on reincarnate monks such as the 
Cagan Nomunhan who governed large lay populations. For instance, the Ganden Phodrang 
government entitled the Shartsang Rinpoché of Rongwo monastery, who administered twelve 
tribes in the Repgong region, a “nomunhan” in 1703. Qing rulers beginning with Kangxi appear 
to have adopted the title from the Ganden Phodrung and either re-confirmed existing usages of 
the title or awarded it to other kūtuktu who had not previously received the title. The Qing, like 
the Ganden Phodrang government, reserved the title “nomunhan” for reincarnate monks whom 
the state viewed as holding significant secular/lay administrative responsibilities. Thus, as will be 
discussed in this chapter, several of the jasak lamas of Inner and Outer Mongolia received the 
title, as did the kūtuktu who served as regent in central Tibet. The earliest example of this was the 
first Tsemonling kūtuktu, Ngawang Tsültrim (1721-1791), who received the title upon taking up 
the job of regent for the eighth Dalai Lama in 1777 (Petech, The Dalai-lamas of Tibet, 138). The 
seventh Phagpa Lha Kūtuktu, who governed large lay communities in Kham, also received this 
title from Qianlong in 1791 after making extensive gifts to the emperor in advance of his eightieth 
birthday (see Chapter Two). The importance of the title as a label denoting local political 
authority was further underlined in 1839 when Daoguang ruled that lamas serving as state 
preceptors (國師) could not concurrently hold the title of nomunhan (Zhao Yuntian ed., Qinding 
Daqing huidian shili lifanyuan, 153). 
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and the indirectly administered pasturelands of Kokonor (Ch. 青海 Qinghai) that lay just 
over the frontier. 
By the beginning of the Daoguang reign (1821-1850), the political order that the 
Qing court and its military forces had imposed on the borderlands of Gansu a hundred 
years earlier in the aftermath of the Lobzang Danjin rebellion (1723-24) had crumbled. 
The Mongol banners surrounding Kokonor Lake were facing a demographic collapse that 
had left them unable to defend their increasingly empty pastures from raiding and 
occupation from other nomadic communities further south. Nayanceng identified the 
majority of these raiders as “nomadic Tibetans” (Ma. aiman-i fandze, Ch. 野番). Qing 
prefectures as far away as Liangzhou and Ganzhou (present day Wuwei and Zhangye, 
respectively) along the Hexi Corridor were flooded with destitute refugees—a crisis that 
the court worried would threaten the stability of the strategic route between the interior 
and Xinjiang. A survey of the banner populations completed in February, 1823, revealed 
the scope of the destitution: of the twenty-four banners originally located to the north of 
the Yellow River, only three banners could claim a population that matched its 
population in 1810. Seven banners reported populations less than half of what they had 
been in 1810.740 To the south of the Yellow River, in the pastures that bordered the Qing 
subprefectures (Ch. 廳) of Guide and Xunhua, large migrations were underway as 
herding communities there struggled over pasture.  
Since the Yongzheng reign (1723-1735), the Qing court had recognized 
successive reincarnations of the Cagan Nomunhan as jasak lama and lord of his own 
“nomadic lama banner” (游牧喇嘛旗 or 游牧喇嘛部落), a unique institution among the 
                                                
740 PFZS 2:39b-40b.  
 345 
other twenty-eight Mongol banners in Kokonor.741 During the spring and summer of 
1822 the young fifth Cagan Nomunhan, Pendé Wangchuk Getsun Gyamtso (Tib. Phen 
bde dbang phyug mkhas btsun rgya mtsho), had directed troops from his banner to assist 
Cangling (Ch. 長齡 1758-1838), Nayanceng’s predecessor as governor-general, conduct 
a punitive expedition against Tibetan raiders south of the Yellow River. With court 
backing, in July 1822, Cangling issued the Cagan Nomunhan a grain ration worth one 
thousand silver liang and a license permitting him to occupy territory north of the Yellow 
River on the condition that he guarantee the security of the Yellow River fords against 
further incursions and raids.742 
Thus the meeting between Nayanceng and the Cagan Nomunhan could have been 
a cordial coming together of near equals: two lords united by their common cause—the 
maintenance of the mutually beneficial Qing order in Inner Asia under the banner of Qing 
patronage of the Geluk church. Yet the lama arrived in Xining under a cloud of suspicion: 
Daoguang and Nayanceng had become convinced that the Cagan Nomunhan’s banner 
had become a conduit for Tibetan raiders, not a bulwark against them. According to the 
emperor, the lama and his banner were at best opportunists—“shilly-shallyers (首鼠兩端
),” or at worst bandits themselves.743 At their meeting in the winter of 1822, Nayanceng 
confronted the Cagan Nomunhan with accusations that this lama, his subordinate 
officials, and commoners from his banner had colluded with nomadic Tibetans to attack 
                                                
741 The Qing Huidian shili 欽定大清會典事例－理藩院 (Collected Statutes and Precedents, 
Guangxu edition, 1899), lists seven nomadic lama buluo in the empire. The Cagan Nomunhan 
banner was the only such institution in Kokonor, the other six were located in Inner and Outer 
Mongolia. See modern PRC reprint, Zhao Yuntian, ed., Qinding Daqing huidian shili, lifanyuan 
(Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 48. 
 
742 Xuanzong shilu (Veritable records of the Daoguang reign), 37: 661 (DG 02/06).   
 
743 PFZS 1:2a-b. 
 346 
other Mongol banners north of the Yellow River, occupy their territory, and then 
redistribute and launder the plunder using networks of Muslim traders from the 
interior.744  
 Nayanceng’s ultimate interview with the lama was a deliberately paced 
confrontation:   
 
On the day of the winter solstice, [I] first ordered the [Xining] circuit 
intendant and prefect to confront the [Cagan Nomunhan] with the cases of 
raiding carried out by his banner. That Nomunhan was unable to argue in 
self-defense, and only looked right and left [at his subordinates], not 
daring to speak. It seems as though he takes orders from his subordinates 
and is not his own master. On the next day I ordered the Nomunhan to 
meet me alone, at which time [I] proclaimed to him the majesty of the 
emperor’s virtue, which includes both the inner and outer, and that the 
foolish Tibetan banners (蠢爾番旗) must not shut themselves off from 
civilized ways. I repeatedly interrogated him about how it was that the 
people of his banner could become bandits. How could it be that as a jasak 
he was unable to restrain the Tibetans and Mongols and thus allow serious 
crimes to be committed? On the one hand I severely censured him, on the 
other I instructed him.  
 The Nomunhan threw himself to the ground and while prostrating 
pleaded that he was only twenty-seven and, until last year, had been 
studying sutras in Lhasa. Only recently had he returned to start governing 
banner affairs. By that time the people below him had already become set 
in their ways. He did not report these matters, but only left it to Heaven to 
censure them. Now the Mongols have been thoroughly instructed but have 
only just awoken to the truth.  [He] is willing to lead the people across the 
river and back to the original pastures and eliminate their old habits, in 
order to make up for their past sins. However, his subordinate captains and 
lamas have already held power for a long time, and accumulated power far 
exceeding their status. It is truly difficult to subdue them. [He] implores us 
to come and punish them on his behalf. His state of deep remorse and fear 
was such that through the entire [meeting] he cried and wept.745 
 
                                                
744 PFZS 2:5b-10a (DG 02/11/24; 1823-1-5). 
 
745 PFZS 2: 7b-8b. Emphasis added. 
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The portrait of the Cagan Nomunhan that emerges from this description is not that 
of a lama who is being patronized or otherwise courted by the Qing for his religious 
knowledge, tantric powers, sage council, or diplomatic savvy. Nayanceng’s collected 
memorials from this conflict reveal no pretense of the patron-priest relationship that 
serves as a framework for understanding Qing-Tibetan relations in contemporary 
Tibetan-language chronicles. To the contrary, this is an image in which the lama is 
carefully removed from the protective trappings of his office, humiliated, and placed in a 
position of unambiguous subordination to the court and its field officials. The Cagan 
Nomunhan emerges as little more than the feckless pawn of his subordinates, his long 
monastic education evidently having left him with none of the practical skills necessary 
to handle the responsibilities of his office.  
Presented in this manner, Nayanceng calls into question the effectiveness of the 
administration of the Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu and the legitimacy of Buddhist 
knowledge and reincarnation as a basis for rule. The administration of the Cagan 
Nomunhan was emblematic of all that was wrong with the contemporary administration 
of the Gansu frontier region. The governor-general’s memorial reconstructs this 
encounter with the monk as an unprecedented invitation to the Qing state to intervene 
more directly in the administration of local Tibetan and Mongol affairs and as a 
legitimation of the broader project to transform this frontier more fully into the 
civilization of the interior.   
The texts and memories of this meeting, and the grassland conflicts that swirled 
around it, are an invitation to explore the intersection of Qing and indigenous forms of 
administration in Amdo and the divergent attitudes and knowledge Qing officials and 
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local actors brought to bear on local crises. Local Tibetans also produced 
contemporaneous accounts of the domains of the Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu and the 
grassland conflicts that led to the disenfranchisement of the Mongol Banner elite and the 
destitution of Mongol commoners. For the purposes of this chapter, I will primarily be 
referencing descriptions of the Cagan Nomunhan domain that appear in the works of 
Belmang Pandita and his student Drakgönpa—the two most influential chroniclers of the 
local scene in the first half of the nineteenth century. These works will be supplemented 
with the early twentieth-century account of Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso (Tib. 
yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso), a monk who grew up in the Cagan 
Nomunhan community and served as tutor to later incarnations.746 These indigenous, 
Tibetan-language descriptions of the lama’s domain, its history, and its position within 
the larger political, economic, and religious structures of Kokonor differ in significant 
ways from Qing official accounts and analysis.  
This chapter will argue that, despite the fact that the Qing court recognized this 
lama as a legitimate part of the Qing governing structure in Kokonor, the Qing official 
understanding of his “proper” role and the boundaries of his domains did not correspond 
to indigenous understandings or aspirations. Qing border making in the eighteenth 
century had not only cut the Cagan Nomunhan’s domain in half—separating his 
territories in the high pastures from his monastic seat and agricultural communities along 
the Yellow River, but had also driven a line through the center of “Amdo country,” an 
indigenous geographic sensibility that had been split into Gansu province in the east and 
Kokonor in the west. Thus, activities, community structures, and aspirations that 
                                                
746 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso, “La mo tsha kan hu thog thu bla rabs kyi lo 
rgyus mdor bsdu” (manuscript in collection of author, date uncertain, probably 1990s).  
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appeared legitimate and natural in Tibetan texts appear as flagrant violations and 
transgressions in Qing government reports.  
Tibetan, Manchu and Chinese-language documents from the region also reveal 
that in the early nineteenth century, Kokonor and Gansu province were experiencing a 
profound social transformation in which categories such as “Chinese,” “Tibetan,” 
“Mongol,” “commoner,” “nomad,” and even “Muslim” had popular currency and 
meaning yet were hardly predictive of individual or community identity and behavior. 
Nayanceng was shocked to discover not only that the ostensibly “Mongol” banner of the 
Cagan Nomunhan was full of Tibetan nomads but also that the subjects of the banner had 
become intimately linked to the economy and people of the interior through the illegal 
activities of traders and innkeepers from Gansu province, the majority of whom were 
Muslims (Ch. 回民). The memorial quoted above reflects this confused state of affairs: 
Nayanceng alternately refers to the Cagan Nomunhan’s banner as either “Tibetan” or 
“Mongol.”  
This chapter proceeds as follows: The first section will examine the history of the 
Cagan Nomunhan domain as understood by indigenous observers and the Qing court 
prior to Nayanceng’s service in the region. It will demonstrate that the complexity and 
administrative span of the Cagan Nomunhan polity was largely invisible in Qing official 
sources. The second section of the paper focuses on Nayanceng’s account of the conflict 
with the Cagan Nomunhan banner. An examination of both Nayanceng’s published 
account of the conflict and the larger historical context reveals that Nayanceng’s Kokonor 
policies were informed by a particular school of contemporary discourse on “statecraft” 
that advocated a novel approach to handling frontier affairs. Like his predecessors, 
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Nayanceng’s policies in Kokonor hinged on the exercise of court-sanctioned violence, 
but he shed blood in new ways and with a new rationale. Instead of mounting the usual 
military campaign against nomadic communities suspected of raiding, Nayanceng 
directed the civil and military officials of the region to round up the merchants who dared 
conduct unsanctioned trade with Tibetans and Mongols. Dozens of merchants from 
Gansu and Shaanxi, most of them Muslims, would die in Qing custody in a matter of 
months. Moreover, Nayanceng envisioned his work in Kokonor as part of a broader 
program for reconsolidating court authority along all of the Qing’s frontier regions. 
Nayanceng’s memorials from Gansu were simultaneously a testament that his analysis 
and policies were effective and an application for future assignments elsewhere on the 
Qing frontiers. The final section contrasts subsequent understandings of the violence of 
the 1820s within the Cagan Nomunhan community with those of Chinese commentators. 
Of particular importance are the writings of Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso (Tib. 
Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso 1908-2004),  a monk affiliated with Lamo 
Dechen monastery and the larger community of the Cagan Nomunhan. 
 
The History of the Cagan Nomunhan Principality/Banner as seen from Tibetan-
language and Qing Sources 
 
If Nayanceng represented the apex of Qing authority in the region, then Pendé 
Wangchuk Getsun Gyamtso, the fifth rebirth (Ma. hūbilgan; Tib. sprul sku or skye sprul) 
in the Cagan Nomunhan lineage, represented the apex of local forms of authority. The 
Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu, known in Tibetan as the Lamo Zhabdrung Karpo (Tib. zhabs 
drung dkar po) or more simply as the “Lamo Kūtuktu,” and in Chinese as the baifo seng (
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白佛僧), was in the early nineteenth century one of the most illustrious incarnation 
lineages (Tib. sku phreng) in the Amdo region and inheritor of one of the wealthiest and 
largest corporate estates (Tib. bla brang) in the Tibetan-Buddhist world. He was not only 
a well-educated lama in charge of a network of approximately twenty-five monasteries, 
but also a political ruler, the supervisor of a heterogeneous community of herders and 
farmers who inhabited a strategic and prosperous stretch of the Tibetan plateau. 
According to the garrison commander of Xining who conducted a census of the lama’s 
subjects in 1823, the banner consisted of 2,332 households, or 18,198 persons, split up 
across twenty “communities” (Ch. 族).747 The lineage remained a significant force in the 
region well into the twentieth century: the eighth-generation incarnation eventually rose 
to the position of head of the Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and vice-chairman 
of the Qinghai Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference in the first decade of the 
People’s Republic of China.748 
With the exception of a short introductory article written in French, the lineage 
has not received any scholarly attention in the West.749 This is remarkable since European 
chroniclers of the Qing political order writing in the late nineteenth century singled out 
                                                
747 Murandai’s report (稟) of census figures was included in Nayanceng’s memorial of DG 
03/02/27 (PFZS 3:55a-58b).  This is a substantial population by the standards of the Amdo 
region.  Consider that according to Rockhill, the permanent population of the region’s major city, 
Xining, was only thirty to forty thousand souls in the 1880s. Rockhill, The Land of the Lamas: 
Notes of a Journey through China, Mongolia, and Tibet (New York: The Century Company, 
1891), 50.  
 
748 Debu Chelie ‘ao sai, Xiarong gabu zhuan (A Biography of the Zhabdrung Karpo) (Lanzhou: 
Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1996). 
 
749Yontan Gyatso, “Le monastere de La-mo bde-chen dans l'Amdo,” in Tibetan Studies: 
Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fargnes 
1992, ed. Per Kvaerne (Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994, 
Vol. 2.), 981-989. 
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the Cagan Nomunhan as an important feature of the dynasty’s Inner Asian “colonial” 
order.750 Their interest in the Cagan Nomunhan was probably a reflection of the fact that 
their descriptions were based on Guangxu-period editions of the Qing Huidian—a text in 
which the Cagan Nomunhan, on account of his position as a Mongol jasak, featured 
prominently. For nineteenth-century observers writing in Tibetan, the institution of the 
Cagan Nomunhan was also an important feature of the local political landscape. 
Drakgönpa and his tutor Belmang Pandita devote considerable attention in their writings 
to the history of the Cagan Nomunhan. The analysis in this section is based primarily on 
the Drakonpa’s Oceanic Book, and secondarily on the description of the Cagan 
Nomunhan that appears in Belmang’s History of India, Tibet, and Mongolia.751  
Drakonpa places the lineage of the Lamo Zhabdrung Karpo in several different 
contexts, the first being geographic. The overall narrative structure of the history leads 
the reader river by river in a watery circumambulation of the Amdo region (figure 2). 
Thus the lineage is first introduced as the founders of Gur and Lamo Dechen monasteries, 
two large and influential monasteries situated within the “great bend of the Ma Chu” 
(Yellow River), at the heart of “Amdo country” (Tib. yul mdo smad) as envisioned by 
Drakgönpa.752 According to this vision, Amdo stretches from the Qiliang mountains in 
the north to the marshy highland pastures to the south of the Yellow River in present-day 
Sichuan province, and from the pastures around Kokonor (Ch. Qinghai) in the west to the 
                                                
750 See descriptions in William Frederick Mayers, The Chinese Government (115), and H.S. 
Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, The Present Day Political Organization of China (Shanghai: 
Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1912). Both texts identify the Lifanyuan as a “colonial” institution. 
 
751 Belmang Pandita, History, 656-657. 
 
752 Oceanic Book, 23-24, 268-288. 
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upper watersheds of the Daxia, Tao, and Min rivers in the east. The monasteries of the 
Cagan Nomunhan lineage are also the seats of two other important reincarnation 
lineages—Lamo Serkhri (Tib. la mo gser khri), and Lamo Dragkan (Tib. la mo grags 
rgan). All three monks anchor a “mandalized” religious space centered on the permanent 
chronological presence of the incarnate lineage and permanent physical structures such as 
monasteries, mansions, farms and pastures.753 The “Amdo country” of the Oceanic Book, 
is also firmly within the sphere of “Greater Tibet,” (Tib. bod chen po) a concept that is 
defined first as a legacy of the Tibetan empire’s successful campaigns against the Tang 
and second as a result of the “Tibetan” (Tib. Bod) character of its monasteries and 
religion.754 Drakgönpa’s conception of Amdo as an integral part of Greater Tibet was 
shared by earlier writers from the region, most notably Sumpa Khenpo and Tsenpo 
Nomunhan.755  
 
                                                
753 See Charlene Makeley’s description of “mandalized” religious space around Labrang 
monastery. Makley, The Violence of Liberation: Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revival in Post-
Mao China (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2007), 33-39. 
 
754Oceanic Book, 23, 28.  In the introductory chapter at least, bod seems to function more as a 
cultural-religious identifier than an ethnonym.   
 
755 Bstan po no mon han ‘Jam dpal chos kyi bstan ‘dzin ‘phrin las (Tsenpo Nomunhan), 128; Sum 
pa ye shes dpal 'byor, Mtsho sngon lo rgyus tshangs glu gsar snyan zhes bya ba bzhugs so (Zi 
ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs  dpe sgrun khang, 1982 [1786]), 47-48 
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Figure 4: Amdo according to the Oceanic Book. The red line indicates the approximate 
boundaries of Amdo. The green polygon approximates the domains of the Cagan 
Nomunhan Kūtuktu. The locations of Lamo Dechen monastery and the kūtuktu’s mobile 
tent-camp government are both indicated. 
 
The second context is the role of the Zhabdrung Karpo lineage in the transmission 
of the teachings of the Geluk school from central Tibet to Amdo, their propagation 
among the Mongol aristocratic polities of the region, and the subsequent involvement of 
the Lamo incarnations and their patrons in the struggle among the various schools of 
Tibetan Buddhism for dominance in Tibet. In the late 1500s, following the establishment 
of a priest-patron relationship between the Third Dalai Lama Sonam Gyatso and the 
Altan Khan at the edge of lake Kokonor, the third Dalai Lama dispatched Tsoknyi Gyatso 
(Tib. tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho, d. 1609) of Lamo Rinchen Gang (in central Tibet) to the 
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region. This lama received the patronage and support of the Tumed ruler and settled at 
the monastery of Ngagar Jangchupling (Tib. rnga sgar byang chub gling) in the region 
that would later become central to the domain of his subsequent incarnations (present-day 
“Chentsa” county, Tib. Gcan tsha, Ch. 尖扎县).756 The Mongol nobles conferred upon 
him the title “Cagan Nomunhan” in honor of the accomplishments of his ministry. As this 
title was generally granted to reincarnate lamas who also carried an administrative 
portfolio, it may have been that Tsoknyi Gyatso had already assumed some duties for 
governance in the region. After his death, his reincarnation, Lamo Lodrö Gyatso (Tib. La 
mo Blo gros rgya mtsho 1610- 1659) was born to a local aristocratic “lineage of the 
Tumed” and thus began the lineage of reincarnations (or “garland of emanated bodies” 
Tib. sku phreng) known as the “Lamo Kūtuktu.”757   
It was during the lifetime of the second Lamo Kūtuktu that his estates began to 
take shape as a political institution. This occurred despite considerable upheaval in the 
Amdo region. Civil war among the Khalkha led to the expedition in 1632 of the army of 
the Khalkha Choghtu Khan (Tib. chog thu) into Kokonor. The Choghtu Khan’s conquest 
of the region brought to an end fifty-four years of Tumed rule in Amdo and threatened 
the position of the Geluk school and the Lamo incarnation in the region.758A decade later, 
in 1642, the dramatic conquest of “Gushri Khan of the Junghars”759 reversed the fortunes 
                                                
756 Oceanic Book, 28, 268-9. According to Drakgönpa, when Sonam Gyatso first arrived in the 
region, he was received in the place of Arik (Tib. A rig), a community that would become closely 
intertwined with the fortunes of the Cagan Nomunhan.  
 
757 Oceanic Book, 269. 
 
758 Oceanic Book, 31. 
 
759 Oceanic Book, 269. The identification of Gushri Khan as a “Junghar” here is unusual. Qing 
official texts, for instance, typically identify him as Oirat or Khoshot. 
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of the Lamo incarnation and of the Geluk more generally. “Having defeated the Choghtu 
Han, [Gushri Khan] and Batur Hong Taiji, having esteem for [the Lamo Tülku], with 
reverence made donations of large communities of farmers and nomads [to the Cagan 
Nomunhan].”760 On the basis of this new patronage, the second Lamo Kūtuktu was able 
to establish the Gur (Tib. mgur) monastery along the bank of the Yellow River in the 
early 1640s.761  
Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso, an incarnate lama who resided at Lamo 
Dechen monastery in the early twentieth century and composed a history of the 
monastery based on his knowledge of the monastery and its archives prior to liberation, 
offers some further details on the origins of the Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu that 
correspond closely to those in the Oceanic Book. He writes that the second Lamo 
Kūtuktu initially received one hundred households of Tumed herders (Tib. thu med kyi ru 
ba ‘brog khrim brgya) that became his “religious estate” (Tib. lha sde). Fifty of these 
households then formed the farming community (Tib. shing sde) below Gur monastery. 
The other fifty herding households became the basis of the “nomadic section” (Tib. nyin 
thebs sde,) of the lama’s estate. Later, after settling a dispute to the north of the Yellow 
River in Kaligang (in present-day Hualong county 化隆縣) the lama received another 
donation of villages that became known as the “Zhabdrung Hora” (Tib. zhabs drung ho 
                                                
760 Oceanic Book, 269.   
 
761 Ibid: the text reads, “[In 1646] the year after the Jurchens (jur cid) obtained the throne of 
China he established a monastery, and because it was originally in a tent, it was called ‘mgur’ 
monastery” (Oceanic Book, 269). The round, domed felt tent typical of the Mongols is known as 
a “ger.” The Tibetan term is a transcription of the original Mongol word. 
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ra) after the position of the official dispatched by the Zhabdrung Karpo to administer the 
region.762  
The accumulation of estates and monasteries accelerated during the lifetime of the 
third Lamo Ngawang Lobzang Tanpé Gyaltsan (Tib. ngag dbang blo bzang bstan pa’i 
rgyal mtshan, 1660-1728). Shortly after completing his religious education in Lhasa, the 
third Lamo, together with his companion and future abbot and lineage founder Lamo 
Drakganpo Lobzang Trashi (Tib. Grags rgan po blo bzang bkra shis, 1647-1713), 
founded Lamo Dechen monastery in 1682, a day’s travel to the east of Gur Monastery. 
Drakgönpa records that a local lord, the Daiching nangso (Tib. DA’i Ching nangso, Ch. 
岱青昂索) sponsored the monastery. A tax levied on communities both around Kokonor 
lake and in the pastures south of the Yellow River provided the funding for the 
construction.763  
This monastery quickly grew into one of the largest in the region. The Oceanic 
Book, looking back at the history of the early eighteenth century, describes the institution 
of the Cagan Nomunhan as the “leading principality” (Tib. dpon khag) of the thirty-three 
principalities of Kokonor. The author at this point identifies the office of the Cagan 
Nomunhan as an “urgé” (Tib. u rge), a loan word from Mongol meaning a circular 
                                                
762 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso, “La mo tsha kan hu thog thu bla rabs kyi lo 
rgyus mdor bsdu” (date uncertain) 252-3.  See also the biography of Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang 
mkhas grub rgya mthso in Mkha’ ‘gro skyabs’s privately circulating history of Lamo Dechen 
(manuscript in collection of author). 
 
763 Oceanic Book, p. 270. “In the thirty-seventh year after the founding of Rma mgur, La mo bde 
chen chos gling was founded on the order of nangso DA’i Ching (Dai Qing/ 岱青昂索), on the 
basis of the entire monastic community of Mgur and the “monk tax” levied from Mangra, ‘Bal, 
and Bya; Sbra, Nag, and Kha; and Bayan.”   
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encampment of royal tents.764 Drakgönpa alternates this loan word with an indigenous 
Tibetan term “garzhung” (Tib. sgar gzhung), which also connotes an administrative 
office located in a mobile encampment. Quoting the Seventh Dalai Lama, he states that, 
“As the chief spiritual teacher (Tib. dbu bla) of all the principalities of the encampments 
(Tib. ru) to the right and left of the lake, the peace that he established inside and outside 
his urgé was such that it resembled the holy mansion of Indra.”765 That the Seventh Dalai 
Lama would praise the realm of the Cagan Nomunhan is unsurprising given that the later 
had formally recognized the former as the Dalai Lama and seen to his bodily preservation 
and education during the conflict that followed the disappearance and death of the Sixth 
Dalai Lama.766  The scale of the political and religious achievements of the third 
Zhabdrung Karpo evidently lingered in local historical memory. Belmang Pandita, 
writing in the early nineteenth century, noted that the urgé of the lama surpassed those of 
the other lords of the “Mongol lands” as it was composed of “several tens of urgé that 
resembled the orb of the moon fallen to earth.”767  
It was during the last years of the life of the Third Lamo Kūtuktu that the Qing 
court made its first major intervention into the politics of Amdo. It is only at this point 
                                                
764 Urga also became the name for the government of the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu of Outer 
Mongolia.  Later, the term urga gave its name to the capital of independent Mongolia in the early 
twentieth century.  Similarly, in Qinghai, what was originally the term for the mobile government 
of the Lamo Zhabdrung Karpo, became a name of a specific place in present day Guinan county.  
Although originating as a term that could describe the encampment of a major Mongol lord, it 
seems that during the course of the Qing (17-18th centuries), this term was increasingly reserved 
for the encampments of major lamas. 
 
765 Oceanic Book, 271.  
 
766 Oceanic Book, 270-71. 
 
767 Belmang, Rgya, Bod, Hor, Sog gyi lo rgyus, 656:6-657:1. Given the significance that these 
Labrang-based historians placed on the estate of the Cagan Nomunhan, one comes to suspect that 
it may very well have been a model for the Jamyang Zhepa, the Lamo Kūtuktu’s close friend, 
when he founded of Labrang monastery in 1709. 
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that Drakgönpa’s description of the Cagan Nomunhan polity directly touches on its 
relationship to the “Jurchen” (i.e. Manchu) Qing dynasty.768 The aftermath of the 
Lobzang Danjin rebellion (1723-24) witnessed the re-organization of the Mongol 
principalities of Kokonor into twenty-nine banners and the complete dismantling of the 
Khoshot Khanate that had dominated these polities since the 1640s. Given the long 
history of cooperation between Lobzang Danjin and the Cagan Nomunhan in support of 
the candidacy of the Seventh Dalai Lama Kelzang Gyatso (Tib. Skal bzang rgya mtsho), 
it is remarkable that the communities and monasteries of the Lamo Kūtuktu’s estates did 
not get dragged into the violence (figure 4). The Cagan Nomunhan was apparently in 
Lhasa at the time of the rebellion. His return to the region shortly afterwards did not go 
unnoticed by Qing officials.769 The package of proposals submitted by general Nian 
Gengyao to the court includes a list of “Twelve matters that are forbidden in Qinghai,” 
the very last of which is a singular and explicit warning to the Cagan Nomunhan to “not 
gather [people] together in his temples to discuss and memorialize on [political] 
matters.”770   
                                                
768 In his description of the first three Lamo incarnations, there is almost no reference to the Qing.  
He records that the Kangxi emperor bestowed a name on Lamo Dechen monastery, but beyond 
this the author even seems to celebrate the lack of contact, noting that unlike those lamas who 
have frequent contact with “Mongolia and China,” the third Lamo lived a life of rigorous 
discipline untainted by the customs of those places. 
 
769 Oceanic Book, p. 271-272. 
 
770 Nian Gengyao (“禁約青海十二事”),  Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Dang’anguan, comp., Yongzheng 
chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1989), 27-43. Also, 
Shizong shilu 20:336.  
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Figure 5: Detail of the Gansu frontier, prior to the Lobzang Danjin rebellion and the 
incorporation of Kokonor Mongols into banners. Map indicates position of the Cagan 
Nomunhan’s rangeland, but not Lamo Dechen monastery. Huangyu quanlan tu [Kangxi 
Atlas], 1717, plate 4.4. 
 
In 1725, the Cagan Nomunhan polity was incorporated into the new 
administrative structure of Qinghai as one of the twenty-nine “Mongol banners” of 
Kokonor, part of a policy the court labeled “planting the banner and delimiting the land” 
(Ch. 插旗定地) intended to establish Qing supervision over the Mongol aristocracy and 
limit its movements to specific rangelands. Appointments to the position of banner 
commander, “jasak,” subsequently required the approval of the court. As a result of these 
reforms, by the early nineteenth century the community of the Cagan Nomunhan 
appeared in official Qing sources as a specific type of institution, a “nomadic lama 
 361 
banner” (Ch. 游牧喇嘛旗 youmu lama qi), with a specifically delimited range and 
specific type of subject population: Mongol herders. The Imperially-Sanctioned Collected 
Statutes and Precedents of the Court of Colonial Affairs describes the Cagan Nomunhan 
banner as “affiliated with the Mongol nomads of Lake Kokonor.” It delimits his range as 
a narrow band of pasture with the Yellow River to his west, the central banner of the 
Khoshot’s ‘south-left’ wing to his south and east, and the Tibetans of Guide sub-
prefecture to his north.771   
Following the establishment of the Mongol banners, the Qing court steadily 
attempted to extend the civilian administration of the neighboring districts of Gansu 
province to the Tibetan (“Fan” 番) communities who had previously been subjects of the 
Khoshot principalities. In the mid-eighteenth century, the court established “sub-
prefectures” (Ch. 廳) in the fortified towns of Xunhua (1762) and Guide (1792), and 
assigned the subprefects (Ch. 同知) the task of supervising the surrounding Tibetans 
(figure 5).772 The establishment of these two jurisdictions reflected the Yongzheng 
court’s conviction, first articulated by Nian Gengyao, that the Tibetan people living along 
the borders of Xining and Lanzhou prefectures should be governed as commoners of the 
interior, while the Mongol principalities should remain beyond the frontier, governed 
indirectly through the banner nobility. Nian argued in 1724 that the western Tibetans 
                                                
771 Qinding Daqing huidian shili, lifanyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 48. 
 
772 See Nayanceng’s memorial from 1812 concerning administrative reforms and the affairs of the 
Qinghai amban, Xining daotai, and Shaan-Gan governor general. 奏请将甘肃循化同知改隶西
宁府并西宁府知府缺改由本省拣员题调事, Palace memorial 04-01-12-0370-016 (道光三年正
月十八日).  See also Ma Haiyun’s account of 18th century Qing administrative reforms in 
Xunhua, “Fanhui or Huifan?  Hanhui or Huimin?  Salar Ethnic Identification and Qing 
Administrative Transformation in Eighteenth-century Gansu” Late Imperial China  29.2 
(December 2008), 1-36. 
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(Ma. tanggūt or aiman i fanze) of Kokonor (西海) had  “already turned towards 
transformation” (Ch. 西番皆已向化 ) and could be considered and governed as 
commoners of the interior.773 Thus from the perspective of the Qing court from the 
Yongzheng reign onwards, “Kokonor” (Ch. 青海) meant only the Mongol-inhabited 
pastures surrounding Lake Kokonor that were supervised by the office of the Qinghai 
amban in Xining, not the broader “Amdo” region.  
 
 
Figure 6: Approximate boundaries of Guide subprecture (blue), Xunhua subprefecture 
(purple), and Gansu provincial boundaries (yellow), 1820s. Sketched on the basis of 
maps included in Nayanceng, Pingfan zoushu, 1:2b-4a. 
 
                                                
773 Yongzhengchao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe, 3.33b. 
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Drakgönpa and other Tibetan-language commentators in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries discuss neither a new provincial border cutting straight through the 
middle of their “Amdo country” nor the narrow geographic zone to which Qing 
administrators attempted to restrict the Cagan Nomunhan’s domain. Although Drakgönpa 
notes the existence of the towns of Guide and Xunhua, he does not recognize (or even 
mention) their administrative functions or boundaries. He continued to list communities 
that ostensibly fell under the jurisdiction of the sub-prefects as major constituencies of 
the Cagan Nomunhan. From a Qing perspective, the location of even the lama’s monastic 
throne at Lamo Dechen and his original agricultural estates were located deep in Guide 
sub-prefecture. 774  The estates of the Cagan Nomunhan cut across multiple Qing 
jurisdictions and were neither simply Mongol nor Tibetan but a heterogeneous mix.775 It 
should be noted, however, that indigenous geographic conceptions also had recognized a 
distinction between “Amdo” (or “Domé,” Tib. mdo smad) and “Kokonor” (Tib. mtsho 
sngon), although there seems to be differing ideas about whether Amdo included 
Kokonor or was separate from it.776 
                                                
774 This can be demonstrated from an examination of Qing maps. For example, the Qianlong 
edition of the Huangyu quanlan tu in Qingting san da shice quantu ji (清廷三大實測全圖集) 
(Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 2007) v. 3; the maps of Xining and Lanzhou prefectures in the 
Daqing Huidian, Jiaqing edition, Gansu fascicle; and the map of Xunhua and Guide (循化貴德所
屬番境圖) included in Nayanceng’s Pingfan zouyi (PFZS 1:3b-4a). 
 
775 Oceanic Book, 288. 
 
776 Sumpa Khenpo writes, “Above [Lanzhou] is Dpa ris and A mdo which are inside Greater 
Tibet. To the west of that is Kokonor where previously Tibetans (bod) and others resided. Now 
there are the Oirats. [North] of that are the Sarik Uyghurs (hor sha ra yu gur) and the black lance 
Tibetans (bod mdung nag)” (Sumpa Khenpo, 47-48. From this quote one can also observe that 
Sumpa Khenpo distinguished the Kokonor region from Amdo. Tsenpo Nomunhan shared Sumpa 
Khenpo’s sense of distinction between the Amdo/Domé and Kokonor. However, in his 
conception, Kokonor appears as a distinct region within greater Amdo (cited in Wylie, 105, 112). 
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Indigenous sources do note the existence of a banner population, but identify it as 
only one of the lama’s constituencies. According to Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso, 
for the Lamo estate the establishment of the banner primarily meant only that the herding 
community (Tib. ru sde) of Nyintep was reorganized “following the Mongol pattern” into 
four companies (literally, “arrows,” Tib. mda’ tshan gzhi).777 Over the course of the 
eighteenth century this sub-community of the Cagan Nomunhan institution gradually 
came to be known simply as the “Four Companies” (Tib. mda’ gzhi). Moreover, during 
the life of the fourth Lamo Cagan Nomunhan, Lozang Tupten Gélek Gyatsen (Tib. blo 
bzang thub bstan dge legs rgya mtshan, 1729-1796), his urgé continued to acquire large 
new communities. For instance the political and religious oversight of the herding 
community (Tib. ru sde) of Balzhung (Tib. ‘bal gzhung, a valley in present-day Tongde 
county) was given to the Cagan Nomunhan when the jasak of the banner to which it 
belonged died without heirs.778 By the early nineteenth century, nomads belonging to the 
Cagan Nomunhan estate were spread across three major valleys—the Mang, Bal, and Sha 
(Tib. Bya)–that descended into the Yellow River to the west.779 The lama also retained 
control over estates around Gur and Lamo Dechen monasteries and north of the river in 
Bayan sub-prefecture (in present-day Jianzha and Hualong counties). 
                                                
777 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso, 254. 
 
778 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mthso, 256-7. 
 
779 Bya (沙沟 Bya gzhung) was the northernmost valley and lies in present-day Guide County.  
Mang (芒曲 Mang gzhung) was middle valley of the Cagan Nomunhan’s territory.  It lies in 
present-day Guinan County. ‘Bal (巴溝 ‘Bal gzhung) was the southernmost valley.  At present it 
forms the center of Tongde County.  This river drained two holy mountains, one the patron deity 
of the Mongol Qinwang and the other the patron of the Zhabdrung Karpo. Mkha’ ‘gro skyabs, 17-
22. 
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 If there was any attempt to curtail his political power, it is not apparent to the 
author of the Oceanic Book who, in the section on the fourth Lamo Cagan Nomunhan, 
writes:  
Granted [the title] ‘jasak’ by China, he necessarily served both as lama 
and a governor (Tib. bla dpon), and established an urgé in the regions of 
Sheulung (Tib. She’u lung) and Mangra, and thus resided permanently in 
the Mongol lands (Tib. sog yul).  Although endowed with a great fortune, 
his deeds of the two traditions (i.e. political and religious) were extensive 
and his conduct was tempered, disciplined and pure.  He put great effort 
into his teachings on both the general and specific, and thus attained 
increasingly efficacious methods.  His urgé was surrounded by fields full 
of great tents. Adorned as they were with various ornaments, the three 
holy tents [of the lama], stood out in splendor and majesty at the center of 
the principalities of Kokonor.780 
 
The Qianlong emperor’s 1794 attempt to force the Cagan Nomunhan community 
to comply with his 1792 regulations concerning the identification of reincarnate lamas 
reveals the deference that even the Qianlong emperor paid to his local authority. The 
emperor commanded that future reincarnations be confirmed using the Golden Urn ritual. 
Yet he simultaneously granted the Cagan Nomunhan an exemption from the corollary 
regulation that candidates could not be sought among his relatives or other nobles of his 
banner. A Tibetan-language version of this edict held in the Qinghai Museum reads:  
 
As a special case because the Jasak Lama Cagan Nomunhan of Kokonor is 
not only a tülku but also has status as a jasak who administers a 
community of subjects and is central in the affairs of the land of the great 
lake… In the future when this tülku is no longer, there will be great 
practical benefit in proceeding in accord with the wishes of his own 
officers and subjects and whatever it is they wish to do… 
Henceforth, having delivered [the names of candidates] to the Xining 
amban…[he] must place the names of the candidates into the golden urn to 
                                                
780 Oceanic Book, 272-73. 
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be selected regardless of whether or not they are kinsmen or close 
followers, in accord with the desires and will of his subjects.781 
 
Ultimately, even this concession was in vain. The Fourth Zhabdrung Karpo 
passed away two years later and his successor was located without the use of the Golden 
Urn ritual. In fact, it would not be until 1837—fourteen years after Nayanceng’s 
departure from Gansu, that a reincarnation of the fifth Cagan Nomunhan would be 
identified using the urn ritual.782  
Thus throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth, the 
patrimony of the Cagan Nomunhan banner defied the Qing state’s attempts to limit, 
define, categorize, control, and finally transform. The lama’s supervision of such mixed 
communities of Tibetan and Mongolian speakers made his banner unique among the 
seven nomadic lama banners of the Qing. Having grown from the gradual accretion of 
communities and monasteries during the course of several hundred years, by the early 
eighteenth century it had become a hybrid polity, unified and legitimated ultimately by 
the authority the Cagan Nomunhan could claim on both the temporal and spiritual realms 
as a reincarnated Buddha. It was a “hybrid polity” also in the sense that it welded 
together two different Inner Asian governing institutions: first, the ger-camp palace 
(urga) of the kūtuktu was an institution descended from the historical traditions of the 
Mongol aristocracy and, second, the corporate estate of the reincarnate lama (labrang and 
lhade), a tradition pioneered by Tibetan Buddhists. Combined, the Cagan Nomunhan 
                                                
781 Photograph and transcription of this edict in the collection of the author. 
 
782 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan Manwen Lufu dang (Manchu-language copies of palace 
memorials held by the Grand Council, hereafter abbreviated MWLF): 207-0107 (3-2-4178-029). 
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state was flexible and mobile across space, but also a permanent chronological presence 
guaranteed by the chain of rebirths.  
Moreover, as a religious master, beyond those subject communities that owed him 
specific duties such as the ‘Four Companies’ (Tib. Mda’ gzhi) that appear as his ‘banner’ 
population in Qing documents, the lama’s community also consisted of a wide range of 
teachers, disciples, patrons, and pilgrims spread across the Amdo region and extending to 
central Tibet and even as far as Beijing.783 The Cagan Nomunhan domain therefore had 
both hard and soft boundaries, the latter of which could reach much further than Qing 
observers imagined. And from the local perspective, one cognizant of the centuries of 
discourse between the Cagan Nomunhan and communities across the Amdo region, both 
around Lake Kokonor and in the pastures south of the Yellow River, Nayanceng’s refusal 
to countenance the migration of a portion the Cagan Nomunhan banner to unoccupied 
pasture north of the Yellow River near Kokonor must have seemed obtuse and shocking.  
 
Nayanceng’s Diagnosis and Treatment of the Tibetan-Mongol Conflict in Kokonor 
 
Like they had in the 1720s, in the 1820s, Qing officers were again struggling to 
assess where the Cagan Nomunhan stood in the violence that was sweeping the Gansu-
Kokonor region. The institutional memory of the Lobzang Danjin revolt and the strategic 
importance of Kokonor on the crossroads of the main routes between Tibet and Mongolia 
and between the interior and points further west in Xinjiang clearly weighed on the mind 
of the Daoguang emperor when he dispatched first one and then a second seasoned 
                                                
783 Oceanic Book, 280. 
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official to the post of governor-general.784 Cangling and Nayanceng took dramatically 
different approaches to the turmoil in Kokonor. Cangling implemented a strategy that 
recognized the weakness of the Mongol banners around Qinghai lake as irreversible. He 
therefore sought to empower those “Mongol” leaders who still appeared strong—such as 
the Cagan Nomunhan, and co-opt groups of “Tibetans” who appeared to be rising 
powers, encouraging them to take positions to defend the existing order.785 Nayanceng, 
however, saw things quite differently. 
As Nayanceng’s investigation of the grassland violence proceeded in the fall of 
1822, the complexity of the Cagan Nomunhan’s domain and the Tibetan communities 
ostensibly under the supervision of the sub-prefects in Guide and Xunhua gradually 
became visible in his reports to the Throne. Nayanceng’s exhaustive surveys of the 
Mongol and Tibetan populations in Gansu and Kokonor revealed the extent to which the 
Cagan Nomunhan banner was home to Tibetans—the Qing eventually counted twenty 
different sub-communities (Ch. 族), as well as the “Mongol” constituency, and that the 
monk had permitted extensive trade by sojourning Muslims. Yet although the governor-
general came to appreciate the complexity of the Cagan Nomunhan domain, he was not 
prepared to tolerate it. The lama’s domain, according to his analysis, was a combustible 
mix: nomadic Tibetans led the Mongols out on raids while “criminal merchants” (Ch. 奸
商) and “criminals from the interior” (Ch. 漢奸) laundered the booty and supplied the 
raiders with gunpowder and grain. Where Cangling had seen a conflict over “water and 
                                                
784 PFZS 1:1b. 
 
785 Cangling’s position is characterized in the following reports, Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan 
Hanwen lufu (China Number One Historical Archive, Grand Council file copies of palace 
memorials), #51-1635-4 (DG 2/5/12), #51-192-9 (DG 2/3/13); Also Xuanzong shilu 33:592 (DG 
02/04/13), and 33:624 (DG 02/05/09).  
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grass” between nomadic Tibetans and Mongols in the distant pastures of Kokonor, 
Nayanceng saw a chronic failure of the Qing’s existing field administration in Gansu to 
adequately supervise and segregate their subject peoples.  
Therefore, whereas Cangling had deemed it sufficient to dispatch a military 
expedition against the most intransigent Tibetan raiders and co-opt the rest with offers of 
pasture, titles, and money, Nayanceng pushed through a reform of the provincial 
administration and initiated a thorough reorganization of Tibetan communities south of 
the Yellow River in order to break up indigenous centers of political authority and 
establish greater supervision by the local sub-prefects of Xunhua and Guide.  
Nayanceng’s views also mark a significant departure from those of Nian 
Gengyao, who had designed the overall administrative structure of the Gansu borderlands 
in the 1720s. Nian’s primary concern was the elimination the Khoshot khanate of 
Lobzang Danjin as a military threat. Moreover, Nian, who was optimistic about the 
possibility of transforming the Tibetans into “Hua” (Chinese), envisioned the Tibetans as 
a “fence” against the Mongols.786 In contrast Nayanceng reckoned the Tibetans and 
criminals from the interior (Ch. hanjian 漢奸) as the major threats to the long-term 
stability of the Kokonor-Gansu frontier.787 At the same time, Nayanceng argued, the 
Mongols needed to be succored and reformed to the point where they could stand as a 
bulwark against the Tibetans. In short, where Nian saw the Tibetans as a buffer against 
the Mongols, Nayanceng saw the Mongols as a buffer against the Tibetans.  
                                                
786 Yongzhengchao zhupi zouzhe, 3:27b, 33b (Nian Gengyao, palace memorial, YZ 02/05/11). 
 
787 Wu Mi, “Hanjian kaobian,” Qingshi yanjiu 4 (2009): 110. Often translated as “Han traitors,” 
in this article Wu argues that until after the first Opium War, hanjian was understood in Qing 
discourse as “Han criminals,” i.e. people from the interior (neidi) who committed crimes or 
caused other trouble in frontier regions or other places not under the standard administration. 
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In considering the origin of his novel diagnosis and treatment of the crisis in 
Kokonor, it is important to observe that Nayanceng arrived in the field with a particular 
intellectual agenda, one deeply rooted in a contemporary discourse on “statecraft” (Ch. 
經世) that was changing the way Qing officials dealt with rebellions and unrest in border 
regions. His experience putting “statecraft” policies into practice on other Qing frontiers 
over the course of the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820) informed his approach to the problems 
in Kokonor. His very appointment was an indication that the court expected a certain 
kind of solution to the problem.788 Moreover, Nayanceng saw his handling of the affair in 
Kokonor as an exemplary case of “applied statecraft thinking” and wished to see his 
policies transferred to other frontiers. The strongest evidence for this is that shortly after 
he departed Gansu, Nayanceng personally oversaw the publication of sixty-one reports to 
the court he had composed while serving in the region together with the edicts the 
emperor had issued in response. The resulting volume entitled Pingfan zouyi (“Memorials 
concerning the pacification of the Tibetans”) was one of only two such books he had 
published during his lifetime.789 At the time of publication of Pingfan zouyi Nayanceng 
was positioning himself in the debate over how to deal with instability in southern 
Xinjiang. And his efforts were not without results: A year later, he was appointed head of 
                                                
788 That this was the case, and that the appointment of Cangling represented a different kind 
policy orientation, is evidenced by the fact that the Jiaqing and Daoguang courts repeatedly 
appointed these two officials one after the other to deal with a host of conflicts around the empire. 
In 1807, 1822, and 1827, Cangling’s appointment to a given post would be followed with the 
appointment of Nayanceng, either as his assistant (1807) or his replacement (1822 and 1827). 
 
789 Song Tingsheng, “Nayancheng Qinghai zouyi yu” [Introduction to Nayanceng’s memorials 
from Qinghai], in Nayancheng qinghai zouyi (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1997), 9. 
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post-rebellion reconstruction in Kashgar. In Xinjiang Nayanceng attempted to implement 
a package of reforms that closely resembled those of Kokonor.790 
The collection also includes an exchange of letters between Nayanceng and Yan 
Ruyi (1759-1826), who edited the volume and appended a celebratory appraisal of 
Nayanceng’s Kokonor policy.791 Yan Ruyi, a pillar of the statecraft movement during the 
Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns, was contemporaneously recognized as the foremost expert 
on pacification and reconstruction in mountainous frontier regions, therefore his 
endorsement of Nayanceng’s policies in Kokonor carried much weight. The “statecraft” 
school of statesmanship was a self-conscious network of likeminded officials and 
scholars who shared a conviction that moral righteousness alone was insufficient for good 
governance. Instead, this orientation held that officials must be pragmatic and plastic in 
their governing practices, when possible cultivating “practical” knowledge in order to 
develop policies that maximized the state’s power and society’s wealth. 792 In 1800, 
having labored for several years on the staff of the Hu-Guang governor-general during 
the Miao wars, Yan suddenly rose to a position of prominence when he placed first on an 
special exam held by the Jiaqing emperor designed to locate experts on rebellion 
suppression.793 Yan came to the attention of Nayanceng, who subsequently sponsored his 
                                                
790 Laura Newby’s account of Nayanceng’s tenure in southern Xinjiang strongly resembles his 
time in Kokonor. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations 
with Khoqand c. 1760-1860 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 127, 150-151. 
 
791 The original printing of this collection may have been under the title 《經略蒙番節略》 (“A 
brief guide to the strategic management of Mongols and Tibetans”), PFZS 4:44a-48b. 
 
792 William Rowe, Saving the World (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 3. 
 
793 Daniel McMahon, “The Yuelu Academy and Hunan’s Nineteenth-Century Turn Toward 
Statecraft,” Late Imperial China 26.1 (June 2005): 91. See also by the same author, “Identity and 
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career, and even invited the Chinese official to accompany him to Guangdong in 1805 to 
tackle the pirate crisis there.794  
 Nayanceng’s Kokonor policies shared a number of core principles with the 
policies Yan Ruyi had pioneered in Hunan and Shaanxi province. First was the idea that 
“rebellions” in frontier regions were less a result of the strength or ferocity of non-Han 
than a sign that the Qing administrative methods were corrupted or ineffective. Yan 
stressed that pacification must focus first on creating secure, carefully supervised 
communities that could defend themselves and only secondarily on defeating the enemy. 
Moreover, the unsupervised movement of commoners from the interior into frontier 
zones was destabilizing, especially if they “turned away” from the “morally superior” 
culture of the interior. Han who traveled across the border were both corrupted by the 
experience and corrupters of the frontier barbarians. Therefore boundaries between 
communities (i.e. between Han commoners and Tibetans) had to be preserved if adequate 
plans were not in place for the transformation of the Other. Thus conceived, the 
immediate military campaign was less important than comprehensive reconstruction and 
administrative reform.795 Second was a conviction that large state intervention in the 
economy and environment could be effective and transformative. Finally, there was a 
shared belief that detailed knowledge of the frontier and its people was a prerequisite to 
                                                                                                                                            
Conflict on a Chinese Borderland: Yan Ruyi and the recruitment of the Gelao during the 1795-97 
Miao Revolt,” Late Imperial China 23.2 (December 2002): 53-86. 
 
794 McMahon, “Reforming the Garden: Yan Ruyi and the Civilizing of China’s Internal Frontiers, 
1795-1805”  (PhD Diss., University of California, Davis: 1999), 219-20. If it is possible to speak 
of a “patron-priest” relationship involving Nayanceng, then surely it can only be the one between 
himself and Yan Ruyi. 
 
795 McMahon (1999), 7, 23, 216.   
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effective policy development.796 In many respects this final conviction explains the 
unprecedented detail of Nayanceng’s memorials and maps, as well as his wish to see 
them made available to other officials.  
 
Nayanceng’s Diagnosis 
 
If one wishes to sever the inner thread that links the Mongols to the 
Tibetans, one must punish the criminals from the interior.  And if one 
wishes to prevent the Tibetans from marching north, one must clean up the 
Mongols.797 
 
Upon arriving in Xining in November of 1822, Nayanceng faced two conflicting 
concerns. On the one hand the Court wished to see the Mongols protected and nourished: 
“The various Mongol princes and taiji of the region have been obedient servants of the 
dynasty for a long time and cannot be compared to the barbarians of the outside.”798 On 
the other hand, Nayanceng quotes the emperor as stating, “It is not possible to 
permanently station troops in order to protect the Mongols.”799 Thus Nayanceng was 
acutely aware that continued large-scale military operations, such as the one mounted just 
                                                
796 According to McMahon, Yan Ruyi was particularly famous for his thorough administrative 
guides to frontier management that included maps and much detailed information. McMahon 
(2005), 95. 
 
797 PFZS 3:37b-42a (DG 03/02/09, 1823-3-21). 
 
798 PFZS 1:13a. 
 
799 PFZS 1:14a. 
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months earlier by Cangling, were not sustainable over the long term. Even feeding the 
Mongol refugees was a problem as they insisted on only eating tsampa.800   
Nayanceng’s ultimate diagnosis was harsh.801 He attributed the demographic 
collapse and insecurity of the banners primarily to the exploitation of the banner nobility, 
who were “avaricious and barbarous.”802 In an early assessment that would become 
standard in later memorials, Nayanceng writes:  
 
Generally speaking the nomadic Tibetans are flourishing and thus lust 
after the water and pastures of the region north of the river.  How is it that 
they come to know the wealth and poverty of the Mongols and the 
emptiness of the land?  It is because the Mongol princes oppress their 
subjects, and their subjects, having become impoverished, defect therefore 
to the nomadic Tibetans in order to survive. Later the [defectors] lead the 
nomadic Tibetans back to pillage their former masters.803 
 
Thus Nayanceng quickly overturned the perceived wisdom concerning the Mongols. The 
crisis appears no longer as a simple conflict over resources or historical grievances, but 
rather as the result of collaboration between individuals for whom traditional loyalties to 
banner and lord mattered very little.   
Yet as Nayanceng’s investigation evolved, he came to identify a graver concern, 
and one that had eluded his predecessor, Cangling. Nayanceng argued that left to their 
                                                
800 PFZS 3:17b-18a.  Nayanceng, especially in some of his orders to the magistrates of 
Liangzhou, Xining and other departments that were sheltering Mongols, is quite adamant that the 
Mongols must be treated as “human beings.”  The refusal of Mongols to eat anything but tsampa 
(the roasted barley dough central to the Tibetan diet) perhaps demonstrates the degree to which 
they had become acculturated to Tibetan/Fan cultural practices. 
 
801 See for instance the analysis of Song Tingsheng, who, directly quoting Nayanceng’s 
memorials, has no difficulty attributing the Mongol collapse to the “exploitation” of the “feudal 
aristocracy.”  Song Tingsheng, 3-6. 
 
802 PFZS 3:37b. 
 
803 PFZS 1:14b-15a. 
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own devices, the raiding of the nomadic Tibetans would pose little threat. What was truly 
disturbing, however, was the commercialization of the conflict and the profits that were 
purportedly being reaped from it by people from the interior. 
 I humbly advance the opinion that at this time the nomadic Tibetans’ 
furtive migration north of the river reflects nothing more than their lust for 
pasture and water and that their raiding is nothing more than the pursuit of 
trivial gain. However, the collaboration of Muslim commoners (Ch. 回民) 
and the agricultural Tibetans (Ch. 熟番) with cunning people of the 
interior (Ch. 奸民) is becoming common practice and their gangs are truly 
wicked. If not quickly punished, the peril to the interior will be greater 
than that of the foreigners (Ch. 外番). Therefore I must first clear up 
matters in the interior and only afterwards consider what to do with the 
nomadic Tibetans.804  
 
Yet as he began the investigation, the scope of the problem was still not clear: 
 
Who are these criminals from the interior (Ch. 漢奸)? How many of them 
are there? If one calls them ‘Muslim’ people (Ch. 回), then where are they 
from? If they are Mongol, then which Mongol banner (Ch. 旗)? And how 
many of them are there? Since no one knows, they are just given the label 
‘Tibetan bandit’(Ch. 賊番). Now these Tibetan bandits have occupied the 
regions north of the river, but which community (Ch. 族) is where? And 
who are their leaders? Which Tibetan community (Ch. 族 ) contain 
Mongols? Which community (Ch. 族) contain criminals from the interior? 
Not a single person knows!  In sum, since no one has done the 
investigative work and we don’t know what is going on, how can we grasp 
the crux and take control of events?805 
 
Even while en route to Xining, Nayanceng’s attention had turned to the trading 
communities of the market towns that lined the Gansu frontier. In particular he suspected 
that it was the commercial resources and organizational capacity of traders from the 
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interior that provided the knowledge and the incentive to bring Tibetans and Mongols 
together in networks that could move stolen goods from the highlands down into border 
markets within Gansu province. Long-standing law prohibited commoners from the 
interior from conducting trade across the border in Kokonor. In principle, Mongols and 
select groups of Tibetans were permitted to enter the interior to conduct trade. In market 
towns such as Guide, Xunhua, Taozhou, Dangar, and Xining, a unique institution had 
come into existence to handle this trade, the xiejia (Ch. 歇家). Literally meaning “rest 
houses” but often used to refer to the proprietor himself, these institutions were primarily 
brokerages that lodged their clients from the grasslands free of charge, provided 
translation services, and then took a commission from handling the marketing of the 
grassland products. By the early nineteenth century (and probably much earlier), xiejia 
and a variety of unlabeled trading ventures, often no more than a handful of men and 
their capital were increasingly finding ways to slip across the frontier and bring their 
services directly to their clients in the grasslands, working either out of their own mobile 
dwellings or residing among the tents of nomad hosts. The ubiquity of this commercial 
sojourning in the grasslands and the apparent permissiveness of the local officials 
disturbed Nayanceng. As a result of these suspicions, Nayanceng ordered the complete 
closure of the frontier between Kokonor and Gansu and the arrest and investigation of all 
those caught trading beyond the passes. In addition, he ordered the closure of all privately 
run xiejia within the borders. The remaining “official” xiejia (xiejia that were either 
directly owned and managed by the government or had received official business 
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licenses) were required to keep detailed registers of their guests and deliver these 
registers to the local magistrates at regular intervals.806  
Subsequent arrests and confessions over the course of the fall and early winter 
confirmed his suspicions. There were indeed many private traders operating in the 
grasslands. Their trade had expanded from essentials such as grain, tea, and finished 
leather and metal goods to gunpowder and weaponry. They also revealed the remarkable 
and unexpected involvement of both the institution of the Cagan Nomunhan and his 
subjects in the illegal grassland economy. It furthermore appeared that their partners were 
usually Muslim. A month after arriving in Xining, Nayanceng submitted a major report 
that included a long list of individuals who were under investigation for involvement in 
the raiding.807 The memorial began with a case concerning the discovery of men from the 
Cagan Nomunhan banner among a large group of raiders who had attempted to attack 
border posts east of Xining. This information was added to the growing list of 
accusations against the Cagan Nomunhan Banner. But it was the actions of a Muslim 
commoner from Hezhou, Gansu province, Ma Mugou (麻木溝), who ultimately provided 
an example of the type of character Nayanceng was most concerned about.  
When captured in a remote valley of in the Qilian mountains, Ma Mugou was 
found armed and dangerous. Having been brought to Xining for interrogation, he 
admitted to leading Tibetans from communities (族) subordinate to the Cagan Nomunhan 
as well as Mongols and Tibetans from several other banners in numerous raids. Among 
these was the attack of August 22nd, 1822 on an imperial horse farm in Ganzhou 
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Prefecture.808 Nayanceng felt that this man was so important that he kept him alive three 
extra months in order to ensure that all possible information was extracted and personally 
oversaw the interrogation.809   
Ma Mugou admitted to having spent nearly two decades engaged in a mixture of 
long distance trade and raiding together with a rotating group of Muslim acquaintances 
who hailed from towns all across Gansu and Shaanxi provinces.810 He had also overseen 
a series of gold mines in the Qilian Mountains that provided funds for armaments, men, 
and other supplies, as well as a base of operations. What bothered Nayanceng most was 
his ability to organize Mongols and Tibetans from a wide range of backgrounds and 
locales into successful raiding parties. On several occasions this raiding even involved 
monks from the Cagan Nomunhan banner. Still, the bulk of Ma Mugou’s accomplices 
were Muslim commoners from the interior and destitute Mongols. Nayanceng describes 
their strategy thus: 
They wear Tibetan clothing. Moreover, the frequently marry Mongol and 
Tibetan women and adopt Fan children. Thus when they head out on raids, 
the majority of them wear Tibetan coats and hats to disguise themselves as 
Tibetans. Thus in the eyes of their victims they appear to be Tibetan, but 
who and of what community (族) they do not know. Actually, real 
Tibetans live two or three thousand li away!811   
 
Nayanceng’s statement reveals much about the social life of categories such as 
“Mongol” (Ch. 蒙), Muslim (回), Tibetan (番), community (族), and banner (旗) in the 
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early nineteenth century. First it demonstrates that from the perspective of Mongol 
victims and Qing officials, the categories of Mongol or Tibetan, and especially nomadic 
Tibetan (野番), were obvious and essential divisions that carried transparent meanings 
and were imbued with stereotyped expectations of culture and behavior. Only when a 
category like “Tibetan nomad” had a relatively stable meaning across the many particular 
communities of the Gansu borderlands could a Muslim commoner dress as a Tibetan 
nomad and expect to frighten Mongols into relinquishing their property. Second, 
Nayanceng’s memorials also reveal that Qing officials expected that residents of 
Kokonor could identify themselves not only as Mongol or Tibetan but also by affiliation 
with the indigenous political institutions of banners or community (族) if pressed 
forcefully enough (and in confessions most people ultimately could present themselves in 
a manner ‘legible’ to the state). What the actual case of Ma Mugou and many other 
individuals who supply confessions in Pingfan zouyi, make clear, however, is that bonds 
and alliances were constantly forming and reforming across these categories, despite the 
state’s efforts to stop them. People were re-configuring themselves in temporary and 
opportunistic alliances that have little to do with community or banner, let alone broader 
categories such as Mongol or Tibetan. 
 Ma Mugou was not an exceptional case. The case of Su Cheng (蘇城) is also 
illustrative not only of the types of relationships established between Cagan Nomunhan 
subjects and Muslims, but also of the mortal perils that could befall an individual trying 
to navigate between the Qing state and the grassland monastic domains. Su Cheng was a 
Muslim commoner and native of Dangar in Xining prefecture. From a young age he had 
accompanied his father on trading missions outside the border of the prefecture to the 
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Mongols and Tibetans and eventually he brought his own sons into the business. He was 
fluent in Mongol and Tibetan, he had conducted trade for many years with Mongols and 
Tibetans subject to the Cagan Nomunhan banner, as well as nomadic Tibetans of the 
Gangzan community (Ch. 剛咱族).812 Every year, he and his sons usually led at least one 
or two trading expeditions. He could also handle visits by Mongols and Tibetan clients to 
the interior and would help arrange accommodations (at xiejia) and the purchase of grain.    
Su Cheng first came to the attention of the governor-general in December of 
1822, due to a report filed by the military commandant of Xining, Murandai, and the 
prefect, Bayanju. But Su Cheng had previously come to the attention of other officials 
when he and his sons were captured under suspicion of illegal trading on October 27, 
1822. After some investigation it was revealed that the Su family had established bonds 
of brotherhood (“結為兄弟”) with the leader of the Gangzan zu, one of the more 
obstinate groups occupying pasture to the north of the river. Su Cheng’s son Su Sijiu (“Su 
Forty-nine” 蘇四九) was accused of forewarning the Gangzan leadership that Cangling 
was leading an expedition of troops in the third lunar month of that year. It was also 
discovered that in the seventh lunar month (late August-early September), Su Sijiu had 
organized an illegal expedition together with Maga Manla (馬尕滿拉) to trade flour, tea, 
potatoes, and other items for hides in the tent of Duoli, the Gangzan leader.813   
These were serious crimes and capital offences, yet the Su family preserved 
themselves by offering to put their grassland expertise in service of the state and work as 
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spies to capture bandits. The state accepted this offer and on November 11th, they headed 
off, leaving several family members as hostages. Su Cheng returned on January 9th 1823, 
with four “suspicious” Mongols from the Cagan Nomunhan’s banner. 
Shortly thereafter, however, Su Cheng’s position began to fall apart. A conflicting 
petition arrived from the Cagan Nomunhan himself accusing Su Cheng (whom the 
kūtuktu identified as a “Han” not a Muslim commoner) of leading thirty people from the 
Gangzan to attack his people. The lama wrote that Su Cheng had arrived in his territory 
and claimed an official mandate to punish the Cagan Nomunhan for not having made 
reparations for murders the latter had previously carried out on the Gangzan.  
Faced with two conflicting stories, the Qing officials tortured Su Cheng. He 
ultimately confessed that before arriving at the Cagan Nomunhan banner to spy, he 
stopped at the camp of Duoli. Duoli told Su Cheng that the Cagan Nomunhan had killed 
some of his tribesman and wanted reparations. Su Cheng offered to help and proceeded 
ahead to the Cagan Nomunhan encampment where he not only conveyed Duoli’s 
demands but also requested ula (labor/transportation service) and grain. When the 
kūtuktu did not acquiesce, the Gangzan attacked.  Because they caught a group of the 
Cagan Nomunhan’s people in the midst of moving camp (and thus relatively defenseless), 
they are able to make off with fourteen families (a total of sixty-five people) as captives 
and all their livestock.814 
Nayanceng, outraged, condemned Su Cheng to decapitation and ordered his sons 
dispatched to distant frontiers to serve as military slaves. His memorial presents this case 
as a textbook example of the dangers of permitting people from the interior to roam 
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beyond the borders. From his and Yan Ruyi’s perspective, it was clearly minren 
(“commoners”) that were the agents provocateurs in the grassland conflict.815 The 
commercialization of grassland raiding by Sino-Muslim traders represented a grave threat 
to the stability of both Kokonor and Gansu.  Moreover, the degree to which people from 
the interior were “turning away” from Chinese culture—learning to speak Tibetan, taking 
local wives, adopting the nomadic diet and attire—threatened the entire rationale for 
Qing colonial governance in the Gansu borderlands. As Daniel McMahon argues in his 
dissertation on the frontier policies of Yan Ruyi, statecraft thinkers directly linked the 
dynasty’s ability to instruct and transform its frontiers to its overall health and stability.816 
Thus cultural backsliding by Gansu province’s trans-frontiersmen was a sure sign that the 
dynasty itself was in peril.  
  Such fears about cross-cultural mixing were also most likely an important reason 
for the intense scrutiny of the Cagan Nomunhan. Nayanceng’s treatment of this kūtuktu is 
singular. Although he would later write to Yan Ruyi expressing concern with the size and 
influence of Labrang, Tsongkha, and Rongwo monasteries, no other lama or monastic 
institution was targeted in the manner with which he pursued the Cagan Nomunhan. 
Confessions such as those of Ma Mugou and Su Cheng together with other investigations 
revealed the heterogeneous nature of the Cagan Nomunhan’s polity. As a harbor for 
refugee “Mongols” and a collaborator with “nomadic Tibetans,” his institution was also 
an instrument of transformation—in this case into Tibetan nomads. Moreover, as an 
apparent hub (and probably also a bank) for the trans-frontier trading network, the Cagan 
Nomunhan could not be left unreformed. By early December of 1822 suspicions had 
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hardened into a concrete policy: on December fifth, Nayanceng requested permission to 
forcefully blockade and harass the Cagan Nomunhan banner in its new territory north of 
the river until they agreed to return south.817   
 
Nayanceng’s Treatment: 
 
Eliminate traitors in the interior in order to cleanse the outside of 
trouble.818 
 
Nayanceng’s approach to reconstruction in Kokonor was a dramatic expression of 
the idea that the ultimate source of instability was the administrative and economic 
system of regions inside the passes. On February 28th, 1823, Nayanceng provided 
statistics on the numbers of men engaged in private trade and/or raiding who had been 
flushed out of the banner and zu (族) communities of Kokonor. It was a considerable 
body count: thirty-three men beheaded, thirteen hanged, seventy-six sent to serve as 
military slaves; another fifteen men received various lesser punishments. A further one 
hundred and thirty individuals were still awaiting investigation. In total two hundred and 
sixty-seven men had been caught. There were so many open cases that Nayanceng 
complained that the jails of Xining had run out of capacity to house further convicts. And 
a further twenty-two accused traders were still at large.819 This creeping purge of the 
Gansu trading community seemed to know no bounds. Each new trader caught in the net 
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ultimately exposed a new circle of acquaintances and thus confirmed the governor-
general’s suspicion that the hanjian “cancer” had spread across Gansu.820 Even the 
yamen of the Qinghai amban was not immune from his assault: the entire staff of 
translators (Ch. 通事) was fired in December of 1822 on suspicion that they, too, had 
become complicit in the illegal cross-border trade.821  
Nine key elements can be identified in Nayanceng’s reforms: 1) the resettlement 
of Mongols in their original pastures with guarantees of Qing official military support 
during the winter and the forced removal of nomadic Tibetans to points south of the 
Yellow River;822 2) a reform of the collection of tribute tax from the Tibetans of Yülshu 
(a district in the far southeast corner of present-day Qinghai province) in order to 
alleviate the hardships of Mongols along the route;823 3) resurrection of a licensed trading 
system in designated markets; 4) administrative reforms in Gansu; 5) division of Tibetans 
into new decimal-based units of administration based on extensive new surveys and the 
appointment of new local headmen; 6) investigation and surveillance of monasteries; 7) 
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822 The major reform instituted among the Mongols was the establishment of a league-chief 
(mengzhang) position to broadly coordinate between the banners.  Since Nian Gengyao forbade 
inter-banner alliances in the aftermath of the Lobzang Danjin rebellion, the Mongol banner 
nobility in Qinghai had had difficulty organizing a coordinated response to incidents such as the 
Fan raiding.  The overall decline of the Mongol banners in Kokonor also probably resulted from 
the rigidity of the banner system.  Since it limited population transfers between banners and 
movement across banner territory, the increasingly ossified banner system prevented the banner 
populations from evolving in ways that might have offset the challenges they faced.  
 
823 PFZS 2:30a-32b. Nayanceng’s unprecedented set of regulations instituting tribute tax on the 
fan of Xunhua, Guide, the Cagan Nomunhan banner and points further south was known as the 
“Horse Tribute Regulations” (Ch. 貢馬章程). Although labeled a “horse tribute tax,” it was 
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reorganization of the military deployments of the provincial garrison;824 8) the use of 
harsher sentencing guidelines from the legal system of the interior to punish offenders 
from beyond the passes;825 and finally, 9) employment of Tibetan monks to promulgate 
and explain the reforms to the non-Chinese speaking population.  The following section 
will discuss these reforms primarily as they related to the Cagan Nomunhan banner.   
As noted above, Nayanceng’s chief tool for “pacifying” the nomadic Tibetans of 
the Cagan Nomunhan and other groups was a strict economic blockade—not another 
military campaign. In fact he was able to force the Tibetans south across the Yellow 
River to their “original” rangeland without any significant fighting. In order to make this 
successful, however, Nayanceng spoke overtly of the regulation of individual Tibetan 
diets and bodies.826 Only the careful regulation of food would assure that the Tibetans 
were too weak to resist Qing management. As Nayanceng noted in his report on the 
submission of the Cagan Nomunhan, the collapse of nomadic Tibetan resistance occurred 
more quickly than he anticipated. He took this as a sign that the ubiquity of the illegal 
commercial network had created a degree of dependence on supplies from the interior 
that had not existed in the past. In a memorial dated January 29, 1823, Nayanceng cited 
an interview with a Mongol who escaped from the Fan to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of his policies. The Mongol reported that difficulties began shortly after trade was first 
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cut in the ninth lunar month (October-November 1822). The herders then began eating 
their flocks, but were soon suffering from disease. Three months later, at the time when 
he slipped away, many Fan had already died of starvation.827 Nayanceng believed these 
hardships had hastened the Cagan Nomunhan’s submission earlier in the month. In the 
same memorial, Nayanceng noted that local officials in Xunhua and Guide had reported 
that, “No less that twenty thousand people from the Cagan Nomunhan, as well as 
nomadic Tibetans of various zu, have been able to cross the river at the fords because the 
water is now low. Their cattle, sheep, camels, and horses number in the hundreds of 
thousands and Tibetan tents crowd along the banks of the [Yellow] River for three 
hundred li in Guide and Xunhua.”828 
Nayanceng envisioned the eradication of unsupervised trade in Kokonor as a 
permanent policy. Therefore its long-term success hinged on the concurrent 
implementation of a series of administrative and trading policies to remove the incentives 
that drove the trade. He outlined these policies for the first time on January 5, 1823. At 
the heart of his approach was a system of licenses (Ch. 票) to be granted to cooperative 
Tibetan headmen. The licenses would authorize the headman to trade for a specific 
quantity of grain, tea, and other essentials based on an exact census of his population and 
a calculation of how much this population required for survival. The license would then 
allow the headman to oversee trading in a specific market town at specific government-
supervised shops that would sell at government-authorized prices. Licenses were good for 
one year, and authorized two yearly market transactions; they were neither transferrable 
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nor extendable. Chiliarchs (Ch. 千戶) were required to reapply each year at their local 
sub-prefectual (廳) or battalion (營) yamen for new licenses. Nayanceng was confident 
that these “Regulations for the Exchange of Grain and Tea” (Ch.《易換糧茶章程》) 
would eliminate entirely private merchants from the marketplace. To further incentivize 
the Tibetan leadership, he ordered that all outstanding debts to “criminal merchants” (奸
商) need not be honored and that anyone trying to collect a debt would be prosecuted.829 
These regulations were also a statement of Nayanceng’s confidence that the state could 
deliver goods more cheaply than the market.830   
These economic regulations went hand in hand with the administrative reform of 
the Cagan Nomunhan banner and other nomadic Tibetan communities in Guide and 
Xunhua. In order to issue the appropriate licenses, Nayanceng’s officials had to break the 
Tibetans into legible units so that their dietary intake could be accurately assessed. This 
policy also served the purpose of distributing power and authority away from major local 
leaders (such as the Cagan Nomunhan) and inserting state supervision at a lower level. In 
an early discussion of this policy, Nayanceng argued that by reorganizing herding 
households into equally sized units, he could not completely eliminate raiding but at least 
he could reduce its scale.831 He wrote, “we must break up their strength so that they 
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cannot again tyrannize people.”832 Nayanceng clearly stated that his reforms among the 
nomadic Tibetans should not be considered the establishment of direct rule. As the 
nomadic Tibetan spoke a different language and lived “beyond the frontier,” it was still 
inappropriate to place them under the direct rule of Han or Manchu magistrates.833 Still, 
Nayanceng hoped that this measure would help extend the baojia collective security 
system of the interior to the sub-prefectures of Guide and Xunhua and thus lay the 
groundwork such that the nomadic Tibetans would “spontaneously return to our system 
and thus be ruled effortlessly.”834   
With regards to the Cagan Nomunhan banner, these reforms were much more 
difficult, a reflection of the fact that this polity was neither a straightforward “Mongol” 
banner nor a collection of “Tibetan zu,” but rather an ambiguous combination of the two. 
Memorials from the Jiaqing and early Daoguang reigns concerning the Cagan Nomunhan 
polity generally referred to it as a “Mongol banner.” Initially, Nayanceng assumed that 
the nomadic Tibetans discovered to be sheltering in the Cagan Nomunhan banner were 
merely opportunistic criminal associates. However, by the time he met personally with 
the kūtuktu he recognized that the banner did in fact include twenty zu of Tibetans. Yet, 
even during the course of this memorial, Nayanceng swings from labeling this polity a 
“foolish Tibetan banner” (蠢爾番旗) to referring to the lama’s people simply as 
“Mongols.” He then ordered the Tibetan portion to be reorganized “according to the old 
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Mongol statutes.”835 In the winter Nayanceng switched track and ordered that the 
Tibetans be organized into a “chiliarch-centurion” (Ch. 千戶-百戶) system together with 
the other Tibetans of Guide and Xunhua.836 It appears Nayanceng expected that after 
these reforms, the Guide magistrate would more closely supervise the chiliarchs and 
centurions from the Cagan Nomunhan banner. 
Further complicating the Qing’s efforts to reform the Cagan Nomunhan banner 
was the fact that officials discovered that it was full of “captives.” In February 
Nayanceng memorialized that one hundred households of captured Mongols that had 
been extracted from the Cagan Nomunhan banner were returned to their original banners. 
An additional twenty-three households of Arik “Tibetans” (番子) were returned to the 
Arik headman.837 One can only speculate about how these people ended up part of the 
Cagan Nomunhan banner.  Perhaps they had indeed been acquired through raiding. Or 
perhaps officials were trying to delegitimize the Cagan Nomunhan’s acquisition of 
certain communities either because they had been donated to his estates (which the Qing 
may have considered invalid) or because they had sought refuge there for economic 
reasons (and this was an embarrassment to the Mongol aristocracy). There is no 
indication in Tibetan sources that the Cagan Nomunhan’s estates were acquired (even 
partially) through warfare. 
Nayanceng and Yan Ruyi both held the deep conviction that the conquests of their 
ancestors in the Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns had established an unprecedented peace 
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on Qing empire’s frontiers, frontiers that they corrolated with “China.” In his letter to 
Yan Ruyi, Nayanceng identified Qing pacification of the Tibetans (番) with the historical 
relationship between the Tibetans and China (“中國”), noting the contrast between the 
Tang dynasty’s defeat by the Tufan (吐蕃) and his present dynasty’s success. His swift 
defeat of the Cagan Nomunhan, the “strongest banner of them all” and a descendent of 
the Tibetans of the Tibetan empire, is understood here as an opportunity. Citing Tang 
sources that advocated military settlements (屯) on the upper Yellow River, Nayanceng 
argued that the region was indeed tillable and ready for state-supported settlers from the 
interior.838 Yan Ruyi, in his response, agreed, pointing out that settling Kokonor would be 
like the ancient settlements established by the Western Han and Tang dynasties in Yiwu 
and Luntai (near Barkol and Kuche, respectively, in Xinjiang), thus drawing an implicit 
parallel between Kokonor and the Qing’s far western territories in Xinjiang.839 The 
position of Tibetans in this new order was ambiguous at best. As we have seen above, 
Nayanceng held the belief that some the “raw” and “cooked” Tibetans—those Tibetans 
who were agriculturalists or participated in a mixed agricultural economy—who fell 
under the jurisdiction of Guide and Xunhua might be susceptible to “transformation.” Yet 
Nayanceng's sights were trained primarily on the land, not the people of Kokonor. The 
region would be transformed by settlement and colonization from the interior and the 
Tibetans—especially the nomadic Tibetans—would be marginalized.840 
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Nayanceng concludes his publication by noting that danger that even the Tibetan 
monasteries posed to the dynasty: “The monasteries of Labrang, Tsongkha, and Rongwo 
call together twenty to thirty thousand monks. Their temples are too vast, their monks are 
too plentiful, and it is difficult to guarantee that their ranks do not harbor traitors. Their 
lamas must not freely come and go, otherwise information from the interior will leak 
across the frontier. If a monastery hides traitors like Gönlung monastery (Ch. 郭隆寺), 
one must incinerate their scriptures and burn their hermitages.”841 The potent possibility 
of a trans-frontier alliance between nomads and monks, as in the case of the Cagan 
Nomunhan banner, was still a major concern.  
  
Local Legacies and Understandings 
 
Regardless of the short-term devastation Nayanceng’s policies certainly wrought 
on local merchants and herders, they had little long-term effect. By the 1850s, a large 
portion of the Cagan Nomunhan community had successfully completed a long-term 
migration to formerly Mongol banner pastures north of Kokonor Lake (figure 7).842 By 
most accounts, the slow deterioration of Mongol aristocratic fortunes was not reversed. 
Muslim trading networks continued to expand across the Mongol and Tibetan pastures of 
northern Tibet and Kokonor.843 Most significantly the influence of individual Qing 
                                                
841 PFZS 4:48a. This is a reference to the support of the monks of Gonlung Monastery for 
Lobzang Danjin. 
 
842 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 258-9. 
 
843 Archival sources from Xunhua subprefecture from the 1870-1890s demonstrate this. See for 
instance reports filed concerning the weakened position of the Mongol lords, QSDG: 7-YJ-2697 
(GX 06/10/15), 7-YJ-2730 (GX 09/10/01). 
 392 
administrators and their policies seems completely absent from the historical memory of 
members of the Cagan Nomunhan polity as recorded in historical chronicles and 
biographies from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, Tibetan authors 
locate the origins of the nineteenth conflict in reasons that are completely invisible in 
Qing reports and place their history within a completely different framework.   
 
 
Figure 7: Approximate location of new territories of the Cagan Nomunhan in the 1850s 
(green polygon). 
 
Late nineteenth-century descriptions of this grassland violence in Chinese sources 
generally portray these events as an ethnic conflict between Mongols and Tibetans. The 
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New Comprehensive Gazetteer of Gansu of 1908 describes the Cagan Nomunhan as a 
traitor, castigates Cangling as “foolish” for relying on him, and then reports on the 700-
man strong cavalry detachment sent to bring the lama to heel. Yet, although the gazetteer 
directly quotes from several of Nayanceng’s memorials, this retelling omits the economic 
story and the reconstruction measures of which the governor-general was so proud.844  
Later local official assessments of the grassland conflicts of the nineteenth century 
understood it primarily as a story of Tibetan revenge on the Mongol banners for their 
occupation of what had originally been Fan pastureland around Kokonor in the 
seventeenth century. Thus over the course of the nineteenth century what Qing officials 
had once been considered a “Mongol” banner had come to be conceptualized as a fully 
Tibetan (“Fan”) enterprise. This portrayal of these events as a stark ethnic conflict 
influenced twentieth century Chinese historians, as well as the most influential English-
language commentator on the history of Qinghai, Louis Schram.845  
The Tibetan language accounts from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
present a very different picture. The migrations north are not motivated by a desire to 
recapture lost homelands. There is no master narrative of conflict between Tibetans and 
Mongols. Rather, the origins of the conflicts over pasture are more local, particular, and 
above all more tragic. Far from being a triumphant march northward against the 
Mongols, monastic chronicles from the domain of the Cagan Nomunhan portray the 
                                                
844 Sheng-yun, Chang-geng, eds., Gansu xin tongzhi 甘肅全省新通志 (1908), 46:62b-63b. 
 
845 Louis Schram, The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1954-61), 616. Schram’s account of ethnic conflict in Qinghai was picked 
up by Joseph Fletcher Jr., “Heyday of the Ch’ing order in Inner Asia,” in The Cambridge History 
of China vol. 10, Late Ch'ing 1800-1911, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 402. 
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event more as an exile—a painful response to being displaced themselves by raiders from 
other nomadic communities further to the south and west.846 Since the Oceanic Book is 
largely silent on the history of the Cagan Nomunhan Kūtuktu and his institution after the 
fourth incarnation (d. 1796).  Therefore the primary source on the subsequent history of 
the Lamo incarnations are monks affiliated with Lamo Dechen monastery who wrote 
during the twentieth century, among whom the account of Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub 
Gyatso has been particularly influential.847 This highly nuanced narrative deserves close 
attention for what it reveals about local conceptions of communities and boundaries in 
Amdo. 
Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyatso devotes considerable attention to the events 
that transpired during the life of the fifth Zhabdrung Karpo. Unlike the Nayanceng and 
Yan Ruyi’s portrayal of the monk as cunning, deceitful, powerful and ultimately weak, 
Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso argues that the fifth Zhabdrung maintained his 
lineage’s reputation for diplomacy in the Amdo region. He writes:  
 
Through the combined spiritual deeds of this lord together with those of 
the Shar Nomun Han (Tb. shar no min han) and Arik Geshé, (Tb. a rig 
dge bshes chen mo) tranquility was established in the district to the north 
and south of the great river (Yellow River).  He became renowned for both 
his scholarship and practice by having met individually with many tens of 
teachers at Lamo Dechen and Gur monasteries and on account of his 
                                                
846 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 258-9. 
 
847 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho’s narrative is closely paraphrased by a number 
of other Tibetan-language local histories published in the last two decades.  See for instance: 
Debu-Chenlie Aosai Xiarongga’bu zhuan (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1996; and Mkha’ 
‘gro skyabs’s history of the Lamo Zhabdrung Karpo lineage (unpublished manuscript in 
collection of author). 
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zealous study of both the exoteric and esoteric of the Hinayana and 
Vajrayana sciences.848 
 
Yet in the narrative that follows this description, the fifth Lamo Kūtuktu plays no 
significant role in dealing with the violence that engulfed his community. The text is 
silent on the topic of what kind of relationship this incarnation had with Qing officials.  
Instead, it is secular leaders from the Cagan Nomunhan community and neighboring 
communities who are the influential historical actors. 
The conflict that would ultimately force the Cagan Nomunhan to flee to the north 
of Qinghai Lake began after the death of a “minister” (Tib. blon chen) of the Mongol 
Danzin Wang.849 This official was in charge of many nomadic encampments in the region 
around the valley of the Bal River (present-day Tongde county). This valley also included 
many communities of nomads who belonged to the estate of the Cagan Nomunhan.  
Known as “the tiger of Bal,” the leadership of this minister had been the key to a general 
peace in the pastures to the south of the Yellow River. Upon his death, nomads from the 
Rebgong region, the Hor sbra nag (the “black-tent Hor” nomads), began to encroach on 
the pastures of the three valleys of Mang, ‘Bal, and Bya.850 There subsequently ensued 
“several years of conflict between Hor and Mongols (sog).” Because the nomadic 
                                                
848Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 258.  Shar Nomunhan is an important 
incarnation series affiliated with Rongwo Monastery in Rebgong.  Arik Geshé was an influential 
lama who played a major role in the region just to the south of the Cagan Nomunhan’s estate and 
founded a number of important monasteries, most significantly Rabjya Monastery in 1769. 
849 The name of this Mongol official was “Al der ho sho’i chi” which may mean “Alder of the 
Khoshot Banner.”  But it seems like Al der ho sho’i chi is currently remembered as a proper 
name.  Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 259. The crucial role that the Mongol 
prince’s strongman played among the Mongol banners south of the river should give us pause to 
consider what types of inter-banner political structures still existed, despite Qing restrictions.   
 
850 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 259. 
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subjects of the Cagan Nomun Han lived in such close proximity to the nomadic 
communities of the Mongol Qinwang, they too were caught up in this conflict.851 Around 
1830, the situation had become untenable and the very survival of the Cagan 
Nomunhan’s nomadic communities was in doubt.  The Hor sbra nag “army” soundly 
defeated and dispersed the Four Companies (Tib. mda’ bzhi) and the urga of the Cagan 
Nomun Han, as well as numerous monasteries supervised by the lama. Therefore, under 
the leadership of the headman (Tib: dpon po) of Bya, Gyaltsan Zangbo (Tib: rgyal 
mtshan bzang bo), the Four Companies and the urga of the Lamo Kūtuktu (including his 
personal chapel) migrated from their original pastures and regrouped at a new 
encampment on the north shore of Kokonor Lake (Tib: bo ro chu ‘gag gzhung, Ch: 海晏
水峡).852 
According to this narrative, Qing authorities did not pose an obstacle to this 
migration to new pastures north of the Yellow River. Nor does the Tibetan-language 
account suggest that the Yellow River was the proper boundary of their community. To 
the contrary it was local Mongols living in these “new” pastures who threw up objections 
to the immigration. Here, however, Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyamtso, citing local oral 
histories, throws in a surprising twist: In order to overcome the Mongols’ objections and 
earn a place in the Mongol pastures, Gyaltsan Zangpo, together with the headman (Tib: 
spyi dpon, Ch: qianhu) of “seventeen black-tent” communities, hatched a clever scheme: 
the latter would attack the Mongols and the former would fake a counter-attack.  
According to plan, a “bandit army of black-tent Bod” (i.e. Tibetans) attacked the Mongols 
                                                
851 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 259. 
 
852 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 262-3. 
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on the north shore of Kokonor, driving off many head of livestock. Gyaltsan Zangpo then 
led the Four Companies in “pursuit.” After exchanging blank shots with the Tibetans, 
they succeeded in “defeating” the raiders. The Four Companies then returned a number of 
“poor quality” animals to the Mongols and were able to claim a reward from their 
Mongol hosts. In return for rescuing the Mongol flocks, the local Mongols granted the 
Cagan Nomunhan’s herders the right to nomadize within their territory to the north of 
Lake Kokonor.853     
Conclusion  
 
The narrative of Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyatso both confirms and confounds 
Nayanceng’s account of the Cagan Nomunhan polity and the grassland conflicts of the 
Daoguang period. On the surface, this story confirms Nayanceng’s suspicion that people 
from the Cagan Nomunhan banner were colluding with nomadic Fan to deceive and rob 
the Mongols. The absence of the Cagan Nomun Han Kūtuktu from any direct 
involvement in the crisis might also support Nayanceng’s contention that the lama had 
very little influence over the governing of his community. However, the status of the 
Cagan Nomunhan banner as ambiguously “Meng/Mongol” or “Fan/Tibetan” from the 
perspective of outsiders presented opportunities for Cagan Nomunhan insiders to 
manipulate shifting assumptions about the identity of their community to suit their 
circumstances. In this case, the astute lay commander of the remaining Cagan Nomunhan 
communities was able to manipulate the perception that they were a “Mongol Banner” as 
a screen to fool their Mongol hosts. The polity’s diversity allowed it to tap into the multi-
                                                
853 Yongs ‘dzin blo bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho, 260-1. 
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cultural resources of Amdo in order to form alliances and survive in the competitive 
political landscape of the Qinghai highlands. 
This indigenous description of the conflict indicates that the communities subject 
to the government of the Cagan Nomunhan had intimate relations with neighboring 
Mongols. Their original camps and pastures had, in many places, been mixed among 
those of nomads belonging to the Mongol banners from south of the Yellow River. The 
‘Four Companies’ nomadic estate (Tb: ru sde) had been organized explicitly “according 
to Mongol custom” in the 1720s.  Moreover, it would appear that to some extent, in a 
period when their own leader was weak (in his infancy or in the midst of his education), 
the nomadic estates of the Fifth Lamo Cagan Nomunhan relied on a neighboring Mongol 
banner strongman for their security. Yet although core constituencies of the Cagan 
Nomunhan had clearly been organized in Mongol administrative fashion, Yongzin 
Lobzang Khédrub Gyatso does not identify them as ethnically “Mongol” (sog). Nor are 
they identified as “Tibetan” (bod or bod pa) as are the neighbors of the Cagan Nomunhan 
estate who live in the “black tents.” Thus this twentieth-century Tibetan-language 
narrative implies that the community boundaries and identity were delimited primarily by 
status as subjects of the tent-camp government (sgar gzhung/urga) of the Cagan Nomun 
Han Kūtuktu. 
In contrast to the essentialized categories of “Tibetan,” “Mongol,” “Han,” and 
“Hui” (Muslim) that frame Nayanceng’s account, the Tibetan-language accounts and the 
details of Nayanceng’s reports reveal a landscape in which such broad categories have 
little relevance and are seldom employed. For instance, Nayanceng’s reports contain 
detailed confessions from individuals who had crossed boundaries, learned multiple 
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languages, dressed as nomads, and pursued personal relationships that did not accord 
with their “official” status. Nayanceng is dismayed to discover that nomadic “Tibetan” 
raiders are more often than not, Mongols or even Muslims masquerading in “Tibetan” 
clothes in order to frighten potential victims. The migration of nomads from regions to 
the south of the Yellow River north into the pastures of the Mongol banners around Lake 
Kokonor led to the impression in Qing reports from the mid to late nineteenth century 
that the region around Kokonor lake was becoming “Tibetanized” (or “Fanicized”) at the 
expense of local Mongols. The documentary record from this period demonstrates, 
however, that rather than “Tibetans” displacing “Mongols,” it was the “Mongols,” 
“Muslims,” and even “Han” who were actively adopting social and cultural trappings 
associated with nomadic “Tibetans.” 
The case of the Cagan Nomunhan polity is perhaps only the most salient example 
of a broader phenomenon: the importance of affiliation with highly localized political 
structures and ways of life (like nomadizing in black-tent encampments), and lineages 
(Tib: rus, literally “bone”) over broader categories such as “Tibetan,” “Mongol,” or 
“Muslim.” In fact, the very existence of these categories is highly suspect, especially 
from the perspective of Tibetan sources. The present-day ethnonym Böpa (“Tibetan” Tib. 
bod pa) appears only rarely in nineteenth-century sources. In Belmang’s History, for 
instance, Böpa is generally used to refer to lay officials and monks from Ü-Tsang, not as 
a term that necessarily includes people in Amdo or Kham.854 Drakgönpa appears to have 
followed his teacher’s usage. In his biography of Belmang Pandita, he writes, of “two lay 
Tibetan officials (bod pa drung 'khor gnyis)” from Lhasa. In the Oceanic Book as well, 
                                                
854 Belmang, History, 576-577, 606-6-7. 
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Böpa is used almost exclusively for people from central Tibet.855 There are no signs of 
the modern regional self-identifier “Amdowa” (Tib. a mdo pa, “person of Amdo”) either. 
Thus one struggles to find an indigenous category in Amdo to match the Chinese and 
Manchu concepts of fan or fandze, respectively. Tibetan-language local histories such as 
the The Oceanic Book and the account of Yongzin Lobzang Khédrub Gyatso, writing as 
they were for a local audience, present a view of society in which individuals were 
primarily recognized not by large categories such as “Tibetan” but rather through 
affiliation with regional political structures labeled variously déwa (Tib. sde ba “polity” 
or “domain”), “lhadé” (Tib. lha sde “religious domain”), or pönkhag (Tib. dpon khag 
“principality”), smaller subdivisions or communities called tsowa (Tib. tsho ba or tsho 
khag), and also by economic culture into rudé (Tib. ru sde, “herding group”) or shingdé 
(Tib. shing sde, “farming group”). Thus this twentieth-century Tibetan-language narrative 
implies that the community boundaries and identity were delimited primarily by status as 
subjects of the mobile, tent-camp government (Tib. garzhung or urgé) of the Cagan 
Nomunhan Kūtuktu. 
 
On the frontier and away from court, Qing patronage of the Geluk Buddhist 
aristocracy entailed no smooth cooperation between church and empire, especially when 
Qing officials were dealing with incarnate lamas who were also local rulers. Although 
local authors note that Qing rulers had patronized the Lamo Kūtuktu’s monasteries since 
the Kangxi reign and Qing official compediums recorded the Cagan Nomunhan as having 
entered the ranks of the Qing elite as a banner jasak, there is no agreement between these 
two perspectives over the scope of his realm or his role. The Qing state and the Geluk 
                                                
855 Drakgönpa, BMNT, 160; Oceanic Book, 40, 43, 46, 216, 251, 371. 
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church had created profoundly different “maps” of the Gansu borderlands. The political 
jurisdiction of the Cagan Nomunhan’s office, the economic relationships of his subjects 
and monasteries, and the religious role of the lama himself all transgressed the “proper” 
boundaries as understood by the Daoguang emperor and Nayanceng. 
The differing “maps” of Amdo/Gansu were also expressions of competing 
imperial enterprises. The major texts considered for this chapter all harbor imperial 
visions legitimized by the rhetoric of a civilizing mission. According to both Belmang 
Pandita and Drakgönpa, successive generations of the Cagan Nomunhan, as embodied 
Buddhas and virtuous and effective rulers, had not only brought peace to his own vast 
estates but also been crucial agents in the overall transformation of the Amdo region and 
its various peoples into the domain of Gelukpa Buddhism. Belmang Pandita’s Manchu 
contemporary Nayanceng, in his exchange of letters with his editor and mentor Yan Ruyi, 
positioned the Cagan Nomunhan as a bit player in the historical conflict between the 
civilization of China (“中國”) and the barbarity of the Tibetans in which the Qing had 
finally and permanently gained the upper hand. Moreover in both narratives the catalyst 
for expansion was the “request” of the untamed and unruly Mongol aristocracy of 
Kokonor.  
The conflict with the Cagan Nomunhan reverberated well beyond Nayanceng and 
Yan Ruyi. Wei Yuan’s enormously influential military history of the dynasty, the 
Shengwuji, published in several successive editions between 1842 and 1846, depicted the 
Cagan Nomunhan as the most obdurate threat to the stability of Qinghai. Wei Yuan’s 
account not only rehearsed the monk’s supposed role in the conflicts of the Jiaqing and 
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Daoguang reigns, but also accused him of being the prime instigator of the Lobzang 
Danjin rebellion.856 
The hostile meeting between the Cagan Nomunhan and Nayanceng marked a 
moment when what had been a mutually beneficial cooperation between Gelukpa 
Buddhists and the Qing dynasty began to give way to mutual suspicion and hostility as 
each side found itself stymied by the other in its attempt to fully realize its imperial 
ambitions, visions that as early as the 1820s left increasingly little room for re-
interpretation and acceptance by the other side. The contrast between the relatively 
harmonious relationship between Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs from Amdo and the 
Qianlong court and the increasingly tense relationship during the Jiaqing and Daoguang 
reigns is stark. Qianlong’s “reform” of Tibetan affairs in the 1790s following the Gurkha 
wars laid the legal basis and historical precedent for a much more interventionist 
approach to managing political and religious affairs in Tibet, Amdo, and Mongolia. Yet 
the expectations of nineteenth-century rulers and administrators far outstripped their 
ability to actually influence local affairs. Beset with crises elsewhere, the rulers of the 
Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns were limited to periodic campaign-style interventions in 
Amdo such as the ones led by Cangling and Nayanceng. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century, indigenous institutions and leaders would increasingly eclipse Qing 
officials as the center of political power and influence. 
Despite these developments, however, Tibetan involvement with Qing institutions 
increased, as did contact between Tibetans, Mongols, Muslims, Han, and many other 
smaller ethnic groups across both Qing administrative frontiers and the Tibetan-
conceptualized divide between Amdo (or “Tibet,” bod chen po) and China. As will be 
                                                
856 Wei Yuan, Shengwuji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 139-142. 
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discussed in the remaining two chapters, Qing colonial jurisprudence acted as a key agent 
in the continuing transformation of the political-economy of Amdo. Much as the allure of 
Gelukpa jurisprudence had undermined Khoshot political authority in the eighteenth 
century, the opportunities presented by the appearance of alternate Qing legal forums 
posed new challenges for both Gelukpa hierarchs and Qing magistrates.  
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Chapter Six: The Creation of the “Tibetan” Codes and the Qing 
Colonial Legal Order in Xunhua Subprefecture 
 
 
 
Introduction: An Historical Juxtaposition and a Paradox 
 
 
 The foundational elements of what would eventually become the civil and 
military apparatus of the Xunhua Subprefecture were laid in the 1720s with a simple goal 
in mind: to “remake the Tibetans as Chinese.”857 In 1726, the Yongzheng emperor 
accepted the advice of one of his field commanders Danai that a “subprefect for pacifying 
the Tibetans (撫番同知)” be established in Hezhou and delegated the responsibility for 
administering the Tibetan populations that lived along and beyond the borders of 
Hezhou.858 Just four years later, a military garrison was moved across the frontier and 
established in a new fort labeled “Xunhua” (循化), the meaning of which can be 
approximated as, “Obedient Transformation.”  The fort was situated on a narrow plain of 
agricultural land located on the southern bank of the Yellow River. Separated from 
Hezhou in Gansu province by the Jishi mountain range and several days of rugged 
backcountry travel, the region had been part of the domain of the Khoshot khanate until 
the Lobzang Danjin rebellion in 1723. Even the Yellow River made its way from Xunhua 
into Gansu only with great effort—it had forced its way through the Jishi mountains, 
                                                
857 Gong Jinghan, Xunhua Zhi (“Xunhua Gazetteer,” Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1981 
[1792]), 25. Gong is citing an imperial edict that posits that after Tibetans living along the frontier 
are subjected to an administrative system modeled after that of the interior, “Thus the Tibetans 
will be transformed into Chinese and will know how to be good people of the borderlands (則化
番為漢。悉作邊地良民。).”  
 
858 Deng Chengwei, Xiningfu xu zhi (“Supplement to the Xining prefectural gazetteer,” Xining: 
Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1985 [1883]), 31-32. 
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carving out a gorge that dropped the river several hundred feet before reaching the broad 
valleys of Hezhou.  
The Xunhua garrison was established to coordinate the defenses of two smaller 
fortified outposts, Qitai and Bao’an, located, respectively, to the southeast and southwest 
of Xunhua. These two forts, along with another military outpost of Guide (貴德所) 
several days journey westward up the Yellow River, traced their roots to the Ming period, 
but had been a largely dormant, if not non-existent, presence beyond the frontier. The 
Xunhua Gazetteer observed that in the late Ming, the officers of the garrisons at Qitai and 
Bao’an had moved to Shuangcheng, a fortified hamlet “within the passes” of Hezhou and 
had remained there through the Kangxi reign.859  
That the re-establishment of this military apparatus marked an expansion beyond 
the traditional frontiers of “China” and Gansu Province was explicitly recognized both by 
Nian Gengyao (as noted in the previous chapter) and subsequent officials who continued 
the work of rearranging the administration of the Gansu-Qinghai region after Nian 
Gengyao was recalled to the capital. However, they were optimistic about the prospects 
for incorporating the region into the “interior.” In 1725, Yue Zhongqi memorialized to 
the throne that he had observed that Tibetans (番) living within the passes had already 
intermingled with the regular commoners (百姓), spoke “Chinese” (漢語), and had 
acquired the morals of the interior (歸誠). On this basis he argued that since the Tibetans 
had demonstrated that they could easily be governed according the routine administrative 
system there was no need to subject Tibetans beyond the passes to various forms of 
                                                
859 Gong Jinghan, 22-24. This retreat probably coincided with the Mongol takeover of the region, 
first by Tumed Mongols during the mid 1500s and later by the Khoshots under Gushri Khan. 
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indirect rule through indigenous authorities (土司).860 A year later, Danai seconded Yue 
Zhongqi’s advice. Danai had “exited the border” (出口) and conducted surveys of “Fan” 
populations south and west of Xining and Hezhou. Danai suggested that the subprefect in 
Hezhou be given responsibility for collecting taxes from the Tibetans across the 
mountains.861 For the author of the Xunhua Gazetteer of 1792, Danai’s suggestion that 
the Hezhou subprefect take up responsibility for the civil administration of Tibetans 
across the border marked the origins of the Xunhua subprefect.862 Thirty-six years later 
(1762), in order to facilitate greater oversight of tax collection and Tibetan affairs, the 
office of this subprefect would be moved to the fort of the Xunhua battalion, thus 
formally marking the beginning of Xunhua subprefecture. Subsequently, the boundaries 
of Gansu were understood as having rolled westward and the province was seen as 
standing astride the old dividing line between “inner and outer.”863 
The optimism of some Qing officials regarding the prospects for incorporating 
and assimilating Tibetan regions is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the discussions 
of which legal tradition should prevail in the new territories.  In response from a request 
                                                
860 Memorial quoted in Gong Jinghan, 24-25. 
 
861 Memorial quoted in Gong Jinghan, 26. 
 
862 Gong Jinghan, citing the Qianlong-era edict moving the subprefect “across the frontier (移於
邊外),” also noted the subprefect’s origin as a Ming-period officer charged with supervising the 
tea and horse trades (30). 
 
863 Many years later, in 1898 (1898-5-22, GX 24/04/03), the Qinghai amban referred to Gansu as 
being both “inside and outside the passes” (甘肅關內外及青海). QSDG (1898-5-22, GX 
24/04/03), 7-YJ-130:《钦差署理西宁办事大臣联札循化厅》. This is not to say that the Jishi 
mountains and the gorge of the Yellow River through these mountains, did not remain a symbolic 
marker of the limits of “China.” Tao Baolian, in the 1890s wrote that, “Having passed the Jishi 
[mountains] the [Yellow River] becomes a river of China” (逕積石而謂中國河。). See Tao 
Baolian, Xinmao shixingji (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 2002 [1896?]), 233-234. 
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from the Jiaqing emperor to investigate the history of the “Tibetan Codes” (番例), the 
Qinghai amban Wenfu provided the following synopsis:  
I have learned that when the Tibetans were first attached to the interior, 
after consulting with Ortai et. al., the Yongzheng emperor, in the eleventh 
year of his reign [1733], ordered the Xining amban Danai to identify those 
commercial and criminal articles in the Mongol Code that pertained to 
Tibetan subjects and compile them into a Tibetan Code. Five years after 
their promulgation, matters were to be handled according to the Law Code 
of the interior.864  
 
Thus according to Wenfu, the Tibetan Code was originally intended as an expedient and 
provisional measure. Civil and military officials from Xining and Hezhou would handle 
cases involving Tibetans according to the Tibetan code for a brief transition period, after 
which the Tibetan Codes would sunset into oblivion and the newly incorporated and 
assimilated Tibetans would be subject to the same criminal code as other Chinese 
subjects of the empire.865   
                                                
864 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li (《西寧青海番夷成例》 ) in Zhongguo zhenxi falü dianji 
jicheng, bing bian, vol. 2 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1994 [1809]): 379: “伏查番子內附之始，
雍正十一年間，經大學士鄂等會議，令西寧辦事大臣達鼐於蒙古例內摘選關係番民易犯條
款，纂成番例。聲明俟五年後，再照內地律例辦理。” A similar account of the creation of 
the Tibetan Code can be found in the biography of Wenfu in the Qingshi gao, 11407-11409. 
 
865 Donald Sutton, in his study of the contemporaneous Qing attempt to assimilate the Miao areas 
of Hunan has noted the degree to which Qing officials were divided between those who held 
“optimistic” and “pessimistic” views on the prospects for the assimilation of non-Han regions. He 
suggests that officials who hailed from the banners and perhaps had both more experience in 
frontier regions and personal interest in cultural preservation had more sanguine views of the 
assimilation of the Miao. He also argues that Qing officials, almost uniformly, mistook 
acculturation for assimilation. Danai and Yue Zhongqi’s statements about the apparent 
transformation of Tibetans living within the borders of China into Chinese certainly seem to fit 
into this habit of thought. However, I find that officials such as Danai were more difficult to parse 
into “optimistic” or “pessimistic” camps, as they held shifting and seemingly contradictory 
opinions about Tibetans. Sutton, Donald S. Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the 
Eighteenth Century,” In Pamela Kyle Crossley et. al., eds. Empire at the Margins: Culture, 
Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: University of California, 2006), 190-
228. 
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Yongzheng and his field officers would probably have been surprised to learn that 
180 years later, when the last Qing emperor abdicated the throne, the Tibetan Code was 
still in effect as the underlying framework for dealing with crimes and conflicts involving 
Tibetans in Gansu. As Donald Sutton has pointed out, even during the rush to “return” 
frontier regions to regular civil administration during the Yongzheng reign, many highly 
placed officials were themselves dubious about the prospects for the swift transformation 
of the non-Han populations. The actual implementation of the policy often allowed for 
continued indirect rule through indigenous elites.866 Thus one suspects that although Ortai 
built a “sunset clause” into the code, the officials who drafted the laws might have sensed 
that they could be “provisionally” in effect for the foreseeable future. Danai, for instance, 
was bullish on the prospect of collecting tribute tax from the Tibetans along the border,867 
yet strongly supported the idea of drafting a separate code for them, noting that, “The 
Tibetan people are foolish and know nothing of legal systems.”868 However, even 
Yongzheng-era officials cognizant of the differences between Tibetans and people of the 
interior would have been taken aback by the description of Xunhua left by Tao Baolian, 
the son of Tao Mo, the Governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu provinces from 1895-
1899, after traveling extensively through the Tibetan regions of Gansu in 1896: 
 
What in Chinese are called ‘temples,’ the various Tibetan tribes see as 
palaces. The sons of the Tibetans are happy to become lamas. Minor lamas 
are like our tribute students.869 Major lamas are like serving officials. 
Stewards870 are thus their generals and kūtuktus are like their sovereigns…  
                                                
866 Sutton (2006), 197-198.  
 
867 Gong Jinghan, 26. 
 
868 Danai, quoted in Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 381: “得據達奏稱，番人等愚蒙不知法度…” 
869 “貢士,” entry-level licentiates who purchased their status as opposed to those who sat for and 
passed the county-level exams. 
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Previously, when Tsö monastery and Labrang monastery fought over 
territory, the military conflict lasted for many years and an innumerable 
quantity of people lost their lives. Unwilling to surrender [to Labrang], 
Tsö avoided this fate by become a vassal of Rongwo [monastery].  
 
These Buddhist states are like the Warring States, among which Labrang 
is but a small player. To its south is there not also Ü and Tsang? How 
would it be to place these regions within the prefecture and county 
system? The law is imperfect and the officials are inept, unable to even 
protect themselves! Even if Guan Zhong or Zhu Geliang took up such a 
post, the situation would still spin out of control. [Yet] what if we simply 
leave things to continue as they are? It would be like giving weapons to 
pirates and grain to bandits871 and I fear that from among them a superior 
power would gradually rise up. When one considers the western lands, it is 
impossible to not be concerned! Some may say I should not reveal how 
tenuous our control is, but these distant people already know this for 
themselves!872 
 
In this passage, Tao Baolian presents a familiar dilemma: On the one hand, the 
administrative practices which seemed to have worked so effectively in China proper 
appeared impracticable in non-Han regions. On the other hand, continued reliance on 
indigenous authorities empowered them in ways that threatened the peace of the frontier 
and the security of the dynasty. Yet Tao describes a political landscape that would have 
sounded unfamiliar to previous generations of frontier officials who had served in Gansu 
or Qinghai, including Nayanceng. As noted in the previous chapter, in his later memorials 
from Gansu, Nayanceng had argued that the size and wealth of monasteries such as 
                                                                                                                                            
 
870 “商卓,” probably a reference to the position of “steward,” Tib. phyag mdzod. 
 
871 In other words, aiding one’s own enemy. 
 
872 Tao Baolian, 240: “華言謂之寺，彼族視為公宮也。番之子樂為喇嘛，小喇嘛猶貢士，大
喇嘛猶居官。商卓，則將相也。呼圖克圖，則國主也。佛國亦戰國，拉布楞猶小焉者也。
其西南不有衛藏耶？將郡縣之乎？而法弊官冗，不克自保。管葛任之，亦徒召亂。將聽之
乎？則寇兵盜糧，恐或有賫而籍之者。顧此西土，能勿警惕！或謂余不當泄此機緘，不知
遠人之泄之也久矣！” 
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Labrang and Rongwo augured poorly for the peace of the region, but his attention was 
directed primarily towards dealing with the sorties of nomadic Tibetan raiders emanating 
from Xunhua and points further south and the commercialization of the frontier economy 
that he perceived as incentivizing the violence.873 The principle antagonist of Nayanceng 
and previous Qing administrators since the mid-Qianlong realm, therefore, had been 
Tibetan tribes, not Tibetan monasteries. This was despite the fact that in the case of the 
Cagan Nomunhan, Nayanceng believed he had caught Gelukpa hierarchs profiteering 
from the raiding and harboring the criminals.  
Tao Baolian’s hyperbolic portrayal of the Gansu borderlands as dominated by 
confederations of aggressive state-like monastic domains was entirely original in 
comparison to commentators from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But 
the idea that monasteries and their reincarnate hierarchs—not Mongol or Tibetan tribes 
and their aristocratic lords—were the chief strategic competitors of the Qing state in 
Inner Asia was increasingly voiced by Qing officials serving in Gansu during the 
Guangxu reign (1875-1908). In the archival record that survives from this period, Qing 
officials from a variety of positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy, from the 
subprefects posted to Taozhou, Xunhua, and Guide, to governor-generals such as Tao Mo, 
Tao Baolian’s father, can be found expressing amazement at the vast and seemingly ever-
expanding gulf that separated rulers and ruled despite nearly two hundred years of 
contact.874 
                                                
873 PFZS 4:48a. 
 
874 See, for instance, the following letter of instruction from Tao Mo to the Xunhua subprefect 
concerning the proper handling of “Tibetan cases” in which he reminds his subordinates of why 
the fundamental differences between Tibetans (“Fan”) and the interior necessitates use of separate 
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The archival record, however, reveals an important paradox lurking behind Tao 
Baolian’s statement. The Tibetan monasteries in Xunhua had experienced tremendous 
growth in terms of monastic population, material wealth, physical infrastructure, and 
administrative scope during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, yet this 
growth had been accompanied by intensifying use of the resources of the Qing 
administrative apparatus. Thus, where Qing officials perceived an increasingly 
autonomous threat on their southern and western flanks, the archival record presents an 
alternate story of increasing imbrication of Qing institutions in local Tibetan society. This 
chapter contends that the rise of Labrang and other monastic polities in Amdo was not the 
result of the withdrawal or decline of Qing authority in the region and therefore an 
expression of the autonomous development of Tibetan society, as has been previously 
suggested. Instead, the shifting configurations of monastic polities were profoundly 
shaped by ongoing and contingent interactions between indigenous actors and 
representatives of the Qing state.  
Ironically, the primary vehicle that drove the embedment of Qing officials in 
Tibetan and Mongol society was the “provisional” legal order that had begun to take 
shape during the late Yongzheng reign. In fact, one of the primary complaints of Qing 
officials from the Qianlong reign-on was the seemingly unceasing stream of litigation 
that Tibetans from all stations brought to the gates of the their field offices—the “yamens” 
(衙門), and sometimes even directly to the office of the governor-general in Lanzhou. 
Contemporaries, both Tibetan and Qing, often interpreted local violence and the resulting 
litigation as arising from competition between Labrang monastery and its neighbors, most 
                                                                                                                                            
criminal code: QSDG (GX 24/04/15, 1896-6-3), 7-YJ-4164: 《陝甘總督為查辦賣吾、黑錯番
案的札》.   
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importantly Rongwo monastery to the west, Terlung monastery to the north, and Tsö 
monastery to the southeast.  
In a recent pioneering study of the archival record from Xunhua, Yang Hongwei 
has argued that the Qing court manipulated these cases as part of an overt strategy of 
“divide and rule” and sought to create a formal alliance of monasteries to counterbalance 
the influence of Labrang.875 While recognizing that the containment of Labrang was 
indeed a goal expressed by some Qing officials, I find that this was more often than not a 
retrospective assessment—the spin by which Qing agents rationalized their involvement 
in local conflicts. In practice, the outcome of cases in which Qing officials became 
involved was highly contingent and provisional and imperiled the prestige of local 
officials and the authority of the dynasty. Qing officials recognized these dangers and in 
communications with one another frankly lamented their inability to enforce verdicts and 
even, in some cases, to locate and bring both sides of a dispute together in court. The fact 
that Tibetans sought out Qing jurisprudence was taken not as a sign of Qing control but 
of its failure. For centers of judicial authority among the Tibetans as well, the presence of 
alternative legal forums posed risks. Just as the presence of an alternate and competing 
judicial system at Labrang had undermined the administrative authority of successive 
Mongol princes south of the river (Chapter Four), the presence of the Xunhua magistrate 
threatened the authority of the Jamyang Zhepa and the ecclesiastic government at 
Labrang.  
                                                
875 Yang Hongwei, “Zhishi yu zhixu: Gansu Xunhua ting Zangqu quanli jizhi yanjiu” 
[Knowledge and order: research on the mechanisms of power in the Tibetan areas of Gansu 
Xunhua subprefecture] (PhD diss., Lanzhou University), 2009. 
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When the institutions of Qing governance were first established, Qing officials 
had anticipated that their primary responsibility would be the collection of taxes and the 
occasional resolution of criminal activity. Instead, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, almost immediately after the move of the office of the subprefect from Hezhou to 
Xunhua in 1762, the magistrate became embroiled in the combustible politics of Tibetan 
monastic establishments (figures 8 and 9). Not only that, this and subsequent subprefects 
were compelled from both above and below to resolve cases according to the “Tibetan 
Laws and Statutes (番例番規),” a tradition of jurisprudence with which Qing officials 
had varying degrees of expertise (often none, as some magistrates admitted in their 
correspondence). Try as they might, Qing administrators were unable to extract 
themselves from the burden of Tibetan litigiousness. The stream of petitions arriving 
from Tibetan communities became yet one more mark of the their fundamental difference 
and resistance to transformation. This chapter will explore in greater detail the process by 
which Tibetans, Qing officials, and other intermediaries created a Qing-centered, 
pluralistic legal order in Xunhua during the late Qing.   
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Figure 8: The Sino-Tibetan borderlands. Area of study for chapters six and seven is 
indicated by red box (see figure 9). 
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Figure 9: The “Warring States.” Red labels indicate monasteries and communities 
affiliated with Labrang monastery. Blue labels indicate monasteries and communities 
affiliated with Rongwo monastery. Red polygons indicate sites of conflict. 
 
Xunhua as a Qing-Centered Pluralistic Legal Regime 
 
Between the initial incorporation of the region later known as Xunhua in the 
1720s and the collapse of the Qing in 1911, the legal culture of the Amdo region 
gradually shifted from a multi-centric legal regime to a state-centered legal regime in 
which agents of the Qing emperor and legal codes developed and sanctioned by the court 
played an ever greater role in Tibetan society. In this respect, developments in Xunhua 
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paralleled processes in other colonial states during the same period as described by 
Lauren Benton in her 2002 comparative study of colonial law.876  
Benton’s study begins by noting that during the fifteenth through seventeenth 
centuries, expanding imperial states, be they based in the Iberian or Anatolian peninsulas, 
shared a “single institutional framework” for managing the existence of multiple centers 
of legal authority in their realms.877 In Spanish, Portuguese, and Ottoman empires, 
sovereigns were but one of several centers of legal authority. Ecclesiastical jurisdictions, 
for instance, were relatively independent from royal oversight and separate from the 
jurisdictions of secular or royal law. This framework was both facilitated by and 
facilitated the ubiquitous presence of large and influential diaspora communities. Rulers 
were accustomed to accommodating diaspora communities that observed their own 
traditions of jurisprudence. Lest this be an overly reductionist portrayal of early modern 
empire, Benton demonstrates that jurisdictional boundaries were neither fixed nor 
uncontroversial. However, diaspora or minority populations as well as rulers developed a 
shared repertoire of strategies for managing the complexity. It was these shared strategies 
together with the rise of intermediaries expert in coping with pluralistic legal orders that 
constituted “institutional continuity” across culturally distinct imperial polities.878  
Benton’s concern lies in understanding the process by which colonial empires 
gradually assumed first centralized oversight of the different legal traditions they found in 
their realms and later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, asserted the hegemony of 
                                                
876 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
877 Benton (2002), 25. 
 
878 Benton (2002), 58. 
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a single, state-centered law over alternate legal traditions and jurisdictions, often to the 
point of formally eliminating legal pluralism. She argues that previous historians have 
missed the degree to which this transformation was driven not by the goals of sovereigns 
or jurists from the metropole, but rather that it was propelled by agitation at the margins 
in the course of local conflicts over jurisdiction.879 Benton refers to this field of activity 
as “legal politics,” a term she has subsequently defined as, “the experience of strategic 
engagement with the law,” and a phrase that, “reminds us that law is fluid and contingent, 
not a phenomenon reducible to legal codes, legislation, or even rules or norms.”880    
In Xunhua, the “law” was similarly a field of activity not easily defined by a set 
of codes dictated by Qing officials. The Qing court formally sanctioned a “Tibetan Code” 
and indigenous Tibetans clamored for its application, but the use and interpretation of this 
code in practice was highly dependent on specific events and personalities and was 
unevenly interpreted over time and space. In Amdo, the reorganization of Mongol and 
Tibetan administration following the Lobzang Danjin rebellion can be interpreted as an 
expression of the Qing court’s belief that it had become imperative to supervise the 
pluralistic legal order and a first step toward its centralization under a single sovereign 
authority. Previously, following the submission of the Khoshot aristocracy to the Kangxi 
emperor in 1697, jurisprudence in the Mongol domains remained largely an issue to be 
worked out between the Mongol nobility, Tibetan lay elites, and a diverse range of monks 
and hierarchs from different Buddhist traditions. A lack of historical materials from this 
region prior to 1724 means that our knowledge of this period is hazy, but on the basis of 
                                                
879 Benton (2002), 6-10, 24, 253. 
 
880 Lauren Benton, “Forum on Law and Empire in Global Perspective: Introduction,” American 
Historical Review 117 n. 4 (October, 2012): 1093. 
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the information on debates over whether to use Tibetan or Mongol jurisprudence and the 
appropriate boundaries of lay and religious jurisdictions during the eighteenth century 
available in Tibetan-language works such as Belmang’s History and Wangchen Kyab’s 
Lessons of the Ancestors, one can assume that legal politics during this period was 
fractious.881 
Little is known about the process that lay behind the creation of the Tibetan Code 
beyond what can be gleaned from the brief accounts available from the original 
memorialists and later redactors. This information, however, is sufficient to demonstrate 
that, much like other colonial powers encountering an unfamiliar legal tradition, the 
attempt to produce a standard “Tibetan” legal code for the reference of Qing magistrates 
was a highly creative process.882 In 1808, the Jiaqing emperor learned from Wenfu that 
the original Tibetan code (“番例”) had been extracted from the existing Mongol Code 
(“蒙古例”), not a preexisting Tibetan legal tradition. The court was also reminded that 
prior to 1733, Qing officials had already developed “Codes for Tibetan People (番子律
例)” for Tibetans in Yushu and Nakchu that were also based on Mongol laws.883 That 
Qing local officials should reach for Mongol statutes, is perhaps not so surprising since, 
as noted above, the man initially charged with the task, Danai, had dismissed any 
possibility that the Tibetans already possessed a distinctive system of jurisprudence. 
                                                
881 A Manchu-language document in the archives of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, 
Taiwan, that has recently come to my attention and may shed light on the legal culture of pre-
Lobzang Danjin Qinghai. It appears to be a Kangxi-era (possibly 1697) framework for handling 
relations between the Khoshot princes: 《為青海諸部盟所訂例法事項 》(Doc. # 
125.411000059). 
 
882 See, for instance, Benton’s discussion of the invention of a “traditional” Hindu legal tradition 
in the 1700s in colonial India. Benton (2002), 128. 
 
883 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 381. 
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Moreover, since Mongol rulers had dominated the region from the late fourteenth century 
until the first year of the Yongzheng reign, it is only natural that the Qing would turn to 
the “Mongol” administrative traditions of Gushri Khan and his descendants. The 
following year (1734), the Yongzheng emperor approved modifications to the Mongol 
statutes in order to accommodate the differences they perceived between Mongols and 
Tibetans. For instance, the compensation standards were altered to account for the 
different relative rankings of Tibetan headmen (“番人頭目”) and also in recognition of 
the belief that “Tibetans typically raise few horses but many yaks.”884 After these changes 
had been made, the statutes were translated into Tibetan and a copy was sent to the 
appropriate board in the capital for safekeeping (one suspects this would have been the 
Lifanyuan).  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, despite the fact that the codes 
initially were intended as a temporary measure to smooth the transition to the criminal 
code of the interior and direct rule by Qing magistrates from the regular civilian 
administration, the production of an imperially sanctioned “Tibetan Code” had the 
unforeseen effect of carving out a legitimate space for Tibetan jurisprudence within the 
Qing empire. Although conceptualized as a privilege, not a right, once granted by the 
Yongzheng emperor, it proved difficult to retract—had subsequent rulers even desired to 
do so. As Wenfu recorded in his introduction to a new redaction of the Codes in 1808, the 
laws had remained in continuous effect since their promulgation. The Qianlong emperor 
granted extensions in 1736, 1740, and 1743. Finally, in 1748, the emperor—speaking of 
the Tibetans along the Gansu frontier—declared:  
                                                
884 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 381. 
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The Tibetan subjects live in a far away and desolate place and have their 
own customs. Therefore, since they are not familiar with all of our Code, it 
is not convenient to subject them to the laws of the interior in their entirety. 
If one cannot let the Tibetans govern themselves, at least one must 
compromise with their foreign dispositions. Later, if there are cases of 
murder or raiding, resolve the cases by fining them according to the 
Tibetan statutes. It is not necessary to request further extensions.885  
 
Moreover, from the perspective of the Qing court, not only had the laws achieved 
a semi-permanent status, but also the purview of the code had expanded from the 
“Tibetan territories attached to the interior” to the entire jurisdiction of the Qinghai 
amban. In both Wenfu’s memorial and the Jiaqing emperor’s edict of 1809 sanctioning 
the continued use of the code, it was stated that the laws applied to Mongols as well as 
Tibetans.886 Wenfu argued to the court that in the event of “rebellion” or other large-scale 
violence that threatened the overall security of the frontier, the court should reserve the 
right to execute the instigators. However, he warned that experience had proven that 
introducing capital punishment for localized violence—murder or raiding, would only 
lead to a prolonged cycle of vengeful feuding. The cycle of revenge and escalation could 
be broken if Qing officials helped broker compensation between the concerned families 
or communities in accordance with the Tibetan Code.887 Persuaded by Wenfu’s argument 
that the Tibetan Codes had proven themselves effective in heading off long-term feuds 
among Tibetans and Mongols, the emperor wrote that, “these statutes match the ones 
originally compiled in 1733 on the basis of selections from the Mongol Code. Since they 
                                                
885 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 379-380. “嗣准刑部議覆：番民僻處要荒，各因其俗，於一
切律例索不通曉，未便全以內地之法繩之。不若以番治番，竟於夷情妥協。嗣後，自相戕
殺命盜等案，仍照番例罰服完結，毋庸再請展限。等因具奏。” 
 
886 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 380. 
 
887 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 380. See also Qingshi gao [Draft history of the Qing], 11407-
11409. 
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have been in place for over seventy years and have kept the peace, there is no need to 
alter or excise.”888 In summary, an attempt to assert a uniform “Qing Code” across both 
China proper and the Tibetan populations in Amdo had resulted in a legal order that 
formally guaranteed the continued availability of “Tibetan” jurisprudence in the yamens 
of Qing local officials to Tibetan and Mongol litigants. But what did this mean in practice? 
 
I have yet to locate a specific reference to the “Tibetan Code” of either 1734 or 
1809 in an eighteenth or nineteenth century Tibetan-language text. 889  Ortai and 
Yongzheng left the final form of laws and their promulgation up to Martai (馬爾泰), a 
Manchu bannerman who had served in Qinghai with Danai since 1732 and is reported to 
have had experience with Tibetan regions. He was ordered to make sure that the laws 
were appropriate for Tibetans.890 That such an order would have resulted in consultations 
with Tibetan or Mongol lay and monastic elites is highly probable, but is a point that 
requires further corroboration.  
The Chinese-language edition of the Tibetan Code from 1809, which claims to be 
a faithful reproduction of the original 1734 code, consists of sixty-eight statutes in 
                                                
888 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 380. As noted in the previous chapters, the idea that the region 
was at peace was based on either an analysis of Qinghai and Gansu relative to other regions of the 
empire or a degree of wishful thinking. After all, Jiaqing’s review of the Tibetan Code occurred 
less than two years after the court had felt compelled to dispatch eight thousand troops under the 
command of Cangling, Nayanceng, and Šingkui to stamp out another incident of raiding by 
Tibetan nomads. See, Wenfu, Qinghai shiyi jielüe, 22. 
 
889 Neither Belmang’s History nor Drakgönpa’s Oceanic Book mentions these codes. It is possible 
that the codes are referenced in the biographies of the second, third, and fourth Jamyang Zhepas 
since, as the chapter will discuss below, all three of these monks were engaged in protracted legal 
conflicts that involved the Qing local officials. However, I have yet to come across such a 
reference in my readings of these sources to date. 
 
890 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 381. 
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addition to the imperial edicts approving the promulgation of the code. In terms of 
quantity and specificity, the code appears to have been much more elaborate than any of 
the Tibetan legal codes described by Belmang Pandita in his History of India, Tibet, and 
Mongolia. Whereas the fifteen laws enumerated by Belmang establish what might be 
considered a set of “first principles” for establishing peace and defending the realm, 
dealing with crime, handling relations between the sexes, and the deportment of 
government officials, the Qing Tibetan Code is an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
list of punishments for all conceivable crimes. The Qing Tibetan Code sanctions capital 
punishment in only four situations: 1) for low-ranking headmen who commit murder 
while leading large groups in raids; 2) in the event of murders committed by commoners 
while raiding; 3) in the event of arson resulting in death; and 4) for servants who kill their 
masters (in this case the criminal is to be executed by slicing, for the other crimes, the 
punishment was beheading). Given that the code sanctioned capital punishment for only a 
minority of violent crimes, one might hypothesize that Tibetans like Belmang, if they 
were familiar with the code might have viewed it as in keeping with the aversion to 
executions that had been expressed in previous law codes from the Tibetan legal tradition. 
To the extent that Tibetan observers knew that the code had been based on Mongol 
statutes, it is also possible to imagine that they found this acceptable if they shared 
Belmang’s opinion that Gushri Khan and his descendants had, until the mid eighteenth 
century, based their jurisprudence entirely on Tibetan codes. Still, until more 
contemporaneous Tibetan-language descriptions of the Qing “Tibetan Codes” can be 
located, these suggestions remain unsubstantiated. 
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Similarly, our partial glimpse of the Xunhua archival record (roughly 1300 
documents out of potentially 100,000 pages of materials) finds the subprefects 
consistently citing “Tibetan Codes” in their jurisprudence, but only rarely indicates 
precisely what type of text or code they based their decisions on. For instance, a reference 
copy of the imperially sanctioned Tibetan Code has yet to be found in the Xunhua 
archives.891 The Jiaqing emperor’s 1809 edict sanctioning the continued use of the 
statutes reveals that successive Qinghai ambans had consulted the Tibetan Code to 
personally adjudicate major conflicts and crimes involving Mongols and Tibetans.892 A 
draft memorial from 1900 held in the Xunhua archives reports that when adjudicating a 
particularly thorny “Tibetan case” that had vexed the provincial authorities since 1898 
they had carefully made use of “statutes and precedents issued in the twenty-fourth year 
of the Jiaqing reign [i.e. 1819].”893 This is most likely a reference either to revised edition 
of the Regulations of the Lifanyuan (理藩院則例) that were produced in 1817 or the 
1809 Tibetan Code.894 Until greater access to the Xunhua archives or the Labrang 
monastic archives held in the Gannan Prefecture Archives becomes possible, it is as yet 
difficult to state definitively that the frequent mention of “Tibetan” laws and statutes in 
                                                
891 Associate professor Yang Hongwei, of Lanzhou University, who has the most extensive 
knowledge of the archive, has also not seen a copy of the codes or any other manual or 
compendium of regulations or statutes for Tibetans in the Xunhua documents. Personal 
communication. 
 
892 Xining Qinghai fanyi cheng li, 379. Jiaqing notes that his desire to learn more about the 
Tibetan codes was piqued when Gungcukjab reported that he was planning on administering fines 
and punishments according to the “Tibetan statutes (番例).  
 
893 QSDG (GX 25/12/28, 1900-1-28), 7-YJ-2925: 《會辦番案詳報擬結折稿》. 
 
894 For useful summaries of the history of the Regulations of the Lifanyuan see Zhang 
Rongzheng’s introduction to Qinding Lifanbu zeli (Tianjin: Tianjin guiji chubanshe, 1998), and 
Zhao Yuntian’s introduction to Qianlong chao neifu chaoben ‘Lifanyuan zeli’ (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 2. 
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archival sources from Xunhua (many of which were authored or submitted by Tibetan 
petitioners) bears any connection to the imperially-issued codes.  
Having thus qualified our discussion, let us return to the main argument: The 
repeated promulgation of the “Tibetan Codes” provided imperial approval for Qing local 
officials in Amdo to exercise “Tibetan” jurisprudence. However, the precise meaning 
what constituted “Tibetan” jurisprudence and just where and to whom its jurisdiction 
would extend was open to multiple interpretations and the pressures various actors could 
bring to bear on the case. With regards to the imperially sanctioned “Tibetan Code,” for 
instance, Wenfu was careful to leave room for the imposition of punishments from the 
criminal code of the interior. “Cases that affect the overall security of the frontier,” he 
wrote, “should be handled on a case by case basis according to imperial instructions in 
order to make manifest the laws of this dynasty.” As we have already seen in the cases 
handled by Nayanceng, higher-ranking provincial authorities, especially the amban and 
the governor-general had enormous discretion to interpret to whom and in what 
circumstances the Tibetan statutes applied.  
Qing officials, however, were not alone in their ability to define the boundaries of 
Tibetan jurisprudence. Through their strategic engagement with the entire range of Qing 
officials in both Xunhua and Gansu more broadly, Tibetans from Xunhua also exercised 
an enormous influence on the jurisdiction of both “Tibetan” law and Qing local 
administration. Archival sources from Xunhua reveal that Tibetans, both individually and 
as representatives of their villages, nomadic communities, or monasteries, not only 
regularly availed themselves of Qing authorities in their pursuit of justice, but they often 
phrased these requests as pleas for the court to “take charge (作主)” and assert its 
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sovereignty over the region. Such demands, however, were usually couched in the 
expectation that Qing sovereignty would be exercised according to the “Tibetan laws and 
statutes (番例番規),” the general label for Tibetan jurisprudence found in the Xunhua 
archives. Thus, the arrival of Qing officials at the edges of Tibetan communities and the 
promulgation of the Tibetan Code in the late Yongzheng period did indeed lay the 
groundwork for the advance of Qing sovereignty. Yet, much to the chagrin of Qing 
officials, Tibetans drove the process as they attempted to manipulate the Qing colonial 
apparatus. In this respect, the shift to a more Qing-centered legal order in the Amdo 
region during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resembled what occurred in 
British India and Russian Central Asia where the strategic engagement of people at the 
margins of empire with the pluralistic legal order led to greater centralization of judicial 
authority.  
In both India and in the Russian empire, colonial authorities first attempted to 
formally establish separate courts where indigenous judges adjudicated for an indigenous 
population according to the indigenous legal tradition. Responding to pressure from both 
the metropole and Indian litigants for access to “British” law, the local courts came to be 
nested in an appellate hierarchy supervised by the British East India Company and later 
imperial judges.895 In Russia, beginning with Catherine the Great, the Romanov dynasty 
supported the creation of an Islamic ecclesiastical establishment—a “church” to parallel 
the bureaucratic institutions of the Orthodox faith, which gradually grew to become a 
complimentary pillar of the state’s central bureaucracy. Starting with the Orenburg 
Assemby in 1788, the state-affiliated Muslims clerics and jurists began to manage not 
                                                
895 With regards to India, see Benton (2002), 131-132, 135-137, 151-152. 
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only spiritual matters but also provide legal services to the Muslim subjects of the 
growing empire.896 As Jane Burbank has pointed out, the institutionalization of an Islamic 
legal order was but one example of a broader strategy of “inclusionary legalism” by 
which the Russian empire recognized and incorporated unique regimes for its diverse 
population.897  
The history of Xunhua tells of a distinctive trajectory to a state-centered 
pluralistic legal order. In Xunhua, Tibetans brought in representatives of the state to 
practice indigenous jurisprudence. The burden of maintaining the “tradition” of 
indigenous jurisprudence thus was placed squarely on magistrates of Chinese or Banner 
origins. In their own words, Tibetans sought out Qing sovereignty, yet this “sovereignty” 
remained expressed in the vernacular of Tibetan jurisprudence.  
The legal situation in Xunhua exhibited in certain respects what Benton refers to 
as “strong” legal pluralism.898 For the period that is the primary focus of this chapter and 
chapter seven, from the late 1700s through the early 1900s, imperial instructions had 
formally sanctioned the use of two different traditions of jurisprudence by the subprefect: 
the “Tibetan Codes” in cases involving Mongols and Tibetans and the standard “Qing 
Code” for cases involving Han, Hui, Salars or any combination of any of these groups. In 
practice, deciding which law to apply was hardly straightforward and the process of 
making such a jurisdictional decision was the focus of intense “legal politicking” by 
                                                
896 For the book-length treatment of this institution and its successors, see Robert D. Crews, For 
Prophet and Tsar (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 
897 Burbank, “The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire,” in Ann 
Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, & Peter C. Perdue, eds. Imperial Formations. (Santa Fe, NM: 
School For Advanced Research Press, 2007), 77-111. 
 
898 Benton (2002), 11. 
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litigants. While the implications of the decision of which law to apply and how was a 
thorny one from the perspective of the magistrate, manipulating the issue had obvious 
advantages for litigants. Furthermore, the magistrate was himself the singular 
embodiment of the plural legal order. As a result, formal protections for legal pluralism 
were exposed to slippage and blurring when a single jurist was expected to practice both 
Tibetan and Chinese law. The magistrate’s outsider status, general lack of expertise in 
both Tibetan jurisprudence and local affairs, and the enormous size of the subprefecture 
also left him highly reliant on intermediaries and Tibetan elites. Both by default and by 
design, indigenous authorities such as reincarnate Gelukpa hierarchs, hereditary lay 
Tibetan rulers, and the Mongol banner elite were the first point of contact for the vast 
majority of criminal acts and other social conflict and themselves often brought conflicts 
to the attention of the magistrate or where themselves litigants. In the following sections 
of this chapter, we will examine the contingent relationship between the subprefect and 
other persons possessing judicial authority in Xunhua, as well as the ways in which 
various parties pushed and pulled at the boundary between “Chinese” and “Tibetan” 
jurisprudence and often arrived at settlements that combined aspects of both yet were 
firmly labeled “Tibetan.”  
 
Characteristic Features of Xunhua’s Litigation Culture 
 
For the period for which we have archival records from the yamen of the Xunhua 
subprefect, roughly 1872 through the early 1900s, it is possible to identify elements of a 
shared legal culture—principles that unified a fractious and diverse region. First, there 
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seems to have been a shared conviction among Tibetan litigants and Qing officials that 
conflicts should be settled according to the “Tibetan laws and statutes (番例番規).” What 
this meant differed from case to case, litigant to litigant, magistrate to magistrate, but the 
general idea of “Tibetan laws and statutes” provided a mutually recognizable discursive 
terrain in which to hammer out agreements. Second, Tibetan litigants expected that prior 
jurisprudence demarcated the territory of the “Tibetan laws and statutes.” Litigants 
typically framed their petitions as requests for the Qing court to reaffirm earlier decisions 
or contracts and reestablish previous arrangements. The profoundly conservative 
orientation of the legal culture was remarkable to Qing officials as well. While attempting 
to deal with the 1889-1891 case (Chapter Seven, “Case Three”), the Xunhua subprefect 
Cangyun (Ch. 長贇) expressed his exasperation with his inability to settle the conflict by 
“going down a new road (新路).” The litigants, he reported to his superiors, insisted on 
following the “old road” (i.e. following precedents), yet interpretations of the old road 
were so divergent, and the existing decisions so ambiguously written, that he despaired of 
ever working out an accord that would be acceptable to all of the concerned parties.899   
The emphasis on historical precedent brings us to the third feature of the Qing-
centered legal-order: the significance of written documents, particularly those maintained 
in the offices of the Xunhua subprefect, Qing military forces, or higher ranking provincial 
officials and the Xining amban. Accords or contracts adjudicated by indigenous 
authorities, including by high-ranking lamas such as the Jamyang Zhepa, took on added 
gravitas if approved by Qing officials and filed in government archives. This point should 
be qualified, however, by noting that the Qing records were not necessarily more 
                                                
899 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684:《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
 
 429 
legitimate than indigenous records, but that the possession of Qing documents or 
documents that matched official records were seen as key to building a case that would 
persuade the Qing to intervene on one’s behalf. The authenticity and integrity of the 
documentary record, and the potential for manufacturing or manipulating official 
documents, therefore, frequently became a focus of the judicial process. As we shall see 
below, the multilingual nature of the written record, and the fact that a large portion of 
the Xunhua subprefect’s official archive had been destroyed in the conflagration 
following the Muslim uprisings in 1864, posed enormous challenges to the resolution of 
conflicts. 
Fourth, Tibetans in Xunhua engaged in what scholars of legal pluralism have 
referred to as “forum shopping”—the strategic use of different offices of the Gansu 
provincial administration and the Qinghai amban in hopes of achieving advantageous 
judgements.900 Tibetans in Xunhua not only sought out the Xunhua subprefect, but also, 
either in person or via letters or representatives, filed suit (or counter-suits) in the yamens 
of the Lanzhou prefect, the Xining prefect and circuit intendent, the Gansu lieutentant 
governor and provincial prosecutor, and finally the governor-general. The archival record 
reveals that Tibetans observed shifts in personnel and would attempt to resubmit suits if 
they felt that the new occupant of the post might provide a more favorable hearing. The 
fact that conflicts often straddled Qing administrative boundaries also presented litigants 
with opportunities for forum shopping. For instance, conflicts involving the Henan 
Mongols and Rongwo fell under the jurisdiction of both the Qinghai amban and Gansu 
provincial authorities. During the early Guangxu period, the Qing court shifted the 
                                                
900 For the first use of this term, see, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, “Forum Shopping and 
Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village,” Journal of Legal 
Pluralism 19: 117-159. Also Benton (2002), 106. 
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jurisdictional boundaries of Taozhou further westward, giving it supervision over 
communities that had previously been entirely within Xunhua. Unfortunately, however, 
ongoing feuds continued to bind communities on both sides of this border, thus leaving 
the subprefects of both Taozhou and Xunhua responsible for their ongoing adjudication. 
Tibetans litigants were cognizant of this overlap and carefully moved back and forth 
between both yamens, taking full advantage of the jurisdictional complexity.901  
Finally, Qing officials and Tibetan litigants communicated with each other (in the 
documentary record) by means of mutually intelligible tropes that spanned the cultural 
divide. The first of these was that of the “violent Tibetan.” Tibetan litigants strategically 
manipulated the stereotype that Tibetans were untamed, martial, and prone to 
uncontrollable outbursts of vengeance if provoked. The archival record is replete with 
petitions from Tibetan authorities, both lay and monastic, that presented Qing authorities 
with the “choice” of intervening on their behalf or facing the unpleasant consequences of 
the Tibetans’ unrestrained and violent instincts. However, as easily as Tibetans could 
adopt the script of the “violent Tibetan,” they could also “speak Chinese,” sometimes 
even in the same petition.902 Depending on circumstances, Tibetan litigants appealed to 
the paternalistic instincts of their “father and mother officials” and manipulated the 
rhetoric of transformation, begging for protection or support from less civilized enemies. 
Less frequent, however, is evidence that Qing officials, especially at the local level, ever 
                                                
901 This last phenomenon was most salient in the 1890s feud between Labrang, Tsö monastery, 
and Dzögé Mewo. 
 
902 See, for instance, the following petition from the fourth Jamyang Zhepa in which he refers to 
Qing civil and military officials as “mothers and fathers of the people” and begs for their 
intervention, but also notes that the Tibetans are “foolish people” and more prone to violence than 
the Chinese: QSDG (GX 25/11/12, 1899-12-14), 7-YJ-2936: 《委署西寧道會辦番案甘肅候補
道歐陽為移知事》. 
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spoke from scripts derived from the concept of the relationship between preceptor and 
donor. In dealings with the reincarnate monks of the region, I have located no document 
in which the Xunhua magistrate referred to himself as a patron or disciple. Such rhetoric 
appears to have been limited to contact between the Xining amban or governor-general 
and lamas who possessed imperial titles and/or kūtuktu status such as the Jamyang Zhepa. 
Tibetans in Xunhua not only chose to speak to Qing authorities from a violent 
script, but also practiced violence. The scale of the violence perpetrated by Tibetans 
against other Tibetans, the majority of whom were at least nominally all followers of the 
Gelukpa teachings, may surprise some readers of this chapter. Gelukpa monasteries such 
as Labrang raised and maintained military forces that were used to attack or harass 
neighboring Gelukpa monasteries. By the late nineteenth century, the large monasteries 
of the region were also operating prisons in which they held captured soldiers and 
subjects from non-aligned communities. By the early nineteenth century, Labrang’s jail 
was notorious throughout the region and fear of incarceration prompted many would-be 
pilgrims and traders from traveling to the monastery. Indigenous military forces that 
included both laymen and monks targeted monasteries and monks, Buddhist images and 
texts, homes and barns, livestock and crops, forest and water resources, and 
noncombatants including women and children. The archival record reveals that in 
Xunhua alone, from 1872 to 1908, at least one thousand Tibetans died directly from 
armed conflict while perhaps thousands more suffered indirectly from the destruction of 
crops, animals, and homes. Moreover, evidence from the Xunhua archives suggests that 
much of this violence was calculated and tactical in nature. 
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 Litigation in Xunhua was not something that necessarily occurred subsequent to 
violence. Filing a lawsuit was not merely an addendum or afterthought to the pursuit of 
one’s goals through coercion, raids, or other military action. Rather violence and, as 
mentioned above, the threat of violence was an integral part of the legal process and often 
unfolded simultaneously as litigants or their proxies filed petitions and conducted 
negotiations with each other and with Qing authorities. Violence had to be carefully 
calibrated in order to maximize one’s leverage and strengthen one’s bargaining position 
vis-à-vis one’s opponents and the Qing administration without triggering a punitive 
expedition by Qing military forces. As a result, litigants engaged in tactics of escalation 
and brinkmanship. Reports from Qing officials and petitioners reveals that the warring 
parties kept records not only of their own losses, but also estimates of how many people 
they had killed or injured and other damages they had inflicted on their opponents. Such 
records were essential given that final settlements would result in compensation—
exchanges of property in which litigants stood to lose or gain, often irrespective of the 
original reasons behind the conflict or the ultimate assignment of blame. Furthermore, 
disputants sought to represent themselves to the court as suffering disproportionately 
from the violence for the obvious reason that as victims they stood a greater chance of 
gaining sympathy and, most crucially, military support from the Qing.  
Violence, therefore, was often an integral component of a strategy for prevailing 
in the Qing-centered legal system in Xunhua. However, actors who decided to engage in 
tactical violence often overestimated their ability to control the results. An illustrative 
case concerns the attempt of the elder and younger Rongwo nangso (the lay “officer” in 
charge of the Repgong region) to dictate the terms of a peace agreement to the Henan 
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Khoshot Prince (probably the seventh generation junwang, Ch. 春津 or朝日吉勒, dates 
uncertain). Tibetans under the supervision of the nangso had been engaged in tit for tat 
raiding with Mongols and Tibetans affiliated with the junwang for several years when in 
June of 1883 the nangso led a military force of three thousand including both monks and 
laymen into the Mongol pastures. The Rongwo nangso had threatened such action several 
times in letters to the Xunhua magistrate but had evidently not received satisfaction that 
the Qing would act on Repgong’s behalf. The intimidated Mongol prince agreed to parlay, 
but the negotiations proved more tortuous and protracted than the Repgong side had 
expected. For reasons that remain murky, on the night of July 7, apparently after a final 
agreement had been hammered out and then suddenly rejected by the elder of the two 
Rongwo nangso, a melee broke out that costs the lives of over fifty men from Rongwo 
and many more injuries. Many more died before the Rongwo expedition was able to 
return to home.903 
Over a year later it was a deputized committee of Muslim military officers from 
Hezhou together with the Shingza Tulku from Ragya monastery who were finally able to 
work out a peace accord between Repgong and Henan that held. 904  The Muslim 
committee members noted, pointedly, that they adjudicated the case according to the 
“Tibetan Codes (番例)” and would now submit it to the Xunhua subprefect for 
                                                
903 A selection of documents relevant to this case: QSDG (GX 09/06/15), 7-YJ-2726:《循化廳役
為查訪隆務寺出兵攻打蒙古事》 ; QSDG (GX 09/06/20, 1883-7-23), 7-YJ-2726:《循化廳為
蒙古、隆務寺打仗具體情形上的稟》 ;  QSDG (GX 09/09/02), 7-YJ-2729:《會辦蒙古、
隆務案委員上的稟》 ; QSDG (GX 11/07/14), 7-YJ-2743: 《署任陝甘總督與前青海大臣
為辦結蒙番積案上的奏摺》 . 
 
904 QSDG (GX 10/?), 7-YJ-2739:《會辦委員為蒙古與隆務仇殺案結案上的詳》 . 
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approval. 905  The prominence of Muslim military officers in the pacification and 
resolution of the crisis illustrates another facet of the Qing-centered pluralistic legal order 
in Xunhua: the significant role of intermediaries and Muslims in particular.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, prior to the Muslim rebellions of the 1860s, 
Muslims from Gansu and especially Hezhou had already played an essential role in the 
trade between the interior, the Tibetan communities of Xunhua, and the Mongol banners. 
The Qing state had sanctioned some of this work. “Official” brokers (官歇家) had been 
licensed to operate both in “outer” trading posts such as Guide and Xunhua, while others 
remained within the borders at markets such as those of Hezhou. And despite 
Nayanceng’s regulations, an unofficial and illegal cross border trade had also continued. 
Many Muslim xiejia in Xunhua had found work in another capacity, as tax collectors 
working on behalf of the subprefect. The Xunhua archives contain a petition from one 
such “grain-tax broker,” Ma Laichi (馬來遲) who described how his ancestors had 
migrated from Hezhou to Xunhua during the Yongzheng reign and had been licensed to 
collect the tribute tax from a particular circuit of Tibetan communities around Wendu 
Monastery (Tib. bis mdo'i dgon chen bkra shis chos 'khor gling, 邊都寺/文都寺) for over 
“150 years.”906 In this role Hui xiejia were well placed to both assist Tibetans bring 
petitions to the Xunhua yamen and also provide information to the subprefect and 
facilitate his adjudication of local conflicts. Ma Laichi’s petition had in fact been 
prompted by circumstances related to his involvement in a local feud. He was petitioning 
the Xunhua subprefect to clear up slanders against him that had been made during the 
                                                
905 QSDG (GX 10/09/15), 7-YJ-2739:《會辦委員為蒙古與隆務仇殺案結案上的副詳》 . 
 
906 QSDG (GX 09/12/18), 7-YJ-2724:《歇家馬來遲等為被誣告上的稟》 . 
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course of representing the Tibetans of Wendu against the Tibetans of Sho’ong (Tib. sho 
‘ong or zho ‘ong dpyis, Ch. 雙朋) in a case before the magistrate.  
As demonstrated by the situation of Ma Laichi, in the aftermath of the Muslim 
rebellions, many Hui resumed their work as xiejia brokers. Other Muslim families with 
roots in the cross-border trade were able to capitalize on their prominence during the 
rebellion to establish an entirely new role for themselves in the post-rebellion political 
order. Ma Zhan’ao (馬占鰲, 1830-1886), the overall commander of the Muslim forces in 
Hezhou during the rebellions, and a close associate, Ma Haiyan (馬海晏, 1837-1900),907 
have generally been identified by secondary scholarship for their initial prominence as 
religious leaders within the Khafīya order.908 They both hailed, however, from Monigou 
(漠泥溝), a valley on the western edge of Hezhou through which passed a main trade 
route to the Tibetan and Mongol territories. Their prestige may have derived from their 
religious expertise, but their strength in arms surely derived from the wealth the 
community had earned from cross-border trade, both legal and illegal.909 The post-
rebellion accommodation of Ma Zhan’ao and his allies as “Muslim gentry (回紳)” and 
the loose incorporation of their military forces into the Hezhou military apparatus meant 
                                                
907 Ma Haiyan’s son, Ma Qi (馬麒) was a leading force behind the establishment of Qinghai as a 
province in 1928, and served as the first governor. As a younger man, Ma Qi, like his father, was 
also involved in Tibetan affairs in Xunhua. Tibetans in Amchok filed suit against him in the early 
19th century: QSDG  (GX ??/01/29), 7-YJ-4686:《阿木輟合八溝寺院為受馬家軍欺負上的
稟》 . 
 
908 Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 126. 
 
909 For information on the historical connections of Ma Zhan’ao, Ma Haiyan, and Ma Qianling to 
the regions beyond the passes, see reproductions of genealogies and tomb inscriptions in Linxia 
xian wenshi ziliao di qi ji (临夏县文史资料，第七辑, Linxia: Zhongguo Renmin Zhengxia 
xieshanghui, Linxia xian weiyuanhui, ed. 2007). 
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that Chinese Muslims were better positioned than ever to insert themselves into Tibetan 
affairs and profit from their ability to manage local conflicts on behalf of Qing 
administrators.910 Moreover, in a period when Qing military forces were stretched thin, 
the enforcement of Qing jurisprudence increasingly hinged on the actions of Hui-
commanded military units. Thus it is no surprise that in 1883-84, when a serious crisis 
broke out between Repgong and Henan, it was Ma Zhan’ao and Ma Haiyan who could 
muster the requisite resources and skills to orchestrate a solution. Thus both Qing 
officials and local Tibetans and Mongols had to take into consideration the interests and 
capabilities of Muslims when dealing with local conflicts.  
Having identified in broad strokes the distinctive features of the pluralistic legal 
order in Xunhua, the remainder of this chapter as well as Chapter Seven turns to a 
chronological examination of three salient periods of social conflict in order to 
demonstrate the ways in which they shaped the evolution of Labrang and other monastic 
domains and the manner in which they helped articulate Qing sovereignty. The first case 
involves an astonishing nineteen years (1772-1790) of nearly continuous litigation 
stemming from the attempt of Labrang monastery to impose an abbot on Tsö monastery, 
its neighbor to the southeast. Not only did this case set a precedent for Qing involvement 
in disputes between monasteries, but it also established the principle that “each 
monastery should govern itself (各管各寺).” While initially intended to ensure that each 
monastery remained independent from its neighbors, the nineteenth century principle was 
soon reinterpreted to restrain confederations of monasteries from further expansion.  
                                                
910 Ma Zhan’ao’s military forces were reorganized as three brigades of cavalry and foot soldiers 
(“馬步三營旗”). In the Xunhua archival documents, Ma Zhan’ao is referred to as a zongbing (總
兵), “regional commander” (Hucker, 533). He appears to have been only nominally subordinate 
to the overall commander of the Hezhou garrison (河州鎮). 
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Chapter Seven will take up the second case, dating to the years shortly after the 
Qing recovery of Hezhou following the surrender of Ma Anliang’s military forces in 
1872, stemmed from a feud between the Tibetan communities of Khagya (Tib. kha gya) 
and Rong’ar (Tib. rong ngar) over territory, tenants, revenue, and monastery resources. 
The conflict escalated as Labrang and Rongwo monasteries, as well as the newly “loyal” 
Muslim military officers threw their weight behind competing litigants. Zuo Zongtang 
oversaw the composition of the final accord. This accord resulted in the establishment of 
a new political and religious authority in Xunhua sanctioned by the imperial court. 
Entitled the “General Administrator of Terlung” (Ch. 沙溝總管), the Sétsang kūtuktu 
was elevated to be a third major center of power to balance out Labrang. The third case 
concerns the violence that broke out as the consensus about the meaning and utility of the 
Terlung general administrator frayed in 1889. The conclusion will briefly touch on a 
fourth case, dating to 1899, in which the governor-general Tao Mo found himself dealing 
with the unpredictable nature of reincarnation. All four of these cases had a major 
influence on the organization of Labrang and other neighboring monasteries and set 
precedents for Qing involvement in local affairs. 
 
Case Study One: Labrang Monastery and Tsö Monastery, 1772-1790 
 
 In 1772 Labrang monastery filed suit with the Xunhua subprefect over its ability 
to appoint the abbot of Tsö monastery. According to the Xunhua Gazetteer, Labrang had 
been appointing abbots since 1748, yet it had recently encountered resistance from the 
Tsö community itself who wished to appoint their own candidate. Unwilling to entertain 
this request, the second Jamyang Zhepa had filed the suit. The dispute, however, had 
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much deeper roots in the conflict over the identification of the reincarnation of the first 
Jamyang Zhepa that began after his death in 1721. These roots, however, are largely 
invisible in the two historical texts consulted for this case, the Drakgönpa’s Oceanic Book 
and the Xunhua Gazetteer. 
The founding of Tsö Monastery (Tib. gtsos dgon dge ldan chos gling; also known 
as rgya khar dgon—“Gyakhar” Monastery) can be dated to the generation proceeding 
that of the first Jamyang Zhepa. The Xunhua Gazetteer dates the founding of the 
monastery to 1682-1683. The Oceanic Book provides no date for the founding of the 
monastery, but identifies the founder as Bé Shérap Chöden (Tib. ‘be shes rab chos ldan), 
a local monk from Amdo who had achieved the geshé lharampa degree in Ü and then, at 
the invitation of a lay ruler in the Tsö region, returned to his homeland to propagate the 
teachings of the Geluk school. Bé Sherap Chöden’s reincarnation, Ngawang Techok 
Wangchuk (Tib. ngag dbang theg mchog dbang phyug) was among a group of laymen 
and monks from Amdo who, in 1704, traveled to Lhasa to invite the Jamyang Zhepa to 
return to Amdo to found what would become Labrang monastery. Drakgönpa records that 
in 1710, just a year after the founding of Labrang, during a visit of the Jamyang Zhepa to 
Tsö, “the monks and lay rulers, all sharing the same aspiration, donated the ownership of 
the monastery [to the Jamyang Zhepa].”911 Following the death of the first Jamyang 
Zhepa, however, the monks of Tsö monastery sided with the faction of the Sétsang Lama 
in the dispute at Labrang over the reincarnation of the first Jamyang Zhepa. The Sétsang 
Lama, a close disciple of the first Jamyang Zhepa and abbot of Labrang at the time of the 
                                                
911 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 555: “bla dpon thams cad ‘dun pa chig dril gyis dgon paphul ba 
bdag gir bzhes/” 
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first Jamyang Zhepa’s death, believed that his master would not reincarnate.912 The 
monks of Tsö monastery were joined in this dispute by the surrounding community and 
also the main lay patron of the monastery, the second generation Henan qinwang Tendzin 
Wangchuk. As discussed in chapters Three and Four, while he retained the throne at 
Labrang, Sétsang and his supporters were able to fend off the alternate candidate and his 
supporters, including the wife of the first generation Henan qinwang. Yet following the 
death of the Sétsang Lama in 1738, his opponents, led by the treasurer of Labrang, the 
Detri Lama, were able to confirm and enthrone their own candidate as the second 
Jamyang Zhepa.913 
According to Nietupski’s account of the conflict between the Sétsang and Detri 
lamas, the tensions continued to simmer despite attempts to reach accommodations.914 
The Detri Lama recognized a reincarnation of the Sétsang Lama in 1746. And the second 
Sétsang even attained the position of overall abbot of Labrang in 1760 despite the fact 
that the man the first Sétsang Lama had refused to authenticate—the second Jamyang 
Zhepa Könchok Jigmé Wangpo, retained overall ownership of the monastery.915 The 
young Sétsang Lama and his supporters, however, were forced out of Labrang in 1762, 
leading to a permanent schism in the region.916  
                                                
912 Yang Hongwei, Ph.d. dissertation (2009), 123. 
 
913 Nietupski (2011), 126. 
 
914 Nietupski (2011), 126. 
 
915 Zhou Ta and Chen Xiaoqiang, De’erlong si yu libei saicang huofo (Beijing: Zhongguo 
zangxue chubanshe, 1994), 49-50. 
 
916 Zhou Ta and Chen Xiaoqiang, 51-52. 
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Relations between Tsö and Labrang remained tense as well.  These tensions were 
apparently exacerbated in the late 1740s, when, as reported by Drakgönpa, the second 
Jamyang Zhepa and Tendzin Wangchuk, the Khoshot Prince, invited the throne holder of 
Ganden Monastery in Lhasa, Gyaltsen Senggé (Tib. rgyal mtshan seng ge) to Labrang 
Monastery. Upon arrival, the monk apparently perceived a slight in the position of his 
throne and departed for Tsö. It is in this vignette that Drakgönpa allows the reader to 
catch a glimpse of the friction between Tsö and the supporters of the second Jamyang 
Zhepa at Labrang. While at Tsö monastery he instituted a new debate curriculum and his 
disciples subsequently served as the first instructors. Shortly after his departure, however, 
it seems that Labrang gained control over appointments of instructors and also started 
installing their own candidates for abbot.917 One suspects that what was offensive about 
these abbots was not the fact that Labrang appointed them, but rather that the death of 
both the First Sétsang Lama (d. 1738) and Tendzin Wangchuk—the Henan prince (d. 
1749), meant that Labrang was now dominated by the faction that had supported the 
reigning Jamyang Zhepa. Thus appointments made by “Labrang” or the Jamyang Zhepa, 
where more precisely appointments made by a faction within Labrang with which Tsö 
had become opposed.  
According to the Xunhua Gazetteer it was the death and reincarnation of Gyaltsen 
Senggé that triggered the conflict with Labrang. The throne-holder (“Serkhri” Tib. ser 
khri) from Lhasa had evidently made a strong impression on Tsö. Gong Jinghan reports 
that having heard that his reincarnation had been found nearby, they invited him to the 
monastery to be raised as their abbot. Gong Jinghan, on the basis of the archival 
                                                
917 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 556; Gong Jinghan, 253. Gong’s account is more succinct, merely 
noting that after he arrived in the region at the invitation of the Mongol prince, the “Galdan 
Kūtuktu (噶爾旦胡圖克圖)” became the abbot of Tsö. Drakgönpa details his teaching initiatives. 
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documents in his yamen at Xunhua, writes that, unwilling to accept such a move, the 
Jamyang Zhepa filed suit.918 From Drakgönpa, we learn that despite the tensions between 
Tsö and Labrang, the young reincarnation of Gyaltsen Senggé (the second Tsö Serkhri) 
had entered Labrang for his monastic training. However, because the young man took his 
vows of full ordination from the second Sétsang lama, he was “accused of wrongdoings,” 
and, one assumes, also driven out from Labrang monastery.919 On Labrang’s refusal to 
countenance the installation of the Tsö Serkhri as the abbot at Tsö, Drakgönpa is silent. 
Instead, he blames unruly elements at Tsö monastery for causing trouble and destroying 
the Jamyang Zhepa’s property: “In the Water dragon year [1772] a quarrel arose and the 
Jamyang Zhepa's residence at Tsö was destroyed. A monk from within [Tsö] Trashi 
Gyatso [bkra shis rgya mtsho] then in a wanton and unrestrained fashion appointed 
himself abbot.”920 Drakgönpa notes neither the appeal of the Jamyang Zhepa to Xunhua 
subprefecture in 1772 nor the tortuous cycle of countersuits that followed. Instead, he 
simply states that in 1777, Labrang and the Mongol prince regained control of Tsö. For a 
detailed account of the involvement of the Qing provincial administration in the conflict, 
it is necessary to turn to Gong Jinghan’s reconstruction of the case.  
According the documents Gong Jinghan found on hand in the archives of the 
subprefect’s yamen, the Qinghai amban Wu-mi-tai (Ch. 伍彌泰) and the subprefect 
Zhang Chunfang (張春芳), “without careful investigation,” ruled in favor of Labrang on 
                                                
918 Gong Jinghan, 523. 
 
919 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 556. Drakgönpa charitably states that the accusations were false 
and that the young lama went on to an accomplished career. Still, the passage provides evidence 
for the depth of the discord between the supporters of the Sétsang lama(s) and the second 
Jamyang Zhepa, as well as the alliance between Tsö and Sétsang. 
 
920 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 556. 
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the basis of “prior tradition (照舊).” Yet Tsö refused to obey the decision. Thus Labrang 
filed suit for a second time (“又控”).  At this, the Qinghai amban organized a committee 
consisting of a court-affiliated lama, a translator (most likely from the staff of the 
Qinghai amban, but perhaps from the Lifanyuan), and the subprefect to work out a new 
decision. This time, the committee issued the judgment that, “Each monastery should 
govern only itself (各管各寺) and that the abbot should be appointed autonomously by 
Tsö.” However, subsequent to this decision the amban Wu-mi-tai was transferred to Tibet 
and the Jamyang Zhepa attempted to overturn the decision with a new appeal (suit # 3). A 
new committee was formed consisting of several low-ranking officials from the civil 
administration of Gansu together with some staff from the Qinghai amban’s office. In 
January of 1775, this group issued a new interpretation: since the Mongol prince had 
sponsored the original construction of Tsö monastery, he could appoint the abbot. 
However, he was instructed not to appoint monks from Labrang. Unwilling to accept this 
verdict, in 1776 Labrang brought the case before a higher authority, the governor-general 
of Shaanxi and Gansu (suit # 4). The governor-general convened a committee of higher-
ranking provincial officials including the Lanzhou prefect, the former Xunhua subprefect 
who had initially handled the case in 1772, Zhang Chunfang, and the current subprefect, 
Xie Huan (謝桓).  
This committee also ruled against Labrang. Yet this time the governor-general 
produced a more extensively reasoned decision that examined the history of the 
relationship between Labrang and its neighboring monasteries and their relationship to 
the Qing state and the Mongol banners. At the heart of the decision was the determination 
that, “The Mongol lamas of Labrang in principle should have no involvement in Tsö 
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monastery. Since the Tibetan people provide for the [monastery], they may request an 
abbot, and the decision shall take into account what pleases them. The Jamyang Zhepa 
must not trespass on the people’s [desires], nor may he impose his will upon them 
through force of arms. The monks and laypeople of [Tsö] monastery are tax-paying 
commoners of the interior. Mongol lamas in particular are forbidden from brazenly 
contending for their territory.”921 In this decision, the panel of Qing officials resurrected 
the principle established by Nian Gengyao during the Yongzheng era of segregating 
Tibetans from Mongols. Having previously been placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Mongol banners of Kokonor, Labrang and the Jamyang Zhepa, regardless of their self-
identification, were “Mongol” and therefore must remain separate from the affairs of 
those “Tibetans” supervised by civil officials from the Gansu provincial administration. 
The ruling also explicitly reversed a 1764 statement from Changkya Rolpé Dorjé in 
which the monk had determined that “all the territory to the southeast of the Mongol 
tribes until Songpan and including the six tribes of Khagya are within the administration 
[of the Mongol banners].”922 Furthermore, the ruling reaffirmed the principle of monastic 
autarky (“each monastery should rule itself”) and requested that the Lifanyuan cancel the 
license previously granted to the Mongol prince to supervise the affairs of Tsö and other 
Tibetan monasteries.923 
                                                
921 Gong Jinghan, 253: “議以黑錯寺與拉卜楞寺蒙古喇嘛本無干涉，番民公共香火，延請法
臺，自應聽從民便。嘉木樣本不得違眾強爭，而該處寺院僧俗悉屬內地粮民，蒙古喇嘛尤
不得公然爭控其所。 
 
922 Gong Jinghan, 254. 
 
923 Gong Jinghan, 254. 
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Having failed to make the case with the governor-general, Labrang appealed for 
the fifth time to the Qinghai amban. In 1777 the amban ordered the Xunhua subprefect 
Xie Huan to bring both sides to the provincial capital to rehear the arguments. However, 
before the case was heard in Lanzhou, the conflict took a surprising turn: “Without 
authorization and on his own initiative Xie Huan led two thousand government troops to 
detain and interrogate the monks and laypeople of Tsö. This caused such consternation 
and fear at Tsö that they begged for peace and the Jamyang Zhepa was ordered to appoint 
an abbot.”924 The Qinghai amban then inscribed this fait accompli “in stone.”925 Gong 
Jinghan writes that this decision was bitterly endured by Tsö only because the 
reincarnation of the Serkhri lama Gyeltsen Senggé was still only a child. Twelve years 
later, in 1789 (QL 54), when the young man came of age, they drove out the abbot 
appointed by Labrang and installed the second Serkhri on the abbatial throne. At this, the 
Jamyang Zhepa filed suit in the office of the Xunhua subprefect for the sixth time in 
eighteen years. In August of the following year (1790), the Qing ruled against Labrang, 
expressly overturning the previous judgment: “The seven hundred lay and monastic 
households of Tsö have always been commoners of the interior who till the earth and 
submit taxes under the direct control of Xunhua subprefecture. Since Labrang monastery 
is under the administration of the Mongol junwang, how can obedient lamas of the outer 
regions presume to take ownership of the taxpaying households of the interior?”926 The 
ruling noted that Labrang had only been able to appoint abbots since 1748 and that claims 
                                                
924 Gong Jinghan, 254. 
 
925 Gong Jinghan, 254. 
 
926 Gong Jinghan 254-255. 
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that Tsö had offered alms to Labrang prior to this date would not be considered evidence 
of the subordination of the monastery. The Lifanyuan subsequently reaffirmed this 
decision and the Qinghai amban was ordered to forcefully restrain the Jamyang Zhepa if 
necessary.  
And so concluded the case, for the time being. From the perspective of Labrang, 
only one ruling seems to have stuck. Or rather, the monastery and its chroniclers chose to 
remember only one moment in the protracted legal battle. As mentioned above, in the 
Oceanic Book Dragkönpa only noted that in 1777 Labrang resumed appointing abbots. 
Drakgönpa did not state that the return of Tsö to Labrang’s control was a result of Qing 
intervention, thus leaving the impression that the Qing state and its show of military 
power had nothing to do with Labrang’s authority over Tsö. Drakgönpa does not mention 
the reversals the monastery suffered at the hands of Qing authorities.927 During the late 
nineteenth century, Labrang officials would more explicitly cite the 1777 judgment of the 
Qinghai amban and subprefect Xie during the course of renewed legal battles over 
Labrang’s territory.928 Yet it appears that even among Labrang’s supporters there were 
those who failed to see the point in pursuing a protracted legal battle for control of Tsö. 
Drakgönpa recorded the following conversation:  
 
Previously, during the time of conflict, the superior protector (Jamyang 
02), was asked by some people, ‘What's the use of making peace with 
[Tsö] monastery? You still have to provide funds for the repair of the main 
prayer hall and, in addition to this trouble, there is nothing to be gained!’ 
The [Jamyang Zhepa] replied, ‘The valley is really a pleasant one and I 
                                                
927 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 556.  
 
928 QSDG (GX 15/07/03), 7-YJ-4640:《拉布塄為被隆務寺兵搶殺上的稟》. 
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think that if we can appoint abbots to teach there perhaps a little bit of 
benefit might come from it.’929 
 
As revealed in this passage, for partisans of Labrang the justification for the 
Jamyang Zhepa’s claim lay primarily in a sense of moral duty to edify the surrounding 
region. The Jamyang Zhepa felt obliged to appoint the abbots only to ensure that the 
monks of Tsö were adequately educated. Drakgönpa continues his description of Tsö by 
listing the extensive donations the second Jamyang Zhepa made to the main prayer hall at 
Tsö. He also notes how the Jamyang Zhepa resolved conflicts between the lay ruler of 
Tsö and his subjects. Drakgönpa thus insinuates that Tsö’s resistance to Labrang stems 
not from some unified rejection of Labrang, but rather from the machinations of various 
factions within the discordant politics of the Tsö community itself. The fact that 
Drakgönpa’s brief description of Tsö, which was written in 1865, is largely dedicated to 
laying out both the moral justifications for the Jamyang Zhepa’s ownership of Tsö and 
the historical proofs of that control (i.e. the “donation” of the Tsö monastery to the estate 
of the Jamyang Zhepa in 1710 and the Qing confirmation of that privilege in 1777), is 
therefore simultaneously a tacit recognition that Labrang had not been able to exercise 
effective control over Tsö since the 1790s and an exhortation to future action. Fifteen 
years after Drakgönpa wrote this description, Labrang officials would present these 
arguments again to Qing officials in the course of new attempts to assert its perceived 
prerogatives over Tsö and other neighboring monasteries.  
                                                
929 Drakgönpa, Oceanic Book, 557: “sngar 'khrugs pa'i dus skyabs mgon mchog la 'ga' zhig gis 
rgya mkhar la 'grig nas ci byed/ 'du khang 'phub dgos pa sogs sku tshegs las thob bya ci yang 
med zhus par/ lung ba dga' mo zhig yod pas khri ba re bskos nas 'chad nyan byas na phan cung 
zad re e thog snyam pa yin zhes gsungs pa'i gsung rgyun 'khrul med thos te/ tshul de rang zhan 
kun gyis shes dgos pa zhig yin no/” 
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The dogged pursuit of a favorable ruling in Qing court by the second Jamyang 
Zhepa was unprecedented in Qing legal history. Equally unprecedented was the 
involvement of Qing local magistrates in a conflict between Gelukpa monasteries.930 The 
arrival of the lawsuit just a decade after the founding of the subprefecture in 1762, and 
the protracted legal battle that followed had a profound impact on the jurisdiction of the 
Xunhua subprefect. The fact that the actions and decisions of both Qing and indigenous 
actors had such an enormous influence on the role that the subprefect and other Qing 
administrators was precisely why the author of the Xunhua Gazetteer, Gong Jinghan 
(1747-1802), devoted so much attention to the case.   
Much in the same way as Nayanceng’s Pingfan zoushu was a vehicle for 
promoting a particular strategy for handling frontier affairs, the Xunhua Gazetteer was a 
platform from which Gong Jinghan could evaluate the history Qing efforts to administer 
and incorporate the Tibetans and Mongols living beyond the original borders of Gansu 
Province. Like Yan Ruyi, Gong was also from southern China (Minxian in Fujian 
province) and had developed a reputation for innovative and effective governance in the 
hinterlands of the Qing empire. Fukanggan had helped launch his official career in Gansu, 
where Gong had already served eight years before arriving in Xunhua. Later, Gong 
would become best known for theorizing and implementing a policy of “Strengthening 
the walls and clearing the countryside” (堅壁清野) that proved effective in suppressing 
the White Lotus Rebellion in eastern Gansu and Shaanxi during the late 1790s. The 
policy consisted of building what Philip Kuhn has aptly labeled, “strategic hamlets” to 
                                                
930 I know of no previous case of this nature in the history of Qing-Geluk relations in either Amdo 
or Kham. I suspect, however, that in Inner Mongolia, where the Qing possessed a much longer 
history of dealing with monastic affairs, it may have previously been involved in inter-monastic 
disputes of a similar scale. 
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gradually create a web of loyal villages defended by unofficial militias.931 Gong had not 
invented the strategy behind “Strengthening the Walls and Clearing the land,” but he did 
write the book on it: His Discourse on Strengthening the Walls and Clearing the 
Countryside (《堅壁清野議》) became a key text in the nascent statecraft movement of 
the early nineteenth century.932 The gazetteer, therefore, far from being a parochial 
celebration of local identity, was a text with an argument for an empire-wide audience. 
Gong served only briefly in Xunhua—perhaps only four months (a not atypical tenure for 
Xunhua subprefects), but evidently developed an acute belief that mistaken decisions 
taken by Qing officials throughout the bureaucracy of Qinghai and Gansu during the 
course of the Tsö-Labrang conflict had imperiled not only the prospects for the smooth 
transformation of the Xunhua region, but also the overall security of the region. 
Although Gong Jinghan’s specific opinions on a range of matters can be found 
throughout the gazetteer, in the final fascicle, titled, “Foreign Dispositions (yi qing夷情),” 
he restates his overall assessment of Qing policy in the region in a single essay. Gong’s 
essay can be reduced to at least four major points. First, returning to the period initially 
following the Lobzang Danjing rebellion, Gong argues that although the idea of 
subjecting the Tibetans to the rule of civil officials from the interior was not necessarily 
problematic, the implementation of the policy was. Citing the insights of Yue Zhongqi, 
he writes, “Although one says that the newly submitted Tibetans are subordinate to the 
officials of the interior and even deliver grain tax and have been otherwise reigned in, this 
is not the same as being able to arrange and order them as one does the commoners of the 
                                                
931 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980 [1970]), 41-42. 
 
932 Kuhn (1980), 45. 
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interior.”933 In other words, the attempt was bound to fail because the Qing had not 
implemented the complete system of the interior and lacked the capacity to do so. For 
Gong, the smooth functioning of the system hinged not on the superficial presence of 
civil officials, but the presence of a legal code and a self-enforcement mechanism for the 
population—the baojia system. It would require “excessive earnestness” and “galloping 
about” for the civil officials to actually maintain the peace on their own, and this was 
anyways out of the question in the difficult physical and cultural terrain of the Tibetan 
region.934 To illustrate his point, Gong selected a memorial from the subprefecture’s 
collection from 1741, in which even at this early date the author, the Qinghai amban, felt 
it necessary to inform the court that, “The borderlands and the interior are vastly different 
(邊地與內地迥異)” and continued to complain that there were no civil or military 
officers in the region who were capable of handling cases involving Tibetans.935 Without 
the requisite social infrastructure in place, Gong argued, the civil officials from Gansu 
had faced an impossible task and, “Having handled things in a muddleheaded and 
careless fashion caused the Tibetans to gradually come to disdain China.”936  
Case in point was the handling of the Labrang-Tsö conflict. Gong’s reconstruction 
of the litigation in the gazetteer presented the Qing local administration as having 
transgressed the fundamental principle (established by Nian Gengyao) of segregating 
Mongols from Tibetans. The handling of the case had violated this principle first in the 
                                                
933 Gong Jinghan, 304. 
 
934 Gong Jinghan 304-305. One can imagine that Belmang might have offered the same critique 
of the Qing administrative system, referring to it as “neither sheep nor goat.” 
 
935 Gong Jinghan, 298. 
 
936 Gong Jinghan, 305: “顢頇了事啓番民輕視中國之漸。” 
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sense that Labrang had set a precedent for “Mongols” filing cases at the offices of Qing 
magistrates, both in Xunhua and elsewhere in Gansu province. The “Mongols” of 
Labrang had jumped the border between Qinghai and Gansu in order to file suit in the 
Chinese interior.  The principle had also been violated because on several occasions 
Xunhua jurists had found in favor of Labrang, thus permitting a “Mongol” monastery to 
assert control over taxpaying Tibetans who were now considered to be under the 
administration of China proper/the interior. 937  Gong warned that placing Tibetans 
unfairly under the control of the Mongols of Qinghai furthered the perception that the 
court was biased against the Tibetans and only embittered them against the Qing court.938  
Citing both the Labrang case and another series of cases that were concurrently 
mismanaged by the Qing magistrate in Guide, Gong Jinghan concluded his essay by 
arguing in support of the recent proposal of the governor-general Leboo (勒保) and 
Qinghai amban Kuišu to place the subprefectures of Xunhua and Guide under the 
authority of the amban, a policy that was approved by the Throne in 1791, just before the 
composition of the gazetteer. Previously, it had been the responsibility of civil officials 
from the interior to handle criminal behavior among Tibetans. Danai, the first Qinghai 
amban together with the second amban Martai had jointly argued in 1733 that the 
jurisdiction of the office should be limited to the Mongol banners and the minority of 
distant Tibetans who had, “yet to enter the map (未歸版圖 ).” 939  The primary 
responsibility for dealing with criminal activity by Tibetans lay with the civil officials 
                                                
937 Gong Jinghan, 253-255. 
 
938 Gong Jinghan, 306-307. 
 
939 Such as the Tibetan of Yushu. 
 
 451 
stationed in the “counties and prefectures” of Gansu province. Cases of Tibetan raiding 
on Mongols or merchants were to be handled jointly by these civil officials and the 
amban’s office.940 However, Gong Jinghan, supporting Kuišu and Leboo, argued that the 
notion that the office of the Xining amban would handle only Mongol affairs, and the 
civil administration of Gansu would handle the Tibetans in between had become 
untenable.  
First, Gong noted that administrators had quickly faced the problem that the 
boundary between those “Tibetans” who had “entered the map” or were later identified as 
“cooked”—i.e. farmed and paid taxes, was in practice impossible to delimit. Second, the 
civil administration had not only proven inept at prosecuting raiding, but criminal activity 
had increased exponentially since the 1720s and especially since 1772.941 The solution 
was to place both Mongols and the Tibetans of Xunhua and Guide directly under the 
supervision of the Qinghai amban.  Guide county was to be converted into a 
subprefecture like Xunhua, and in matters involving Tibetans, the subprefects were to 
report directly to the office of the amban in Xining. Under this arrangement, cases 
involving Mongols and Tibetans could be resolved under a single authority and, perhaps 
more importantly, the state’s energies could be directed towards patrolling the boundary 
between Mongols and Tibetans and not distracted by the impossible task of weeding 
“cooked” Tibetans from “raw” ones. The memorial from Kuišu and Leboo thus 
                                                
940 Gong Jinghan, 297. 
 
941 Gong notes a dramatic uptick in raiding cases begin in 1772, a fact he correlates with Qing 
mishandling of cases involving Mongol rulers by the Guide county magistrate and the Xunhua 
subprefect (299). 
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concluded by focusing on the need to energetically monitor the karun (卡倫) border posts 
between Mongols and Tibetans.942  
The Labrang case, then, as understood by leading officials in the Gansu-Qinghai 
region, had profound implications for the overall arrangement of Qing administrative 
boundaries. The resulting edict repealed almost sixty years of civilian supervision of the 
Tibetans and, in a sense, reversed what might have appeared to some as the steady 
expansion of “China.” The establishment of the amban’s control over Tibetan affairs in 
Xunhua and the unification of Xunhua and the Mongols under a single legal 
framework—the “Tibetan code,” meant that the “frontier” had moved east, not west. As 
an advocate for this policy shift, the Xunhua Gazetteer was therefore a key text arguing 
for the centralization of authority over both Mongols and Tibetans in the office of the 
Qinghai amban. It might also be argued that the inclusion of these two subprefectures in 
the jurisdiction of the amban also expanded the meaning of “Qinghai,” thus marking a 
key step in the creation of the geo-body that would later become known as “Qinghai 
province.”943 Although modern Qinghai province is no longer ruled by an “amban,” the 
easternmost districts of the province represent the former territory of Xunhua 
subprefecture.944 
Gong Jinghan thus composed the gazetteer just as a host of potentially 
transformative policies had been introduced. Just three months before he arrived to the 
                                                
942 Gong Jinghan, 307-309. 
 
943 For the concept of the geo-body, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the 
Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
 
944 The modern Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, which represented the most easternmost 
portion of Xunhua subprefecture, was later placed within the boundaries of Gansu province. 
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post, the emperor approved a further proposal in February of 1792 from the amban and 
governor-general suggesting that a system of hundred and thousand-household chiefs be 
instituted among the “cooked” Tibetans.945 The purpose of this policy was to identify an 
intermediary network of indigenous leaders to perform the basic police work, filling the 
essential gap between magistrates and the population that Gong had identified in the 
previous administrative arrangement.  
Gong’s analysis of the frontier policy in Xunhua and in Gansu shared several 
characteristic concerns with Nayanceng, but also differed in an important respect. 
Although both began by addressing the problem of Tibetan raiding on the Mongol 
banners, their analyses led to different diagnoses. Gong and his contemporaries focused 
on reestablishing the boundary between Mongols and Tibetans. Under the newly unified 
supervision of the amban, the karun (border posts between Mongol and Tibetan 
territories) could be better policed. The ultimate verdict on the Labrang-Tsö case 
similarly asserted the segregation of Mongol and Tibetan populations. Nayanceng shared 
these concerns, yet believed that regardless of how well the state policed the border 
between the Tibetans and Mongols, their efforts would be fruitless if the material 
incentives driving the collusion were allowed to persist. Therefore Nayanceng focused 
not on the border between Tibetans and Mongols but the one that needed to be 
constructed between Tibetans and commoners of the interior (especially Hui). To borrow 
a phrase from Sutton’s study of the Miao frontier, Nayanceng envisioned the Tibetans of 
Xunhua and Guide as inhabiting a “quarantine” zone, blocked from further movement 
                                                
945 Gong Jinghan, 309-310. 
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south and west by Mongol sentries and sealed from China proper by the licensed trade 
system.946 
The history of the Labrang-Tsö case reveals that the principle of separating 
“Mongol” and “Tibetan” populations was not obvious to Qing magistrates and even 
higher-ranking officials in Qinghai and Gansu. And the justifications used either to grant 
or block the access of the Jamyang Zhepa to Tsö monastery and its surrounding 
community shifted considerably over the course of nineteen years of legal wrangling. The 
idea that the Qing’s interests in the case were clear to Qing officials, or that they 
manipulated the case in order to break up the growing authority of Labrang is belied not 
only by the multiple instances in which Qing authorities sided with Labrang but also by 
the dispatch of a punitive military force against Tsö. If Labrang seems to have learned 
anything from this matter, it was that persistence might pay off, as would the strategic use 
of the entire scope of the Qing administrative system. The Jamyang Zhepa practiced what 
Lauren Benton as aptly referred to as, “forum shopping:” sending the case to different 
Qing officials and even repeatedly to the same office if they sensed a shift change might 
result in a more favorable ear. The Jamyang Zhepa also clearly used his status as a 
“kūtuktu” to appeal his case directly to the Qinghai amban and governor-general. As 
Gong Jinghan hints in his commentary, the only thing that seems to have brought the case 
to a conclusion was the death of the second Jamyang Zhepa in 1791.947   
The process of handling the case had major implications for the local political 
arrangements within Xunhua as well as those at the regional level. First, the case forced 
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947 Gong Jinghan, 255. 
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Qing officials to clarify and define the relationship of the Xunhua subprefect to Tsö 
monastery as well as several other communities that neighbored Labrang, most 
importantly for our purposes, Khagya. What was initially a weak and ambiguous claim to 
Tibetan communities was gradually rearticulated in a more forceful fashion. For instance, 
during the second and third rounds of the case, the Qing first settled for a principle that 
countenanced Tsö’s autonomy to outside authorities (the “各管各寺” principle) then 
decided to recognize the Khoshot junwang’s authority over the monastery. The idea that a 
as taxpaying “Tibetan” community, Tsö should have an exclusive relationship with the 
Qing state came only later and was not fully expressed until the sixth round of the case. 
The final ruling noted that Tsö had “always been under… the direct control of Xunhua 
subprefecture,” but this was the first time that such a claim appeared in writing in an 
official document.948 Although it is impossible to tell to what degree such a relationship 
was desired by Tsö, as we shall see in subsequent cases, during the late nineteenth 
century Tsö and other rivals of Labrang would actively employ precisely this rhetoric to 
extricate themselves from the claims of Labrang.   
Moreover, the case resulted in a novel and paradoxical articulation of the internal 
and external boundaries of Xunhua. As a “Mongol” territory, the subprefect had no 
prerogatives over the internal administration of Labrang monastery or the communities 
pledged to the estate of the Jamyang Zhepa. However, since Tsö monastery sat to the 
southeast of Labrang, the determination that Tsö was in fact under the jurisdiction of 
Xunhua not only delimited the southeastern boundary of Xunhua subprefecture, but it 
also had the effect of transforming Labrang into an enclave within Xunhua subprefecture. 
                                                
948 Gong Jinghan 254-255. 
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Gong Jinghan captured this confusing situation in his brief description of Labrang 
monastery:  
Labrang is located in Genkya, subject to the junwang of the Qinghai 
Mongols. The name of Labrang in Tibetan is ‘Trashi khyil.’ It is within the 
territory of the subprefecture but not subordinate the subprefect. The 
monks live in a disorderly fashion and rely on the power of the junwang. 
Squabbles with other Tibetans over land and the submission of lawsuits 
are not infrequent occurrences. [Labrang] often claims Tibetan clans of the 
interior as their own subjects or gives cover to those fleeing the law. This 
brings harm to the vital interests of Xunhua. Thus to avoid future trouble 
[we] have ordered the destruction of [monasteries] within the Mongol 
borders and forbidden them to build further temples in the interior.949 
 
In conclusion, Labrang’s attempt to seek out justice via the Qing had delivered 
unanticipated results. On the one hand it had contributed to a general reformulation of the 
Qing dynasty’s strategic position in the Gansu region that now emphasized the difference 
of Tibetan and Mongol regions from the interior of the empire. Yet at the local level it 
had resulted in the articulation of greater Qing sovereignty over Labrang’s neighboring 
communities and set a precedent for Qing oversight of Labrang’s relations with 
neighboring communities. The tensions inherent in this situation and the ambiguities 
manifest in Gong Jinghan’s formulation—“within the subprefecture but not subordinate 
to the subprefect”—would continue to be the focus of legal politics for the rest of the 
dynasty. 
 
  
                                                
949 Gong Jinghan, 258. Emphasis added. The original reads: “按拉卜楞寺番名札木奇爾寺。在
廳地而非廳所屬。僧眾雜遝倚恃郡王之勢。屢與各番爭地控案不一而足。又招內屬番族為
其屬，或藏匿亡命，此循化腹心之一害也。當令拆毀於蒙古界，別建寺宇不許在內地以絕
後患。拉布楞即拉布楞番語也。” 
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Chapter Seven: The Warring States 
 
Introduction  
 
 
To the limited extent that the history of the rebellion of the Muslims of Hezhou 
against the Qing state in 1862 has been told, it has focused on the story of Ma Zhan’ao’s 
roots as a Sufi religious leader whose knack for military strategy enabled him to organize 
the Muslim population of Hezhou into a military force that ejected the Qing completely 
from a broad swath of Gansu province and ultimately handed Zuo Zongtang one of the 
most crushing defeats of his career in 1872.950 To the south and west of Hezhou, at Ma 
Zhan’ao’s rear, however, lay the Tibetan-populated highland regions of Xunhua. 
Ostensibly loyal to the Qing and a potential military threat, the region must not only have 
been a key source of military supplies (especially horses and leather), but also a partner in 
the trade that kept the economy of the Muslim regime in Hezhou afloat during the war. 
Although no archival sources from this period have survived, archives from the period of 
reconstruction (善後) that followed the return of Hezhou to Qing control hint that 
relations between Hezhou Muslims and certain Tibetan individuals and communities had 
deepened during the rebellion. Moreover, events that transpired during the rebellion 
sparked an outpouring of litigation in the immediate aftermath. 
   This chapter examines the conflict between Khagya (Tib. kha gya, 卡加) and 
Rong’ar (Tib. rong ngar, 隆哇) that, although sparked by events of the rebellion, soon 
                                                
950 For a summary of this period and the importance of understanding the multiplicity of  Muslim 
rebellions and not just the “Muslim Rebellion,” see Lipman, 125-129, and especially 130-138. 
For a detailed account of the events in Hezhou from the perspective of Qing official sources, see, 
Gao Wenyuan, Qingmo xibei Huimin zhi fan Qing yundong (Taipei: Xuehai shuju, 1989). 
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dragged in larger neighbors such as Labrang and Rongwo monasteries and exposed fault 
lines among Tibetans that had been deepening since the Qing had initially become 
involved in inter-monastic conflicts in the late Qianlong reign. Much like the Qianlong-
period case, the encounter between Tibetans, Qing officials, and now, Muslim gentry in 
the context of a Qing centered legal order had unexpected consequences. This case 
resulted in the Qing court’s enfeoffment of the third Sétsang lama Lobzang Tashi Rabgyé 
(1814-1879) as the “General Administrator” (Ch. zongguan, 總管, Tib. tsung kon) of 
Terlüng with responsibility for the political administration of a large district to the north 
and east of Labrang. The establishment of Sétsang as zongguan was neither a 
straightforward case of imperial recognition of a local hero, nor was it simply a cynical 
attempt at containing the Jamyang Zhepa. Instead this new political institution was the 
outcome of contingent events and itself highly unstable. 
 
Case Study Two: The Creation of the Terlung General Administrator, 1875 
 
The conflict between Khagya and Rong’ar first came to the attention of the 
Xunhua subprefect, Wang Shengyuan (汪聲元), in a petition from the Gyangro tulku 
(Tib. ‘gyang ro gong ma, Ch. 江落昂千戶) of Khagya monastery, dated to June of 1873. 
The monk began his letter by reminding the magistrate of his loyal service to the dynasty 
during the recent rebellion. Most importantly, in 1866 he had received orders from 
provincial authorities to raise a military force to “assist in exterminating the Muslim 
bandits (調番助剿兵回匪).” He had obeyed these orders and his Tibetan cavalry had 
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evidently fought together with Qing forces for the next eight years.951 Two months prior 
to his petition, in April of 1873, the Gyangro tulku had been present at the recovery of 
Xunhua town from the rebels. On that occasion he met both the provincial prosecutor and 
the new subprefect, and received various bestowals, including the title of chiliarch (千
戶), for his efforts on behalf of the dynasty.952 He regretted to inform the magistrate, 
however, that when asked to draft soldiers in 1866, three of the villages he administered (
所管), Menlung (Tib. sman lung, Ch. 麻隆), Tangar (Tib. thang dkar, 唐尕), and 
Xiangka (Tib. zhing dkar?, 香卡) had not only refused the draft, but had thrown their lot 
in with the neighboring lord of Rong’ar (the “Rong’ar honpo,” Tib. Rong ngar dpon po), 
whom Gyangro accused of refusing to aid the Qing cause. Since the re-conquest of 
Xunhua, the Gyangro chiliarch had asked the Rong’ar honpo to return the three villages 
to him. But not only had this request been rebuffed, but Rong’ar had violently resisted, 
leading to the death of the Gyangro tulku’s older brother and twenty other people.  
Perhaps swayed by Gyangro’s appeal to the notion of loyalty to the dynasty and 
the “air of rebellion” (賊風) with which he had tainted Rong’ar, a fortnight later, the 
Xunhua subprefect found in favor of Khagya. He ordered the Rong’ar honpo to return all 
the “commoners (百姓)” of Menlung, Tangar, and Xiangka to the control of the 
chiliarch.953 A day later he dispatched a similar command directly to the headmen of the 
                                                
951 QSDG (GX TZ 12/05/11; 1873/06/5), 6-YJ-271:《南番卡加寺千戶江洛昂為隆哇霸佔屬莊
上循化廳的稟》. 
 
952 QSDG (TZ 13/11, December 1874-January 1875), 6-YJ-350:《卡加寺千戶捏力哇為隆哇抗
頑不遵官命呈循化廳新任同知的稟》 . 
 
953 QSDG (TZ 12/05/25; 1873/06/19),  6-JY-271:《循化廳為麻隆三莊仍歸卡加千戶管轄給隆
哇紅布的諭》. 
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three villages in question.954 That same month, Zuo Zongtang, the governor-general also 
bestowed a memorial tablet (匾額 ) on Khagya monastery, further marking the 
communities privileged relation with the Qing.955  
The Rong’ar honpo, however, refused to comply. Over the next three months, the 
Gyangro tulku along with the manager of his domain (Tib. gnyer pa, gnyer las pa, Ch. 捏
力哇) continued to submit petitions to Xunhua reporting the intransigence of Rong’ar and 
asking the magistrate to intervene on his behalf.956 Finally, in September of 1873, the 
magistrate wrote to both sides of the dispute that if the three villages were not returned, 
he would travel himself to enforce the law. He also sent instructions to the abbots of Tsö 
and Shangnanbula (Tib. ?, Ch. 上南不拉) asking them to intervene and “suppress and 
straighten out” the Rong’ar honpo.957  These efforts at enforcement, mediation, and 
intimidation from afar came to nothing, and on November 2, 1873, the subprefect 
announced that he was traveling in person to the conflict zone and requested that several 
                                                
954 QSDG (TZ 12/05/26; 1873/06/20), 6-YJ-271:《循化廳為麻隆三莊仍歸卡加千戶管轄給麻
隆等三莊頭目的諭》. 
 
955 QSDG  6-YJ-350:《卡加寺千戶捏力哇為隆哇抗頑不遵官命呈循化廳新任同知的稟》, 
The tablet, which evidently hung in the monastery read, “Stalwart of the Frontier, Hater of 
Enemies (悍邊敵愾).” The significance of this tablet and its subsequent destruction by Rong’ar 
was of great interest to provincial officials. See, for instance, the opinion of the Xining circuit 
attendant: QSDG (GX 01/04/16), 7-YJ-2661: 《西寧兵備道為隆哇、卡加仇鬥給循化廳的憲
牌》. 
 
956 QSDG, 6-YJ-271: 《南番卡加寺江洛昂千戶為麻隆三莊不服官諭上循化廳的稟》( TZ 
12/06/21, 1873/07/15); 《南番卡加寺江洛昂千戶為麻隆三莊梗頑藐法上循化廳的稟》(TZ 
12/06R/18, 1873/08/10); 《隆三莊梗頑如故上循化廳的稟》(TZ 12/07/25). 
 
957 QSDG (TZ 12/07/26, 1873-09-17), 6-YJ-271: 《循化廳為不得私行械鬥事給卡加寺千戶的
諭》(TZ 12/07/26, 1873-09-17); 《循化廳為仍歸卡加寺給麻隆三莊得諭》; 《循化廳為速將
麻隆等三莊歸還卡家管束給隆哇紅布的諭》. 
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local notables including Ngawang Tenpei Lama, the Mewo honpo, the managers of Tsö 
and Terlung monasteries to present evidence related to the case and assist in mediation.958 
The trip, however, was not a success. The subprefect informed the provincial 
prosecutor that: 
The villages administered by Rong'ar and Khagya of the southern Tibetans 
are side by side with the border running between them. The manager of 
the Khagya chiliarch has a rough knowledge of Chinese customs and 
language (粗知漢禮漢語) and therefore stands out from the other Tibetan 
headmen. According to the many petitions from the chiliarch that have 
piled up over the summer, he insists that he sincerely observes the law and 
will not feud [with Rong'ar] and requests that we objectively examine the 
case and take charge (作主)… Yesterday I proceeded to inspect Terlung 
and learned that the Rong'ar headman had brought a large party to meet 
me. I promptly confronted him with the need to consider people's feelings 
and the law and inquired about his attempts to dominate other tribes and 
his acts of burning and raiding. The headman firmly resisted directly to 
my face and insisted that the matter did not require my efforts at 
resolution. He used forceful language and refused further questioning. 
Instead, he insisted that Rong'ar was at peace and warned me not to enter 
his territory with further inquiries. At this juncture, had I acted rashly to 
arrest him, I fear that there would have been an incident and had we 
proceeded to his monastery, there would have been no way to avoid 
looking weak. I then proceeded to Khagya were I resided for a short time 
in order to further investigate the roots of this case and handle other 
matters.959  
 
Further investigations at Khagya proved to the magistrate’s satisfaction that the 
chiliarch’s claims over the three villages were justified and recorded in Tibetan-language 
documents. Yet he reported to the provincial prosecutor that both his own attempt to 
resolve the case and that of the Hezhou garrison commander had resulted in only 
obstinate resistance from the Rong’ar honpo. Moreover he warned that if the conflict was 
                                                
958 GSDG (TZ 12/09/13, 1873-11-02), 6-YJ-268: 《循化廳為調節卡家、隆哇番案給阿讓丹壩
喇嘛、買吾紅布等的諭》. 
 
959 QSDG (TZ 12/10/10, 1873-11-29), 6-YJ-350: 《循化廳稟覆巡查南番情形並隆哇番案不服
查究由》. 
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left to fester, it would have implications for the overall peace of the region and the 
authority of the dynasty: “If we do not heavily punish [the honpo], not only will we be 
unable to resolve this case, but will be unable to impress all the Tibetans.”960  
The Gyangro chiliarch’s manager was equally unimpressed with the performance 
of the subprefect. Evidently quite resourceful, the manager was able to get a petition 
directly into the hands of the governor-general. In this letter, he described how the 
subprefect had essentially become trapped in Khagya for over twenty days because 
Rong’ar, located along the main route between Khagya and Hezhou, had been able to 
impede travel. It was only with an escort from Khagya that the magistrate and the 
garrison commander from Hezhou had been able to travel back to Hezhou. Moreover, he 
reported that just days after the officials had departed, Rong’ar launched revenge attacks 
against Khagya resulting in two deaths and major destruction.961   
Despite the setbacks of the late fall, in early 1874 the prospects for settling the 
case increased. The subprefect Wang was replaced by a Manchu bannermen, Anfu, who 
would eventually become one of the longest serving magistrates in the history of the 
subprefecture (1874-1879). In January, the subprefect also received an offer of assistance 
from the senior of the two Rongwo nangso. Stating that, “Khagya and Rong’ar are 
Tibetans governed by me, the Rongwo nangso,” he requested authorization to adjudicate 
the dispute and expressed confidence that he could bring both sides to an agreement: 
“The war between these two communities is just a common occurrence among us 
                                                
960 Ibid. 
 
961 QSDG (TZ 12/10/10, 1873-11-29), 6-YJ-350: 《陝甘總督為卡加、隆哇番案給河州鎮、循
化廳的劄》. 
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Tibetans (我番民).  Your honor should not overly trouble yourself with this...”962 The 
subprefect approved this motion and, sure enough, a month later the new subprefect Anfu 
was able to proclaim the terms of the agreement, which were as follows: 
 
- Each household of Menlung must provide Khagya monastery with one 
dou of barley and fifteen catties (jin) of butter each year for eternity. 
- Xiangka must perform one day of the monlam at Khagya monastery 
during the first month of the new year. 
- Menlung is to be considered a tribe of Khagya monastery and, in 
accordance with past precedents, will be governed by Khagya. 
- Fifty plots of land purchased by Khagya from Xiangka shall be 
returned to Khagya monastery. 
- Irrigation water shall be supplied to Xiangka by Khagya according to 
the existing schedule; Xiangka will host963 one day of monlam each 
year at Khagya monastery, if on the scheduled days Xiangka does not 
receive water because the channel has been blocked, Khagya cannot 
request Xiangka to host monlam. 
- Tangkar is to be considered a tribe of Rong’ar and, in accordance with 
past precedents, shall be governed by Rong’ar. 
- All additional matters are to be handled according to precedent. 
- Herders from Menlung who pasture on Khagya’s alpine meadows 
shall be permitted to graze their animals there according to tradition. 
- All those common people who have been taken captive shall be 
returned to their previous tribes. 
- Rong’ar shall compensate Khagya for all the property of Khagya 
monastery that they destroyed or looted.964  
 
In summary, Menlung and Tangkar were formally placed under the authority of Khagya 
and Rong’ar, respectively. The status of Xiangka, however, remained ambiguous. The 
                                                
962 QSDG (TZ 12/12/03, 1874-1-20), 6-YJ-350: 《隆務寺昂鎖為卡加、隆哇番案上循化廳的
稟》. 
 
963 I have adopted Gerald Roché’s suggested translation of “host” for the Chinese verb 
zuo (作). Personal communication. 
 
964 QSDG (TZ 13/02, 1874-3/4), 6-JY-187: 《循化廳為遵依議規給隆哇、卡加的諭》. 
According to a later petition from the Khagya manager, it was not Rongwo, but rather monks 
from Tsö monastery who worked as intermediary negotiators (“居中當響”). See: QSDG (TZ 
13/11, 1874-December/1875-January), 6-YJ-350: 《卡加寺千戶捏力哇為隆哇抗頑不遵官命呈
循化廳新任同知的稟》. 
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agreement articulated a regulated exchange of water for labor between Xiangka and 
Khagya, but was silent on how to interpret the political status of Xiangka vis-à-vis both 
Khagya and Rong’ar. 
 Unfortunately, the agreement did not hold. In August of 1874, Zuo Zongtang 
ordered Anfu to investigate accusations from Khagya of further raids from Rong’ar. He 
proceeded to Rong’ar together with the Taozhou subprefect. Upon arrival they learned 
that the headman had no intention of observing the agreement. Several days later Anfu 
received a further report that “bandits” from Rong’ar had also attacked a party of 
merchants. Neither Anfu nor his colleague from Taozhou were surprised when the 
Rong’ar headman also refused to hand over anyone suspected of banditry.965  
Three months later in November of 1874, also on the orders of the governor-
general, Anfu returned again to Rong’ar, this time with a much larger party that included 
the temporary assistant magistrate of Bayanrong (署西宁府巴燕戎格补用通判乔金镛) 
and perhaps two dozen cavalry led by the commander of the Xunhua battalion. The group 
made a base at a spot equidistant from Khagya and Rong’ar and invited both sides of the 
conflict to come and present their cases. However, only the Gyangro tulku appeared. The 
subprefect then dispatched a yamen runner and a xiejia to Rong’ar to sound out the 
headman. The messengers returned to report that the Rong’ar headman would not be 
party to any further discussions or agreements because, as far as he was concerned, the 
case had already been settled to his satisfaction by the Rongwo nangso. Moreover, he 
stated that he had seen no evidence of banditry among his people. The subprefect thus 
decided to proceed in person to Rong’ar: 
                                                
965 QSDG (TZ 13/11/09, 1874-12-17), 6-YJ-247: 《循化廳為卡加、隆哇爭鬥上陝甘總督、青
海大臣等的稟》. 
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Therefore, on the fourteenth we went to the small monastery at Rong'ar 
where we heard that the honpo was temporarily residing. I went inside to 
take a look. I sent a messenger in with the request that we meet and 
discuss the feud and the incident of banditry. He suddenly came out and, 
not only did not kneel, but also refused to answer questions or engage in 
discussion. He merely stated, “I have no need for officials. Why is it 
necessary to keep coming around to investigate?!’ Just as we were about 
to commence a stern interrogation, his Tibetan cavalry swarmed around 
the monastery unexpectedly from the back and sides. Observing that the 
atmosphere was truly treacherous and fearing a major incident, I could 
only abandon my investigation and retreat.966   
 
At this juncture the Rongwo nangso again attempted to find a solution to the 
conflict. In April of 1875, he reported to the Xunhua subprefect that he might have 
worked out a compromise. He noted that a sticking point in prior negotiations had been 
the Gyangro tulku’s demand for continued material support from Rong’ar. The nangso 
had come to believe, however, that both sides might agree to a resolution in which 
Rong’ar supplied butter, barley, and wheat, but only to the monks of Khagya and not 
directly to the estate of the Gyangro tulku.967 Yet shortly after Xunhua had dispatched 
runners to arrange a new convocation between all parties, reports began to arrive from 
Khagya of large-scale violence. 
In a series of reports that arrived in quick succession, the Gyangro chiliarch 
reported that since the night of April 29, his monastery had been under siege by a 
combined military force from Rong’ar and Terlung. The violence began ten days earlier 
when Rong’ar attacked and killed several people with firearms and other weapons. On 
the night of April 24, attackers from Tsö broke into the monastery and attempted to set 
                                                
966 QSDG (TZ 13/11), 6-YJ-187: 《循化廳稟覆奉劄查明循化所屬隆哇番目橫行各情一案及
隆哇不遵查辦情形由》. 
 
967 QSDG (GX 01/04/05), 7-YJ-2661: 《循化廳為隆哇、沙溝圍打卡加稟道府憲》. 
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fire to the monastery. The chiliarch pointedly noted that among the damaged objects was 
the ceremonial tablet from the governor-general. He wrote, “Your humble monk pulled 
from the flames the surviving half of the tablet and I have sent it to [Governor-general] 
Zuo in order to file suit! Your humble servant’s situation is absolutely hopeless and I can 
only knock my head to the floor and plead that in your Heavenly mercy your honor will 
promptly take charge!”968 Runners from the Xunhua yamen provided a preliminary 
confirmation of the violence: At least three people had been murdered, including another 
brother of the Gyangro chiliarch, and the combined force from Rong’ar and Terlung 
amounted to well over three hundred armed men.969 Xunhua reported the matter to the 
Xining prefect, who then forwarded the information on to the Qinghai amban.970 The 
Gyangro chiliarch’s petition must have reached Zuo Zongtang as well, because in letter to 
the Xunhua subprefect, he complained that it was highly improper for the monk to write 
directly to the governor-general’s office. The governor-general did, however, express his 
concern for the situation and ordered the Xining prefect to direct the Hezhou garrison 
commander to lead troops to Rong’ar together with the Xunhua subprefect.971 While the 
                                                
968 QSDG (GX 01/03/??), 7-YJ-2661: 《卡加再稟控隆哇、沙溝圍打事》; also:《卡加覆稟控
隆哇、沙溝圍打事》. 
 
969 QSDG (GX 01/04/05, 1875-5-9), 7-YJ-2661: 《循化廳為隆哇、沙沟圍打卡加禀道府憲》 . 
 
970 QSDG (GX 01/04/16), 7-YJ-2661: 《西寧兵備道為隆哇、卡加仇鬥給循化廳的憲牌》. 
 
971 QSDG (GX 01/05/18, 1875-5-22), 7-YJ-4223: 《陝甘總督左為卡家、隆哇番案劄循化廳》
. In giving this order, Zuo was approving a motion made by the Xining prefect on GX 01/04/26. 
Zuo subsequently complained again about the continuing stream of letters from Khagya on GX 
01/05/23 (7-YJ-4223): 《循化廳為奉札傳提卡加千戶捏力哇事》. 
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highest levels of the Qing field bureaucracy in Gansu and Qinghai worked their way 
through the problem, Khagya continued to petition with reports of additional violence.972 
The Qing provincial military forces did not act swiftly, but they came on heavy 
when they did. A large military force departed Hezhou for Rong’ar on September 24, 
1875. Among the troops were three companies of cavalry commanded by Ma Zhan’ao. 
This force quickly demonstrated its command of the local geography when it was able to 
take the fortified hamlet of Menlung from behind via an alternate route through the 
mountains. The major engagement of the expedition came at Xiangka, where the 
subprefect reported that over a hundred Tibetans were killed when they attempted to 
ambush the official troops. The Qing reached Rong’ar on September 30 with little further 
struggle, identified the local honpo and five other local leaders and promptly executed 
them.973  
The Xunhua subprefect Anfu and Hezhou garrison commander Shen Yusui’s (沈
玉遂) post-mortem investigation of Rong’ar’s “rampage (橫行)” produced a remarkably 
original analysis (compared with earlier understandings of the case) and an equally 
striking suggestion for a final settlement. It appears that it was only at this point that the 
Qing officials became aware of Rong’ar’s complaints against Khagya and the Gyangro 
tulku in particular. To paraphrase from Anfu and Shen’s subsequent reports to the 
governor-general: The Sétsang lama of Terlung had previously owned a residence at 
                                                
972 QSDG (date uncertain), 7-YJ-4745: 《青海大臣為江洛稟隆哇給循化廳的札》. The amban 
noted a petition he had received from the Gyangro chiliarch reporting that on GX 01/06/29 
several hundred men from Rong’ar and Terlung had attacked and destroyed the crops. 
 
973 QSDG (GX 01/09/16, 1875-10-14), 7-YJ-2661: 《甘肅西寧府循化同知安福為會辦卡加、
隆哇案上的稟》. In total, Anfu reported that at least 125 Tibetans were killed during the course 
of resisting the Qing military expedition. 
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Khagya monastery and property in the surrounding valley. While initially relations with 
the Gyangro tulku were amicable, enmity arose between the supporters of the two lamas 
over the issue of donations. Khagya then burned the Sétsang’s residence and occupied his 
land. Rong’ar, a long-time supporter of the Sétsang lineage, with the “covert 
encouragement and support of Terlung,” had taken up the task of seeking redress, 
eventually through force, from Khagya.974 In light of this history, on the third day after 
occupying Rong’ar, the two officials gathered together the managers of the three 
monasteries to hash out a settlement to the longstanding feud according to the “Tibetan 
principles of mutual compensation (依番理互相賠償).” Moreover, “Discovering that the 
mood of the Tibetans is such that they all acclaim the principle monk of Terlung [i.e. the 
Sétsang tulku] as having always been fair and just, we therefore decided that henceforth, 
Rong’ar, Khagya, as well as upper and lower Labula (Tib. ?), shall all return to the 
administration of the principle monk of Terlung, Sétsang. In all matters Khagya shall 
consult the Sétsang lama of Terlung. Hereafter, Sétsang of Terlung shall be held 
accountable for all further instances of armed raiding or feuding.”975 Zuo Zongtang 
approved Shen Yusui’s motion that the Sétsang lama be appointed the “general 
administrator (總管)” and forwarded his recommendation to the capital in a memorial 
dated to October 26, 1875 (GX 01/09/28).976  
                                                
974 QSDG (GX 01/09/16, 1875-10-14), 7-YJ-2661: 《甘肅西寧府循化同知安福為會辦卡加、
隆哇案上的稟》. This information is also related in the report composed by Shen Yusui (see 
note 108). 
 
975 QSDG (lacking date), 7-YJ-2663: 《河州鎮為會辦卡加隆哇番案上陝甘總督左的稟》. The 
same passage can be also found in Anfu’s report dated GX 01/09/16 (see note 107). 
 
976 Zuo Wenxiang (Zongtang) quanji (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1979): vol. 4, 1884-1885. This 
was duly approved the following month. See: Dezong shilu, 19: 305. 
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  Assessment 
 
The decision of Anfu and Shen Yusui to appoint the Sétsang lama as the “General 
Administrator” of Terlung, Rong’ar, and Khagya represented a very different outcome 
than the one anticipated by the Gyangro chiliarch and the manager of his estate when 
they first filed suit in 1873. Instead of regaining control of the three villages of Menlung, 
Xiangka, and Tangkar, the Khagya headmen found themselves abruptly placed under the 
supervision of the Sétsang lama, with whose allies in Terlung and Rong’ar they had been 
feuding since 1866, if not earlier. This transpired despite a seemingly highly effective 
campaign of suits and petitions to the local subprefect up to the governor-general and a 
host of offices in between. Unlike the Rong’ar headman, who attempted to evade the 
Qing system of jurisprudence altogether and forcefully chose not to present his side of the 
case when given the opportunity, Gyangro’s aggressive use of petitions enabled him to 
successfully shape Qing interpretations of the case right down to the execution of the 
Rong’ar honpo. Khagya’s petitions, once received by the subprefect or higher-ranking 
provincial officials such as Zuo Zongtang were extensively quoted in their subsequent 
communications and thus reverberated through the provincial bureaucracy. Khagya was 
particularly effective at dominating the official transcript following Rong’ar’s attack on 
the monastery in the spring of 1875. For instance, a letter from the Xining circuit 
intendant to the Hezhou garrison commander and Xunhua subprefect dated May 20, 1875, 
drew its understanding of recent events entirely from Khagya’s petitions. Thus the 
Gyangro’s cultivated self-image as an obedient and law-abiding servant of the dynasty 
victimized by an insatiable tyrant who threatened the peace and stability of the entire 
frontier by default received the imprimatur of the dynasty’s highest ranking officials in 
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Gansu. The detail about rescuing Zuo Zongtang’s memorial tablet from the ashes appears 
to have been particularly effective. The destruction of the tablet was a personal affront to 
the governor-general that officials could not and did not ignore. This tidbit was even 
present in discussions of the conflict after April of 1875. Moreover, the Gyangro tulku 
repeatedly and effectively masked his desire to control a particular territory as a request 
for Qing sovereignty. What was at stake, he informed the Qing, was the dynasty’s own 
writ, so they had better come and “take charge (作主).” 
Only fifteen years later did Qing administrators learn a possible reason behind the 
Gyangro manager’s fluency with the Qing legal system. In 1888, a reincarnate monk and 
abbot from Terlung (not the Sétsang tulku) reported that the Gyangro’s manager was not 
in fact “Tibetan (番),” but rather a “Chinese monk (漢僧)” from Hezhou who had found 
refuge at Khagya monastery during the Muslim rebellions. On account of his profession 
he was welcomed and, “because he took over the task of leading troops and knew 
Chinese, he was appointed manager.”977 The abbot from Terlung blamed the new 
“Chinese” manager for the subsequent feuds that had arisen between Khagya and its 
neighbors and for the subsequent litigiousness of the monastery. He requested, therefore, 
that, “Han who reside among Tibetans return to their native places and be forbidden from 
remaining in Tibetan territory.”978 While one might interpret this statement as a reflecting 
a desire that Tibetan regions remain ethnically exclusive, it is more likely that the petition 
was prompted by a straightforward wish to disarm Khagya of one of its most formidable 
weapons: its legal expertise. 
                                                
977 QSDG (GX 14/05, 1888-6), 7-YJ-2687: 《札咱法台為遭驅逐上的稟》. This petition was 
submitted by a certain Zhazan abbot, whom remains to be positively identified in Tibetan. 
 
978 Ibid. “現將駐番汗民飭歸本籍，不容番地留止等情。” 
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The Rong’ar headman was perhaps damned by his silence. Although it is 
unknown what lessons other local elites drew from his misfortune, the archival record 
reveals that in subsequent cases it was very unusual to not hear from both/multiple sides. 
To the extent that certain litigants might pursue tactics of evasion or delay, it was rare for 
them not to submit petitions or statements to investigating clerks from the subprefect’s 
yamen. Buy why did the Qing abruptly decide to establish a “general administration” 
under the Sétsang lama? 
In a recent article on this subject, Yang Hongwei has argued that the decision was 
motivated by a desire to blunt the expansion of Labrang monastery. Citing the close 
historical ties between the Gyangro reincarnation lineage and Labrang monastery—the 
fourth generation (1773-1850) and fifth generation (1851-1928) Gyangro tulkus had both 
been educated at Labrang and the fourth had even served as its abbot, he posits that the 
move was designed to arrest, for the time being, any further deepening of ties between 
the two monasteries.979 Yang’s argument rests on quotations from assessements of the 
case made by a subsequent Xunhua subprefect in 1891. 980  The 1891 statement 
demonstrates that Qing officials thought of themselves as engaged in a systematic 
program of containment. However, while the sentiments expressed in this statement are 
quite representative of official reports on Tibetan affairs in the 1890s, the archival record 
from 1873-1875 contains no such language. In fact there is no mention of Labrang in any 
context related the Khagya-Rong’ar conflict. The silence of the official record concerning 
                                                
979 Yang Hongwei, “Shagou zongguan shezhi yu qingdai xunhuating suo xia zangqu zuqun 
zhengce (The establishment of the Shagou zongguan and ethnic policies in the Tibetan regions of 
Xunhua subprefecture during the Qing period),” Shixue yuekan 12 (2012): 62. 
 
980 Yang Hongwei (2012), 61. QSDG (GX 17/10/03, 1891-11-04), 7-YJ-2985: 《循化廳為番僧
調查卡家一案給憲台的詳報》. 
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Labrang and any possible connections it might have had to either the Gyangro tulku or 
the Khagya community more broadly is all the more remarkable because Labrang was 
very much in the official eye from the fall of 1874 through the summer of 1875. During 
this period Labrang and Rongwo were openly engaged in armed hostilities in which both 
the Xunhua subprefect and the Qinghai amban also attempted mediation.981  
While Yang’s interpretation cannot be entirely disallowed, in their reports to 
superiors, Anfu and Shen Yusui present their course of action not as a strategic move but 
rather as a seemingly workable expedient: They had become appraised that the Sétsang 
had historical ties to the monastery and, perhaps more importantly, their consultations 
with managers from all three of the monasteries involved affirmed the acceptability of the 
third Sétsang lama. That Qing officials abruptly turned to the Sétsang lama in 1875 was 
no coincidence. According to modern Tibetan sources, only a year earlier, in the winter 
of 1873-1874 the lama had finally returned to his home monastery after well over a 
decade of sojourning among Tibetan Buddhist communities elsewhere in the empire. 
Moreover, the kūtuktu was a known figure from the official perspective. He had a history 
of service to the Qing court (he had been present at the wedding of the Tongzhi emperor 
in 1872) as well as within the Ganden Podrang government in Lhasa, and officials in the 
provincial capital had feted his return to Gansu.982 The appointment of this lama as the 
“general administrator” of this broad swath of territory in Xunhua subprefecture was 
therefore an obvious choice.  
                                                
981 See for instance the following document for an account of a particularly successful raid on 
Rongwo by forces from Labrang: QSDG (TZ 13/10/14) 6-YJ-187: 《隆務寺為所屬被拉卜楞寺
番子搶劫上循化廳的稟》. 
 
982 Zhou Ta and Chen Xiaoqiang, De’erlong si yu libei saicang huofo, 66. 
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As in the case of the Gyangro tulku in 1873, the appointment of the Sétsang lama 
to the position of zongguan entailed more than just the recognition of the status quo 
political situation. On the contrary, in each instance, the appointment of a tulku to 
political rule resulted in the articulation of political claims that were highly controversial 
and exposed underlying tensions over the interpretation of the complex relationships that 
entwined monks and their lay supporters and, at a larger scale, monasteries to other 
monasteries. Such tensions and their resulting conflicts predated the Qing administration 
(as demonstrated by the origins of the feud between Tsö and Labrang). But the Qing 
administrative apparatus provided a new forum (the yamen) in which to contest the 
meanings of these relationships. As for the Gyangro and Sétsang lamas in 1873 and 1875, 
their confirmation as political “headmen” by the Qing forced moments of reckoning. The 
communities of Menlung, Tangkar, and Xiangka, for instance, had over time 
accumulated a variety of obligations to reincarnate monks affiliated with Khagya 
monastery, most importantly the Gyangro and Sétsang lineages. In 1873, however, the 
Gyangro tulku repeatedly and quite successfully made the argument that his routine 
receipt of goods from places such Menlung was evidence of an exclusive political 
relationship.983 The detailed nature of the agreement that was temporarily accepted in 
1874 is a reflection of the degree to which it had become necessary to carefully document 
each relationship (such as water exchanges and labor service during the Monlam festival) 
and interpret its political implications. In approving the establishment of the Sétsang lama 
as zongguan of Khagya three years later, Zuo Zongtang and subsequently the Qing court 
implicitly (if not explicitly) accepted the argument that the historical existence of the 
                                                
983 With regards to Gyangro’s claim to Menlung, see: QSDG (TZ 13/11) 6-YJ-350: 《卡加寺千
戶捏力哇為隆哇抗頑不遵官命呈循化廳新任同知的稟》. 
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Sétsang lama’s estate at Khagya legitimated his political supervision. The appointment of 
Sétsang also implied a hierarchy of patronage relationships: the relationship between lay 
people in Khagya to Sétsang took priority to their relationship to Gyangro. 
The Qing knew that the 1875 resolution of the Khagya-Rong’ar conflict was 
tenuous at best. Moreover, the Sétsang lama had also been the lynchpin in working out 
peace between Rongwo, the Henan Mongols, and Labrang since returning to Amdo. 
Therefore, when the Sétsang lama passed away 1877, the Qinghai amban put his officials 
on alert.984 Sure enough, just eight days later the subprefect was issuing orders to his 
runners to investigate reports from Khagya that they had been raided by men from 
Terlung and Rong’ar.985 Two months later, an elder from Khagya reported six people 
killed by raiders from Terlung and Rong’ar and demanded the subprefect “take charge” 
and investigate the case.986 By the next year, the magistrate was receiving reports (again 
via the governor-general) from Khagya that over a thousand armed men from Terlung 
and Rong’ar had gone on the offensive and killed several people, including a chiliarch 
allied to Khagya.987 Not to be out litigated or underrepresented, this time Terlung also 
submitted petitions to Xunhua stating the righteousness of their actions under Qing law. 
They explained that according to the “royal statutes (王章)” (i.e., the 1875 settlement), 
                                                
984 QSDG (GX 03/06/04, 1877-07-14), 7-YJ-2665: 《青海大臣豫為蒙番爭鬥給循化廳的批》. 
Zhou Ta and Chen Xiaoqiang provide a different date for the death of the third Sétsang lama. 
They write that he departed Amdo in 1877 and died in Alashan in 1879 (67). 
 
985 QSDG (GX 03/06/12), 7-YJ-3131: 《循化廳飭差查辦南番卡加與沙溝事》. 
 
986 QSDG (GX 03/08/05), 7-YJ-3131: 《卡加為受隆哇、沙溝攻打懇恩作主事》. 
 
987 QSDG (GX 04/01/17), 7-YJ-2670: 《陝甘總督為查辦隆哇、卡家番案的札》. 
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they had attempted to exercise their right to appoint monks as overseers at Khagya, yet 
these monks had been harassed and had been unable to conduct their affairs.988  
Adjudication was protracted and often violent. In May of 1878, in the presence of 
three companies of cavalry from Hezhou lead again by Ma Zhan’ao, and under the 
supervision of the subprefect and the garrison commander, unidentified “village elders” 
worked out a framework for Terlung to compensate Khagya for the murders. However, 
the implementation of the settlement proved problematic as Terlung dragged their feet on 
making the repayments. Meanwhile, the magistrate struggled to persuade Khagya to 
respect the manager from Terlung. When Terlung failed to completely compensate 
Khagya within the time allotted by the 1878 agreement, Khagya took matters into its own 
hands, attacking Terlung monastery in April of 1879. Khagya seems to have extracted a 
calculated toll from Terlung, killing just two and ensuring that the overall balance of dead 
still held in their favor. Finally, in May and June a veritable host of “Tibetan and Han 
village elders (番漢鄉老)” including the manager from Tsö monastery and shifting list of 
“Han” who were all clearly Muslims,989 signed their names to a series of pledges that 
resulted in a comprehensive program of compensation between the warring parties (in the 
balance, Khagya gained from the transaction).990  
                                                
988 QSDG (GX 04/04/02, 1878-05-03), 7-YJ-3135:  《覆懇稟僧隆務昂鎖、沙溝寺捏力娃稟卡
加搶殺事》. 
 
989 For example, among the witnesses who signed the pledges on GX 05/04/03 were: “番漢鄉老
人馬連喜、馬海隆、馬進忠、馬福望、黑錯捏力哇、阿群佛爺、馬仲有、辛六十保.”  
 
990 QSDG (GX 05/04/03, 1879-5-23), 7-YJ-2676: 《沙溝所立永遠和氣字據》, 《卡加為與沙
溝和解所立字據》. QSDG (GX 05/05/08, 1879-6-27), 7-YJ-2676: 《番漢鄉老為解說調節經
過上的稟》.  QSDG (GX 05/05/09) 7-YJ-2676:《沙溝、卡加所具結案甘結》. 
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The final settlement(s) contained no reference to the friction arising from the fact 
that, since 1875 Khagya monastery had in effect two masters: The Sétsang lama and 
subsequently the manager of his estate, and the Gyangro chiliarch/tulku. According to a 
remarkably frank analysis of his community’s relationship to the Sétsang lama written 
around 1890, the manager of the Gyangro estate explained to Qing officials that, in 
practice, in accordance with the principle that “each monastery should govern itself,” the 
Gyangro tulku/chiliarch remained de-facto in charge of affairs in-and-around Khagya 
monastery. The manager recognized, however, the Qing-accorded authority of the 
Sétsang estate to overall supervision, especially with regard to major matters involving 
Khagya and outside communities, and also continued to raise revenue from its own 
estates in Khagya. Yet the Terlung manager had little permanent administrative apparatus 
in Khagya.991 Under this modus operandi, peace held for a decade. This arrangement 
began to fray, however, in the late 1880s after the fourth Sétsang tulku died prematurely 
at the age of nine in 1886. The lack of an adult Sétsang lama to inhabit the role of general 
administrator exposed the institution—and the accord that had established it—to 
increasingly diverse and incompatible interpretations among the partisans of the Sétsang 
estate at Terlung monastery and partisans of the Gyangro tulku/Khagya chiliarch.  
 
Case Study Three: Mass Mobilization and Mass Litigation, 1889-1891  
 
  
From 1889 through 1891, the Tibetan regions of Xunhua and Taozhou 
subprefectures experienced a paroxysm of generalized conflict on an unprecedented 
                                                
991 QSDG (undated, probably GX 16), 7-YJ-2678: 《卡家江洛捏力哇格勒漢堅相錯供稱與歲
倉關係 》. 
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scale. The way in which litigants and Qing officials discussed the violence and the 
reasons behind it was also distinct—at least in comparison to the feuds of the late 
Tongzhi and early Guangxu reigns. As argued in the previous section, Xunhua was 
certainly not conflict free in the aftermath of the Muslim Rebellions, but disputes like the 
one between Khagya, Rong’ar and Terlung, or between Tibetans from Repgong and the 
domains of the Khoshot Mongol princes to the southwest were handled without reference 
to the idea that the region was split between two grand confederations. In 1889, feuds that 
began in Terlung and Khagya, were quickly discussed by both Tibetans and Qing 
officials for indications of machinations by “great powers”—either Labrang monastery or 
the triumvirate of Rongwo, Tsö, and Terlung monasteries.  
As discussed above, alliances between monasteries and, perhaps more aptly, 
reincarnate lineages, had begun to form during the late eighteenth century as conflicts 
stemming from the controversy over the reincarnation of the first Jamyang Zhepa began 
to split Labrang from Terlung and Tsö monasteries. Litigation before Qing magistrates 
further formalized and shaped this schism when it resulted in written “decisions (斷, or 
硃判)” or “articles (章程):” in 1790, the Qing had prevented Labrang from appointing 
further abbots at Tsö, in 1807 Nayanceng delegated the governance of all the “western 
Tibetans” to Rongwo,992 and in 1846 provincial officials placed Tsö formally under the 
supervision of Rongwo. The Qing official practice of requesting well-respected monks 
and/or lay “elders” to mediate disputes in other communities brought further “structure” 
to inter-community relations, helping to transform informal affiliations into formal 
alliances. In 1873, for instance, the Qing officials acknowledged no formal political 
                                                
992 Nayanceng, “會同寧夏將軍興公奎、陝甘總督長公齡奏為籌議西寧善後章程” (JQ 
12/09/12, 1807-10-12), reproduced in Song Tingsheng, Nayancheng pingfan zouyi, 68.    
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hierarchy between Rongwo and disputants in Khagya and Rong’ar, yet the repeated 
Qing-sanctioned involvement of the Rongwo nangso and tulku from Tsö in the ongoing 
Khagya-Rong’ar-Terlung feuds established patterns of informal oversight that were cited 
as evidence for formal, state-sanctioned alliances in the 1880s. Yet there were 
countervailing developments that helped maintain networks of patronage, pilgrimage, 
study, and commerce among the Gelukpa monasteries of Xunhua. For instance, the third 
Jamyang Zhepa was born to the family of the leading reincarnation of Rongwo 
monastery. The oft-cited principle that “each monastery should govern only itself” also 
seems to have preserved the ability of smaller monasteries/communities to retain ties to a 
variety of different monasteries (case in point: Khagya monastery from 1875-1889).  
However, in documents from the late 1880s on, the meaning of ge guan ge si (各
管各寺) seems to have been more consistently interpreted as “each monastery shall 
govern its own monasteries.”  Locals and colonial officials shared the conviction that all 
communities in Xunhua belonged either to Labrang or Rongwo. According to the 
Shartsang Rinpoché of Rongwo monastery, the notion that monasteries, monks, and lay 
communities could exist somehow outside these two confederations was an absurdity. In 
a letter to the Xunhua subprefect in 1889, the Rongwo nangso wrote: 
 
 
Labrang is no different from the royal [Qing] law, it possesses its own 
jailers and indiscriminately detains Tibetans, Han and Hui. The fact that 
Tibetans from all over become his tax paying subjects and do his bidding 
is simply a matter of making vassals (栓頭) out of the poor and weak. 
 
Everywhere [Labrang] goes it purchases commoners with cash. If there is 
no royal law, the poor and desperate will seek out his money and become 
his subjects. Your royal law not only does not govern him, but it is said 
that all his instruments of torture and coercion are permitted under the 
royal law!  My Rongwo monastery is just like your Labrang. We also 
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possess three thousand lamas and ourselves supervise numerous headmen. 
And just like your Labrang, I will also take matters into my own hands.993   
 
Couched in sarcastic derision of the Qing and the usurpation of imperial 
prerogatives by Labrang, the Rongwo nangso hereby warned the Xunhua subprefect that 
in the absence of imperial power (王法), the region was fast being carved into two 
opposing camps. According to the nangso, “everyone must serve a master, everyone is a 
vassal.” Some of the subordinates of the Repgong nangso, in a separate petition, 
described local affairs to the subprefect in much starker terms: “We're just Tibetans living 
in a dog-eat-dog world. We don’t understand the underlying principles and can only beg 
for Your Honor’s mercy.”994 Intense competition between monastic confederations led to 
heightened scrutiny of the political status of both reincarnate monks and lay 
communities. The new concern with identifying clear and exclusive lines of authority 
between subjects and rulers of monastic domains is marked in the archival record by the 
emergence of a new term to describe this relationship, “shuantou (栓頭／拴頭).” This 
term, unique to the legal discourse of Xunhua subprefecture from the 1880s-on, functions 
as both noun and verb, meaning, respectively “vassalage” (as in “栓頭關係”) and “to 
                                                
993 QSDG (GX 15/08/29), 7-YJ-4535: 《沙力倉昂鎖等為拉卜楞私設監獄上循化廳的
稟》: “沙力倉昂鎖等在命主大老爺上具的稟，拉卜楞與王法一樣，做有監獄者哩，
將番漢回俱都禁押者哩。各處番子隨他當百姓納糧派差事的話，弱人大家栓頭哩，
各處給銀錢買百姓哩。若莫有王法，是各貧人圖他的銀錢者，成他的百姓哩。你們
王法亦不管他，說各樣刑具是王法們准哈這哩，我隆務寺，你拉布塄一樣這哩，我
也有三千喇嘛哩，也管的頭人多，我照你拉布塄也要有行事的，求施恩。”  
 
994 QSDG (GX 09), 7-YJ-2729: 《勒工十二族頭人等所供案情》:“ 小的們是番子，狗咬狗
的，不懂理性哩，求施恩哩。” Note the use of the character li (哩). It marks the Tibetan verb 
“ré” (“to be,” “is,” “yes,” Tib. red) that is used at the end of many speech patterns in colloquial 
Amdo Tibetan. The use of this character indicates that the statement is transcribed from an oral 
testimony. It simultaneously serves to denote the difference of Tibetans and Tibetan language 
from the Han.  
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make a vassal” (see for instance the above quote from the Rongwo nangso). It is also has 
profoundly negative connotations. 995  In most usages, to “shuantou” is to illegally 
subjugate individuals and communities for nefarious purposes. In the context of 
identifying and disputing the status of vassals, acts such as pilgrimage and almsgiving, 
participating in festivals, studying at neighboring monasteries and bonds of discipleship, 
were scanned for signs of shuantou. It was precisely in this politicization of religious 
activities and relationships that the litigation and violence of 1889-1891 originated.  
 
Round One, 1889: “A Man Cannot Serve Two Masters” 
 
According to the Terlung zongguan, who at the time was also the overall manager 
(Tib. gnyer les pa, 捏力哇) of the Sétsang kūtuktu’s estate,996 the trouble began with the 
honpo (“headman,” Tib. dpon po, Ch. 紅布) of the hamlet of Dangang (Tib. ?, Ch. 旦剛,
當剛, 丹果庄, 登果庄).997 The zongguan claimed the Dangang community as belonging 
to Terlung and that the headman had been induced with the promise of much financial 
reward to shuantou his community to the Jamyang Zhepa: “The Gyangro manager and 
the Dangang honpo [along with several other local leaders, including Pöntsang Lumogya] 
decided to sell the subjects of Sigou [寺溝, a place name] to Labrang and had received a 
                                                
995 These connotations may stem from the root usage of the character shuan (拴): “to fasten” or 
“tie down,” usually used in Gansu to refer to tying down pack animals or attaching draft oxen to 
ploughs. “栓” and “拴” seem to be used interchangeably in official documents. 
 
996 The fourth generation Sétsang lama had just recently passed away at the age of eight the year 
earlier (1888). The fifth Sétsang Lama (1889-1936) was perhaps not even born yet when the crisis 
began. 
 
997 In the archival documents, “Dangang” alternately refers to the hamlet of which the honpo was 
in charge or is used as the personal name of the honpo. 
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lot of money. When Dangang tried to present his uncle Qilao [七老] with a portion of the 
money, the latter man was unwilling to accept it. Therefore [Dangang] killed him.”998  
Runners from the Xunhua subprefect’s yamen confirmed parts of this story and 
added further details: “According to the report of a xiejia named Mama’erli (馬麻二力), 
the Khagya manager avariciously accepted bribes from Labrang and mischievously 
persuaded the headman of Qiexiantan [且先灘, i.e. Dangang] to lead his subjects (百姓) 
to submit to Labrang. He also convinced the woman headman of Wangga’tan (汪尕灘) to 
submit half of her subjects to Labrang. This resulted in Terlung mobilizing its troops and 
killing the Qiexiantan headman Dangang, torching his home, burning to death his wife, 
and murdering of two of their servants. At this, the Gyangro manager called up troops 
from Labrang and led them through Terlung to Nanmula [elsewhere “Labula”] where 
they killed one commoner and burned several homes. Terlung was enraged and planned 
on attacking both Qiexiantan and the female headman in Wangga’tan. However, I was 
able to convince Terlung to hold back.”999  
Matters, however, quickly escalated and spread beyond the original points of 
conflict in upper and lower Labula, a string of agricultural villages located in the valley 
of the Sangchu River between Labrang and Terlung. The xiejia noted that the Gyangro 
manager had persuaded the Jamyang Zhepa to call up a “large military force” from its 
allies at Amchok, Mewo, Bora, and Khagya.1000 Less than a month after the murder of 
Dangang on June 6, 1889 (GX 15/05/11), military forces allied to Labrang launched an 
                                                
998 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2679:《沙溝寺總管為起事緣由上的稟》. 
 
999 QSDG (GX 15/05/26), 7-YJ-2686: 《循化廳為差傳拉卜楞寺香措捏力哇事》. The name 
Mama’erli suggests that this xiejia was Hui.   
 
1000 Ibid. 
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attack on Tsö that resulted in the destruction of several hamlets on June 28 and 29 (GX 
15/05/29, GX 15/06/01).1001 Rongwo responded in kind. Forces from Terlung, Hortsang, 
and Rong’ar rushed to the defense of Tsö while Rongwo’s militia launched a direct attack 
on Labrang, arriving during the night of July 14 (GX 15/06/17).1002 As the Qinghai 
amban and the governor-general later wrote in a memorial to Beijing, “From the 29th of 
the fifth month [June 27] through the latter half of the sixth month [July], the Southern 
and Western Tibetans from near and far engaged in a spree of arson and murder along a 
three to four-hundred li front. The conflagration burned with an intensity that proved 
nearly impossible to extinguish.”1003 The fighting was only brought to an end when 
official troops from the Hezhou garrison under the command of Shen Futian (沈福田) 
arrived at Labrang and Tsö and inserted themselves between the warring parties, thus 
buying time for negotiations.1004  
According to the Rongwo nangso, who frequently spoke for Terlung and Tsö in 
subsequent litigation before provincial officials, the matter should have rested after the 
killing of Dangang. His death was justified in light of his insubordinate attempt to 
                                                
1001 At the time the Rongwo nangso accused Labrang of abducting the Serkhri lama (age 13) from 
Tsö. QSDG (GX 15/08/23), 7-YJ-4535: 《隆務沙力倉昂鎖為拉卜楞攻打黑錯上的稟》. 
 
1002 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦委員為照舊例查辦拉布塄搶殺黑錯的稟》. The losses 
suffered by Labrang during the attack were substantial. They are enumerated in great detail in: 
QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2681: 《查勘拉蔔楞被隆務等番僧焚殺搶擄大概情形》. 
 
1003 QSDG (GX 16/01), 7-YJ-2965: 《陝甘總督楊、青海大臣薩為查明寺院構釁械鬥情形 
彈壓解散按照番例斷結恭折》. 
 
1004 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為各處均已退兵上的稟》. Tsö later thanked the 
governor-general for dispatching troops and claimed that they had arrived just in time to prevent 
“20,000 troops from Labrang” from destroying them. They also described how they organized the 
escape of the young Serkhri incarnation to Choné. See: QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2689: 《黑錯寺給
陝甘總督的謝恩稟》. 
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shuantou his people to Labrang. Therefore, the matter was really an internal one: “Their 
killing one of their own men is a matter with which Labrang had no right to interfere.”1005 
The Shartsang nangso of Repgong and the monks of Rongwo monastery portrayed the 
whole affair as stemming from the hegemonic desires of the Jamyang Zhepa: “That 
Jamyang Zhepa of Labrang may be a lama who knows his scriptures, but he isn't the lord 
of all places.”1006 In a separate letter to the governor-general, they then called for his 
arrest and punishment: 
The Jamyang of Labrang has been specially designated a living Buddha 
whose merit-making and recitation of scriptures blesses and protects those 
of all directions. Yet in order to take possession of monasteries 
subordinate to the Sétsang lama and the people of the Dangang headman, 
he mobilized the military strength of Bora, Amchok, and upper and lower 
Sangke and on June 27 attacked Zögé Geshi tribe, killing many 
people…[Several additional crimes are listed.] In this way Labrang 
ignores the royal law and brings disaster to the common people. As for the 
truth of these matters, just ask your local tax-collecting officials who know 
all about it… We dare to guarantee that in the region of Rongwo of 
Repkong there are no bandits. If the government can find any, you may 
harshly punish them in accordance with official statutes. Labrang, 
however, pays no heed to the royal law and I hope that Your Honor the 
Governor-General will judge this clearly. We only hope that Labrang will 
abide by the law and not oppress our weak tribes. How could we not obey 
the principles of the government's commands? We only hope that the 
governor-general will arrest the Jamyang Zhepa [and other Tibetan rulers], 
bring them to account for their crimes and return the ten tribes of Terlung 
and Rongwo to us Repgong. Thus we obey all your commands and will 
not trespass on our oaths.1007  
                                                
1005 QSDG (GX 15/08/23), 7-YJ-4755: 《隆務沙力倉工拭卜等所供旦剛紅布被殺及衝突事》. 
Accusation from Rongwo. 
 
1006 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ 4545: 《隆務沙力倉昂鎖控告拉布塄似的稟》: “拉卜塄寺加木樣，
他不過是個念經的喇嘛，他不是各地方的主子。” 
 
1007 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-4542: 《隆務寺為受拉卜楞寺襲擊上陝甘總督的稟》. For further 
petitions from the Rongwo-Terlung faction, see: QSDG (GX 15/07/10), 7-YJ-4544: 《隆務寺沙
⼒力倉昂鎖為出兵事上的稟》(Concerns Rongwo’s justifications for use of military force against 
Labrang); QSDG (GX 15/08/17), 7-YJ-4534: 《隆務寺昂鎖等因不滿官府處理上的告假稟》
(Here, the Rongwo nangso disparage the local Qing officials for what they perceive as inept 
handling of the case so far.). For a petition from Tsö accusing the Qing officials of having 
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The Dangang honpo’s view of this matter was unfortunately silenced before it 
could enter the official record. The “headwoman” of Wangga’tan, Pöntsang Lumogya 
(Tib. dpon tshang klu mo rgyal?, 還倉錄毛加/ 利毛加), however, along with “no small 
number of supporters,” had escaped to Labrang and survived to present their case to the 
magistrates.1008 Lumogya and her supporters filed at least three briefs with the committee 
of Qing officials delegated to adjudicate the dispute. In all three, they forcefully asserted 
the rightful independence of her community from the Sétsang estate and the Terlung 
zongguan. Lumogya stated that she was descended from a continuous line of lay rulers 
and that if the community was to be considered subject to any monastery or tulku’s 
estate, it would be to their own two monasteries (Tib. ?, 郭芒札倉/果拉寺 or 南拉貢色
寺/拉不拉寺) and the A-qiong tulku (Tib. A skyong?, 阿琼活佛/喇嘛阿群). Other than 
requesting prayers or divinations from the Sétsang lama, her people “had not become his 
vassals (拴頭).”1009 In one of the petitions, Lumogya and her co-petitioners wrote, “There 
has been only one honpo here and certainly none of your royal law!1010 This manager [i.e. 
the zongguan] acts as if he is even more important than you officials! [His claims] are 
                                                                                                                                            
double-standards when it came to dealing with Labrang, see QSDG (GX 15/08/15), 7-YJ-4534: 
《黑錯稟控拉卜楞寺欺壓》. 
 
1008 Yu Kuilong, a member of committee delegated with the task of resolving the conflict reported 
that Lumogya had gone into hiding at Labrang, which “she relies on as if it was Mount Tai.” See: 
QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-4503: 《委員余魁龍給循化廳同知的函》. 
 
1009 Interestingly, the A-qun lama cited by Lumogya himself submitted a statement to the Qing 
adjudicators arguing that he was in fact subordinate to Terlung. See: QSDG (GX 15/07/18), 7-YJ-
2679: 《阿郡⾺馬喇嘛等為拉⼘卜拉與拉⼘卜楞無⼲干上的稟》. 
 
1010 By this phrase she means to complain that Qing officials have not sufficiently restrained the 
leaders of Terlung. 
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new roads [i.e. unprecedented]. According to the old rules, we’ve had successive 
generations of our own honpo and when the lay people had problems, it was our honpo 
who dealt with them. Terlung had nothing to do with it.”1011 Lumogya concluded her own 
deposition by clarifying the nature of her relationship to Labrang and Rongwo:  
According to the historical statutes, Rongwo has no authority over any 
matter large or small, as these matters are the prerogative of the headmen. 
Monasteries are just monasteries. They are places we travel to worship, 
offer tea, and recite sutras. This is not my first time to make a pilgrimage 
to Labrang. How can you tell me that prostrating before the Buddha is a 
bad thing?  I have been coming to the monastery to worship the Buddha 
and make offerings for many years, along with all those other Tibetans (藏
民!) who consider Lhasa, Kumbum and Labrang to be holy places of 
pilgrimage. This is simply established custom.1012 
 
Representatives of the Sétsang lamas estates, she thus argued, had grossly 
misconstrued not only the nature of her community’s relationship to the Sétsang lama, 
but also to Labrang and the Jamyang Zhepa. They currently resided at Labrang, she 
petitioned, because it had become unsafe to remain in their homes. She and her fellow 
petitioners hoped that “in your investigations, you Chinese officials (漢官) can accurately 
understand the matter.”1013 
                                                
1011 QSDG (GX 15/09/02), 7-YJ-4544: 《還倉錄毛加並眾人等在各委員大人、循化大老爺上
具的稟》. 
 
1012 QSDG (GX 15), 7-4542: 《利毛加等為受隆務欺淩上的稟》: “我不是初次到拉卜楞朝拜，
如果說叩頭拜佛也是壞事，那我到寺院朝拜獻茶由來已久，拉薩、塔爾寺、拉卜楞寺是我
全體藏民朝拜的聖地，這是老規矩了。” 
 
1013 Ibid. 
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The statements above are drawn largely from petitions (稟) collected by the 
Xunhua subprefect Cangyun (長贇, served 1886-1894) and Zhang Shixi (張時熙)1014 
after their arrival at Labrang in July (GX 15/06/04, 1889-7-1). Over the next several 
months the committee of Qing officials held court first at Labrang and subsequently in 
the subprefectural yamen in order to adjudicate the status of Dangang, Wangga’tang, and 
a handful of other communities or individual “tea-service tenant households” (Ch. 熬茶
佃戶). In addition to the testimony of Lumogya and elders from her community, the two 
magistrates also met with the Jamyang Zhepa, the steward, and other members of the 
monastery’s governing assembly.1015 According to a subsequent report from Cangyun, 
the Jamyang Zhepa held a formal audience with the Qing officials at noon on July 2, in 
the main prayer hall of the monastery. The kūtuktu was seated on his primary throne 
while the Qing officials were arranged formally before him in rows to the left and right 
(lit. “to the east and west”). The monk then produced several Tibetan-language 
documents written on yellow silk issued by successive Dalai Lamas and the Changkya 
kūtuktus during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong reigns. Of these, the subprefect 
                                                
1014 Zhang Shixi appears to have been a magistrate-in waiting (候補知縣). The archives of the 
Xunhua subprefecture reveal numerous situations in which officials-in-waiting (候補官) were 
appointed to committees (委員會) tasked with investigating and adjudicating conflicts in Xunhua 
and Qinghai. It seems that successive governor-generals maintained large staffs of “officials-in-
waiting” in Lanzhou and relied heavily on them for dealing with frontier issues and coordinating 
between the military garrisons in Hezhou and Xining. Several of the officials who performed 
“committee work” in Xunhua subsequently garnered actual posts as district magistrates, Xining 
prefect, or Xining circuit intendant. The right to appoint officials in Xunhua, Guide, Taozhou and 
other subprefectures on the Sino-Tibetan frontier was held by the Xining amban and governor-
general of Shaanxi and Gansu, not by the Board of Civil Appointments in Beijing. For further 
information on the roots and expansion of appointment prerogatives, see:, R. Kent Guy, Qing 
Governors and their Provinces (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010).     
 
1015 According to some reports, the Jamyang Zhepa was not in residence at Labrang when the 
violence first began, rather he was itinerating in the Mongol territories. It appears that he returned 
to the monastery at about the same time as the Qing officials arrived. 
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noted that the second and third documents had been issued by the Changkya Kutuktu and 
recognized Labrang’s control over Hortsang, Tsö, Khagya, Terlung, parts of Bayanrong 
subprefecture (north of the Yellow River across from Xunhua), as well as “a large 
number of territories in Sichuan, Tibet, Taozhou, and Minzhou.” Cangyun noted that 
these were the documents that had previously surfaced when the Qing adjudicated the 
Tsö-Labrang conflict in 1790: “These were items that had never been handed over when 
the former governor-general had requested that the Qinghai amban close the case. And 
that monastery has continuously considered them to be sacred objects.”1016  The Jamyang 
Zhepa also presented as evidence a document originally composed by Xie Huan, the 
provisional subprefect in 1777 who, as can be recalled from the gazetteer, had acted in 
favor of Labrang. Much like the certificates from the Changkya Kūtuktu, Cangyun notes 
that this document also, “after 1790 should have been handed over for annulment yet had 
not been.” The fourth Jamyang Zhepa was able to provide one further Jiaqing-period (JQ 
20, 1815) certificate issued by the Xunhua subprefect and two local military officers 
stating that Terlung, Rong’ar, and Khagya all belonged to Labrang. However, Cangyun 
dismissed the document since it lacked official rescripts. He wondered:  
If this is really an official decision, there should be a record on file. How 
could it only be preserved in the hands of this monk? Moreover, it also 
lacks any official stamp and has contains no mark of the governor-general. 
With just a glance one can tell that it is inadmissible as evidence. However, 
[the Jamyang Zhepa] considers it a treasured possession and if I alone 
were to point out that it is nothing but waste paper, he would have become 
deeply embittered and it would have been impossible to set him at ease. 
                                                
1016 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦番案委員等為赴拉布塄查辦情形上的稟》. It is 
possible that the Jamyang Zhepa also submitted a written attestation of these claims at this time. 
See: QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-4643: 《拉卜楞寺為黑錯族屬上的稟》. The Jamyang Zhepa is 
quite straightforward in this petition, stating, “ This year, since it was determined that [the people 
of] Tsö were still my tribes, I punished them.” 
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Therefore I ordered my accompanying secretary to carefully transcribe 
each document and I have submitted them to you for further appraisal.1017 
 
The subprefect continued his description of the audience by reporting that he 
confronted the monk with the partiality of its position and records. “[I] asked why it was 
that despite the possession of the document from 1777, they had not administered Tsö 
monastery.”  To this, the Jamyang Zhepa responded by accusing Terlung of violently 
expropriating territory from Labrang. The subprefect then reported that he had reminded 
the monk that Labrang had not been the only victim of violence: “Not only has your 
monastery, on the basis of waste paper accumulated over many years seized the land and 
subjects of others, you have also purposely committed arson and murder at Tsö 
monastery. Are you the only one without guilt?!”1018  Furthermore, he pointed out that the 
Jamyang Zhepa had been “not more than three or four postal stations from the monastery” 
and thus would have been well informed about the attack launched by Labrang on Tsö. 
The Jamyang Zhepa replied that he had indeed been in contact with the monastery 
throughout the violence, but had “not expected the troublemaking to rise to the degree 
that it did.”1019 Cangyun concluded the report by noting that despite the Jamyang Zhepa’s 
concerns that the Qing was not partial either in this case, he had been persuaded that the 
committee of Qing officials offered the most promising forum for a fair hearing: “The 
Jamyang Zhepa said, ‘With regards to this case I request that your Honors take charge 
                                                
1017 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦番案委員等為赴拉布塄查辦情形上的稟》. 
 
1018 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦番案委員等為赴拉布塄查辦情形上的稟》. 
 
1019 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦番案委員等為赴拉布塄查辦情形上的稟》. 
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and I will necessarily observe the decision. After Rongwo has presented its case, we will 
also come to court.’”1020  
Of course, this letter is not a verbatim stenograph of the meeting with the 
Jamyang Zhepa. However, although Cangyun reconstructed this transcript of this 
“interrogation” of the Jamyang Zhepa for the benefit of the governor-general and, it 
might be added, his own career, the letter does reveal that Labrang did possess an archive 
of Qing documents and was prepared to muster them in defense of its claims. Labrang 
ultimately did submit several petitions stating its claim to Tsö and other contested 
territories that have been preserved in the archival record.1021 This report, as well as 
several others from the same period, also reveals the centrality of the 1791 Xunhua 
Gazetteer to Qing official understandings of Tibetan and Mongol affairs in Xunhua.  
The subprefect reported that they brought with them what official documents they 
could find that might shed light on the political arrangements of Labrang and its 
neighbors. Perhaps because the subprefecture lacked archival sources from prior to the 
Muslim rebellions, for Cangyun and Zhang Shixi, the authoritative record was Gong 
Jinghan’s Xunhua Gazetteer, which Zhang brought with him in his luggage.1022 Upon 
arrival at Labrang one of the first acts of the investigating officials was to read aloud the 
                                                
1020 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦番案委員等為赴拉布塄查辦情形上的稟》. 
 
1021 See for instance: QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2678: 《拉⼘卜楞寺為⿊黑錯族屬上的稟》.  In this 
document the petitioners from Labrang cite several Qing decisions (QL 37, 42) as evidence of 
prior Qing sanction of their claims. With regards to the Jiaqing-era decision to pass the 
supervision of Tsö to Rongwo, they write: “During the Jiaqing reign the four valleys of Tsö again 
changed their allegiance, this time going to Rongwo in Bao’an. After this official troops again 
arrived and after learning of [Tsö’s] error determined that they should again become a tribe 
subordinate to Labrang…This matter is on record with the officials [i.e., the Qing government at 
Xunhua]. After many years of not looking into this matter carefully, I recently discovered that 
Tsö was still one of my subordinate tribes, so I attacked Tsö.”  
 
1022 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
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pertinent sections of the gazetteer to an assembly of monks. According an investigator’s 
report, the reading, “sapped the anger from their hearts and as they subsequently 
understood the [true] facts of this matter were no longer willing to engage in 
violence.”1023   
Yet, as Cangyun himself admitted in a memorandum for fellow officials 
concerning the resolution of the case, the nature of Xunhua subprefecture’s jurisdiction 
over Labrang was not clearly stated in the gazetteer. After recalling Gong Jinghan’s 
ambiguous formulation (“Labrang is within the territory of the subprefecture but not 
under the control of the subprefect”), Cangyun wrote, “According to the gazetteer, during 
the Qianlong reign it is said that each served itself (各服). Therefore I do not know when 
it entered the registry (jurisdiction?) of the subprefecture, nor are there any cases that I 
can check.”1024 Still, neither Cangyun nor his colleague Zhang doubted the legitimacy of 
their presence at the monastery. In a separate report to superiors, Zhang wrote that the 
arrival of the subprefect calmed what had been an extremely tense situation. “The monks 
of Labrang, ” he noted, “all felt that the Jamyang Zhepa had not handled things well, but 
in order to spare his feelings, spoke up for him and helped him explain the situation.” In 
fact, Zhang came to the conclusion that there were many in the monastery who wished 
that a Qing official would reside permanently at the monastery, as a “protective 
talisman.”1025 
                                                
1023 QSDG (GX 15/07/08), 7-YJ-2678: 《為在拉布塄訪問情形上的肅稟》. 
 
1024 QSDG (15/06/10), 7-YJ-2681: 《循化同知長為續報查拉布塄焚殺勒降緊急情形》. 
 
1025 QSDG (GX 15/07/08), 7-YJ-2678: 《為在拉布塄訪問情形上的肅稟》. 
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The gazetteer’s account of Labrang monastery, the Jamyang Zhepa, and the 
history of their conflict with Tsö monastery strongly influenced deliberations among 
Qing officials as they weighed their options for handling the conflict of 1889.  In his 
letters from Labrang, Cangyun made it plain that he would neither recognize Labrang’s 
claim to Tsö nor reverse what he understood from the gazetteer as an overall policy of 
“restraining the Jamyang Zhepa.”1026 However, he also informed his superiors that the 
situation in Xunhua was fundamentally different from the 1790s. Whereas during the 
early Jiaqing reign Labrang “relied on the power of the [Khoshot Mongol] junwang to vie 
with the Tibetans for territory,” seventy years later, “the monastery has expanded to over 
sixty temples inhabited by numerous Tibetan and Mongol kūtuktus and their entourages. 
Its prestige and power ever increase and it bursts with prosperity. In its struggle for 
Tibetan territory it continues to broaden its reach and its avarice is insatiable.”1027 For 
Cangyun, Labrang was no longer simply a “Mongol” monastery administered and 
potentially restrained by the Khoshot princes. “Originally a Mongol monastery, now that 
the Mongols have weakened, the monastery grows stronger by the day.” 1028 This 
transformation posed a thorny administrative problem: the Mongols could no longer be 
expected to control the monastery, but it was still distinct from the “tax-paying Tibetans” 
indirectly administered by the Xunhua subprefect. Moreover, the gazetteer offered no 
easy answers for how to adjudicate the current dispute over communities located in the 
valleys between Labrang, Terlung, Tsö, and Rongwo. In a private letter, Cangyun, 
speaking on behalf of the committee delegated with resolving the case, weighed the 
                                                
1026 QSDG (15/06/10), 7-YJ-2681: 《循化同知長為續報查拉布塄焚殺勒降緊急情形》. 
 
1027 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
 
1028 QSDG (15/06/10), 7-YJ-2681: 《循化同知長為續報查拉布塄焚殺勒降緊急情形》. 
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dilemma for the governor-general, writing that approving Labrang’s claims to 
communities in Khagya, Gyangro, and upper and lower Labula would garner compliance 
to an overall accord from Labrang, but “would not only mean discarding the license 
granted by the previous governor-general [i.e. the 1875 license granted by Zuo Zongtang 
to the Sétsang general administrator] as waste paper but would make it difficult for Tsö 
and Terlung to survive—an outcome Rongwo would not abide.”1029 Moreover, Cangyun 
warned that they must avoid reproducing decisions such as that of Zuo Zongtong that 
oversimplified matters by granting whole districts such as Khagya to one side or the other. 
Any solution, Cangyun suggested, could only involve painstaking consultation with the 
“tax-collecting xiejia and villagers” who were familiar with “who governed each small 
place.” 1030  The magistrate was thus proposing a detailed survey of local Tibetan 
communities in order to assess their status relative to the two large confederations. One 
can imagine, however, that such a move only exacerbated the increasing politicization of 
rural life, as each “place” (“小地名 ,” a category that the magistrate leaves 
problematically undefined) was called on to declare its allegiance.  
The committee of Qing officials brokered a final settlement between Labrang and 
the Rongwo-led alliance on October 10, 1889. In later years, this accord became known 
colloquially and in official Qing documents as the “White Earth Slope Case (白土坡案),” 
probably on the basis of the location where representatives from all parties met for final 
adjudication. I suspect that the site may have been below the white cliffs that loom over 
the northern limits of the Genkya grasslands—a broad stretch of pasture that lies at the 
                                                
1029 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
 
1030 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
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intersection of the main routes of communication between Labrang, Repgong, and 
Terlung. However, I have not yet located a precise description of the meeting point in 
official archives. In their own internal communications with provincial authorities, the 
committee wrote that it “decided the case according to the old cases from 1790, 1846, 
and 1875” and rejected the briefs brought by Labrang as “rubbish that is on the whole 
unreliable as evidence.” Although the committee faulted Terlung officials for their 
unauthorized murder of the Dangang honpo, they directed their censure primarily at the 
Jamyang Zhepa: “The Jamyang Zhepa of Labrang on the basis of a hundred years of 
worthless evidence sought to gobble up Tsö and recently colluded several times with 
Tibetan headmen from tribes subject to Terlung to establish relations of vassalage. They 
hoped to alter the statutes fixed by the decision of 1875. This created jealously and 
animosity between the Tibetans and chiliarchs and managers of Terlung.”1031 The actual 
terms of the accord, however, were much more complex and offered a complete victory 
to neither Labrang nor Terlung monastery. 
A copy of the accord appears to have survived in the Xunhua archives only in a 
fragmentary form. Several of the extant articles can be paraphrased as follows: 
1. The Terlung manager Dajia (Tib. ? Possibly “Dargyé”, Ch. 大加) 
must make full restitution for the death of the Dangang honpo. 
Furthermore all the “incense grain” previously provided to Sétsang 
Lama of Terlung Monastery by the commoners governed by the 
honpo shall henceforth be due to the son of the honpo. The 
commoners shall also be governed by the son and shall serve as his 
support. Until the son becomes an adult and is tested for suitability 
as a Tibetan headman, the people of his patrimony shall be 
overseen by the Sétsang general administrator, who is not to abuse 
them. 
 
                                                
1031 QSDG (GX 15) 7-YJ-2678: 《會辦委員為照舊例查辦拉布塄搶殺黑錯的稟》. 
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2. The son of Qilao (who was murdered by his nephew, the Dangang 
honpo) is currently being held by the Dangang household and shall 
be delivered to Terlung monastery. 
 
3. With regards to Upper Labula, although previously the accord of 
1875 decreed that the village was under the control of the Sétsang 
general administrator, this investigation has determined that prior 
to 1875 the village contained tenants (Ch. 佃戶) belonging to the 
estates (Lit. “nangchen,” Tib. nang chen, Ch. 昂欠)  of reincarnate 
monks from Labrang, tenants belonging to estate of Terlung 
Monastery, as well as those who had been subjected (shuantou’ed) 
both to various estates at Labrang and to Terlung monastery. 
Following the accord of 1875, Terlung did not actually take control 
of this place according to proclamation. Yet recently the village 
was subjected to acts of arson and murder perpetrated by Rongwo 
monastery. Henceforth, the tax and labor obligations of 
commoners (百姓) in the area of Upper Labula shall be due 
directly to Xunhua subprefecture. Terlung monastery and estate-
holders from Labrang, however, shall retain their rights to their 
original tenants (佃戶). But neither monastery is permitted to use 
force to levy additional funds from Upper Labula. Residents of the 
district are allowed to offer milk tea offerings at Labrang every 
five years, but Labrang shall not compel them to do so and neither 
shall Terlung obstruct their passage.  
 
4. With regards to the woman headman Lumogya of Wangga’tan in 
Lower Labula: Originally she was a tenant (佃戶) of the estate of 
subordinate to Terlung monastery. Her ancestors offered alms to 
the monastery and were also effective rulers of local Tibetans. 
Their recent flight to Labrang was truly a result of their fear of 
misrule and assault at the hands of Terlung officials. According to 
statements, Terlung had previously taken possession of 
(shuantou’ed) over forty households from this village and two 
woodlots and had administered them for many years. On the basis 
of this history these will continue to be administered by Terlung. 
Yet if other households experience oppression from Terlung or are 
forcefully subjected (shuantou’ed), they are permitted to file suit 
with the subprefecture. The remaining hundred and ten households 
shall be managed by the Wangga’tan chief Lumogya. She shall 
receive official sanction as a hundred-household head. Yet in order 
to ensure that the Tibetan commoners are properly restrained, as 
before their overall administration shall be handled by the Sétsang 
kūtuktu. Lumogya must according to tradition continue to provide 
those alms that are due to the Sétsang kūtuktu.1032 
                                                
1032 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-4723: 《因旦剛紅布被殺所起衝突的處理結果》. 
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The following two extant articles (Five and Six) concern arranging restitution 
between the various warring parties for loss of life, injuries, and physical damage to 
homes, religious structures, and crops according to “Tibetan custom (番俗).” On the 
basis of subsequent petitions from relevant parties such as Hortsang, Terlung, and 
Labrang reporting the exchange of reparations, one can assume that the missing articles 
laid out a fairly detailed and comprehensive tally of compensation requirements and 
schedules.1033 Furthermore, in a jointly submitted memorial to the court in Beijing, the 
governor-general and the Qinghai amban reported that the accord had further stipulated 
that the managers of the concerned monasteries, including Terlung and Khagya, were to 
be replaced and never again serve in similar capacities.1034  
The terms of the agreement are significant in several respects. To begin with, 
despite a rhetorical posture of overall hostility to Labrang and other petitioners harbored 
and represented by the Jamyang Zhepa, the final accord did not grant Terlung monastery 
blanket authority to the contested region in the same way that Zuo Zongtang’s 1875 
decision had. The descendants of the Dangang honpo, for instance, owed no further 
financial obligation to the Terlung Monastery and were promised a degree of political 
independence from Terlung as well, once the son of the Dangang honpo reached maturity. 
In the third article, the committee members also reduced the political authority of Terlung 
                                                
1033 The following document, for instance, reports the payment of reparations to Labrang by 
subordinates of Hortsang and Tsö: QSDG (GX 15/10), 7-YJ-2683: 《寺溝十頭、火力臧為賠當
剛紅布銀兩上的稟》. 
 
1034 QSDG (GX 16/01) 7-YJ-2965: 《陝甘總督楊、青海大臣薩為查明寺院構釁械鬥情形 
彈壓解散按照番例斷結恭折》. 
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monastery by formally recognizing Labrang’s claim to estates and tenants in Upper 
Labula. Moreover, the officials moved to place those Tibetans of this locale who were not 
tenants belonging to the estates of reincarnate lamas under the direct authority of Xunhua. 
In this respect, the accord marked a significant innovation over previous policies as the 
Qing officials were now distinguishing “commoner (百姓)” from “tenant (佃戶)” 
Tibetans. According to this clause, revenue from commoner households would 
henceforth no longer be divided between authorities in Terlung and Xunhua. In effect, the 
dynasty was now claiming direct ownership of these “commoner” households and 
creating what might be called “royal colonies” in the midst of other communities 
indirectly governed for the Qing by Terlung monastery and the Sétsang general 
administrator.1035  
The status of Tibetans subordinate to Rongwo and Terlung as “grain tax” Tibetans 
was not new. According to the Xunhua Gazetteer, the classification of Tibetans from Tsö, 
Khagya, and Repgong as “tax-paying commoners” was ultimately cited as the primary 
reason behind the decision to rule against Labrang’s wish to appoint an abbot at Tsö.1036 
In 1889, the anti-Labrang faction adopted this principle as a key argument in their appeal 
for Qing intervention. For instance, in a petition to the Xunhua subprefect, three lamas 
from Hortsang (a district ostensibly under the jurisdiction of the Sétsang zongguan) wrote 
that “Hortsang is not willing to become the subjects of the great tulku of Labrang. Instead 
we should be considered commoners (百姓) of Xunhua subprefecture. The people of 
                                                
1035 The term “royal colony” or “crown colony” is borrowed from the vocabulary of the British 
Empire and suggests the sense of direct imperial or royal sovereignty over the people of the 
territory. 
 
1036 Gong Jinghan, 253. 
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Hortsang contend that a man cannot serve two masters… If one were to compel us to 
submit to Labrang, our opposition would be so strong that it would be easier to kill 
us!”1037 This petition evidently made an impression as Cangyun quoted from it in 
subsequent reports to the governor-general. 1038  The petitioners’ sentiment certainly 
echoed the notion held by Qing officials that Labrang should not be permitted to make 
inroads in those communities considered under the purview of Xunhua subprefecture. Yet 
the establishment of specific communities as directly ruled “royal colonies” was a novel 
and contingent (and perhaps an extreme not anticipated by petitioners from Hortsang 
themselves) outcome of the litigation process. In the early stages of litigation after first 
arriving at Labrang, Qing officials expressed no interest in establishing more direct rule 
over Tibetan communities in Upper Labula. This solution may have presented itself as 
the only feasible alternative to recognizing the claims of either Labrang or Terlung in 
their entirety. As will be discussed below, in the years after the White Earth Slope 
Accord, Qing officials increasingly adopted this expedient solution when faced with 
quarrels over people and land in Xunhua. Moreover, Tibetan communities that felt 
threatened by Labrang themselves advocated for and achieved status as royal colonies. 
The 1889 accord also reveals an attempt by Qing officials to distinguish acts of 
piety such as alms-giving and pilgrimage from the obligations due from the tenants (or, 
dare I say, “serfs”?) of the corporate estates of reincarnate lamas (“labrang” or 
“nangchen”). Qing officials appreciated the degree to which the conflict between 
Labrang and its neighbors had been sparked by divergent interpretations of pilgrimage 
                                                
1037 QSDG (GX 15/06/06) 7-YJ-2681: 《橋溝三喇嘛為拉布塄強逼栓頭上的稟》. 
 
1038 QSDG (GX 15/6) 7-YJ-2681: 《循化同知長為續報查拉布塄焚殺勒降緊急情形》. 
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and donations to monastic estates in upper and lower Labula. In other words, the accord 
aimed to disentangle religious acts from political relationships. The accord clarified, for 
instance, that residents of Upper Labula had the right to travel unhindered to Labrang at 
regulated intervals and that such acts should not be confused with their political status 
vis-à-vis either the Qing state as subjects of the crown or as tenants of various estates.  
Similarly, Qing officials appear to have been persuaded to some degree by the 
protestations of Lumogya and other elders from her community. While the fourth article 
of the accord did not formally recognize a right to pilgrimage to Labrang, it did affirm 
their assertion that their flight to Labrang had been mistaken for an act of political 
submission (shuantou). Article four not only recognized Lumogya’s political authority 
but enhanced it: She was licensed as a hundred-household head within the qianbaihu 
system. Yet the nature of this authority was carefully parsed. Although her subjects were 
not shuantou’ed to the manager of Terlung monastery like the other forty households of 
Lower Labula, they were, however, still under the “general administration” of the 
Sétsang lama. This complicated arrangement of nested authorities most likely reflected an 
attempt at reaching a compromise between Labrang and Terlung. The discursive finesse 
of this clause conveyed a subtle distinction between the authority of the manager of 
Terlung monastery and the authority the Sétsang lama derived from his appointment to 
zongguan within the colonial bureaucratic apparatus. On paper, Lumogya and her 
subordinate households were independent of Terlung. Yet petitions from subsequent 
conflicts demonstrate that both partisans and opponents of Terlung saw little effective 
difference between the institution of the Sétsang zongguan and Terlung monastery. The 
Sétsang lama was the founder of the monastery and titular owner of its estates. Moreover, 
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during the 1880s through 1890s, in the absence of an adult Sétsang reincarnation (recall 
that the fourth Sétsang died in 1888 at the age of eight), monks from Terlung shouldered 
the responsibilities of the zongguan. Since Qing officials were surely not unaware of the 
fact that in 1889 the Sétsang lama was at best an infant, it is also possible to imagine that 
they thought that placing Lumogya under the overall supervision of the Sétsang zongguan 
was feasible precisely because there was in fact no genuine zongguan. Thus there might 
be little cause for conflict between the zongguan and Lumogya. Yet regardless, the 
blurred boundaries between Sétsang Kūtuktu and Terlung monastery and the ambiguous 
separation of administrative authority between Sétsang general administrator and local 
headmen/women such as Lumogya or the lay and ecclesiastical chiefs in Khagya proved 
an ongoing source of conflict and litigation. 
In the White Earth Slope Accord, Qing officials attempted to deliver peace by 
clarifying local relationships and inscribing them in imperially-sanctioned charters. 
Although it might be possible to interpret this process as an example of what James C. 
Scott has described as the desire of modernizing states to make society more “legible” 
and thus more readily governable, the above account of the attempt to make Tibetan 
society “legible” to the Qing state stresses the degree to which this process was driven 
from the bottom-up by local events and indigenous interests.1039 Rather than resulting 
from the initiatives of a centralizing state, this charter (or perhaps “masterplan”) for the 
political organization of Amdo Tibetan society was the contingent result of a state-
centered litigation process. Seemingly intractable inter-monastic feuds were the catalyst 
for the clarification of local political and religious relationships. Qing officials 
understood their efforts as primarily delivering a service to indigenous elites. The conflict 
                                                
1039 James C. Scott, Seeing Like A State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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and litigation process led to increased Qing involvement in Tibetan affairs, but from the 
perspective of Qing officials this was not necessarily a welcome development. In 
brokering the White Earth Slope Accord, Qing officials wagered imperial prestige in an 
attempt to bring peace to the violent politics of the Gelukpa monasteries and their tulkus. 
Yet this bet did not pay off. Just five months after the ink had dried on the White Earth 
Slope Accord, it had become a focal point of renewed legal politicking that continued 
over the next two years as local Tibetan elites contested the meaning of the accord. The 
imperial guarantee implicit in the agreement meant that the indigenous disputants 
immediately turned to Qing official forums for redress in the case. And since imperial 
prestige had been placed on the line, Qing officials were obliged to attempt to salvage the 
accord.  
Although not an annulment of Zuo Zongtang’s accord of 1875, the terms of the 
new accord represented a significant revision. The accord also reflected deepening Qing 
penetration into Tibetan society. As Cangyun remarked, the process of crafting the accord 
entailed much closer scrutiny of local society than had occurred in 1875.1040 Where Zuo 
Zongtang and his advisors had simply handed a large swath of territory north of Labrang 
over to the Sétsang Lama, the committee members of 1889 had brokered an accord that 
took into account political alliances at the household level. In doing so Qing officials 
helped reify an increasingly complex matrix of authorities—Labrang, Terlung, lay 
headmen, and Qing officials, to name a few. Villagers in contested places such as lower 
and upper Labula might find themselves and their neighbors in different hierarchies of 
authority, each of which had profound implications for everyday life both mundane and 
                                                
1040 QSDG (GX 15), 7-YJ-2684: 《會辦委員等為請示辦結辦法上的稟》. 
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spiritual. In the following two years, despite their efforts in 1889, Qing officials would be 
forced to learn even more about local Tibetan affairs. 
 
Round Two, 1890: “Falcons and Hounds,” “Hawks and Wolves” 
  
Indications that all was not at peace in Xunhua began to reach provincial officials 
just two months after the White Earth Slope case was decided. On December 15, 1889 
(GX 15/11/23), messengers arrived at the yamen of the Qinghai amban in Xining with a 
letter from the Jamyang Zhepa, the Gyangro chiliarch, and other local elders accusing the 
former manager of Tsö monastery of settling outsiders within the Bora tribe and 
generally causing trouble. Specifically they argued that a certain community they claimed 
ownership over had failed to participate in traditional religious activities at Trashi 
monastery. They also accused the former manager of Terlung monastery of ignoring the 
recent White Earth Slope Accord and plotting to kill the Gyangro chiliarch. Their direct 
appeal for aid from the amban was evidently successful, as he subsequently passed the 
suit to the governor-general, who then ordered the Xunhua subprefect to follow up on the 
matter.1041 The subprefect dispatched a yamen runner who, together with officers from 
the Hezhou garrison then proceeded to Labrang. They reported that their investigation 
revealed that the accusations were baseless. In fact, when they met with the Jamyang 
Zhepa, he personally admitted no knowledge of the original petition and for all he knew 
there was not such conflict. “He thought that it was the Hua-li-wa honpo (華里哇溫布) 
                                                
1041 QSDG (GX 16/01/08), 7-YJ-2958:《循化廳為卡家案上的申牒》. 
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and the former manager of the Gyangro estate that had fabricated this matter.”1042 With 
regards to the Trashi monastery matter, the magistrate determined that official records, 
including the final terms of a case involving the monastery from 1887, made no mention 
of the village in question and thus the Gyangro chiliarch’s claims could not be 
substantiated. The subprefect then waxed nostalgic to his superiors, recalling how 
enforcement of the principle that “each monastery should govern only itself” had brought 
a hundred years of peace and prosperity to the “frontier people (邊民):” Citing the 
instructions of the governor-general, he wrote: 
Follow the old statutes: Let each guard their own temples and thereby 
ensure that the Jamyang does not amalgamate the entire Tibetan world… 
Just as Rongwo and Terlung are not allowed to swallow up Tibetan 
subjects of Labrang, Rongwo and Terlung have sole jurisdiction for their 
subordinate Tibetans at Tsö, Khagya, Longwa and [upper and lower] 
Labula. The Jamyang [Zhepa] also must not be allowed to occupy others’ 
monasteries, incite feuds, take on the cases of others, or submit libelous 
lawsuits. 
 
Yet despite this injunction, the conflict between Gyangro and the representatives 
of the Sétsang estate at Terlung did not subside. Matters appeared to have come to a head 
during the period of the Tibetan New Year’s celebrations when conflict between monks 
aligned with the Gyangro tulku and Khagya chiliarch and those affiliated with the 
Sétsang tulku brought activity in the main prayer hall of Khagya monastery to a halt. In 
the early months of 1890 representatives from Khagya arrived at the yamen of the 
Xunhua subprefect to press their respective cases.1043 The feud hinged on disparate 
interpretations of previous Qing decisions, primarily those of 1875 and 1889, on the 
                                                
1042 QSDG (GX 16/01/08), 7-YJ-2958:《循化廳為卡家案上的申牒》. 
 
1043 QSDG (GX 16/05), 7-YJ-2694: 《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
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nature of the Sétsang lama’s (or more precisely, his representatives) authority within 
Khagya monastery itself and over the lay communities of the Khagya region. 
In a petition to the subprefect, the Khagya chiliarch first reported that while 
Khagya had complied with the stipulations of the White Earth Slope Accord and changed 
chiliarchs, Terlung had failed to remove and replace either their manager (Dajia 大加) or 
abbot. He then complained that with regards to the Sétsang estates in Khagya, although 
the manager (named Jia-yi-qiao, 加乙喬, Tib. ?) had been removed from office, he 
remained in the area claiming that he was in fact the “steward (管家)” of the monastery 
and had refused to allow the Khagya chiliarch to assume governance of the monastery 
and had obstructed the regular observance of the religious calendar.1044 According to later 
summaries of the case written by the subprefect, the new manager of the Gyangro estate 
had demanded sole responsibility for governing the monastery based on the perception 
that the 1875 accord had declared that each monastery should govern itself. Furthermore, 
the subprefect reported that the Gyangro manager had expressed interest in repossessing 
estates currently owned by Sétsang: “The new manager of the Gyangro estate stated that 
the hundred-plus households of Gou-qu-hu tenants (勾曲乎佃戶) should be returned. 
Although they have tilled on behalf of Sétsang for several years, this year it occurred to 
us that our Gyangro [lama] owns these tenants. We demand that the Sétsang manager 
leave.”1045 In another petition, the Khagya chiliarch and Gyangro manager made an 
                                                
1044 QSDG (GX 16/02/22), 7-YJ-2958: 《卡家新千戶上循化廳的稟》. Similar accusations were 
lodged by a monk from Khagya who traveled in person to Hezhou. See: QSDG (GX 16/??), 7-YJ-
2958: 《卡家稟控沙溝番僧滋事的稟與循化廳的回諭》. 
 
1045 QSDG (GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、
憲台的稟》. 
 504 
historical argument for the independence of their monastery vis-à-vis Terlung and the 
Sétsang Lama.  
Since the founding of our monastery, there have been eighteen generations 
of the Gyangro tulku and twenty-one generations of the honpo. There have 
been only three generations of the Sétsang since he fell out with Labrang 
and moved to Terlung. Our Gyangro tulku took pity on Sétsang and 
invited him to Khagya monastery where he was apportioned a salary and 
honored as abbot…In 1875 [Ma Zhan’ao] and the officials decided to take 
a new road [i.e. establish a new precedent] and made the Sétsang the 
general administrator—a decision we respected. He was allowed to reside 
at Khagya and collect alms and oversee his estates, but he was not to 
manage other affairs. Other than our chiliarch, no one else was to interfere 
in the recitation of sutras in the monastery or other affairs in the valley.1046  
 
Representatives from the Sétsang countered this argument first by noting that the 
1875 decision granted the Sétsang lama the right to appoint a manager to “jointly oversee 
the administration and prayer ceremonies of the main prayer hall with the Gyangro 
[tulku].” Second, they argued that Sétsang had owned the hundred Gou-qu-hu households 
for over a century. Furthermore, the Sétsang representatives argued that the suit from 
Khagya was not the work of the Gyangro manager or chiliarch, but rather the initiative of 
the former Gyangro manager who now resided at Labrang and relied on that monastery 
for support.1047  
The subprefect, Cangyun, reported that in the face of these competing 
interpretations of the 1875 accord, he decided to bring out a Chinese-language version of 
the document and translate it for the edification of the litigants. According to the 
                                                
1046 QSDG (GX 16), 7-YJ-4663: 《卡家千戶江洛控沙溝開新路的稟》. Ma Zhan’ao is referred 
to in this petition as “漠泥溝大人.” 
 
1047 QSDG (GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、
憲台的稟》. The Sétsang manager also accused the Gyangro manager of hiding from public 
knowledge those stipulations of the 1889 White Earth Slope decision that did not suit his interests. 
See, QSDG (GX 16/02R/13), 7-YJ-2952: 《歲倉捏力哇狀告卡家寺江洛捏力哇的稟》. 
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subprefect, clarifying the original content of the document helped provisionally resolve 
the situation, but he acknowledged that the original wording posed problems.  He wrote, 
“The root of the feud is the content of the fifth article of the charter of 1875 which states 
‘Sétsang may dispatch one knowledgeable manager to oversee the main prayer hall and 
their tenants’ agricultural work. Affairs of Khagya will continue to be handled by the 
Gyangro chiliarch.’”1048 The subprefect determined that in practice this article of the 
original decision meant joint or consultative handling of affairs in the main prayer hall by 
both the Sétsang and Gyangro tulkus.1049 With regards to the Gou-qu-hu tenants, he 
argued that although the original settlement made no specific mention of these 
households, if Sétsang could provide evidence of ownership, they would be considered 
tenants and thus remain under his control. However, he noted that the second half of the 
article—granting control of Khagya to the Khagya chiliarch, was ambiguous and, lacking 
a specific clause stating that each side retained rights to its own property and tenants, 
could easily be misinterpreted by Khagya as a legitimation for a blanket claim to all 
people and property in Khagya.1050  
In response to this public re-translation of the original text, the Sétsang 
representatives reportedly expressed astonishment that the original terms were quite 
different from the Tibetan language version of the accord. Cangyun did not provide 
details on what difference was perceived between the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the 
                                                
1048 QSDG (GX 16/05), 7-YJ-2694: 《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》: “惟起釁之由根系
因元年執照內第五款載明，歲倉派一懂事管家看守經堂，照料佃戶耕種，不准干預大家事
務，卡家事務歸江洛千戶辦理等因。” 
 
1049 QSDG (GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、
憲台的稟》. 
 
1050 QSDG (GX 16/05), 7-YJ-2694: 《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
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1875 accord in this particular report. Yet, as will be discussed shortly, the subprefect’s 
subsequent investigations revealed that Tibetan-language versions of the 1875 accord 
held by Terlung and Rongwo had dropped mention of the Khagya chiliarch’s (albeit 
limited) authority. Thus it would seem that Sétsang had not been aware that despite 
establishing the Sétsang Lama as zongguan, the local headman/tulku, according to prior 
Qing jurisprudence, continued to have authority in and around the monastery. The 
practical exercise of these overlapping authorities, which might have worked well in the 
event that the Gyangro tulku, other Khagya headmen, and the Sétsang lama had amicable 
personal relations (as they might have had in 1875), proved difficult to negotiate in their 
absence.  
Cangyun reported that at this first round of adjudication both sides committed 
themselves to observing the magistrate’s version of the 1875 accord. For good measure, 
the subprefect demanded that a monk from each side remain in the subprefectural yamen 
until such a time as it could be ascertained that Khagya monastery had reopened. Several 
weeks later Cangyun learned from his yamen runners that “the prayers were being recited 
and the tea boiled,” and that the Gyangro chiliarch and the manager of the Sétsang estates 
in Khagya had agreed on the appointment of a new head monk from Sétsang within 
Khagya monastery. The hostage monks were thus duly released on April 27, 1890 (GX 
16/03/09).1051 
Shortly thereafter, Cangyun learned that the problem of divergent texts and 
divergent interpretations of official pronouncements was more widespread and grave than 
first realized. While resolving a separate case in Repgong in June, the subprefect toured 
                                                
1051 QSDG (GX 16/05), 7-YJ-2694: 《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
 507 
Rongwo Monastery. During the visit, the nangso brought out from the monastery’s 
archives Chinese and Tibetan-language versions of the 1875 accord. However, when the 
subprefect had his clerks read aloud and translate the original Chinese version into 
Tibetan, the gathering realized that the Tibetan-version held by Rongwo lacked an 
essential clause: “The articles did not contain the stipulation, ‘[Although] the manager 
from Sétsang may reside in Khagya to oversee the prayer hall and farming, the Gyangro 
chiliarch shall manage the affairs of Khagya monastery. The Sétsang manager shall not 
interfere.”1052 The unauthorized Tibetan translation, the magistrate noted, thus ignored 
the fact that while certain responsibilities within Khagya had been delegated to Sétsang, 
the Khagya chiliarch retained overall control of the monastery. Cangyun then ordered the 
Tibetan text destroyed. Unsurprisingly, the leading monk of Rongwo, the Shartsang lama, 
and the rest of the audience refused, and the subprefect was unable to force the issue. 
Still, the dangers of these variant texts and the complexity of these settlements was 
foremost in Cangyun’s concluding thoughts to his superiors. He also complained that 
official carelessness was at least partially to blame for the ongoing litigation:  
I have also learned that Terlung possesses a copy of the settlement issued 
by [the Hezhou garrison commander] Shen [from 1875] that is the same as 
the Tibetan language version held here. Last year, when the ‘White Earth 
Slope’ decision was issued, committeeman Zhang just ordered the 
assembled people to observe the old laws and statutes, and did not make a 
verbatim translation of the Chinese-language decision, thus the audience 
had only a hazy understanding of the final settlement… The Tibetans do 
not understand Chinese, nor have they received serious punishment. 
                                                
1052 QSDG (GX 16/04/27), 7-YJ-2948: 《循化廳差役關於隆務寺所藏沙溝寺執照的稟與同知
的批文》: “令兩書吏將執照內漢字各條款一一翻解，通知該沙力倉上下僧眾逐各遵服。惟
條款末所載歲倉捏力哇駐扎卡家看守經堂，耕種，望卡家寺事務歸江洛千戶經管，歲倉捏
力哇不得干預一層。據沙力倉及新舊昂鎖面回，此層與鄉老所立番字約據不同。旋即呈出
番字約據一張，由書辦同該僧等共念一遍，譯出等語果與執照此層不同。當即飭令銷毀。
該沙力倉等不肯。因該寺人多勢眾，亦不便勉強，致因此生案，有所籍口也。” 
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Therefore they take us lightly and are again making trouble. Despite our 
best efforts, ‘what began as a tiger’s head has become a snake’s tail’ [i.e. a 
good start but a poor finish]! How lamentable!1053 
 
More ominously still, Cangyun reported that the new manager of the Gyangro 
estates returned to the yamen in May (GX 16/04/20) asking for further clarifications of 
the various settlement. “Fearing that he was about to make trouble,” the magistrate 
dispatched runners to accompany the manager back to Khagya in order to calm the 
situation and requested that the Hezhou garrison also send military officials to the 
region.1054  
Their efforts failed. On June 20, Labrang delivered a petition to the subprefecture 
reporting that feuding had resumed between supporters of the Gyangro and Sétsang lamas 
resulting in the death of several people allied to the Gyangro tulku.  The next day the 
magistrate’s own runners rushed back from Khagya with a more detailed account of the 
expanding conflict. Arriving at the head of Khagya valley on the evening of June 15 (GX 
16/04/28), this party of subprefectural and garrison personnel encountered the Gyangro 
manager at the head of a large body of “several hundred Tibetan troops” who were on 
their way to attack the Sétsang estate’s manager (the “Zhazan lama,” who himself hailed 
from Khagya). They also learned that just two days earlier the Gyangro headman had led 
over two hundred men in an attack local supporters of the Sétsang tulku, shooting to 
death two monks, injuring four others, and taking a further six monks captive. The 
Gyangro partisans had also attacked another small temple higher up in the hills where the 
                                                
1053 QSDG (GX 16/04/27), 7-YJ-2948: 《循化廳差役關於隆務寺所藏沙溝寺執照的稟與同知
的批文》. 
 
1054 QSDG (GX 16/05), 7-YJ-2694: 《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
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Sétsang manager had taken refuge, killing one “lama” and making off with a large 
quantity of loot. The Sétsang manager then fled to a village below the mountain. 
Although the Xunhua yamen runners were able to temporarily arrest the march of the 
Gyangro troops against Sétsang, their nighttime shuttle diplomacy failed to achieve a 
truce. The next day the Gyangro militia attacked the village of Sétsang supporters, 
resulting in the death of four more Tibetans and another “lama.” The surviving Sétsang 
supporters and the tenants from his estates fled the scene. Only then were the runners 
together with tulku from Tsö and Khagya monasteries able to hammer out a sixteen-day 
ceasefire.1055  
The subprefect departed for the conflict zone just a week after receiving these 
initial reports. According to the subprefect’s own analysis, the renewed conflict was 
primarily a dispute over ownership of estates and tenants between Khagya and 
Terlung.1056 Yet in a letter to the governor-general he also argued that the feud had been 
exploited by outside powers, primarily Labrang and Rongwo monasteries. Moreover, he 
despaired at the possibility of ever bringing the managers of the Gyangro and Sétsang 
estates—men who he placed in the same category as “Han criminals (漢奸)”—to justice: 
“The Jamyang Zhepa relies on the old Gyangro manager as his ‘falcons and hounds’ and 
colludes with him to such a degree that he will never deliver up the Gyangro [manager 
for punishment]. Similarly, Rongwo relies on the power of their ‘hawks and wolves’ –the 
Jiayi and Zhazan [monks of Sétsang], to preserve their influence among the southern 
                                                
1055 QSDG (GX 16/05/08), 7-YJ-2948: 《差役馬興、李複祥為卡家、沙溝事稟循化同知》; 
(GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、憲台的
稟》; (GX 16/05/??), 7-YJ-2694 & 2696:《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
 
1056 QSDG (GX 16/06/15), 7-YJ-2945: 《循化廳同知長贇為卡家、沙溝衝突上憲台的稟》. 
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Tibetans and will therefore also not give them up. If [Labrang and Rongwo] are not 
intimidated and their influence not quickly limited, there will arise such a conflict that 
neither officials nor local gentry and elders will be able to bring it to an end.”1057  
By “local gentry and elders,” the subprefect was referring to the Muslim military 
commanders from Hezhou who had been instrumental in establishing peace between 
Khagya and Terlung in 1878: Ma Zhan’ao, Ma Fuwang (馬福旺), and Ma Haiyan (馬海
宴).1058 Although Ma Zhan’ao had passed away, Cangyun noted that his son, Ma Anliang 
was “intimate with the details of the original case.” Therefore, Cangyun, after consulting 
with the Hezhou garrison commander, delegated Ma Anliang, Ma Fuwang, and Ma 
Haiyan to proceed to the Tibetan districts to see if they could bring representatives of the 
warring parties, most importantly the former Gyangro manager and the Jiayi and Zhazan 
lamas from Terlung to Hezhou to litigate the case. In reports to provincial authorities and 
the Xining amban, Cangyun expressed hope that the Muslim military officials would 
resolve the case without necessitating his own personal travel to Terlung, Khagya, or 
Labrang. Both sides however, refused these summons.1059 
In Labrang, the renewed involvement of Hezhou Muslims in the negotiations 
appears to have been greeted with disgust and concern. Seeking to remove the Muslims 
                                                
1057 QSDG (GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、
憲台的稟》. Similar sentiments had been previously expressed in the subprefect’s report of a 
month earlier: (GX 16/05/??), 7-YJ-2694 & 2696:《循化廳為卡加、沙溝爭鬥牒報事》. 
 
1058 Ma Haiyan’s (1837－1900) son Ma Qi would later become the ruler of Qinghai after the fall 
of the Qing and the province’s first governor in 1928. 
 
1059 QSDG (GX 16/06/12, 1890-07-28), 7-YJ-2954: 《循化廳為卡家寺、沙溝寺爭鬥上總督、
憲台的稟》. The monks of Terlung monastery, it was reported, out of anger at the lack of Qing 
action against Gyangro and his partisans in Khagya, threw rocks at the Qing representatives and 
refused to even talk. Terlung explained that they felt the Qing was overly partial to Labrang and 
their opponents in Khagya. See, QSDG (GX 15/08/15), 7-YJ-4534: 《黑錯稟控拉卜楞寺欺壓》. 
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from the process, the Jamyang Zhepa submitted a petition to the lieutenant governor of 
Gansu and the provincial prosecutor accusing Ma Anliang and his affiliates of a wide 
range of crimes.  
“We have respected the 1875 decision and this is on record in the Hezhou 
yamen. [However,] subsequently the son of the ahong of Monigou [i.e. Ma 
Anliang] has engaged in illegal logging and killed a chiliarch. He has 
hidden the truth of these crimes from his reports and misled you officials. 
Moreover, the recent collusion between Terlung and Tsö that violated 
imperial decisions and led to much deceit and oppression of the poor 
commoners was all instigated by Ma Anliang, who wishes to overturn the 
results of previous litigation, harass Khagya and prevent them from 
peacefully farming and herding. Recently runners from Xunhua 
subprefecture were attacked with stones at Terlung. It appears that the 
emperor cannot enforce the law and make investigations. It is difficult to 
avoid the fact that, observing this state of affairs, various Tibetans will 
make trouble.  As a result we plead that your honors take charge and order 
Xunhua subprefecture to harshly censure Ma Anliang.”1060  
 
To this list of crimes committed by Ma Anliang, the Jamyang Zhepa also 
appended two further statements from the Khagya chiliarch, the Gyangro tulku, and 
various other monks and elders from Khagya. The second of these statements reminded 
the provincial authorities that the community had made what it felt were considerable 
sacrifices on behalf of the dynasty:  
“Previously, during the Muslim disturbances, our chiliarch led troops to 
block [the Muslims] and defend [the dynasty]. In all, we killed over three 
hundred Muslim bandits. In return, over seventy of our people were killed 
or injured by the Muslim bandits. Evidence of our chiliarch’s great efforts 
on behalf of the emperor can be found in the yamens of the governor-
general, the Xining amban, Hezhou, and Xunhua subprefecture. At the 
time there were none whose bravery rivaled that of our chiliarch. For his 
service to the state, Zuo [Zongtang], Liu [Jintang], the Hezhou garrison 
commander and Xunhua subprefecture awarded him a button for his cap 
as well as authority over the prayer schedule at Khagya monastery and all 
other monastic and lay affairs. Sétsang tribe was not to interfere in these 
matters. [However,] after peace was reestablished, the Sétsang lama and 
                                                
1060 QSDG (GX 16/07/17), 7-YJ-2934/2944: 《甘肅布政使張、提刑按察使裕札循化廳》. 
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Terlung, borrowing from the power of the Monigou ahong, Ma Zhan’ao, 
repeatedly made trouble for the monks and tenants of our monastery.”1061   
 
The petitioners then presented a detailed account of how, over the eighteen years 
since the Muslim rebellion ended, Ma Zhan’ao and his allies had repeatedly sown discord 
between the Khagya chiliarch/Gyangro tulku and his subjects and neighbors. “As of now, 
our chiliarch, monks, and elders have filed fourteen suits with either Hezhou or the 
Xunhua yamen, and [you] have yet to take charge. All this is because Ma Anliang, Ma 
laoye [?], and Qing-lian-mo-nai-ke have made trouble and not permitted [you officials] to 
take control.”1062 The petitioners also reasserted their claims to the Gou-qu-hu tenants, 
stating that the Sétsang lama had merely “rented” them from the Gyangro lama. Finally, 
they asserted their historical ties to Labrang by arguing that the Jamyang Zhepa had 
always set the monastic curriculum and appointed cantors in Khagya monastery. With the 
submission of these petitions, Labrang thus not only attempted to demonstrate the degree 
to which they had attempted to work within the framework of the local Qing legal 
system, but also remind the provincial authorities who were their true allies in the region 
were. 
Yet it proved difficult for Labrang and the Khagya chiliarch to capitalize on their 
demonstrations of loyalty during the Muslim rebellions. Zuo Zongtang’s strategic 
compromise with the Muslim commander Ma Zhan’ao on the field of battle in 1872 left 
the dynasty’s local allies in an awkward situation, unable to reap what they felt were the 
rewards of their sacrifices and dangerously exposed to reprisals from their former 
enemies. Moreover, these documents hint at the degree to which inter-monastic feuds had 
                                                
1061 QSDG (GX 16/07/17), 7-YJ-2934/2944: 《甘肅布政使張、提刑按察使裕札循化廳》. 
 
1062 QSDG (GX 16/07/17), 7-YJ-2934/2944: 《甘肅布政使張、提刑按察使裕札循化廳》. 
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provided an opening for the Hezhou Muslims to secure their southern flank and even 
locate potential Tibetan allies. Ma Zhan’ao’s support for Terlung monastery in 1875 and 
the continued cover his son Ma Anliang provided to the monastery in the 1880s and 
1890s suggests that Terlung’s silence in the face of Qing attempts to levy troops from the 
southern districts of Xunhua during the rebellion was an indication of a tacit alliance with 
the Muslims.   
In his own letter to the provincial authorities in Lanzhou, the subprefect rejected 
the Jamyang Zhepa and the Gyangro chiliarch’s positions point by point. First, he wrote 
that he had carefully investigated the accusations against Ma Anliang and found them to 
be false. The Jamyang Zhepa’s accusations were a bald attempt to remove a potentially 
hostile party from investigating the case. Ma Anliang’s expertise in Tibetan affairs, 
Cangyun wrote, was essential to handling the case. As for the alliance between Tsö and 
Terlung monastery, he dismissed the assertion that it was illegal or nefarious: “The two 
hundred year unity of Tsö and Terlung is because ‘In the presence of a powerful 
neighbor, the weak band together for survival.’ The fact that they mutually assist each 
other is nothing more than normal human nature.”1063 In contrast, the subprefect advised 
his superiors to reject the argument that there were legitimate historical ties between the 
two monasteries. He determined that the Jamyang Zhepa’s oversight of the curriculum at 
Khagya monastery did not constitute a political relationship. Finally, he wrote that the 
Sétsang’s estates in Khagya could hardly be considered “rented” since, “as everyone 
knows,” the Sétsang lama had possessed them since the Qianlong reign. 1064  The 
                                                
1063 QSDG (GX 16/08/08, 1890-9-21), 7-YJ-2945: 《循化廳為沙溝與卡家爭佃上憲臺的稟》. 
 
1064 QSDG (GX 16/08/08, 1890-9-21), 7-YJ-2945: 《循化廳為沙溝與卡家爭佃上憲臺的稟》.  
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governor-general subsequently concurred with the subprefect and pointedly noted the 
importance of Ma Anliang’s continued involvement in the case.1065 The governor-general 
also, however, brought the former subprefect Anfu (who had served as subprefect in 1875 
and had recently been serving as prefect of Pingliang in eastern Gansu) out of retirement 
and instructed him return to Xunhua to join a new ad-hoc committee of local officials to 
adjudicate the case.1066  
This committee consisted of the Xunhua subprefect Cangyun and a mid-ranking 
military officer from the Hezhou garrison. In Hezhou they were joined by several Muslim 
gentry including Ma Fuwang and Ma Haiyan, and an escort of forty cavalry troopers. 
This large party departed Hezhou on December 10, 1890 (GX 16/10/29), and arrived 
three days later at Khagya where they bivouacked amidst a large number of “stewards, 
honpo, and managers from Terlung, Rong’ar and Gyangro,” all of whom had come to 
present various petitions, “each of which had its own perspective making things very 
difficult to verify.”1067 Still, the chief litigants, the former managers of the Gyangro and 
Sétsang estates had not appeared and the committeemen were forced to bide their time 
while they waited for them to arrive.  
According to Anfu, The Gou-qu-hu households were members of the six tribes of 
Khagya who had been bequeathed to the Sétsang estate during the Qianlong era in 
appreciation for services rendered to Khagya by the Sétsang lama. Relations between 
                                                
1065 QSDG (GX 16/09/26), 7-YJ-2969: 《陝甘總督關於卡家一案給循化廳的札》. 
 
1066 QSDG (GX 16/08/??), 7-YJ-2974:《陝甘總督、青海大臣 為卡家一案給前署平涼府安福
的札》.  
 
1067 QSDG (GX 16/11/09), 7-YJ-2955: 《撫番府長、委員候補府安為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥上
督憲的稟》. 
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these households (which Cangyun elsewhere counted as approximately one third of the 
three hundred households of Khagya) and other Khagya households had been amicable 
until the Tongzhi reign when events during and after the Muslim rebellions poisoned 
relations between followers of the Gyangro and the Sétsang lamas. Anfu recalled for the 
provincial officials how Zuo Zongtang’s 1875 accord had required further attention from 
himself and other local elites in 1877. The application of “traditional laws” by “Tibetan 
and Chinese elders” had eventually established a peace that had held for a decade. This 
time round, Anfu blamed the absence of tulkus in both Terlung and Khagya for the 
outbreak of violence: “Since the Sétsang lama passed away and his [reincarnation] had 
yet to be [identified], and because the Gyangro tulku is elsewhere, outsiders took heart 
and plotted to manipulate the two sides, resulting in new conflict.”1068 In a later 
document, Anfu also observed that the present situation was much thornier than the 
earlier litigation since this time round outside powers such as Labrang and Rongwo had 
become directly involved in the conflict.1069 Anfu and Cangyun reported, however, that 
the blame did not entirely lie with the Tibetans. They ventured to argue that, despite the 
fact that Zuo Zongtang’s original accord was “correct and should be observed forever,” it 
had “omitted necessary details,” and would require revisions.1070 
It appears to have taken well over a month of protracted negotiations before a 
settlement was reached on January 21, 1891 (GX 16/12/07). The accord took time to 
                                                
1068 QSDG (GX 16/11?), 7-YJ-2955: 《委員、循化廳。河州鎮等為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥請示
的稟》. 
 
1069 QSDG (GX 16/12/12), 7-YJ-2955:《委員、循化廳。河州鎮等為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥請
示的稟》. 
 
1070 QSDG (GX 16/11?), 7-YJ-2955: 《委員候補知府安福、循化廳關於查辦卡家、沙溝爭鬥
的稟》. 
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work out if only because a considerable amount of investigative work had to be 
conducted in order to verify damage claims and calculate the reparations due to each side. 
In this case, the Sétsang estate claimed that it had suffered eight thousand liang-worth of 
damage at the hands of the Gyangro supporters. Ultimately, the Gyangro estate was 
compelled to repay 1,500 liang silver. As Gyangro had suffered one less casualty than 
Sétsang, it was also liable for a life-price valued at 150 liang. The more difficult task, 
however, involved sorting out competing claims of authority within Khagya monastery 
and in its surrounding lay communities. On January 6, the committee took the 
unprecedented step of calling together monks from both sides and reading out two 
monastic constitutions possessed by the monastery. The Qing officials recorded that the 
first document, authored by the Sétsang lama, listed the vows required of monks residing 
at the monastery. The second constitution listed the founding regulations of the 
monastery as well as rules for apportioning funds and material goods among the monks. 
Neither document explained the respective roles of the Sétsang or Gyangro lamas at the 
monastery. Yet it was clear to the officials that the Sétsang lama and the documents 
produced by his previous generations continued to command respect across the now 
fractious monastery.1071   
Despite the protests of Labrang, the committee of Qing officials in consultation 
with local Tibetans and the Muslim gentry represented by Ma Anliang and Ma Haiyan 
worked out eight new clauses to add to Zuo Zongtang’s original accord. Finally, the 
officials determined that the former manager of the Gyangro estates was responsible for 
the violence because he had attempted illegally shuantou Khagya in its entirety to 
                                                
1071 QSDG (GX 16/12/12), 7-YJ-2955:《委員、循化廳、河州鎮等為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥請
示的稟》. 
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Labrang. The Sétsang zongguan, the magistrates wrote, would continue to exercise 
overall control in the region. Both sides, however, were charged five hundred liang of 
silver in court fees. The officials wrote that by this they hoped to deter further 
litigation.1072 
1891: The Conclusion of the Case: “Protecting Terlung, Protecting the Frontier” 
 
 
 As if following a fixed seasonal pattern, friction between Khagya, Labrang, and 
Terlung increased during the late winter and early spring of 1891 and eventually sparked 
large-scale violence during the summer months. According to the Khagya chiliarch, the 
feud had resumed just a day after Anfu and Cangyun had departed Khagya on January 23, 
1891 (GX 16/12/14) when the representative of the Sétsang’s interests in Khagya, the 
Zhazan lama again refused to allow the monks to assemble for prayers.1073 The Terlung 
general administrator (zongguan) reported the first deaths of the year to the subprefecture 
on August 13.1074 He argued that the Jamyang Zhepa was taking advantage of the fact 
that there was no adult Sétsang lama to serve as general administrator and that the estate 
was struggling to collect its dues. The Terlung steward filed a second, more extensive 
complaint several days later. In his suit, the Terlung steward wrote that the tensions had 
flared shortly after the Jamyang Zhepa and his entourage had met with the governor-
general during his official visit to Hezhou in June. The governor-general had traveled to 
Hezhou to review the garrison’s troops. “While on his way home … The Jamyang Zhepa 
                                                
1072 QSDG (GX 16/12/12), 7-YJ-2955:《委員、循化廳、河州鎮等為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥請
示的稟》. 
 
1073 QSDG (GX 17/11/18), 7-YJ-4654: 《卡加千戶為札咱喇嘛搶殺上的稟》. 
 
1074 QSDG (GX 17/07/09), 7-YJ-4654: 《沙溝總管狀告嘉木樣的稟》. 
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dispatched an urgent messenger, the lama Sai-kang-mei-zhou, to Khagya monastery. He 
gathered together the lay and monastic subjects of the Gyangro, slaughtered a pig, and 
said that the four head monks of the monastery were all the Jamyang Zhepa’s and that the 
honpo is the Gyangro chiliarch.”1075 The Terlung steward then noted that the Jamyang 
Zhepa had undertook a variety of provocative acts, including monk officials to collect 
funds and breaking ground on the construction of his own manor at the monastery. 
Moreover, when arguments broke out concerning the use of local forest resources for 
building the Jamyang Zhepa’s manor, a man who disagreed with the project was stabbed 
to death. Terlung had dispatched “elders” to investigate the situation, but this move had 
only resulted in an even larger armed attack by the Gyangro chiliarch that resulted in the 
deaths of a further five people in Terlung.  
 The plaintiff then underlined for the subprefect what he felt was at stake in the 
feud:  
When your runners went to instruct and suppress, [Labrang] didn’t take 
the slightest heed! That Jamyang and Gyangro are greater than the power 
of your dynasty’s laws. Since their power is great, that Jamyang now has 
even seized over a hundred tenant households from the estate of the Xu-
hu-jia-cang tulku [許乎加倉佛] in the lower valley of the Qitai district 
subordinate to Rongwo and resettled them in the Eight-Cornered-Fort at 
Genkya… Other than on the orders of the imperial law, how can it be 
possible for others to raise a military force? Ten years ago, when the 
Jamyang Zhepa ordered the Guan-qu-hu lama to organize and lead a 
military force, he was arrested and executed according to your imperial 
law. So there is an example and precedent on the books! If the Jamyang is 
again able to gather together soldiers and your imperial law does nothing, 
then what? The area of Genkya is after all under your imperial law, so 
how can it be that they gather troops? You should look into this!1076  
 
                                                
1075 QSDG (GX 17/07/21), 7-YJ-2980: 《沙溝香錯狀告江洛、拉布塄違反舊規事》. 
 
1076 QSDG (GX 17/07/21), 7-YJ-2980: 《沙溝香錯狀告江洛、拉布塄違反舊規事》. 
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 With this incendiary passage, the plaintiffs were clearly trying to goad local Qing 
officials into taking forceful action against Labrang. Not only did they accuse Labrang of 
occupying territory and stealing tax-paying Tibetan commoners, but they insisted that the 
dynasty’s sovereignty in the region was at stake. Just a couple weeks later, the Xunhua 
subprefect found itself receiving additional reports from Rongwo monastery that Labrang 
had also attacked tenants of the Serkhri reincarnation of Tsö monastery.1077 
 In early November, the Xunhua subprefect Cangyun reported his own version of 
events to the Gansu lieutenant governor. He had assembled his own understanding of 
events based on the investigations of the yamen’s clerks and runners. In this case, the 
yamen staff were also assisted by a tulku from Bayanrong subprefecture who traveled to 
Labrang and personally interviewed the Jamyang Zhepa. The yamen staff reported that 
the conflict had begun when someone from Gyangro faction killed a woodworker 
belonging to Sétsang during an argument over whether the woodworker was owed money 
for his work on the Jamyang Zhepa’s new manor. The Terlung community attacked 
Khagya with its militia, “in accordance the old Tibetan codes.”1078 During the melee, 
however, the smaller Terlung force ended up trapped in the main prayer hall. In the 
ensuing battle, nine men from both sides had died. The Gyangro chiliarch then began 
building stone fortifications around the monastery. Their monk investigator confirmed 
the yamen runner’s reports and added that in his own audience with the Jamyang Zhepa 
had repeatedly insisted that he “truly wanted Khagya to return to his control” as well as 
                                                
1077 QSDG (GX 17/08/16), 7-YJ-2980: 《隆務沙力昂鎖、三寺喇嘛、勒工眾僧稟拉卜楞攻打
黑錯》. 
 
1078 “番規.” QSDG (GX 17/10/03, 1891-11-04), 7-YJ-2985: 《循化廳為番僧調查卡家一案給憲
臺的詳報》. 
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revenues from the district and manor house built at the monastery.1079 The monk also 
confirmed that indeed Labrang had resettled sixty-one households of Tibetans in the 
Genkya grasslands. These Tibetans, he wrote, had been enticed by the Jamyang away 
from their grain-taxpaying communities near Repgong with promises of silver and 
livestock.1080   
This time round the subprefect Cangyun placed the blame squarely on the 
Jamyang Zhepa. Moreover, his report to the Gansu lieutenant governor expressed in 
perhaps the strongest terms yet the importance of pursuing a policy of containing 
Labrang: 
Labrang was founded during the Kangxi reign and in the beginning was but 
a tiny speck. Now it stretches contiguously for thousands of li all the way 
from the Sichuan border in the south to where it touches the border of Tibet 
[西藏] in the west. In every new territory it acquires it appoints a monastic 
official and drives out the local chief. By means of its deep accumulation of 
capital and material the monastery grows stronger and wealthier day by 
day. It has only failed to acquire the communities [族] of Tsö, Khagya, 
Rong’ar, Wanggatan, Terlung, and Hortsang. It already possesses the 
Mongols. The Tibetan regions of Sichuan as well as Taozhou, Minzhou, 
and Songpan have all become attached to that monastery. Yet because the 
Southern Tibetans [南番] still stand in their way, [Labrang] has been 
unable to unify the strengths of these places into one. Thus [Labrang] 
slavers night and day over the Khagya community. The moment it acquires 
Khagya, it will possess the key to the Southern Tibetans, as it will have 
split Tsö, Longwa, Terlung, and Hortsang in two and can then pick them 
off at its leisure, one by one, and finally become master of the entire field.  
 
Therefore, in Daoguang 26 [1846] the governor-general placed Tsö 
monastery under the general administration of Rongwo monastery and not 
[Labrang] despite the fact that it was hundreds of li away. In the first year 
of the Guangxu reign [1875], governor-general Zuo placed Khagya under 
                                                
1079 Translated into Chinese, the Jamyang Zhepa reportedly stated, “惟加木樣末尾向我說，他的
真情是要卡加歸他管，要江洛千戶給他熬茶六個分子.” See, QSDG (GX 17/10/03, 1891-11-
04), 7-YJ-2985: 《循化廳為番僧調查卡家一案給憲臺的詳報》. 
 
1080 QSDG (GX 17/10/03, 1891-11-04), 7-YJ-2985: 《循化廳為番僧調查卡家一案給憲臺的詳
報》. 
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the control of the general administrator of Terlung and thus also did not 
return it to [Labrang]. With regards to the White earth slope case of 1889, 
our [current] governor-general took a far-sighted view of the frontier and 
issued a license that again placed the tribes of Khagya and Rong'ar under 
the control of the Terlung General Administrator and did not permit them 
to be governed by [Labrang]. Near and far there are none who do not look 
upward with amazement at the wisdom of our governor, whose thought is 
like a candle illuminating the distance and perceives the treacherous details, 
his subtle plan brings peace to the frontier and steers/controls the Fan. By 
protecting Terlung we protect the frontier and split the power [of the 
Tibetans]. This should certainly not be misunderstood as showing favor to 
Terlung.1081 
 
A month after dispatching this report, the subprefect, together with the former 
prefect Anfu, headed south from Hezhou with a contingent of forty to fifty cavalry to 
investigate yet one more time. At around the same time, the Jamyang Zhepa submitted 
his own account of the conflict directly to the governor-general, much as he had in 
previous years. First, the Jamyang Zhepa dismissed as “trumped up and concocted” the 
accusations that he was asserting his hegemony over Khagya monastery. Second, he 
described how during the Muslim rebellion, the troops led by the Rong’ar nangso had 
massacred over one hundred households subordinate to Labrang that resided in Genkya. 
“Ever since, bullies from Rong’ar and Terlung have robbed merchants traveling to 
Labrang through this region. This year, since our losses were particularly heavy and there 
was no one in the area to come to the aid [of travelers], I decided to settle commoners at 
the head of the road through Genkya. Henceforth, if travelers are still attacked, these 
households will be held responsible.”1082 Finally, the Jamyang Zhepa accused the leaders 
                                                
1081 QSDG (GX 17/10/03, 1891-11-04), 7-YJ-2985: 《循化廳為番僧調查卡家一案給憲臺的詳
報》. 
 
1082 QSDG (GX 17/11/09), 7-YJ-2988: 《陝甘總督為拉卜楞嘉木樣呼圖克圖的稟札循化廳查
辦事》. 
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of Terlung of launching attacked on a Labrang ally that resulted in the sacking of a 
Buddhist chapel and “innumerable deaths.”1083  
The governor-general was unimpressed with this argument, however. In his 
memorandum to Xunhua subprefecture, he wondered why, if the raiding in Genkya was 
so egregious, this was the first time the Gansu provincial government was receiving news 
of it. Unsurprisingly, the committee of Qing officials in Khagya were equally unmoved 
by this argument. In their final decision, issued on or before January 14, 1892, their 
censure fell heavily on the Jamyang Zhepa for “plotting to acquire more vassals.”1084 
They determined that the settlers in Genkya would be considered subjects of the Xunhua 
subprefecture and, if after three years their efforts at farming and herding proved 
successful, they would begin to submit taxes to the dynasty. The Jamyang Zhepa signed a 
personal pledge to observe this decision. He formally recognized “his guilt” and that the 
households he had settled in Genkya were now “commoners (百姓),” and therefore 
“subject to the control of the imperial household (歸與皇上家管束).”1085 In writing (in 
Chinese) he agreed not to attempt to shuantou additional populations of Tibetans. 
 As for the Gyangro chiliarch and the Zhazan lama of the Sétsang estate, both 
were to be cashiered. The Zhazan lama, however, was also ordered to serve five years in 
prison in the jail of Gaolan county (i.e. Lanzhou). With regards to the murders and 
robberies of the past year, the officials oversaw the negotiation of a new schedule of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1083 QSDG (GX 17/11/09), 7-YJ-2988: 《陝甘總督為拉卜楞嘉木樣呼圖克圖的稟札循化廳查
辦事》. 
 
1084 QSDG (GX 17/12/25, 1892-12-24) 7-YJ-2983: 《委員、循化同知奉委查辦南番各案訊結
情形》. 
 
1085 QSDG (GX 17/12/15) 7-YJ-2990: 《拉卜楞寺嘉木樣呼圖克圖所具甘結》. 
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reparations according to the “Tibetan statutes (番規)” by a group of “Chinese and 
Tibetan village elders.”1086 This group again included Ma Haiyan and a number of other 
Muslim gentry from Hezhou as well as leaders from Mewo and Tsö monasteries. 
The committee of Qing officials made one further decision of significance. 
Finding that the enmity between the two factions at Khagya monastery had proven 
insurmountable despite three years of litigation, they ruled that Khagya monastery would 
be divided. The Sétsang supporters were to establish a new monastery further up the 
valley.1087 This was set out in a separate agreement (“甘結”) that was guaranteed by 
representatives of Mewo and Tsö monasteries and signed by the new Gyangro chiliarch, 
and the steward of the Sétsang general administrator. The agreement lists in considerable 
detail the process by which the monastic community at Khagya would be separated and 
the property divided.1088 The authors of this decision intended that the division of the 
monastery would put an end to the conflicting claims of the Sétsang and Gyangro tulkus 
(and their estates) to Khagya monastery. However, much as they had a year earlier, the 
committee resolved that overall administrative authority for the Khagya region remained 
                                                
1086 QSDG (GX 17/12/25, 1892-12-24) 7-YJ-2983: 《委員、循化同知奉委查辦南番各案訊結
情形》. 
 
1087 QSDG (GX 17/12/25, 1892-12-24) 7-YJ-2983: 《委員、循化同知奉委查辦南番各案訊結
情形》. The archival record contains some indications that the division of the Khagya monastery 
was an outcome desired by the Sétsang faction. In a petition from earlier in the year, the Khagya 
chiliarch accused the Zhazan lama of openly plotting to divide the monastery—a result that 
certainly was not in the interest of the Khagya chiliarch who had consistently claimed authority 
over the entire monastery. See, QSDG (GX 17/11/18), 7-YJ-4654: 《卡加千戶為劄咱喇嘛搶殺
上的稟》. 
 
1088 The two sides could not be completely disentangled, however. For example, the complexity 
of this arrangement was such that nine households, although belonging to the Sétsang estate, still 
had rent obligations to the Gyangro estate. The agreement (甘結) detailed numerous similar 
arrangements in which specific households had divided obligations. QSDG (GX 16/12/23), 7-YJ-
2983: 《黑錯、買吾承保卡家、沙溝等具的甘結》. 
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in the hands of the Sétsang zongguan. By this the officials seem to have meant that any 
major business that involved Khagya and neighboring communities. In contrast they 
wrote, “Major public affairs of the Khagya valley shall be in general handled by the 
chiliarch.”1089  
The division of the monastery appears to have successfully brought large-scale 
feuding between the Khagya chiliarch and the Sétsang lama to a close. It was not until 
1898 that another major round of violence would break out between Labrang and its 
allies and the Rongwo-Tsö-Terlung confederation. Between 1875 and 1892, however, 
Qing officials, and especially the Manchu bannermen Anfu and Cangyun, had become a 
familiar presence at Labrang and surrounding monasteries and cases handled by these 
two officials had led to in several changes in Xunhua. First, among Qing officials, 
attitudes and policies shifted considerably. Whereas in 1875 Qing adjudicators viewed 
the case involving Khagya, Rong’ar and Terlung as a local feud, in 1891, tensions 
between these monasteries were scanned for machinations of Labrang monastery and 
other “outside” forces.1090 During the last twenty years of the dynasty, Qing officials 
understood Xunhua and the Sino-Tibetan frontier in general as a zone of contention 
between large monastic states. As described by the subprefect Cangyun, Qing policy, 
therefore, was necessarily devoted to blunting their rise and balancing their powers and 
Labrang in particular had become the focus of an explicit policy of containment. Yet this 
outcome was contingent on subjective perspectives and the course of events. From the 
                                                
1089 This particular clause reads in full: “惟江洛仍歸沙溝總管，四溝遇有大公事歸千戶總辦，
俾符執照舊章。” See, QSDG (GX 17/12/25, 1892-12-24) 7-YJ-2983: 《委員、循化同知奉委
查辦南番各案訊結情形. 
 
1090 QSDG (GX 16/12/12), 7-YJ-2955:《委員、循化廳、河州鎮等為處理卡家、沙溝爭鬥請
示的稟》. 
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late 1880s-on, Qing officials worried most about the rising power of Labrang. Yet as 
recently as 1883 (GX 09), the Xunhua subprefect was on record as claiming that Rongwo 
represented the greater threat to regional security.1091  
Second, the litigation process between 1889 and 1892 not only helped reify a 
system of competing monastic confederations, it also contributed to the general 
politicization of religious activities in Xunhua. Pious activities such as pilgrimage, 
almsgiving, itinerant travel by monks or tulkus, and even large prayer ceremonies such as 
those held during the New Year’s celebrations at Khagya monastery become the focus of 
violent legal politicking with significant implications for religious practice and even 
freedom of movement within Xunhua. Qing officials found themselves responsible for 
overseeing the “rectification” of these relationships in a series of new contracts and 
accords negotiated during this period. The ultimate division of Khagya monastery into to 
separate entities was an extreme expression of this trend. 
 
 
Conclusion: Making a “Tibetan World (番宇)” 
 
This chapter has explored just a few of moments from an extensive record of 
“Tibetan cases” that were handled by the Xunhua subprefect and other Qing officials 
from the administration of Gansu province and Qinghai between 1872 and 1912. The 
engagement of local Tibetans from Labrang and other monastic polities in Amdo with the 
Qing’s colonial administration was extensive and intensive, a fact best demonstrated by 
                                                
1091 QSDG (GX 09/07/01, 1883-8-8), 7-YJ-2727: 《循化廳為隆務寺準備攻打河南蒙古上的
稟》. 
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the registers (號薄) of daily business assigned to the clerks and runners of the Xunhua 
yamen. On a single day in August of 1889, for instance, the magistrate authorized 68 
separate items of business touching on Tibetan affairs—most of it relating to feuds or 
criminal cases.1092 This day was to some degree atypical—it fell in the midst of the 
magistrate’s busy season (late summer through fall) and during the process of handling a 
particularly important case. A more typical workload consisted of twenty to thirty items 
of business per day during the spring and summer.1093 The contingent handling of these 
cases and other Tibetan affairs had a profound affect on the both the development of the 
large monastic polities of Labrang and Rongwo as well as the daily lives of individual 
Tibetan households. 
It has recently been asserted that during the late Qing, Labrang monastery was a 
polity “ruling an area about the size of Switzerland.”1094 On the basis of the archival 
record from Xunhua subprefecture, this and other portrayals of Labrang as a unified, 
contiguous and autonomous domain tamed and organized around the charisma of the 
Jamyang Zhepa are problematic in several respects.1095 First, it should now be clear that 
several neighboring monasteries such as Tsö, Rongwo, and Terlung fiercely contested 
Labrang’s control, resulting in a much more complex patchwork of allegiances and 
estates. The Fourth Jamyang Zhepa (1856-1916), far from serving as a rallying point for 
                                                
1092 QSDG (GX 15/07/12, 1889-8-8), 7-YJ-4058: 《會銜差遣號薄》. 
 
1093 See for instance: QSDG (GX/12/07/22), 7-YJ-4058: 《行轅文移諭示稟各件號薄》; (GX 
15/06), 7-YJ-4059:《光緒十五年六月行轅差遣號薄》; (GX 15/07), 7-YJ-4059: 《光緒十五年
七月會銜文移號薄》. 
 
1094 Kurtis R. Schaeffer, Matthew T. Kapstein, and Gray Tutltle, eds., Sources of Tibetan 
Tradition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 601. 
 
1095 For such characterizations, see Nietupski (2011), and Charlene Makley, The Violence of 
Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 39-40. 
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Tibetan Buddhists around the region was to the contrary the focus of ongoing 
calumniation from multiple quarters, including from within Labrang itself. Second, this 
characterization oversimplifies the layered and multivalent obligations held by many 
Tibetan households that might have considered themselves affiliated with Labrang. The 
newly transplanted farming families in Genkya, for instance, probably felt some 
connection to the Jamyang Zhepa for having assisted with their resettlement, but they 
also owed tax to the Xunhua subprefect. Labrang itself was not exempted from certain 
limited tax responsibilities. In the 1870s, Zuo Zongtang compelled Labrang to permit 
provincial authorities to begin collecting tax duties on transactions in the monastery’s 
marketplace. Third, while Labrang did retain its own internal judicial system, it also 
participated in a legal order centered on Xunhua subprefecture and other local 
representatives of the Qing state. And far from being imposed from above, the Jamyang 
Zhepa and other indigenous authorities linked to Labrang actively sought out this legal 
regime and helped shape it and the meaning of Qing sovereignty (“王法”) through their 
legal agency. In their own words, Qing sovereignty was directly associated with the 
operation of the Qing criminal code. In this sense, it would also be a mistake to view 
Labrang and the broader Amdo region as a northern extension of what James C. Scott has 
elaborated as “Zomia”—a region of highland Asia in which the indigenous inhabitants 
actively sought to avoid the trappings of the state.1096 Far from being a region beyond the 
reach of the Qing colonial state, Labrang was an active participant in the creation of a 
state-centered pluralistic colonial legal order.  
                                                
1096 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 
ix-x. 
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The growing presence of the Qing state in local legal matters and Tibetan affairs 
more generally was not an outcome universally welcomed by Qing officialdom. In 1899 
the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, Tao Mo, found himself deeply involved in 
one of the most difficult cases the Qing had faced since the recovery of the region in the 
aftermath of the Muslim Rebellions. Provincial officials handling the case in the field 
pressured the governor-general to not only dispatch a large punitive military force against 
Labrang and a local lay headman allied with Labrang, but to also eliminate the fourth 
Jamyang Zhepa as a political ruler (literally, “melt down the seals of the kūtuktu”).1097  
The conflict concerned the appointment of the abbot at the “Old” monastery in 
Dzögé Mewo, a district located between Tsö and Labrang monastery. According to a 
petition written in Tibetan by local headmen, during the Xianfeng reign (1851-1861) the 
leading reincarnate monk and abbot of the monastery, the Tawönba lama (Tib. TA dbon 
ba, Ch. 達瓮巴 or 達羊巴喇嘛) broke with Labrang and moved to Tsö monastery. 
However, Tawönba suddenly claimed that he had been abducted by Tsö monastery and a 
conflict erupted between the two regions resulting in the death of 299 people. After an 
outside tulku negotiated a settlement, the Tawönba lama returned to the original 
monastery in Dzögé Mewo. Yet the monastic community, deeming him responsible for 
the mayhem that had engulfed their community, took the radical step of executing the 
Tawönba. Subsequently, the lay and monastic community of Dzögé Mewo invited 
Labrang to appoint the abbots and oversee the monastery. Things remained peaceful until 
the late 1880s when it was suddenly learned that the Tawönba lama had reincarnated in 
                                                
1097 QSDG (GX 24/03R/25), 7-YJ-2918: 《洮州廳為辦理黑錯與買吾衝突上陝甘總督、甘肅
布政使等的稟》. The Taozhou subprefect was particularly incensed by the fact that he had been 
compelled to prostrate before the Jamyang Zhepa during an audience. 
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Choné, several days travel to the southeast.1098 The reincarnation of the Tawönba lama 
posed a number of thorny questions: Should the Tawönba return? Was the child entitled 
to property and status at his original seat monastery? Tsö monastery thought so. Yet the 
headmen of Dzögé were adamant that this would not occur. The resolution of these 
questions had significant implications for their long-standing relationship with Labrang. 
Where they vassals of Labrang? Did Labrang have a right to shuantou Dzögé Mewo? 
Could Labrang help prevent the return of Tawönba? Tensions became more acute in the 
late 1890s when the child approached adulthood and a number of monks at the Old 
Monastery in Dzögé Mewo voiced support for the Tawönba’s return. These monks, who 
all hailed from the local community yet appear to have had educational ties to Tsö, were 
then subject to a debate over whether their loyalty should lie first with their home lay 
community in Dzögé Mewo or with their lines of monastic discipleship in Tsö.1099 In 
1898, these contentious issues erupted in a spate of violence that quickly dragged in 
Labrang and Rongwo monasteries and their respective alliances, and resulted in multiple 
abductions and the deaths of several dozen people, including a headman from Dzögé 
Mewo. Much of the Old Monastery was also destroyed.1100  
                                                
1098 QSDG (Date uncertain), 7-YJ-2911: 《作格全體頭人呈循化廳的稟》. A Tibetan-language 
petition was also filed under the name of the Tawönba: QSDG (GX 25/02/08), 7-YJ-2930: 《達
羊巴佛僧致循化廳的稟》. 
 
1099 QSDG (GX 24/03R/25), 7-YJ-2918: 《洮州廳為辦理黑錯與買吾衝突上陝甘總督、甘肅
布政使等的稟》. 
 
1100 Among those abducted were the thirteen-year-old Tawonba and numerous monks from Dzögé 
Mewo. The murder of the Mewo honpo was, according to Labrang, gratuitously violent. See, 
QSDG (GX 25), 7-YJ-2921: 《拉卜楞寺為黑錯不遵約定上循化廳的稟》. For overall 
summaries of the conflict, see: QSDG (GX 25/12/28, 1900-1-28), 7-YJ-2925: 《會辦番案詳報
擬結折稿》; (GX 24/03R/25), 7-YJ-2918: 《洮州廳為辦理黑錯與買吾衝突上陝甘總督、甘
肅布政使等的稟》. 
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The case severely taxed Qing administrative resources over the course of 1898-
1899. Litigants in the case rushed to file their plaints with the Qing administration and 
aggressively “forum shopped.” In the early Guangxu period Dzögé Mewo had been 
shifted from the jurisdiction of Xunhua subprefecture to Taozhou subprefecture. This 
meant that two different subprefectural yamens potentially had jurisdiction. Litigants 
from both Tsö and Dzögé Mewo bounced between the two subprefectural yamens 
seeking favorable hearings.1101 Moreover, Labrang and Rongwo both lodged appeals 
directly to upper levels of the provincial administration (the Jamyang Zhepa even 
traveled in person to Lanzhou to meet with the governor-general).1102 As settlements 
were successively reached and discarded, Qing officials in Taozhou and Xunhua, as well 
as the Xining circuit intendant, citing the advice of Ma Anliang, increasingly pushed the 
governor-general to authorize the Hezhou garrison to impose a solution.1103  
The governor-general Tao consistently resisted this strategy. He warned his 
subordinates that such a move ran the risk of exacerbating the conflict: “Although the 
Tibetans are brave, wild, and extremely stupid, the moment we dispatch troops to the 
region, we will also have to provide livestock, grain and fodder to supply them which 
runs the risk of giving rise to bad old habits (i.e. corruption). The fact that these two sides 
cannot conclude their matter [peacefully] will cause innocent and good Tibetans to suffer 
                                                
1101 Mutual accusations that the other party was attempting to bribe either Taozhou or Xunhua 
soon followed. 
 
1102 In Lanzhou, the Jamyang Zhepa not only represented Dzögé against Tsö, he also accused Ma 
Anliang of attempting to frame him for various crimes. See, QSDG (GX 24/04/13), 7-YJ-2914: 
《循化廳書辦為黑錯、買吾衝突呈循化廳的稟》; (GX 24/03R/15), 7-YJ-2918: 《鎮南營馬
統領為奉札會查黑錯、買吾糾紛申請事》; and (GX 24/08/05), 7-YJ-2919: 《循化廳為拉卜
楞寺所上稟給襄佐回的諭》. 
 
1103 QSDG (GX 25/10/28), 7-YJ-2935: 《陝甘總督陶為黑錯、買吾番案札循化廳》; (GX 
25/11/03), 2923: 《陝甘總督陶為處理南番黑錯與買吾衝突事給循化廳的批文》. 
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the burden of supplying our troops. We must reconsider this matter.”1104 The governor-
general’s main argument was that he did not trust his own officials, and perhaps more 
obliquely Ma Anliang, to not abuse their authority. His son, Tao Baolian, was even more 
blunt than his father:   
When officials and officers of the interior travel out [beyond the passes] 
on business, regardless of whether they are merely transmitting 
instructions to the pastures or defending the capital, these great chiefs 
bully gifts of cash and livestock out of the people who have gathered to 
greet them. If they take only a little, [the people] are not overly resentful. 
If they ask nothing, the people are especially relieved. But some seize the 
opportunity and take as much as they can, even extracting people's 
treasure and daughters. At this [the people] bite their tongues in silent 
fury. Therefore, officials lust after such trips as a chance to strike it rich, 
while the Tibetan tribes [番族] come to see Chinese officialdom as largely 
corrupt. On the outside they appear respectful to the point of 
obsequiousness. Yet their hearts could not be further away. The 
government officials boast, ‘These are the people whom I restrain!’ The 
people of the felt tents mutter under their breaths, ‘These are the people 
whom we indulge.’1105 
 
Governor-general Tao was concerned, however, with more than just limiting 
opportunities for official corruption. He was also interested in reversing the direct 
engagement of Tibetans in the Qing legal order. For instance, from a very early moment 
in the management of the case he advised the Xunhua and Taozhou subprefects to avail 
themselves first of whatever local, Tibetan intermediaries he could find and make sure 
that the cases were handled according to the “Tibetan regulations.” These instructions 
went as far as to recommend that the officials avoid dispatching clerks and runners 
                                                
1104 QSDG (GX 25/10/28), 7-YJ-2935: 《陝甘總督陶為黑錯、買吾番案札循化廳》. 
 
1105 Tao Baolian, 241: “內地官弁以事往，無論為牧令、為都守，其豪酋召集男婦跪迎斂錢
及羊馬為贐。少納無怨，不納尤感。或因緣多取之，甚至索女索金，亦敢怒不敢言。窮員
方羨為利籔，番族視華官多貪鄙，貌甚恭，心益離。官府大言曰：此吾所羈縻者也。氈帳
竊曰：此吾所敷衍者也。” 
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directly to the Tibetan litigants.1106 With these instructions the governor-general also 
revealed the degree to which high-ranking Qing officials were becoming concerned that 
the Tibetan legal order was not merely being integrated into a centralized legal order, but 
rather eradicated by it. In this respect, the situation faced by governor-general Tao 
mirrored that of colonial America, Australia, and India where colonial officials faced 
pressure from both settler movements and sometimes indigenes themselves to eliminate 
pluralism and unify the legal order around the legal tradition of the metropole.1107 
As in the British Empire, the seeming “barbarism” of the indigenous legal order 
became a rallying point for local efforts to promote greater state sovereignty in indirectly 
administered regions. In Amdo, the most salient example of this was ongoing effort of 
some members of the Muslim gentry of Hezhou, and Ma Anliang in particular, to expose 
the internal legal regime at Labrang as “barbaric” and unjust. Starting in the 1880s, a 
steady stream of reports arrived in Xunhua subprefecture from Ma Anliang and 
associated Muslim gentry and traders accusing Labrang of operating a vast jail complex 
where travelers, both Tibetan and Hui, were subject to arbitrary detention, torture, and 
expropriation. 1108  Tibetans, as well, such as the Shartsang Rinpoché of Rongwo 
                                                
1106 QSDG (GX 24/04/15), 7-YJ-4164: 《陝甘總督為查辦買吾、黑錯番案的札》.  
 
1107 Elizabeth Kolsky provides an extensive account of these pressures in British India in, 
Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 12-15. For examples from colonial America and Australia, see: Lisa 
Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-
1836. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 4, 43, 86, 95. 
 
1108 QSDG (GX 15/12/19), 7-YJ-3132: 《马尕五为桑吉勒赎上循化厅的禀》; (GX 16/01/24), 
7-YJ-3131: 《循化廳為⾺馬尕⾦金被害事具的詳報》.  
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monastery lodged similar accusations against the Jamyang Zhepa.1109 Authorities in 
Hezhou and Xunhua ruled that Labrang’s jails were illegal and a violation of the 
prerogatives of the dynasty. However, other than offering to remove the prisoners and try 
them according to the “Tibetan Code,” Qing officials seem to have taken little direct 
action.1110 Yet their continued support for a directly supervised “Tibetan” legal tradition 
was notable given the pressures brought to bear by the Muslim gentry. 
In 1899, the conflict between Dzögé Mewo and Tsö was ultimately resolved 
without resorting to Ma Anliang’s military force. As noted above, Tao Mo’s reluctance to 
sanction the military expedition was a result of his fear that such a force would inevitably 
do more harm than good. It may also have been a reflection of a desire to reverse the 
influence of the Muslim military elite of Hezhou in the Tibetan regions of Xunhua. Tao 
was adamant that he wanted the subprefects to avail themselves first of indigenous 
Tibetan mediators.1111 However, while the party that negotiated the final settlement 
included several prominent Tibetans from both Rongwo and Labrang monasteries, 
several Muslim gentry were also involved and signed as guarantors (although this group 
did not include Ma Anliang).1112  Their appearance in this settlement underlines the fact 
                                                
1109 QSDG (GX 15/08/30), 7-YJ-4535: 《循化厅为沙力仓昂锁等禀控拉卜楞私设班房下的
谕》. Rongwo was itself also accused of operating an illegal jail: QSDG (GX 09/07/01, 1883-8-
8), 7-YJ-2727: 《循化廳為隆務寺準備攻打河南蒙古上的稟》. 
 
1110 QSDG (GX 16/01/24), 7-YJ-2960: 《嘉木样状告隆务属番族的禀与循化厅回的谕》& 
《循化厅为马尕金被害事具的详报》; (GX 16/02R/07), 7-YJ-3131: 《河州州镇批准循化厅
长丞》. 
 
1111 QSDG (GX 24/04/15), 7-YJ-4164: 《陝甘總督為查辦買吾、黑錯番案的札》. 
 
1112 For the original text of the final settlement, see: QSDG (GX 25/12/26), 7-YJ-2925: 《黑錯、
德爾隆與買吾糾紛得調節方案》. For a description of the settlement process, see: QSDG (GX 
25/12/28, 1900-1-28), 7-YJ-2925: 《會辦番案詳報擬結折稿》 
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that in the aftermath of the Muslim rebellions, the newly recognized Hui gentry had 
become seemingly indispensible interlocutors between the Qing state and Tibetans in 
Xunhua. For the period covered by the Xunhua subprefectural archive (roughly 1872-
1912), it is difficult to locate a “Tibetan case” that did not involve consultation with 
Muslim gentry from Hezhou or Muslim grain-tax collectors who had formal affiliation 
with the subprefectural yamen in Xunhua town. 
The impact of the gentrification of Muslims in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands was 
profound. Once Muslim military commanders such as Ma Zhan’ao and his son Ma 
Anliang were formally incorporated into the local civil and military administrative 
system, it became institutional habit, as well as a convenience, to turn first to these men 
for advice on Tibetan affairs. The availability of Tibetan “expertise” within the system 
reduced the incentive for direct consultation first with indigenous Tibetan elites and 
therefore opened up a gap between provincial authorities and their Tibetan counterparts. 
The Jamyang Zhepa might still be able to demand an audience with the Xining amban or 
the governor-general, but the perspective of the monk was identified as a “petition” or 
“supplication” (i.e. a bing 稟). For confidential advice on policy, high-ranking officials 
were more likely to draw on the advice of Ma Zhan’ao or his sons, forwarded internally 
up the bureaucracy in reports and memorandums from Hezhou or Xunhua. Tao Mo, for 
instance, in choosing a course of action in 1899, was deliberating policy suggestions that 
originated with Ma Anliang, not the Jamyang Zhepa. As a result, from the 1870s through 
the early 1900s, from the perspective of Qing officials’ documents from Gansu and 
Qinghai, Tibetan Buddhist elites went from being “allies” to “indigenes.” This 
aboriginalization of Tibetans was intertwined with the emergence of the Hui as the key 
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strategic partner in the governance of the Sino-Tibetan frontier. The scope of the Muslim 
rebellions had forced Qing policy makers to recognize the power of the Muslims of 
Gansu in an unprecedented fashion. The “discovery” of the Muslims during the late Qing 
led to a significant new role for Chinese Muslims in the national politics of the late Qing 
empire.  
Tibetan elites in Xunhua were not passive observers of this process. Tibetan 
litigants sought out the offices of Muslim gentry and/or xiejia, often on the basis of what 
appear to have been unofficial or tacit alliances that had emerged from the period of 
Muslim rule in southern Gansu during the rebellion. It appears that Terlung monastery in 
particular had found reasons for common cause with Ma Zhan’ao and his son Ma Anliang 
throughout the Guangxu reign. In 1875, 1889-1892, and again in 1898, Terlung found 
allies for its positions with Ma Zhan’ao and Ma Anliang. Labrang as well eventually 
found Muslim allies among the sons of Ma Qianling (馬千齡)—Ma Fuxiang (馬福祥) 
and Ma Fulu (馬福祿). During the Muslim rebellion of 1895 that engulfed much of 
Xunhua and Hezhou, this lineage of Qing-allied Muslim gentry found refuge at Labrang 
from the ferocious infighting between Muslim factions in Hezhou. The decision to harbor 
this lineage bore fruit for Labrang in the late Qing and even in the period of the early 
Republic. The sons of the family went on to serve the Qing court in the defense of 
Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion and subsequently rose to positions of prominence 
both in the Qing military and in the Gansu provincial government. A grandson of Ma 
Qianling ultimately established himself as the chairman of Suiyuan (Ningxia) province 
and was a major player in Republican politics during the 1930s. From its powerbase in 
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Yinchuan, the family offered both financial and political support to Labrang well into the 
1940s.1113   
Yet it was perhaps the pluralistic legal order itself that served to reify and 
institutionalize the difference between Tibetan, Han, and Hui in Xunhua, despite the fact 
that the Qing gradually came to view all three of these groups, including the majority of 
Tibetans in Xunhua, as “tax-paying commoners.” This chapter has labored to argue that 
the “Tibetan” legal tradition in Xunhua entailed not simply the implementation or 
adoption of a pre-existing Tibetan legal system. To the contrary, “Tibetan law” (variously 
Tibetan “codes,” “statutes,” or “regulations”) was a unique fabrication of the Qing 
colonial context. At their point of origin during the Yongzheng reign, the official 
“Tibetan code” had emerged (albeit murkily) from what the dynasty perceived to be 
“Mongol” legal traditions. Around the imperially-sanctioned idea of a timeless, “Tibetan” 
criminal code, Qing officials and Tibetan litigants gradually built a scaffolding of accords, 
contracts, pledges, and other precedents (or “old roads” according to Tibetans) that 
established an increasingly elaborate framework for the political-economy of the 
monastic polities of Amdo. Having formally established the office of the local magistrate 
as the center of a pluralistic legal order, Qing officials could not help but be exposed to 
the “foreignness” of Tibetan culture. The subprefects frequently found themselves 
investigating and adjudicating conflicts that were vastly different from what they had 
been exposed to within the interior of China proper. Moreover, when Tibetan litigants 
self-consciously spoke (or wrote) from their “barbarian” script they could not help 
remind Qing officials of the gap between “Tibetan customs” and those of the interior. By 
                                                
1113  See Ma Hongkui’s autobiography: Ma Xiaoyun huiyi lu (Hong Kong: Wenyi shuwo, 1984), 
7-19. 
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default these encounters also accentuated the relative familiarity of the Muslim gentry 
with their “Neo-Confucian” educations and exam credentials. 
During the late Guangxu reign, Qing officials in Gansu (and sometimes their 
sons) feared the unification of a “Tibetan world” under the auspices of the Jamyang 
Zhepa at Labrang and sought to postpone its arrival through their adjudication of 
conflicts between Labrang and its neighbors.1114 Contingent results of these labors 
included both the establishment of the Sétsang lama as the general administrator of 
Terlung and Khagya and eventually the division of Khagya monastery. The 
institutionalization of a broad alliance of anti-Labrang monasteries centered at Rongwo 
monastery was of even more significant outcome. Within official circles, the very idea 
that Tibetans could unify into a single political structure was novel to the Guangxu reign 
and it coexisted awkwardly with an equally pervasive notion that the Tibetans, unlike the 
Hui or the Salars, were inherently factious. This latter opinion was voiced by Nayanceng 
in 1807 when he observed in an oft-cited memorial to the court that, “The Tibetans reside 
in dispersed tribes. Since their nature is greedy and suspicious, they frequently trespass 
against each other and cannot act in unison.”1115 It was for this reason that some Qing 
officials believed that violence among Tibetans was unlikely to rise to the level of 
“rebellion” as it was wont in the case of Muslims.1116 
The Tibetans were disunited, but, “Their character is essentially obedient and, 
although not inherently difficult to govern, as a result of the pollution of their customs, 
                                                
1114 QSDG (GX 16/01/08), 7-YJ-2958: 《循化廳為卡家案上的申牒》. 
 
1115 Memorial reproduced in Song Tingsheng, Nayancheng Qinghai zouyi (Xining: Qinghai 
renmin chubanshe, 1997), 67. 
 
1116 QSDG (GX 06/10/15), 7-YJ-2697: 《署青海大臣為查辦多娃、蒙古案給循化廳、委員等
的札》; QSDG (undated, but probably after 1902), 7-YJ-4288: 《循化廳照抄西寧道告示》. 
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they have become extraordinarily litigious.” So wrote Huo Leyi (霍勤燡), the second-to-
last circuit intendant to serve in Xining before the fall of the dynasty in a proclamation he 
distributed to the Xunhua subprefect. The litigiousness of the region, the circuit intendant 
opined, “Was not due to the peoples’ innate stubbornness but a result of the fact that they 
have rarely received moral instruction, the responsibility for which lies with the officials 
and not the people.”1117 This chapter has shown that the Tibetans of Xunhua made 
extensive use of the Qing judicial apparatus. Unlike Huo Leyi, however, I interpret this as 
a sign of the relative success of the system as opposed to the moral failure of dynasty’s 
field officials. While the Tibetans’ use of the system should not be mistaken as a sign that 
they found it legitimate, it can be interpreted as an indication that they saw the potential 
to turn the litigation process to their own advantage. Moreover, although Tibetans in 
Xunhua were indeed litigious, they all met before the magistrate as “Tibetans.”  
The Amdo region was highly fractured, not merely between different sects but 
within the Gelukpa as well. All the monasteries mentioned in this chapter identified 
themselves as Gelukpa, yet this shared scholastic orientation guaranteed no degree of 
political cohesion. Tibetan Buddhism was not the only way of producing and maintaining 
“Tibetan” identity across a vast and complex terrain that had engendered a diversity of 
ways of life and community structures. The ongoing and dialogic negotiation of 
“Tibetanness” in the context of legal politicking in Qing courts helped make Tibetans. 
The potential existence of a “Tibetan” ethnic identity was perhaps most visible in the 
context of “Tibetan law,” a category that itself was perhaps most salient in the context of 
the pluralistic legal order shouldered by the overworked and ill-equipped local 
                                                
1117 QSDG, 7-YJ-4288: 《循化廳照抄西寧道告示》. 
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subprefects and their Muslim interlocutors. In this respect, the “Tibetan world” was at 
least partially a product of Qing colonial administrators, despite their best efforts to 
obstruct its emergence. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire 
 
 
In the late 1700s, Qing colonial administrators of the Qianlong reign began to 
view indigenous legal and administrative institutions in Amdo and central Tibet as 
increasingly defeasible. First, beyond the original (Kangxi-reign) borders of Gansu 
province, Qianlong’s advisors began establishing a series of subprefectures to prepare 
Tibetan populations for incorporation into the administrative system of the Chinese 
provinces and the application of the legal code that prevailed therein. Second, in the 
1790s, concern for the dangers posed by unregulated and unsupervised divination in 
central Tibet prompted the Qianlong emperor to impose a suite of new laws regulating 
these rituals. Over the course of 1792-1793, the desire to monopolize the arts of 
divination evolved into a much broader assertion of Qing sovereignty in Lhasa—a claim 
that the Qianlong emperor himself found unprecedented. The Qing imperial residents in 
Lhasa (the ambans) were now representatives of Qing sovereignty (Ma. toose) and this 
novel authority was on display most explicitly through their new duties to supervise the 
chief ministers of the government in Lhasa (the kalön) and coordinate the ritual 
identification of reincarnations using the Golden Urn. These developments in Amdo and 
Lhasa marked a sea change in official attitudes towards Tibetans and their future 
relationship to the Qing state and the interior regions of the empire. As Qianlong stated in 
his Discourse on Lamas, henceforth, Tibetan legal and administrative institutions were in 
principle and of necessity open to a degree of “rectification,” annulment, forfeiture, and 
replacement that had not been countenanced just a year earlier in 1791.  
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Yet, as successive Qing officials such as Gong Jinghan, Sungyun, Wenfu, 
Nayanceng, and even resident lamas in Beijing pointed out, the replacement of Tibetan 
jurisprudence and local systems of administration in toto with the criminal code and 
administrative system of the interior was unrealistic—at least in the short term. Qing 
emperors as well, from Qianlong through Daoguang, also remarked on the need to find a 
balance between pushing through changes and supporting the historical prerogatives and 
customs of the indigenous lay and monastic elites. As a result Tibetan jurisprudence was 
formally incorporated into what became a Qing-centered, hierarchical, and pluralistic 
colonial legal order. Historians of Tibet and comparative empire in the early modern 
world, however, have largely overlooked the existence of legal pluralism in the Qing 
empire and within Tibetan regions.1118  
A recent analysis of legal culture in Tibetan regions by Fernanda Pirie has argued 
that prior to 1958 it is inappropriate to speak of legal pluralism in Tibetan regions such as 
Amdo. According to Pirie, although incorporated into the Qing empire and subject to the 
“supervision” of the Qinghai amban, Amdo had no “centralized political control or 
administration” and Qing officials played only a limited administrative role. In contrast, 
indigenous elites in Repkong, Labrang, and elsewhere exercised “relatively autonomous 
administrative power.”1119 Although these local rulers possessed a “set of common norms” 
                                                
1118 Recent synopses of this latter field of study by eminent legal historians such as Benton and 
Ross (2012, 2013) appear to limit their discussion to the jurisprudence of European or Islamic 
empires (such as the Ottoman) that share common roots in Roman law despite their explicit goal 
of describing “global” patterns of legal history. With the exception of Jane Burbank and 
Frederick Cooper, the Qing has been largely ignored by comparative histories of early modern 
empires. See Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
 
1119 Pirie, “Legal Complexity on the Tibetan Plateau,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 53-54 (2006): 
81. What Pirie considers to be “centralized” political authority is not defined in this article. 
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for resolving conflicts, Pirie argues that they should not be considered “laws” let alone a 
“system” of laws within a larger pluralistic legal order.1120 Pirie is furthermore reluctant 
to describe the legal environment of Amdo during both the Qing and contemporary 
People’s Republic of China in terms of “legal pluralism” because she does not observe 
two or more separate legal orders competing in the same space. Rather, in contemporary 
Amdo she describes a single legal order in which state law alternately competes with and 
coexists with local “norms.” Tibetans accept and may be satisfied with state intervention 
in certain fields of conflict but not others.1121 
Pirie’s analysis provides a useful survey of the diversity of local forms of 
governance and the “plurality of norms” that have guided conflict resolution. It is also an 
important correction to those who might too quickly view the present-day legal scene 
through the lens of Tibetan “resistance” to the Chinese state and its judicial system 
through recourse to their own “oppositional” legal system. Yet since she derives her 
analysis entirely from twentieth and twenty-first century oral accounts, it falls short of a 
complete discussion of the Qing-era judicial and administrative scene. First, reducing 
legal traditions in Amdo to a “host of competing norms” does not accurately capture the 
                                                                                                                                            
Similarly, since the difference between “supervisory” and “administrative” roles is also 
undefined, the contrast seems like a convenient semantic distinction that does little to clarify the 
extent or limits of the amban’s authority.  
In this dissertation, “supervising” has been understood as a point on a continuum of 
administrative duties or governing activities. To supervise is to administer or govern, but perhaps 
with less responsibility for daily, routine, or local aspects of governance. To say that the amban 
“supervised” the Mongol banners of Qinghai or local Tibetan elites across the border in Gansu, 
does not mean that the Qing did not administer, govern, or otherwise exercise sovereignty in 
Amdo. 
 
1120  Pirie, 84. 
 
1121  Pirie, 78, 95-96. Specifically, Pirie notes how her contemporary Tibetan sources in Amdo 
view PRC efforts to resolve territorial conflicts between “tribes” as legitimate, but will turn to 
local Buddhist authorities to resolve other types of feuds. 
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way in which elite Gelukpa authors and legal petitioners from all walks of life saw their 
world. In his critique of expanding (or reducing) the definition of “law” to include all 
social “norms,” Brian Tamanaha has noted that “law” and especially “state-law” should 
be distinguished from other sources of social norms because people have frequently and 
explicitly made precisely this distinction.1122 Tibetan annalists and geographers from 
Amdo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as the second Belmang Pandita and 
Drakgönpa clearly demarcated legal traditions (Tib. khrims or khrims lugs) from other 
sorts of social norms or “customs” that ordered society (Tib. lugs, lugs srol, or lam lugs). 
Furthermore, we have also seen that Belmang and his students distinguished temporal 
from religious law codes: rgyal khrims and chos khrims, respectively. Both forms of “law” 
were defined as such precisely because they did not derive from custom, tradition, or 
other historical social practices. On the contrary, its association with Buddhism and rulers 
distinguished law from other social norms, and the most legitimate codes—codes that 
defined and delimited their civilization—had been granted by the divinely inspired kings 
of ancient Tibet. 
Second, as both the local, Tibetan-language histories and archival sources 
demonstrate, indigenous Tibetans, Qing officials, and even Hui Muslims, all concurred 
that there were indeed a variety of distinctive traditions of law available in Amdo/Gansu 
province. From Belmang’s perspective, for instance, the Qing court had imposed 
“Chinese laws” (Tib. rgyal khrims, a concept encompassing both criminal punishments 
and administrative structures) on Tibetan regions, most significantly the government in 
                                                
1122  Brian Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Law and 
Society 27 (2000): 314. See also Paul D. Halliday’s discussion of Tamanaha in, “Law’s Histories: 
Pluralisms Pluralities, Diversity,” in Legal Pluralism and Empies, 1500-1800, eds. Lauren 
Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 264-5. 
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Lhasa in the 1750s. These laws had replaced both earlier divine codes derived from the 
earliest Tibetan kings and later “Yuan Laws” (Tib. hor khrims) of the Mongol 
descendants of Chinggis Khan. As discussed in Chapter Four, Wangchen Gyab, another 
nineteenth-century Labrang author, had also chronicled how the monastery’s elite, 
including the second Jamyang Zhepa, had organized resistance to the criminal codes of 
the neighboring Khoshot aristocracy of Kokonor.    
Well into the late nineteenth century, institutions such as the estate of the 
Jamyang Zhepas, Rongwo monastery, the royal encampment (“urgé”) of the Cagan 
Nomunhan, and a host of other local elites and elders handled the vast majority of local 
crimes and social conflicts according to their own traditions of jurisprudence. Archival 
documents from the Xunhua subprefecture as well as Labrang itself indicate that 
monasteries such as Labrang and Repkong possessed written codes for dealing with 
crimes among their lay and monastic subjects, extensive records of past legal cases, and 
substantial bureaucratic and physical infrastructure for dealing with criminals.1123 The 
Qing court acknowledged and sanctioned these capabilities. In 1807, for instance, 
Cangling, the governor-general of Gansu, Šingkūi, the general of the Ningxia garrison, 
and Nayanceng, then serving as amban in Xining, jointly submitted a memorial 
suggesting that the leading lay rulers in Repkong, the Rongwo nangso, be given charge of 
                                                
1123  Catalogs of archival materials concerning Tibetan affairs in Gansu province indicate that the 
archives of the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Hezhuo contain extensive records 
from Labrang Monastery that deal with judicial matters during the Qing. See: Gansu sheng 
dang’anguan, Zhongguo Zangxue yanjiu zhongxin, eds., Gansu sheng suocun Xizang he Zangshi 
dang’an shiliao mulu [Catalog of historical and archival materials concerning Tibet and Tibetan 
affairs held in Gansu province] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1996); and Danqu, 
Labulengsi lishi dang’an bianmu yu labulengsi yanlun zhumu suoyin [Catalog of historical 
archives of Labrang monastery and research concerning Labrang monastery] (Lanzhou: Gansu 
minzu chubanshe, 2008). 
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“all [Tibetan] communities (族) in Xunhua” and advised the court to formally sanction 
the administrative and judicial responsibilities of various reincarnate lamas in Amdo. The 
memorialists envisioned these local elites as key elements of the Qing state’s governing 
apparatus both within Gansu and over the border among the Mongol banners of 
Qinghai.1124  
Cangling et al. expected, however, that the subprefects, the Qinghai amban, and 
provincial officials in Lanzhou would closely supervise the indigenous elite. The latter 
were required to communicate regularly with to the subprefects and pay routine visits to 
the official yamens in Xunhua, Guide, or Xining.1125 Letters from the subprefects to local 
Tibetan authorities reveal that Qing officials asserted prerogatives to supervise and 
directly adjudicate violent crimes, capital cases, feuds, and other conflicts that had either 
dragged in multiple communities, crossed administrative boundaries, or had persisted for 
a significant period of time. However, these letters and subsequent communications with 
superiors within the Qing colonial bureaucracy were just as likely to despair that local 
elites had either reported nothing at all or only in an extremely dilatory or desultory 
fashion. In the Guangxu reign, for instance, successive Xunhua magistrates complained 
that they rarely heard anything from the Repkong nangso and had had little luck reigning 
in or otherwise supervising the infamous prisons of Labrang and Rongwo 
monasteries.1126 
                                                
1124 Palace memorial dated October 10, 1807 (JQ 12/09/12), reproduced in Song Tingsheng, 
Nayancheng qinghai zouyi, 67-68. 
 
1125 In his memorial to the throne, Nayanceng couched this duty to send regular reports up to the 
subprefects and/or amban as a “privilege.”  
 
1126 See for instance: QSDG (GX 09/06/05) 7-YJ-2726:《循化廳為隆務寺槍殺郡王稟欽憲來單》
; and QSDG (no date) 7-YJ-4709:《循化廳為西番各族槍殺不己上的稟》. In this latter 
 546 
Yet despite the existence of numerous indigenous judicial forums and potential 
legal mediators both lay and monastic, and the frequent obstruction of Qing supervision 
and information gathering, the subprefects in Xunhua, Guide, and Taozhou directly 
participated in the adjudication of a significant volume of legal cases involving Tibetans. 
And much of this caseload was delivered to Qing official yamens at the initiative of local 
Tibetans. Lawsuits brought by local Tibetans played a key role in expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Xunhua subprefect over new territories and determining the types of 
cases that Qing officials would handle. As discussed in chapters Six and Seven, a legal 
suit originally brought to Xunhua by Labrang monastery against Tsö monastery—a case 
that was coincidental with the founding of the new subprefecture—ultimately set 
important precedents for Qing-Tibetan relations in the region. The final ruling established 
the Labrang monastery as an enclave of Qinghai within Gansu province. Tibetan 
communities around Labrang such as Tsö and Repkong were henceforth increasingly 
thought of as “commoners” with routine tax obligations to Xunhua. Tibetan elites in 
Repkong and its affiliated communities can be heard in subsequent conflicts self-
identifying as subjects of Xunhua in order to gain leverage against Labrang or the 
Khoshot prince to the south.1127 As a “Mongol monastery” subject to the Khoshot prince, 
the Xunhua subprefect had no clearly articulated responsibility to supervise the 
administration of justice within Labrang, but the case established Xunhua’s jurisdiction 
over cases that involved Labrang and neighboring communities and set a precedent for 
the use of Qing judicial forums by the rulers of Labrang. By the late Guangxu reign, 
                                                                                                                                            
document the subprefect also expressed dismay that the nangso himself frequently was left in the 
dark about local crimes and feuds. Not only did Qing officials have trouble gathering information, 
but local elites did as well.  
1127 For another example of this claim, see the following statement from the Rongwo nangso: 
QSDG (GX 08/05/01) 7-YJ-2720: 《隆務寺沙日倉新舊昂鎖為蒙古趕搶馬匹上的稟》. 
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Tibetans affiliated with both Labrang and Rongwo monastery in Repkong had become 
deeply enmeshed in the Qing judicial system and appealed for intervention and support 
from Qing officials with attestations of diligent observance of the dynasty’s laws and 
demonstrations of how the dynasty’s “mother and father officials” had “transformed” (Ch. 
王化) them.  
The extant legal records from Xunhua during the late Qing (1873-1912) are also 
almost entirely free of any language concerning the notion of Qing patronage of Tibetan 
Buddhism. Among the documents examined in the course of this research, the 
subprefects never justify their involvement or interest in local matters in terms of their 
support for the Gelukpa or Buddhist faith. Nor is there any indication that the subprefects 
actively patronized monastic establishments or that Tibetan litigants, either lay or 
monastic, expected Qing officials to act in a certain way because of religious devotion or 
other previous displays of piety. Instead, petitioners seem to have couched their appeals 
to Qing justice primarily in terms of history. As discussed in Chapter Seven, records of 
past military service to the Qing state, especially in times of rebellion, or of duties 
delivered—taxes, labor, etc., were seen as essential to crafting a persuasive case. To the 
extent that the preceptor-donor relationship was enacted, it seems to have been limited to 
the initiative of high officials such as the governor-general and the amban and a handful 
of reincarnate monks such as the Jamyang Zhepa or the Setsang lama. In one rare 
instance, a series of letters between the subprefect and governor-general Tao Mo 
discussed the discovery of an ornamental tablet in the private office of the manager of the 
Jamyang Zhepa’s estate that read, “Omniscent Bodhi (悟徹菩提).” The estate manager 
claimed that the governor-general had donated the tablet. Yet with evident consternation, 
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governor-general Tao informed the subprefect that he had not, in fact, donated the object, 
and ordered a top-secret investigation of who had.1128 Given the nature of this incident, it 
appears that such overt demonstrations of patronage by provincial officials were 
relatively rare.       
This hierarchical yet pluralistic, Qing-centered judicial order was the product of 
both top-down administrative tinkering and bottom-up, periphery-in initiatives. During 
the Guangxu reign, the Tibetan residents of Xunhua participated in a legal order that was 
not simply a conglomeration of several distinct and parallel legal systems—Tibetan, 
Muslim, or Chinese, but rather a single, Qing colonial legal order in which several 
traditions of jurisprudence were reinterpreted and applied through ongoing and 
contingent jurispractice. Legal pluralism in Xunhua during the second half of the 
nineteenth century is therefore best understood as a plurality of laws as opposed to a 
plurality of distinct legal systems.1129 Tibetans in Xunhua could attempt to resolve 
conflicts and feuds through indigenous judicial forums or could decide to bring their 
problems to the Xunhua subprefect or other representatives of the Qing state within 
Xunhua such as the commanders of the military outposts in Qitai or Bao’an. As has been 
discussed in chapters Six and Seven, litigants could also “shop” their cases to 
neighboring subprefects in Guide and Taozhou or civil and military officials in Hezhou. 
Mongol and Tibetan elites such as the Mongol junwang and the Jamyang Zhepa, and 
sometimes even more humble people who had made astute alliances with well-placed 
representatives (such as Ma Anliang or other Muslim gentry), could appeal their cases up 
the Qing administrative hierarchy to higher-ranked officials in Xining or Lanzhou. In all 
                                                
1128 QSDG (GX 25/02/09) 7-YJ-3165: 《陝甘總督陶為徹查拉卜楞寺牌匾給循化廳的札》. 
 
1129 For the expression “law’s pluralities,” see Halliday, 262, 267-274. 
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these forums, Tibetans could demand that their cases be adjudicated according to 
“Tibetan” traditions of jurisprudence.   
The distinctive feature of the Qing colonial legal order vis-à-vis that of the British 
in India was that the Qing magistrate himself was the embodiment of the law’s pluralities. 
In Xunhua the subprefect might be expected to adjudicate on the basis of what where 
recognized contemporaneously as three distinctive traditions of jurisprudence: Tibetan, 
Chinese, and Muslim. The establishment of the “Subprefects for Pacifying the Tibetans” 
of Xunhua, Guide, and Taozhou and the creation of “Tibetan codes and statutes” brought 
“Tibetan” jurispractice, if not necessarily jurisprudence, under the umbrella of the Qing 
administration. From the perspective of Tibetan petitioners, the “royal” or “imperial” law 
(Ch. 王法, Tib. rgyal khrims) of the Qing court could be understood as synonymous with 
the appropriate exercise and enforcement of Tibetan jurispractice.  
At the official yamen in Xunhua as well as in the more grandiose offices of high-
ranking officials such as the Qinghai amban or the Xining prefect, petitioners and 
officials alike were concerned with maintaining the boundaries between “Tibetan” and 
“Chinese” law. Yet the fact that the magistrate was far better versed in the jurispractices 
and jurisprudence of the interior of the empire and rarely if ever from the northwest (and 
certainly never of Tibetan extraction) introduced additional potential for novel 
interpretations and renovations of “Tibetan” jurisprudence, combinations of the various 
traditions, or slippage from “Tibetan” jurispractices to those of the interior. Nayanceng’s 
reports from the field indicate that Qing colonial officials had been encouraged to employ 
the standard criminal code of the interior to a variety of crimes, especially crimes 
involving merchants that crossed the provincial boundaries, murder cases, large-scale 
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feuding or raiding, and attacks on imperial representatives or property. In the early 
Jiaqing reign we have seen that there was even some debate about whether to retire the 
separate “Tibetan laws and statutes” in their entirety. The debate was resolved in favor of 
the provisional preservation of the Tibetan statutes for most crimes excepting those that 
threatened the basic stability of Qing imperial rule in the region. But it should be 
observed that these “Tibetan” codes were the creative product of an early to mid 
eighteenth-century rectification of diverse local jurispractices—legal practices and 
procedures that were identified by Qing officials at the time as “Mongol” in origin. 
It must be additionally noted that the Qing magistrate was rarely the only jurist in 
the room. Moreover, “the room,” or site of the adjudication and mediation, was often 
convened in an ad-hoc fashion in the residencies of local elites, monasteries, or even en 
plein air out in the pastures far beyond the walls of the official yamen in Xunhua town. 
The major conflicts in Xunhua during the last forty years of the dynasty were ultimately 
(or, more accurately, provisionally) resolved by special committees of Qing civil and 
military officials. The composition of these committees also typically straddled the divide 
between the provincial administration and the colonial administrators responsible to the 
Lifanyuan (such as the amban and his secretaries). Impartial and respected reincarnate 
lamas from outside the conflict zone, Muslim xiejia in the employment of the magistrate 
or in private business, Muslim gentry or religious specialists, and other Tibetan or 
Mongol headmen also performed the essential tasks of arranging ceasefires, persuading 
litigants to come to trial, gathering evidence, preparing formal statements for the official 
record, negotiating terms of settlement, and finally guaranteeing compliance. The final, 
written decisions drew on both local Tibetan precedents and principles of jurisprudence 
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as well as the diverse experiences and persuasive capabilities of the committeemen. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, these decisions rarely derived from the straightforward 
application of the Tibetan Laws and Statutes and instead required intensive investigation 
and interpretation of preceding local jurispractice and Tibetan jurisprudence. The final 
documents might have been seen by contemporaries as embodying the principles of 
“Tibetan” jurisprudence and receiving the sanction of Tibetan elites, but were usually 
composites of the empire’s various traditions of jurisprudence. The landmark decisions of 
1875, 1889, 1892, and 1899 set legal precedents that brought imperial sanction to 
transformed social relations in Amdo and should be seen as forming a body of distinctive 
“Qing” jurispractice in Amdo. 
The creation of this novel body of Qing-sanctioned codes, decisions, community 
compacts, and charters shared important similarities with the invention of a new body of 
laws guiding the identification of reincarnation. The Qing court was successful in 
changing the procedure for locating and confirming reincarnate lamas. This success, 
however, hinged on the cooperation of Tibetan Buddhist elites and their willingness to 
adapt existing procedures and adopt what had originally been a Ming bureaucratic 
practice into a Tibetan tradition of divination technologies. As demonstrated by the case 
of the third Jamyang Zhepa, the legitimacy of children identified by this new procedure 
also entailed the repeated and long-term efforts of Tibetan biographers and chroniclers 
over the course of the nineteenth century. It should be noted, however, that Qing 
involvement in the search process and the use of the Golden Urn seems to have become 
particularly common for lineages of reincarnations hailing from Kham and Amdo, and 
less so for lamas from Ü and Tsang. Until the end of the dynasty, the Golden Urn was 
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used to identify reincarnations of the Jamyang Zhepa, the Cagan Nomunhan, Sumpa 
Khenpo, and Changkya. Considering that some of these lineages had not previously been 
identified through consultations with authorities in Lhasa, the Golden Urn had the 
paradoxical effect of tying these lineages more closely to central Tibet at the same time 
that it manifested ties to the Qing state. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, neither Tibetan jurisprudence nor the 
colonial legal order and its diverse legal practices remained static. The fact that the legal 
order became increasingly Qing-centered did not mean that the Qing court could 
manipulate legal proceedings in a predictable manner or dictate the ways in which locals 
understood Qing jurispractice. Yet in the last decade of Qing rule, despite major setbacks 
along the maritime frontier the court and its colonial officials became if anything more 
ambitious in their goals for Tibetan regions. While the history of Qing efforts to bring 
Kham and central Tibet deeper within the fold of “China” has recently been the subject of 
much scholarly discussion, the history of Amdo has received less attention.1130 This is 
probably because Qing efforts to assert greater control in Kham and central Tibet were 
accompanied by a considerable amount of armed conflict. In Amdo, the shifting goals of 
Qing colonialism were less visible because they were expressed and implemented by an 
administrative infrastructure that was already in place. The seeds of Qing colonialism had 
been violently sown in 1724, not in 1904, as it was the case in Kham. By the 1820s, the 
majority of Tibetans in Amdo lived under the jurisdiction of subprefects or magistrates 
                                                
1130 See for instance, Wang Xiuyu, China’s Last Imperial Frontier: Statecraft and Locality in 
Qing Kham Tibet (Lanham MD: Lexingtong Books, 2011); Dahpon David Ho, "The Men Who 
Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 
1905-1911,” Modern China 34.2 (April, 2008): 210-246; and Eliot Sperling, “The Chinese 
venture in K’am, 1904-1911,” in The History of Tibet, Volume 3, ed. Alex McKay, ed. (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 69-91. 
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who themselves were overseen by the overlapping jurisdictions of the amban in Xining 
and the governor-general in Lanzhou.  
Despite the lack of large-scale, violent Qing-Tibetan conflict in Amdo, the 
Xunhua archives reveal growing tensions between locals and the subprefect during the 
early 1900s. A particularly salient example from this period concerns the government’s 
support for the opening of lead mines in Repkong. In response to repeated petitions of 
protest from the Shartsang lama of Rongwo monastery, the nangso, and various headmen, 
the subprefect notified the petitioners that they had no authority over the opening of 
mines and, revealingly, warned him not to submit further petitions to the governor-
general or the amban. The subprefect informed the monk that as subjects of the Qing 
ruler, the dynasty also held rights to the resources of their land: “You Tibetans are also 
children of the imperial court. Thus the lead in the mountain is the property of the 
imperial house.”1131 Subjecthood, according to this missive, entailed obligations that now 
went well beyond the submission of taxes to Xunhua and loyal support for the imperial 
house in times of conflict.  
As evidenced by their petitions, this is not how the elite of Repkong understood 
their subordination to the Qing emperors. When the petitioners repeated their claim that 
their support for the dynasty entailed some degree of discretion over local affairs and 
resources, the magistrate replied, “Your recitation of prayers for the protection of the 
state is in principle about the protection of the imperial house. Since the prefect has 
already informed you that [mining] the lead is also a matter of the imperial house, how 
                                                
1131 QSDG (exact date unclear) 7-YJ-4721：《隆務沙力倉等為開辦鉛礦上的稟及批》: “番民
亦朝廷赤子，鉛山以皇家地土。” 
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can you request not to do it?”1132 In other words, offering up prayers for the dynasty now 
also entailed supplying natural resources. The magistrate further justified the Rongwo’s 
duty to deliver up its mineral wealth by arguing that their efforts were for the “sake of the 
wealth and strength of the nation” and that they would be justly compensated according 
to the “market prices.”1133 Such language marked a dramatic turn from the discourse of 
subjecthood employed in official documents from just years earlier. Qing colonial rule in 
Amdo, much as in Kham and central Tibet, now meant harnessing the latent wealth of the 
territory to the modernizing demands of the Qing state. The power of prayer alone was no 
longer sufficient. The rhetorical framework of the “patron and preceptor” relationship no 
longer resonated with Qing officials. The local rulers of Rongwo, for their part, however, 
promised violent resistance.      
 
Unfinished Business 
 
This dissertation makes two assertions that require further elaboration and 
substantiation. First, this examination of legal culture in Tibetan regions during the late 
Qing has emphasized the degree to which law was constitutive of the “Tibetan” world. 
Chapter Four argued that from the perspective of Belmang Pandita and other influential 
scholar-administrators within the Gelukpa leadership in Amdo, law was the essential 
marker of their civilization and the framework that joined Amdo to central Tibet. Just law 
was by definition derived from Buddhism and the original dissemination of such laws by 
                                                
1132 QSDG ( GX year unclear/10/20) 7-YJ-4721: 《循化廳為考辦鉛礦給隆務寺沙日倉的諭》: 
“爾等念保國真經原是保佑皇家，本府奉札辦鉛亦是為皇家辦事，若可以求准不辦？” 
1133 Ibid. “為國家籌富強” 
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the early kings of Tibet distinguished their kingdom from its neighbors. In the early 
nineteenth century and in the face of fresh efforts by the Qing court to “rectify” the 
governance of Tibetan regions, writers like Belmang saw the Gelukpa as the sole 
guardian of their legal tradition and argued that any ruler who entered into preceptor-
donor relations with the Gelukpa was obliged to adopt not only their religious tenets but 
also the jurisprudence of Tibet. According to Belmang and his students, unwillingness to 
embark on this thorough conversion had undermined the rule of Gushri Khan’s 
descendants in Amdo and threatened to do the same for the Qing.  
Chapters Six and Seven described the establishment of a “Tibetan” tradition of 
jurispractice within the offices of local magistrates in Gansu province. I have suggested 
in the conclusion of the final chapter that legal politics within the pluralistic, Qing 
colonial legal order had a major influence on the development of a “Tibetan” tradition of 
jurispractice and the consolidation of a broader “Tibetan” national identity at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. As noted in Chapter Five, “Tibetan,” “Mongol,” 
“Salar” or “Hui,” “nomad” or “farmer” were fungible labels among the many possible 
categories of identification that existed in nineteenth-century Amdo. In the yamen of the 
Xunhua subprefect, ambiguity evaporated and identities hardened, because the law’s 
pluralities presented both dangers and opportunities. Classification as Tibetan or Han, 
colonial subject or commoner, 1134  meant the application of different traditions of 
jurisprudence with potentially vastly different forms and degrees of punishment. Appeal 
to the magistrate under a particular label might also establish protections from outsiders 
                                                
1134 By “colonial subject or commoner” I am trying to convey the legal distinction between being 
classified as “min” (民), a common subject of the standard provincial administration of the 
Chinese interior, and the non-min “Fan” or “Mongol” residents of Qinghai and other colonial 
territories that were overseen by the Lifanyuan. 
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demanding cultural change, economic privileges, or territorial acquisitions. Rulers in 
Beijing as well as local Qing officials did occasionally prove to be responsive to fears 
that culture and livelihood had been threatened.1135 The subprefect’s yamen was even a 
place where new identities, labels, or categories could be introduced and popularized. For 
example, for the majority of the Guangxu reign, “Tibetan” petitioners were usually 
varieties of “Fan.” During the last couple years of the Guangxu reign, however, the use of 
the modern ethnonym zangzu (藏族 ) began to appear sporadically in official 
documents.1136 
 The contention that a “Tibetan” identity in Amdo was forged before the gates of 
the yamen will remain a weak one until more is known about how people in Amdo 
understood and wrote about their legal traditions both before and after 1696, the year in 
which the Khoshot princes submitted to Kangxi and their domains began to be 
incorporated into the Qing empire. What kinds of legal practices existed in and between 
the Khoshot principalities? Did they distinguish between “Tibetan” and “Mongolian” 
traditions of jurisprudence? How did the reincarnate rulers such as the Cagan Nomunhan 
or Jamyang Zhepa administer justice and mediate disputes within their domains? How 
did they negotiate jurisdictional conflicts and the multiple local traditions of jurispractice 
that existed in Amdo? How did the residents of Amdo differentiate between “royal” or  
“religious” law, rgyal and chos respectively, and do these English-language categories 
                                                
1135 A good example of this phenomenon was the Qing government’s repeated attempts to protect 
Mongols in Qinghai from incursions by Tibetans and settlers from the interior. Archival 
documents from the years 1878-1881 and 1883 (GX 04-07, 09) reveal discussions among Qing 
officials about how to protect the Mongols south of the Yellow River. 
 
1136 See for example, QSDG (GX 30/12/21, 1905-01-26) 7-YJ-3041:  《雙朋頭目呈稟拉卜楞、
雙朋兩方糾紛一案始末》. In this document, translators at the Xunhua yamen have translated a 
request for “Tibetan mediators who understand Tibetan” using the Chinese terms zangzu and 
zangyu. 
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express with any accuracy the indigenous distinctions? What can we learn about Qing 
justice from contemporaneous Tibetan-language sources? How did the residents of Amdo 
differentiate between “royal” or  “religious” law, and do these English-language 
categories adequately represent indigenous distinctions between rgyal, srid, and chos?  
European and Chinese scholarly discussions of law in Amdo have generally seen 
a division between “monastic,” “Buddhist,” or “canon” jurisprudence on the one hand 
and “tribal” or “folk” law on the other. This distinction, which frequently devolves to 
descriptions of vicious, eye-for-an-eye, “tribal morals,” seems to have only a superficial 
bearing on how locals may have understood the different local traditions of jurisprudence 
and jurispractice.1137 As discussed in Chapter Six and Seven, while conflicts between 
Tibetans in Amdo could often result in bloody raids and reprisals, the threat of 
spontaneous and unrestrained “barbaric” violence was also a rhetorical pose that Tibetan 
petitioners carefully and self-consciously deployed in the course of legal wrangling 
before Qing magistrates. Historians and anthropologists of the early twentieth century, 
who relied heavily on the memorials, gazetteers, and other semi-official publications of 
local Qing officials, have read these accounts of “tribal” justice far too literally and taken 
little account of the biases of Qing officials or the underlying case histories. Moreover, it 
should be added that both “tribal” and monastic authorities made strategic use of violence. 
In summary, little is yet known about how Gelukpa hierarchs in Amdo justified the 
                                                
1137 Yu Shiyu, a Han Tibetologist active during the Republican period and early PRC, published a 
particularly influential analysis of Tibetan laws and “tribal morals” (部落道德): “Mantan ‘fanli 
fangui’” in Li Anzhai, Yu Shiyu zangxue wenlunxuan (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 
2002), 326-333. Robert Ekvall, does not mention “tribal morals,” but does introduce the 
distinction between “folk” and “canon” law in Amdo: “Peace and War Among the Tibetan 
Nomads,” American Anthropologist 66.5 (October 1964): 1119-1148. 
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accumulation of the extensive temporal or political (Tib. srid) responsibilities by the mid-
nineteenth century.1138     
Fortunately, the resources to address these questions do exist. But they have yet to 
be thoroughly mined and remain difficult to access. As noted in Chapter Six, at least one 
Manchu-language report on Mongol legal codes and jurispractices in Qinghai during the 
Kangxi reign has already been located. This dissertation has used only an insignificant 
portion of the vast quantity of extant materials in Chinese and Tibetan that has survived 
from the original archives of the Xunhua subprefect. Original Qing-period documents 
from Labrang monastery’s own archives have also survived but are currently held at 
inaccessible archives in Hezhou and within Labrang monastery itself. The fourth 
Jamyang Zhepa, whose life overlapped with the extant documents from Xunhua (1875-
1911), produced a large body of writings including correspondence with Qing officials. 
These writings, as well as his biography, have yet to be read against the archival record 
from Xunhua (which, it should be noted includes several original Tibetan-language letters 
from the monk).1139  
 
The second main assertion that has arisen in the course of this research is that the 
transfer of political authority from Mongol nobles to the estates of reincarnate lamas and 
                                                
1138  Engaging in political affairs and even devoting extensive time to writing or studying them, 
were both activities that could jeopardize the underlying purposes of the monastic vows and 
progress towards religious attainments. Belmang himself, in the preamble to his History, finds it 
necessary to apologize for his inappropriate interest in the “stories of kings and talk of war.” 
Belmang, 481:4. 
 
1139 When attempting to understand Labrang and Amdo during the late Qing, the fourth Jamyang 
Zhepa’s biography, however, should be used with caution since it was completed only after the 
monk’s death in 1916. The biography’s portrayal of the Qing and local political relations is 
probably biased by the fact that the Qing dynasty had been overthrown in 1911.     
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the concomitant growth of massive, monastery-centered polities in Amdo—a process that 
began in the late seventeenth century and accelerated dramatically from the late 
eighteenth century through the nineteenth century, was not only unprecedented but also 
the unique by-product of the Qing colonial context. Political rule by reincarnated 
Gelukpa hierarchs was not an inevitable feature of Tibet’s Buddhist civilization, nor were 
the builders of monastic polities in Amdo necessarily modeling their efforts on that of the 
Great Fifth.  
This impression arose originally from my reading of Belmang Pandita’s history of 
Gushri Khan and his descendants and the subsequent elaboration of this history by his 
students. According to Belmang, the Fifth Dalai Lama had never ruled as an independent 
sovereign. His authority rested on the generosity and military might of his patrons, 
Gushri Khan and his descendants. While such assertions, which echo those of earlier 
historians from Amdo, might be criticized as the bluster of a Khoshot partisan from 
Amdo, the counter-claim, made on the basis of the autobiography and biographies of the 
Fifth Dalai Lama, that the Great Fifth was in fact the sole sovereign in Lhasa, should also 
be subjected to the same type of critique. Contemporary historians who make this claim 
for the Great Fifth are not only ignoring the highly diffused and complex power 
arrangements within the Ganden Podrang government during the second half of the 
sixteenth century and oversimplifying the relationship between the Great Fifth and his 
various regents (Tib. “desi”), but also overlooking the fact that the historical sources from 
Lhasa were produced in the context of a very heated and protracted debate over the 
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nature of the Dalai Lama’s political authority and his legacy among Tibetan and Mongol 
historians.1140 
From Belmang’s perspective it was not obvious that reincarnate lamas such as the 
Dalai Lama or the Jamyang Zhepa could rule even locally without the support of a royal 
patron. He therefore portrayed Changkya Rolpé Dorjé’s suggestion that the second 
Jamyang Zhepa replace the descendants of Gushri Khan as the leading prince of Qinghai 
as something radical and unprecedented. Several years later, however, Drakgönpa’s 
historical geography of Amdo would describe the Jamyang Zhepa as having realized 
Belmang’s vision and fully inhabiting the political role that had previously been played 
by the Khoshot princes. In the 1850s-1860s, Drakgönpa was documenting a political 
landscape that looked nothing like it had a hundred years earlier. Moreover, the growing 
monastic polities of Amdo such as Labrang were not seen locally as reproductions of the 
Ganden Podrang in miniature. 
It is essential, therefore, to look more closely at the Qing, its policies, and the 
overall social and political environment generated by Qing colonialism in order to 
understand the rise of large monasteries and even monastic “confederations” or alliances 
during the nineteenth century. And it is all the more remarkable that these institutions 
arose despite the fact that the Qing state repeatedly tried to limit each monastery to 
governing only itself. Chapter Five suggested that the rise of these monastic domains 
resulted originally from the political vacuum left by the Qing court’s overt efforts to 
eliminate the Khoshot Mongols in Amdo as a strategic threat to the dynasty. The 
                                                
1140 Samten Karmay, for instance, has forcefully argued that as “head of state” the Fifth Dalai 
Lama was fully sovereign in central Tibet. Gushri Khan was simply “king” of the Mongols in 
Kokonor. Karmay, “The Fifth Dalai Lama and His Reunification of Tibet,” in Lhasa in the 
Seventeenth Century, ed. Francoise Pommaret (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 72-73.  
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introduction of the banner system to Qinghai in 1723 limited the mobility of Mongol 
populations, placed obstacles in the path of resolving demographic and ecological 
challenges, and ossified the Mongol nobility by restricting their movement and carefully 
regulating their political authority, thus denying them the ability to regroup or consolidate 
power around effective leaders. Mongol commoners quietly slipped away of their own 
accord, moving into Tibetan communities and adopting Tibetan customs.  
The dynasty, however, had a much more difficult time developing a consistent or 
effective strategy for checking the influence of the Gelukpa monasteries and their 
accumulation of subject communities. This was something of a paradox for Qing 
administrators because the majority of the Tibetan communities in Amdo were at least 
ostensibly under more direct forms of supervision in the subprefectures of Guide, Xunhua, 
and Taozhou, and closer in proximity to Qing officials than were the Mongols who 
resided in banner communities scattered across the distant pastures of Qinghai. From the 
perspective of Qing officials, the challenge of handling Tibetan affairs was frequently 
attributed to the difficulty of finding magistrates fluent in Tibetan legal customs and in 
coordinating policies between different branches of government and across a broad swath 
of territory. Thus we have seen Gong Jinghan, Nayanceng, and other officials repeatedly 
tinker with the administrative structure of Gansu Province and Qinghai. By the mid 
nineteenth century, the result of these efforts was a complex web of overlapping 
jurisdictions. The provincial government in Lanzhou retained the right to oversee 
appointments and non-Tibetan affairs in Xunhua, but the subprefecture had also been 
shifted from the purview of Lanzhou prefecture to Xining prefecture. This move placed 
the amban in Xining in a better position to oversee Tibetans in Xunhua and coordinate 
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the handling of affairs in Xunhua with those of other districts with large Tibetan 
populations, as well as across the Qinghai-Gansu frontier. Thus events in Xunhua could 
be reported up two separate chains of command, presenting jurisdictional tensions that 
could prove a headache for officials and opportunities for litigants. It also explains why 
the extant archive of the subprefecture is awash with documents from both Xining and 
Lanzhou. 
This dissertation has argued that the dynamics of a pluralistic legal environment 
affected the shifting political landscape. The availability of “Gelukpa jurisprudence” at 
sites such as Labrang, Lamo Dechen, or Rongwo monastery helped undermine the 
judicial authority of Mongol rulers. In a similar fashion, the presence of alternate legal 
forums in the subprefectural yamens, at the office of the Qinghai amban, provincial 
offices in Lanzhou, or even at the Lifanyuan in Beijing, could also undermine the 
authority of reincarnate lamas. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Labrang’s local opponents 
could be quite successful in using lawsuits, petitions, and court testimony to delegitimize 
the fourth Jamyang Zhepa. But the leaders of Rongwo monastery, Labrang, and other 
smaller religious estates in Xunhua such as that of the Setsang lama also made extensive 
and strategic use of the Qing legal order to shore up their authority, accumulate “vassals” 
(to shuantou), and build hierarchical confederations of monasteries and lay communities. 
The three major legal cases described in Chapter Seven also appear to document 
the sudden politicization of many types of pious activities and social relationships. Under 
pressure from growing tension between Labrang and its neighbors, Qing officials were 
forced to supervise the drafting of a host of new community charters and compacts to 
“clarify” the relations between the estates of reincarnate lamas and their tenants. In the 
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process, many communities sought to extract themselves from the burden of supporting 
religious estates or multiple authorities by claiming status as “royal colonies” 
administered solely by Xunhua.      
These Qing-focused explanations for the rise of Labrang and other monastic 
domains require further substantiation. Where these institutions truly unprecedented? 
What was different about the Qing-period expansion of Gelukpa monasteries from the 
previous emergence of large monasteries such as Rongwo, Jakhyung (Tib. Bya khyung, 
Ch. 夏琼寺), Gonlung, or Kumbum during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Was 
the politicization of pious activities in the 1870s through 1890s so unusual? Was the 
violence of this period typical? Both of these questions require further investigation and 
the location of additional archival sources or Tibetan-language narratives. The narrative 
told in this dissertation is limited and potentially distorted by the fact that the extant 
record from Xunhua extends no earlier than the 1870s.  
More must also be learned about the relationship between Mongols, the Gelukpa 
monasteries, and lay Tibetan communities during the late Qing. Despite the fact that the 
Khoshot prince’s mansion was burned to the ground in 1883, Mongols remained major 
donors to Labrang, and the monastery’s leadership, for its part, continued to prioritize the 
cultivation of Mongol ties. In the 1850s and 1860s, in violation of Qianlong-era laws 
banning the Gelukpa from seeking donors in Jungharia and western Mongolia, Labrang 
dispatched several monks to the far western regions of the empire. One of these 
missionaries, Künga Gyeltsen (Tib. Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan; Ma. Gung’ajaltsan, 1835-
1895), achieved empire-wide fame when he became a rallying point for scattered Qing 
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and Mongol military forces in Xinjiang during the tumultuous years of the Muslim 
rebellions in the 1860s-1870s.1141  
Finally, insights from this study of ritual law-making in central Tibet and the 
pluralistic legal order in Amdo suggest that the Qing influence on social, cultural, 
economic, and political developments in central Tibet during the nineteenth century 
should also be reconsidered. Much like the situation in Amdo, the pax Manjurica in 
central Tibet was unlikely to have been as “somnolent” as previously assumed. If 
Belmang and other Tibetan historians from Amdo are to be believed, the consolidation of 
religious and political authority achieved by the adroit maneuvering of the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama represented not a resurrection of the government of the Great Fifth but rather 
an original feat. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama legitimized his rule by asserting that he was 
taking up the mantle of the Great Fifth, but this was a mantle that the earlier incarnation 
had only discursively worn. Seen in this light, what role had Qing policies had on laying 
the groundwork for the reign of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama? The very fact that there was 
still a centralized government in Lhasa in 1895—the year in which the Dalai Lama 
assumed governing responsibilities after over a hundred years of regencies, should force 
                                                
1141 Künga Gyeltsen could be accurately described as the “Zeng Guofan” of Tibetan Buddhists. 
When Muslim rebel groups in northern Xinjiang defeated Qing garrisons in 1864, Künga 
Gyeltsen began to organize a private military force to protect Junghar, Solon, Sibe, Manchu, and 
Mongol communities in the region. Ultimately, the monk provisionally abandoned his vows and 
received official status from the beleaguered Qing court to organize civil and military affairs in 
the Targhabatai region. Manchu-language communications between Künga Gyeltsen and the 
Qing court survive in the First Historical Archive, Beijing, and his Tibetan-language biography 
contains further information. Following the rebellions, he resumed his vows and divided his time 
between his estate in Choné, southeast of Labrang, and Mongol communities in the Altai 
Mountains. As a reward for his services, he received the title of “kūtuktu” from the Qing court. 
Of further note, Künga Gyeltsen appears in a number of cases litigated in Xunhua and Taozhou 
during the Guangxu period and can even be found “purchasing titles” (Ch. 捐輸) on behalf of 
other monks affiliated with Labrang. For a recent reprint of his Qing-period biography, see: Skal 
bzang legs bshad, Rje btsun byams pa mthu stobs kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar (Mtsho 
ngon: Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1994).   
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us to think again about the Qing context and the relationship between the Qing court and 
the regents in particular.  
Three of the four reincarnate lineages that supplied the Ganden Podrang with 
successive regents had received ongoing and direct support from Qing rulers since the 
Qianlong reign. The seventh Demo Kūtuktu (regent 1757-1777), first Tsemönling 
Kūtuktu (Tib. Tshe smon gling ngag dbang tshul khrims 1721-1791, regent 1777-1786, 
and again in 1791), and the eighth Tatsak Rinpoché (Ma. Jirong Kūtuktu, regent 1791-
1810), all received strong backing from the Qianlong emperor and their estates derived 
considerable wealth from imperial patronage. For instance, Kundeling Monastery, the 
seat of the Tatsak Rinpoché, was established on the basis of donations from Fukanggan 
and Hailanca in 1792.1142 The regent lineages, with their close ties to the Qing court, 
formed the backbone of a government that in the nineteenth century required none of the 
major investments of men and material that Qing rulers had repeatedly found themselves 
forced to make during the eighteenth century. As noted in Chapter One, creating a more 
self-sufficient and centralized government in Lhasa had been a major objective of Qing 
colonial agents like Fukanggan and Heliyen in the 1790s and was a goal that they did not 
see as necessarily conflicting with simultaneous assertions of Qing sovereignty. 
The regents were not the only institutions created or reformed under the 
supervision of Qing authorities in the 1790s and early nineteenth century. Qianlong’s 
program also tackled the Tibetan government’s finances, currency, tax administration, 
postal service, frontier defenses, and military—reforms that, in the context of any other 
early modern colonial empire would be seen as laying the groundwork for the 
consolidation of national identities and perhaps even the nation-state. However, since 
                                                
1142 Funds derived, one suspects, from the successful campaign against the Gurkhas. 
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Petech’s path-breaking scholarship on the regents during the 1970s, these institutions as 
well as the other points of contact between the Qing court, its colonial administration, and 
Tibetans have been largely ignored.1143 The desire of most non-Chinese scholars to trace 
the “independent” development of Tibetan society as a clean trajectory from the era of 
the Great Fifth to that of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama is understandable in light of the 
events of the twentieth century. But historians do so at the peril of overlooking the degree 
to which intense and sustained encounters between Tibetans and Qing officials and other 
agents of Qing colonialism fundamentally reshaped Tibetan communities across greater 
Tibet during the last century of Qing rule. 
 
Legal Pluralism in Contemporary Gansu and Qinghai Provinces  
 
My arrival in China in 2010 to conduct dissertation fieldwork corresponded with 
renewed efforts by local governments in Gansu and Qinghai to encourage the “blending” 
(交融) of Tibetans into “mainstream Chinese culture.” In October, the Qinghai provincial 
government proposed drastic reforms of the bilingual education policy and the central 
government issued a new law on Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, further restricting the 
numbers and movements of monks and pointedly forbidding “hierarchical relationships” 
among monasteries.1144 The law claimed that it was trying to prevent the “reestablishment 
of the oppression, exploitation, and special privileges of the feudal religious system.” 
                                                
1143 Luciano Petech, “The Dalai Lamas and Regents of Tibet: A Chronological Study,” Serie 
Orientale Roma LX (1988): 125-147. 
1144 Zhongguo guojia zongjiao shiwu ju (China National Bureau of Religious Affairs), “Zang 
chuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa,” issued 2010-09-30. www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-
10/08/content_1717257.htm , accessed 2012-12-09. 
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Locals saw this as yet another effort to dismantle the broad network of Buddhist 
education, pilgrimage, wealth, cultural production, and political resistance embodied by 
Labrang Monastery and other major Gelukpa monasteries. The promotion of the law 
represented an admission by the Bureau of Religious Affairs that the People’s Republic 
had failed to adequately supervise, restrict, and disperse the power of the Gelukpa in 
Amdo. 
The resulting street protests, coming as they did in the aftermath of even greater 
ethnic violence in 2008 and 2009, generated handwringing among the scholars in both 
northwest China and Beijing. The result was unprecedented discussions, both in private 
and public, of questions such as why ethnic minorities did not “identify” with China (the 
“国家认同问题”) and whether it was time to institute a “second generation” of ethnic 
policies (“第二代民族政策”). Some scholars took the position that the entire system of 
minzu identification should be annulled. Others, however, suggested that the PRC focus 
on promoting a form of “Chinese” citizenship less closely identified with or characterized 
by Han culture and history. My research on Qing-period attempts to grapple with a 
complex colonial legal order provides a historical perspective on these contemporary 
debates. 
That the contemporary Chinese state is still attempting to resolve the tensions 
between transformation and preservation of its non-Han periphery—tensions that the 
Qing failed to reconcile—is hardly noteworthy. But what remains underappreciated is the 
degree to which specific PRC efforts to incorporate Tibetan regions are similar to policies 
of the Qing and, much like those of the past, continue to generate difficult to control 
dynamics and unexpected consequences. The Qing placed legal restrictions on Tibetan 
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monasteries and repeatedly tried to outlaw the proliferation of branch monasteries and the 
establishment of inter-monastic alliances and hierarchies under the rubric of “each 
monastery should govern itself (各管各寺).” Much like the British in India, Qing 
officials from the 1820s-on expected that the extension of imperial supervision of local 
legal traditions would have a “soothing” effect on indigenous peoples. The dynasty’s 
promise of justice—exercised either through Tibetan or Chinese codes, was central to its 
claims of legitimacy. Yet in the 1890s Qing officials observed with dismay that the 
extension of the Qing legal system to Tibetan communities not only failed to “transform” 
them, but to the contrary, had resulted in an ever-increasing stream of litigation and 
violent feuding. Moreover, the expedient inclusion of Tibetan laws and statutes within in 
the Qing code only seemed to further reify and unify an oppositional Tibetan identity 
across the region. 
The Qing emperors and the Communist Party have both attempted to legitimize 
and stabilize their rule by enshrining a degree of pluralism in the structure of their state. 
The Lifanyuan supervised a separate system of administration with distinct legal codes in 
its diverse Inner Asian territories. In 1954, the People’s Republic formally established a 
constitutional system of minzu autonomy. The PRC has not, however, formally tolerated 
the continuation of distinctive traditions of minzu jurisprudence. Instead it has asserted a 
uniform criminal code throughout the country. Yet in practice, the Communist party has 
tolerated a variety of local traditions of jurisprudence, especially when they have proved 
effective in resolving local conflicts. Officials of both Han and Tibetan extraction in 
Gansu and Qinghai have made astute use of local Tibetan traditions of jurispractice and 
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the Buddhist authorities. What distinguishes the PRC from Qing is the degree to which 
legal pluralism has been formally enshrined in the administrative structure of the state.  
Thus, we should not be surprised to observe that, much like they did at the offices 
of the Qing subprefects in Xunhua, Tibetans in Gansu and Qinghai have continued to 
seek out agents of the PRC to resolve local grievances. And the system continues to 
generate paradoxical and potentially destabilizing outcomes. The aggressive use by 
Tibetans of PRC courts and local government offices to address criminal and especially 
civil disputes can and do produce legitimacy for the People’s Republic. At the same time 
however, the desire to see things handled in “Tibetan” ways sustains ethnic and cultural 
boundaries and the propensity of government cadres, police, and judges to abuse their 
power generates further disillusionment with the promises of minzu autonomy enshrined 
in the constitution of the PRC. Tao Baolian’s Guangxu-era critique of Qing officialdom 
should serve therefore, as a timely reminder to the cadres of the Xi Jinping-era that they 
should not jump to conclusions about the mood of ethnic minorities who make regular 
and intimate use of the government. “On the outside they appear respectful to the point of 
obsequiousness, yet their hearts could not be further away. The government officials 
boast, ‘These are the people whom I restrain!’ The people of the felt tents mutter under 
their breaths, ‘These are the people whom we indulge.’”1145    
  
 
 
  
                                                
1145 Tao Baolian, 241. 
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Appendix: Translation of the Qianlong Emperor’s Discourse on Lamas 
 
Translated from the Tibetan text1146 
 
An edict concerning the succession of lamas: 
 
 
As for the Buddha’s teaching, it arose in the land of India and spread eastward to 
Tibet1147 (also [known as] “Tangut” or “Zang”). It is the tradition that monks of Tibet are 
called ‘lama.’  This term ‘lama’ does not exist in the documents of China. In the Chinese-
language books of the Yuan and Ming courts1148 there is the incorrect expression ‘la mu.’ 
(According to the written record Chuogenglu1149 composed by Tao Zongyi,1150 during 
time of the Yuan court the preceptor of the king was called ‘la mu’a.’ In the book 
Unofficial History of the Ming [Emperor] Wu Zong1151 written by Mao Qiling1152 there 
was written the word ‘la ma.’ Because they all wrote according to their own ideas, there 
was not a uniform way of writing.) When I carefully consider this matter, in the Tibetan 
language, ‘bla’ means superior and ‘ma’ means ‘not’; thus ‘lama’ means ‘unsurpassed.’  
                                                
1146 O. Franke, and B. Laufer, Lamaistische Kloster-Inschriften aus Peking, Jehol und Si-ngan; 
mit unterstützung der Hamburgischen Wissenschaftlichen Stiftung [Inscriptions from Lamaist 
temples in Beijing, Jehol, and Xi’an] (Hamburg: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen) in 
Berlin, 1914), plate 4. Parentheses indicates interlinear commentary in the original.  
 
1147 Tib. Bod. 
 
1148 Tib. gur. 
 
1149 Ch. 《輟耕錄》. 
 
1150 Ch. 陶宗儀 
 
1151 Ch. 《明武宗外記》. 
 
1152 Ch. 毛奇齡. 
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This is similar to calling “shang zhin,” “hwa shang” in the language of China.1153 The 
lama’s learning is called the teaching of the ‘Yellow Hats.’  The Tibetan1154 lama of 
sublime superior knowledge, ‘Phags pa (also called, “Phas ba”), from the time of the 
Yuan court until the Ming court was celebrated by all as the both the “Preceptor of the 
King” and “Preceptor of the Court.” 
 
(Shizu of the Yuan first presented the title of “Preceptor of the Court” to the Royal 
Preceptor, ‘Phags pa lama. Later, [he] titled [‘Phags pa], “Preceptor of the King, Great 
Precious Sutra Prince,” and another famous person named Bstan pa was also titled 
“Preceptor of the King.” After that, the number of other so-called “Court Preceptors” was 
innumerable. In just the first year of King Hongwu of the Ming court’s reign, the titles of 
“Court Preceptor” and “Great Court Preceptor” were given to at least four or five people. 
In the reign of the Yongle emperor, there were two people who received the titles of 
“Sutra Prince” and “Son of the Buddha of India.” There were an additional eighteen 
people who were titled “Court Preceptor who upholds the teaching.” Up through the 
reigns of Jingtai and Chenghua there again were an uncountable number [of entitled 
lamas].)  
 
In my dynasty, only the Changkya Kūtuktu, having been entitled “Court Preceptor” 
                                                
1153 Tib. rgya nag skad la. 
 
1154 Tib. bod gyi bla ma 
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during the time of King Kangxi,1155 has from then until now continuously [held this title].   
 
(Although my state holds in esteems highly the Yellow Hat teachings, as for establishing 
title of the so-called ‘Preceptor of the King,’ this as not [been done]. In the forty-fifth 
year of Kangxi reign, according to edict, Changkya Kūtuktu was given the [title] ‘holder 
of the teaching State Preceptor,’ and after his death, in the twelfth year of Yongzheng it 
was [permitted] to give the title to all his subsequent emanations/incarnations.) 
 
As for the titles of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni, we have followed the old 
practices of bestowing titles [begun] by the Yuan and Ming courts, and other than carving 
new seals, have not added additional honors.  
 
(As for the origin of the flourishing of the Yellow Hat teachings, it arose from the lama 
Tshong kha pa of the Ming dynasty. Tsongkhaba was born in the fire-bird, fifteenth year 
of the Yongle [reign] and attained nirvana in the 14th year of Chenghua. He had two 
main disciples: One is called the Dalai Lama and the other one is called the Panchen. The 
Dalai Lama is of higher status, named Monlam Gyatso, and his successive rebirths are the 
Holders of the Teaching of the Yellow Hats. The name of the first incarnation was 
Gendun Drupba. The second was Gendun Gyatso [1476-1542]. The third was Sonam 
Gyatso [1543-1588].  At the time of the Ming his name [was written as, sic] “gson po so 
nan gyin tshu.” The fourth was Yonden Gyatso. The fifth was Ngawang Lozang Gyatso.  
In the seventh year of the reign of Wesihun Erdemungge [1643] of my dynasty, the Dalai 
Lama and Panchen Erdeni both presented valuable goods from their country. In the 
                                                
1155 Tib. bde skyid rgyal po 
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eighth year, letters1156 were sent to both of them, written according to the old practices of 
the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Having taken control of the central land,1157 seals of office 
were sent to them both, establishing them as the governing lamas of the entire Yellow 
Teaching.) 
 
Those two have taken charge of the Yellow Hat teaching in the Outer and Inner, and 
obtained the veneration of (11) the Mongols of many regions. As for [our] high esteem 
for the Yellow Hat teaching, it is in accordance with the desires of the Mongols and 
therefore not only important but also necessary. It is not like during the time of the Yuan 
dynasty/court when the lamas were venerated by flattery and gifts. 
 
(During the Yuan dynasty, due to the high esteem for lamas, the royal laws1158 were 
broken and great injury arose. At that time, the pronouncements of the preceptor to the 
king were obeyed as if they were edicts of the king. At the place of audiences, the 
ministers stood while the preceptor of the king knelt on one knee on the edges of the hall. 
Among the preceptor’s monks there were those offered positions as minister of the 
treasury, minister of the household, and court duke; and having obtained gifts of seals 
made from gold and jade, there was disorder on account of their pride, and following 
their desires they engaged in lewd acts. Thus in every direction problems arose. In their 
conceit they raised taxes on the resources of their subjects, they beat ministers, and even, 
having robbed a queen/consort of a great lord, dragged her down from her carriage and 
                                                
1156 I.e. containing titles. 
 
1157 Tib. “yul dbus su dbang bsgyur nas…” Ch. “中國.” 
 
1158 Tib. rgyal khrims, Ch. 政事. 
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beat her. All this was done without punishment. Moreover, there were laws that if a 
servant struck a lama, his arm would be cut off and if a [lama] was insulted, the tongue 
would be cut out.  There has been no such veneration of lamas by me. The Mongols hold 
high the Buddha and have faith in the lamas, [therefore] as one leads a horse, they must 
be taken care of.) 
 
As for the title of ‘kūtuktu’ by which they are praised: Since the lamas have no children, 
they are given disciples like one provides a son, searching for a child with insight and 
auspiciousness. The tülku1159 (in the language of China, this is called ‘a person who is 
born generation after generation’) having filled that role, he is given the title of ‘hutuktu’ 
and gradually takes up the teaching. Over many years this practices continues and it is 
difficult to cut off. Now it has become a frequent occurrence that after successive 
generations the tülku have all begun to emanate among their near relatives, which is like 
a son taking the office of his father, and causes my thoughts to become alarmed. Not to 
mention, if the Buddha himself was never was reborn, where do all these common tülku 
come from? With regards to this, they cannot be done away with, for if today there were 
no more reincarnations of hutuktu, the thousands of lamas would no longer have that 
which they rely on. 
 
(An examination of the successive generations of the Dalai Lama: As for the first birth, 
he reincarnated at the place Sha do da in Tsang. As for the second, [he was reborn] at Ta 
na do rdo rje in Tsang. As for the third, [he was born] at Rdo rengs in Lhasa. The fourth 
was born in the household of the Mongol Altan Khan; the fifth was born at Chung skya in 
                                                
1159 Tib. sprul sku. 
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Lhasa; the sixth was born at a place in Litang, and the current seventh was reborn at Li 
kang in Thob rgyal in Tsang.  Since the locations are all different is there still any need to 
discuss further that they hailed from different families? As for the Panchen Erdeni, after 
the previous one passed away into nirvana, the reincarnations of the present Dalai Lama 
and Panchen Erdeni, as well as the Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu of the four Khalkha all have 
been reborn as relatives, sharing the relationships of uncle and nephew. If great Holders 
of the Teaching such as these all share familial relations then it is no different from the 
inheritance of titles within a lineage. Nowadays, the tülku venerated by jasaks of the 
outer and inner [Mongols] have also begun to emanate as sons of their princes and dukes!  
The Siletu1160 Kūtuktu is the uncle of the Khalkha qinwang Gu run E ha pu lha dbang 
rdo rje. The Stag pa Kūtuktu is the son of the Alashan qinwang Lozang Dorjé. The No 
yon chos rje Kūtuktu is the son of the Dur pan He’u hed junwang Bkra shis yar ‘phel. 
The reincarnation of the Khenpo Nominhan Jampal Dorjé is the son of the Thu she thu 
han, Tsédan Dorjé. It is impossible to have such a [large] number of this type! After the 
death of the previous Jebtsundamba Kūtuktu, the queen of the Tüsiyetü Khan became 
pregnant. It was proclaimed to all that this would be the reincarnation of the 
Jebstundamba.However when the time arrived a daughter was born. This affair was 
laughable. Thus due to this matter the Mongols came to be disdained. 
 
Moreover there is the arrogant behavior of the Šamarba lama1161 who coveted the 
treasures of Trashilhünpo. Because he was a brother of the Panchen Erdeni and Drungpa 
                                                
1160 Tib. Shi re thu; Ma. Siletu. 
 
1161 Tib. Zhwa mar ba, Ma. Šamarba. 
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Kūtutku,1162 he claimed a share [of the former’s wealth] and passed secrets on to the 
Gurkhas. As a result bandits from a distant land assailed and plundered the land of Tsang. 
Recently, an army was dispatched which, having frightened the Gurkhas, forced them to 
beg forgiveness for their transgressions. However, if the source of this evil is not rooted 
out, in the future such reciprocal relations based on self-interest 1163  will make it 
impossible to restore the teachings of the Yellow Hats. Once doubts have arisen among 
the Tibetans and Mongols it is possible that there will be trouble.1164 Therefore [I] have 
commanded, when there is a search for an important lama of Dbus gtsang, in accordance 
with their tradition (lugs), the whereabouts of the [incarnation] shall be identified by the 
special means of reciting scriptures and receiving [oracles] when the La mo chos skyong 
and the other four [protectors] descend to the medium. Rolls of paper1165 with the name 
of each of the children shall be placed in a golden urn that will have been sent from the 
palace. Then, having chanted, before the Jowo Sakyamuni, the Dalai Lama and Panchen 
Erdeni, together with the appointed ambans, will jointly pick out roll of paper. That will 
                                                
1162 The original text reads, “drug pa ho thog thu,” which is a misspelling. Later in this text this 
lama’s name is spelled correctly as “drung pa.” 
 
1163 Tib. gang ‘dod. Literally, “however one pleases” or “however one wishes.” Here the phrase 
refers to acting in one’s own interest or according to one’s own concerns. The Chinese reads, “私
相授受,” connoting the illicit or private transfers that work to the advantage of all involved, but 
not necessarily society more generally. Here Qianlong is addressing the shared self-interests that 
bind aristocrats and monks in pursuit of mutual advantage. 
 
1164 “Doubts” here is my interpretation of the expression, “two minds” (Tib. bod sog yid gnyis). I 
take this phrase not to mean a conflict between Mongols and Tibetans, but rather the state of 
having mixed feelings or suspicions about those recognized as trulku. Qianlong worries that if 
doubts continue to surface about the legitimacy of trulkus, these doubts will inevitably lead to 
succession conflicts between the supporters of different candidates. 
 
1165 Tib: shog gril.  Ch: 書籤. The connotations of these two terms are different, leading to 
different implications. The Tibetan term implies something rolled up, which perhaps lends itself 
more readily to the Tibetan divination tradition of encasing answers in balls of dough. The 
Chinese term refers to a long thin slip, possibly made of paper but also of other materials, 
frequently used as a bookmark, but in this case to be used as a lot.   
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be the reincarnation. I have ordered that the identification occur in this manner. Although 
this may not entirely eliminate the evils of doing things according to their individual 
desires, [I] believe that this is better than letting them make a decision regarding the 
identification however they please. Additionally, in accordance with the proclamation 
issued by the Mongol Yamun,1166 and following the newly established tradition of Ü-
Tsang, the important tülku of the Mongols must be identified having had their names 
placed in the Golden Urn before the image of the Buddha at Yonghegong jointly by the 
seal-holding minister of the capital and the Seal-holding Da Lama. If it is done in that 
fashion, the true incarnation will have been identified and there will be no further dispute 
over the selection like there would be if it was made according to their own wishes.) 
 
Last year’s raid on the region of Tsang by the Gurkhas who trusted in the words 
whispered by the Šamarba offers what lessons? Having been terrorized by [our] military, 
[the Gurkhas] sought forgiveness and Gtsang was returned to peace. Furthermore, when a 
new tülku emerges and is reborn again within the same family, this is a decision 
[motivated by] their own desires.1167 The Buddha had no concern for himself.1168 The 
royal law is indispensable. Now that I have cast the Golden Urn and had it dispatched to 
Ü-Tsang, paper scrolls with the written names of those who are suspected of being tülku 
shall be placed in the urn. Although the evils will not be completely eliminated by means 
                                                
1166 Tib. sog po’i ya mun; Ch. 理藩院. 
 
1167 Tib. rang ‘dod: personal, individual desires. 
 
1168 Tib. rang don: one’s own purpose/welfare/interest, concern for oneself, selfish reasons.  
Whereas in the earlier passage, Qianlong seems to be directing his ire at aristocrats and monks 
who which to manipulate the selection process out of personal ambition, here Qianlong seems to 
impugn the motives of reincarnate lamas themselves.  By extension Qianlong is appropriating 
authority to fully judge and control the process of incarnation. 
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of this, [I] have ascertained that this will be superior to identifications that are the 
decision of individual people. When making a judgement about a matter, it is necessary 
to examine relevant tradition/custom concerning the matter. If I had not previously 
studied the Tibetan religion,1169 I would be unable to discourse in this matter. When I first 
started studying, there were some Chinese who said that I placed excessive importance in 
the teachings of the Yellow Hats.  If, according to the Chinese books, the [teachings of 
the Yellow Hats] were simply famous for nothing, how is it that today, the new and old 
Mongols have been subjugated and for several tens [of years] have lived in peace and 
contentment? 
 
Nowadays, as for the recent execution, conducted according to law, of the lamas 
responsible for the troubles in the region of Tsang, was any similar action ever taken 
during the Yuan dynasty? (Last year when the Gurkhas raided Tsang, after the Drungpa 
Kūtuktu fled, the great monks and sangha also, having heard a mistaken divination that 
they would be forced to break their vows, all fled and the thieves [were therefore able to] 
pillage. Having been especially detained and brought to Ü, the Jédrung was defrocked 
and punished according to the law. The Drungpa Kūtuktu was dispossessed of his so-
called palace. The Yuan dynasty venerated its lamas and not only did not punish them but 
allowed them to damage the royal law. Although I supported the teaching of the Yellow 
Hats, [I] have done so according to a passage that appears in the System of the King: “One 
should improve their teachings not replace their teachings. One should improve their laws, 
                                                
1169 Tib. Bod chos: This is a striking elocution because here we see Qianlong identifying Tibet or 
Tibetaness in terms of a particular set of teachings and also implicitly drawing a contrast with the 
teachings of China. This usage suggests that the notion of a category of “Tibetan Buddhism” or at 
least “Tibetan Teachings” existed in the late 1700s. 
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not replace their traditions.”1170 Those who incite turmoil will be punished according to 
the law in the same manner as subjects of the interior. In the five hundred years since 
Phagpa Lama became the holder of the teachings, and over the course of the Yuan and 
Ming dynasties, and until now, have there been great lamas who have had been defrocked 
and punished according to the law? Vagabonds cannot say to me that I have excessively 
honored the teaching of the Yellow Hats!) 
 
When undertaking a great enterprise, one must not only [act] at the appropriate time and 
context but also in accord with what is just and brilliant. If opportunity presents itself, yet 
one is unable to make a just and brilliant decision, then it will not be accomplished. If one 
makes a just and brilliant decision, but at an inopportune moment, then it has been made 
in vain and nothing will come of it. 
 
As for the recent establishment of a new procedure for the identification of tülku in the 
aftermath of the subjugation of the Gurkhas, it was easily accomplished because the 
moment was fortuitous. Eradicating the selfish desire of tülku to emanate among their 
kinsmen, is in harmony with the wishes of both the outer and inner Mongols.  Now I am 
in my eightieth year, and approach the end of my rule, yet I have accomplished this great 
undertaking and established peace in the region of Tsang. The restoration of the outer 
peoples and the happiness and welfare of the both the dynasty and each household—an 
enduring achievement—is the fulfillment of my desires and I am glad of heart. 
 
                                                
1170 System of the King: a chapter of the Book of Rites (《禮記》：《王制》“修其教，不易其
俗，齊其政，不易其宜。). 
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Written by the king during the waxing days of the first month of winter, water-mouse 
year, Qianlong fifty-seven.1171  
                                                
1171 Approximately the second half of the month of December, 1792. 
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